area handbook series 

Bulgaria 

a country study 



Bulgaria 

a country study 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Glenn E. Curtis 
Research Completed 
June 1 992 



On the cover: Alexander Nevsky Cathedral, Sofia 



Second Edition, First Printing, 1993. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Bulgaria : a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of 
Congress ; edited by Glenn E. Curtis — 2d ed. 

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) 
(DA pam ; 550-168) 

"Research completed June 1992." 

"Supersedes the 1974 edition of Area Handbook for Bulgaria, 
edited by Eugene K. Keefe" — T.p. verso. 

Includes bibliographical references (pp. 287-295) and index. 
ISBN 0-8444-0751-8 

1. Bulgaria. I. Curtis, Glenn E. (Glenn Eldon), 1946- . 

II. Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. 

IV. Series: DA pam ; 550-168. 
DR55.B724 1993 93-10955 
949.77— dc20 CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-168 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared by 
the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under 
the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program sponsored by the 
Department of the Army. The last page of this book lists the other 
published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



in 



Acknowledgments 



The authors are indebted to numerous individuals and organi- 
zations who gave their time, research materials, and expertise on 
Bulgarian affairs to provide data, perspective, and material sup- 
port for this volume. 

The work of Violeta D. Baluyut and William Giloane, coauthors 
of the previous edition of the Bulgaria area handbook, provided 
an important factual base from which to develop new chapters. 
Thanks also go to the Bulgarian National Tourist Office in New 
York, the United States Embassy in Sofia, the Embassy of the 
Republic of Bulgaria in Washington, and Scott Thompson of the 
United States Department of State for assistance in locating illus- 
tration material. The expert photography of Charles Sudetic and 
Sam and Sarah Stulberg provided vivid new images of Bulgaria 
for users of the handbook. 

Thanks also go to Ralph K. Benesch, who oversees the Coun- 
try Studies/Area Handbook Program for the Department of the 
Army. In addition, the authors appreciate the advice and guidance 
of Sandra W. Meditz, Federal Research Division coordinator of 
the handbook series. Special thanks go to Marilyn L. Majeska, who 
supervised editing and managed production, assisted by Andrea T. 
Merrill; to Wayne Home, who designed the book cover and the 
illustrations on the title page of each chapter; to David P. Cabitto, 
who provided graphics support and, together with Harriett R. Blood 
and the firm of Greenhorne and O'Mara, prepared maps; and to 
Tim Merrill, who compiled geographic data and adapted maps. 
The following individuals are gratefully acknowledged as well: 
Sharon Costello, who edited the chapters; Barbara Edgerton and 
Izella Watson, who did the word processing; Cissie Coy, who per- 
formed the final prepublication editorial review; Joan C. Cook, 
who compiled the index; and Malinda B. Neale of the Printing 
and Processing Section, Library of Congress, who prepared the 
camera-ready copy under the supervision of Peggy Pixley. 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Table A. Chronology of Important Events xv 

Country Profile xxi 

Introduction xxix 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

Glenn E. Curtis 

EARLY SETTLEMENT AND EMPIRE 4 

Pre-Bulgarian Civilizations 4 

The Slavs and the Bulgars 5 

The First Golden Age 6 

The Second Golden Age 7 

OTTOMAN RULE 7 

Introduction of the Ottoman System 9 

Bulgarian Society under the Turks 9 

Early Decay and Upheaval in the Empire 10 

NATIONAL REVIVAL, EARLY STAGES 11 

The Written Word 11 

Commerce and Western Influences 13 

European and Russian Policies, 1800 14 

THE BULGARIAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT 14 

Revolution in the Balkans 14 

Cultural Expressions of Nationalism 15 

Religious Independence 16 

Early Insurrections 17 

Balkan Politics of the Mid-Nineteenth Century 18 

The First Independence Organizations 18 

The Final Move to Independence 19 

San Stefano, Berlin, and Independence 20 

THE DECADES OF NATIONAL CONSOLIDATION 22 

Forming the New State 22 

The Stambolov Years 24 

The Rule of Ferdinand 26 

The Macedonian Issue 27 



vii 



Full Independence 28 

THE BALKAN WARS AND WORLD WAR I 29 

The First Balkan War 29 

The Second Balkan War 30 

World War I 30 

THE INTERWAR PERIOD 33 

Stamboliiski and Agrarian Reform 33 

The Fall of Stamboliiski 35 

The Tsankov and Liapchev Governments 36 

The Crises of the 1930s 37 

The Interwar Economy 39 

Foreign Policy in the Late 1930s 40 

WORLD WAR II 41 

The Passive Alliance 41 

Wartime Crisis 42 

The Soviet Occupation 43 

COMMUNIST CONSOLIDATION 44 

Initial Maneuvering 44 

The Dimitrov Constitution 45 

Chervenkov and Stalinism in Bulgaria 46 

Foreign and Economic Policies 47 

After Stalin 47 

THE ZHIVKOV ERA 50 

Zhivkov Takes Control 50 

Zhivkov's Political Methodology 50 

The Constitution of 1971 51 

Foreign Affairs in the 1960s and 1970s 51 

Domestic Policy in the 1960s and 1970s 53 

The Political Atmosphere in the 1970s 54 

Bulgaria in the 1980s 55 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 59 

Pamela Mitova 

NATURAL FEATURES 62 

Boundaries 62 

Topography 62 

Drainage 67 

Climate 67 

Environment 68 

POPULATION 70 

Administrative Subdivisions 71 

Settlement Patterns 71 

Cities 72 

Internal Migration 75 



viii 



Foreign Citizens in Bulgaria 76 

Population Trends 77 

ETHNOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 78 

Government Minority Policy 78 

Bulgarians 80 

Turks 81 

Pomaks 84 

Macedonians 84 

Gypsies 86 

Other Minorities 87 

RELIGION 87 

Eastern Orthodoxy 88 

Islam • 89 

Roman Catholicism 90 

Protestantism 92 

Judaism 93 

SOCIAL SYSTEM 94 

Traditional Society 94 

Family Life and Modern Society 98 

Social Groups and Their Work 100 

SOCIAL SERVICES 102 

Health 104 

Housing 108 

Education 109 

Chapter 3. The Economy 115 

William Marsteller 

RESOURCE BASE 118 

Coal and Minerals 118 

Agricultural Resources 121 

Environmental Problems 121 

LABOR FORCE 121 

Factors of Availability 122 

Labor and Economic Reform 123 

ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND CONTROL 

MECHANISMS 123 

The Centrally Planned Economy 124 

The Planning System 125 

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE 127 

Postwar Economic Policy 127 

The First Five- Year Plans 128 

The Era of Experimentation and Reform 130 

ECONOMIC SECTORS 138 

Fuels 138 



ix 



Energy Generation 138 

Industry 141 

Agriculture 144 

Transportation 151 

Communications 152 

BANKING AND FINANCE 155 

Currency and Exchange 155 

Banking System 156 

Investment Policy 157 

Prices 158 

FOREIGN TRADE 158 

Postwar Trade Policy 158 

Bulgaria in Comecon 160 

Trade with the West and the Third World 162 

New Trade Conditions, 1990 164 

STANDARD OF LIVING 164 

MARKET REFORM 166 

Reform Mechanisms 166 

The Economic Policy Commission 167 

Domestic and International Economic Policies 

in the 1990s 168 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 171 

Glenn E. Curtis 

THE PREWAR POLITICAL CONTEXT 175 

THE EARLY COMMUNIST ERA 176 

The State under Dimitrov 177 

The Chervenkov Era 178 

THE ZHIVKOV ERA 179 

The Rise of Zhivkov 179 

Zhivkov Takes Control 180 

The Constitution of 1971 180 

The Last Zhivkov Decade 182 

Issues of Dissent 184 

The Removal of Zhivkov 184 

GOVERNANCE AFTER ZHIVKOV 185 

The Mladenov Government 185 

The 1990 Stalemate 186 

GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE 188 

The Role of Unofficial Organizations 188 

The National Assembly 188 

The State Council and the Presidency 190 

The Council of Ministers 191 

The Judiciary 192 



x 



Local Government 193 

Electoral Procedures 194 

NONGOVERNMENTAL POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS ... 197 

The Bulgarian Communist (Socialist) Party 197 

The Union of Democratic Forces 199 

Trade Unions 202 

Youth Organizations 205 

The Movement for Rights and Freedoms 206 

Other Political Organizations 207 

The Monarchist Movement 208 

THE PUBLIC AND POLITICAL DECISION MAKING ... 209 

The Intelligentsia 209 

Zhivkov and the Intelligentsia 210 

The Ferment of 1988-90 210 

The Media and Public Issues 212 

The Turkish Problem 214 

FOREIGN POLICY 215 

The Foreign Policy Establishment 216 

Relations with Balkan Neighbors 217 

The Soviet Union 220 

Western Europe and the United States 221 

Chapter 5. National Security 225 

Karl Wheeler So per 

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES 228 

Early Development 228 

From the Struggle for National Independence 

to World War I 229 

The Interwar Years and World War II 231 

Postwar Development 232 

NATIONAL DEFENSE POSTURE 233 

Threat Perception 234 

Doctrine and Strategy 235 

DEFENSE ORGANIZATION 237 

The Military in the Political System 238 

Government Organization for Defense 239 

High Command 241 

Armed Services 242 

Logistics and Arms Procurement 250 

Military Budget 251 

MILITARY PERSONNEL 252 

Recruitment and Service Obligations 252 

Military Training 253 

Officer Education 255 



xi 



Reserves and Mobilization 257 

Ranks, Uniforms, and Insignia 257 

FOREIGN MILITARY RELATIONS 258 

The Warsaw Pact 258 

Military Cooperation and Exchanges 259 

Arms Sales 259 

LAW AND ORDER . 262 

Crime 263 

The Judicial System 265 

The Ministry of Internal Affairs 266 

The Penal System 268 

Security and Intelligence Services 270 

Terrorist and Espionage Activities 271 

Appendix. Tables 275 

Bibliography 287 

Glossary 297 

Index 301 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of Bulgaria, 1991 xxviii 

2 The First Bulgarian Empire under Simeon, A.D. 893-927 . 8 

3 The Second Bulgarian Empire under Ivan Asen II, 

1218-41 10 

4 Hajdutin Activity in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1800 12 

5 Territorial Changes in Bulgaria, 1878-85 24 

6 Division of Macedonia at the Treaty of Bucharest, 1913 ... 32 

7 Territorial Changes According to the Treaty of Neuilly- 

sur-Seine, 1919 34 

8 Topography and Drainage 66 

9 Population Centers, 1990 74 

10 Energy and Mineral Resources 120 

11 Principal Crops, 1990 146 

12 Transportation System, 1988 154 

13 Ranks and Insignia of Ground Forces, 1990 260 

14 Ranks and Insignia of Naval Forces, 1990 261 

15 Ranks and Insignia of Air Forces and Air Defense 

Forces, 1990 264 



xii 



Preface 



Beginning in 1989, Bulgaria passed through a time of political, 
social, and economic transition that changed many of its basic in- 
stitutions and subjected society to stresses unknown in the forty- 
five years of totalitarian communist rule. Events that occurred after 
the ouster of Todor Zhivkov in 1989 demanded a new and updated 
version of Bulgaria: A Country Study. Although Bulgaria was one of 
the most closed communist societies until 1989, subsequent relax- 
ation of tensions and restrictions has made available an increasing 
amount of reliable information about both the communist and the 
post-Zhivkov eras. Scholarly articles and periodical reports have 
been especially helpful in compiling this new treatment of the coun- 
try. The most useful of those sources, together with a smaller num- 
ber of key monographs, are cited at the end of each chapter. 

The authors of this edition have described the changes in Bul- 
garia occurring in the last twenty years, with special emphasis on 
the last three. They have used the historical, political, and social 
fabric of the country as the background for these descriptions to en- 
sure understanding of the context of the important recent events 
that have shaped the Bulgaria we see today. The authors' goal was 
to provide a compact, accessible, and objective treatment of five main 
topics: historical setting, society and its environment, the economy, 
government and politics, and the military and national security. 

In all cases, Bulgarian personal names have been transliterated 
from Cyrillic according to a standard table; place-names are 
rendered in the form approved by the United States Board on Geo- 
graphic Names; in the case of Sofia, the conventional international 
variant is used instead of the transliterated form (Sofiya). Unlike 
the previous edition of the Bulgaria study, this volume adds the 
diacritic ( w ) to the letter "u" to distinguish the distinctive Bulgar- 
ian vowel from the conventional "u" also used in Bulgarian. On 
maps, English-language generic designations such as river, plain, 
and mountain are used. Organizations commonly known by their 
acronyms (such as BCP, the Bulgarian Communist Party) are in- 
troduced first by their full English names. 

Measurements are given in the metric system; a conversion table 
is provided in the Appendix. A historical chronology is provided 
at the beginning of the book, and a glossary and bibliography ap- 
pear at the end. To amplify points in the text of chapters 2 and 
3, tables in the Appendix provide statistics on performance and 
trends in the economy and various aspects of Bulgarian society. 



Xlll 



The body of the text reflects information available as of June 
1992. Certain other portions of the text, however, have been up- 
dated. The Introduction discusses significant events that have oc- 
curred since the completion of research, and the Country Profile 
includes updated information as available. 



xiv 



Table A. Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



SEVENTH CENTURY 
ca. 630 



First federation of Bulgar tribes formed. 



681 



Byzantine Empire recognizes first Bulgarian 
state. 



NINTH CENTURY 
811 



First Bulgarian Empire defeats Byzantine Em- 
pire, begins expanding. 



870 



893-927 



Tsar Boris I accepts Christianity (Eastern Rite 
Orthodox) for Bulgaria. 

Reign of Tsar Simeon, first golden age; maxi- 
mum size of First Bulgarian Empire. 



TENTH CENTURY 
924 



ELEVENTH CENTURY 
1014 



Simeon defeated by Byzantines; first empire be- 
gins decline. 



Byzantines inflict major military loss on Tsar 
Samuil. 



1018 



Bulgaria becomes part of Byzantine Empire. 



TWELFTH CENTURY 
1185 



Asen and Peter lead revolt against Byzantine 
Empire, reestablishing Bulgarian state with 
capital at Turnovo. 



THIRTEENTH CENTURY 
1202 



1204 



Tsar Kaloian makes peace with Byzantine Em- 
pire, achieves full independence, and begins 
Second Bulgarian Empire. 

Treaty with Rome recognizes pope and consoli- 
dates western border of Bulgarian Empire. 



1218-1241 



Reign of Ivan Asen II, second golden age of Bul- 
garia and period of territorial expansion. 



1241 



1277 



Tatar raids and feudal factionalism begin, caus- 
ing social and political disorder. 

Peasant revolt; "swineherd tsar" Ivailo takes 
power. 



ca. 1300 



Tatar raids end. 



FOURTEENTH CENTURY 
1323-1370 



Under Mikhail Shishman and Ivan Aleksandur, 
territorial and commercial expansion resumes. 



XV 



Table A. — Continued 



Period 



Description 



1385 
1389 



FIFTEENTH CENTURY 
1453 



SIXTEENTH CENTURY 
ca. 1600 



Sofia captured by Ottoman Empire. 

Turks defeat Serbs at Kosovo Polje, exposing 
remaining Bulgarian territory to Ottoman oc- 
cupation. 



Constantinople falls to Ottoman Empire, end- 
ing Byzantine Empire. 



Ottoman Empire reaches peak of its power and 
territorial control. 



SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 
1688 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
1741 



762 



NINETEENTH CENTURY 
1804 



1806 



1815 



1820 



1835 

1840 
1844 
1856 
1860 



Suppression of Bulgarian revolt against Otto- 
mans at Chiprovets ends Catholic influence 
in Bulgaria. 



Hristofor Zhefarovich completes his Stematogra- 
fia, seminal work on Bulgarian cultural 
history. 

Paisi of Hilendar writes a history of the Bulgar- 
ian people, using vernacular Bulgarian. 



Serbia is the first Slavic land to take arms against 
Ottoman Empire. 

Sofronii Vrachanski publishes first book printed 
in Bulgaria. 

Bulgarian volunteers join Serbian independence 
fighters. 

End of kurdzhaliistvo, anarchic period precipitated 
by breakdown of Ottoman authority in Bul- 
garian territory. 

Neofit Rilski opens first school teaching in Bul- 
garian, using Petur Beron's secular education 

system. 

First girls' school teaching in Bulgarian opens. 

First periodical printed in Bulgaria. 

First chitalishte (public reading room) opens. 

Bishop Ilarion Makariopolski declares Bulgar- 
ian diocese of Constantinople independent of 
Greek Orthodox patriarchate. 



XVI 



Table A. — Continued 



Period Description 

1862 Georgi Rakovski forms first armed group for 

Bulgarian independence. 

1870 Bulgarian Orthodox Church declared a separate 

exarchate by Ottoman Empire. 

1875 September Uprising, first general Bulgarian 

revolt against Ottoman rule, crushed. 

1876 April Uprising spurs massacres of Bulgarians by 

Ottomans and European conference on au- 
tonomy for Christian subjects of Ottoman 
Empire. 

1878 Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 ends in Treaty 

of San Stefano, creating an autonomous Bul- 
garia stretching from Aegean Sea to Danube. 

1878 In Treaty of Berlin, Western Europe forces re- 

vision of Treaty of San Stefano, returning area 
south of Balkan Mountains to Ottoman Em- 
pire; a smaller Bulgaria retains autonomy 
within the empire. 

1879 Turnovo constitution written as foundation of 

Bulgarian state; Alexander of Battenburg 
elected prince of Bulgarian constitutional 
monarchy. 

1886 Alexander deposed by army officers. 

1887 Stefan Stambolov begins seven years as prime 

minister, accelerating economic development; 
Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha accepts 
Bulgarian throne. 

1891 Social Democratic Party, later Bulgarian Com- 

munist Party, founded. 

1 899 Bulgarian Agrarian Union founded to represent 

peasant interests. 

TWENTIETH CENTURY 

1903 Suppression of Ilinden-Preobrazhensko Upris- 

ing sends large numbers of Macedonian refu- 
gees into Bulgaria and inflames Macedonian 
issue. 

1908 Ferdinand declares Bulgaria fully independent 

of Ottoman Empire and himself tsar. 

1912 First Balkan War pushes Ottoman Empire com- 

pletely out of Europe; Bulgaria regains Thrace. 



XVII 



Table A. — Continued 



Period Description 

1913 In Second Balkan War, Bulgaria loses territory 

to Serbia and Greece; Bulgarian nationalism 
on the rise. 

1915-18 Bulgaria fights in World War I on side of Cen- 

tral Powers; decisive defeat at Dobro Pole 
(1918) forces Ferdinand to abdicate in favor 
of his son Boris III. 

1919 Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine awards Thrace to 

Greece, Macedonian territory to Yugoslavia, 
Southern Dobruja to Romania, sets Bulgar- 
ian reparations, and limits Bulgarian army. 

1919 Under Prime Minister Aleksandur Stamboliiski, 

agrarians become dominant political party; so- 
cialist parties also profit from postwar social 
unrest. 

1923 After four years of drastic economic reform and 

suppression of opposition, Stamboliiski assas- 
sinated by Macedonian extremists. 

1923-1931 Coalition Tsankov and Liapchev governments 

suppress extremists; social tensions rise with 
world economic crisis of 1929. 

1934 In Balkan Entente, Greece, Romania, Turkey, 

and Yugoslavia reaffirm existing Balkan bor- 
ders; Bulgaria refuses participation, is iso- 
lated. 

1934 Right-wing coup by Zveno coalition begins dic- 

tatorship, abolishes political parties; Macedo- 
nian terrorism ends. 

1935 Boris III deposes Zveno and declares royal dic- 

tatorship that remains in effect until 1943. 

1941 Bulgaria signs Tripartite Pact, allying it with 

Nazi Germany in World War II; Bulgaria 
refrains from action against Soviet Union for 
duration of war. 

1943 Boris III dies, leaving three-man regency to rule 

for his underage son Simeon II. 

1943-44 Allied air raids damage Sofia heavily; activity 

of antiwar factions in Bulgaria increases. 

1944 As Bulgarian government seeks peace with Al- 

lies, Red Army invades; temporary Bulgar- 
ian government overthrown by communist- 
led coalition. 



XV111 



Table A. — Continued 



Period Description 

1946 Georgi Dimitrov of the Bulgarian Communist 

Party (BCP) becomes prime minister of the 
new Republic of Bulgaria. 

1947 Dimitrov constitution goes into effect; remain- 

ing opposition parties to BCP silenced; state 
confiscation of private industry completed. 

1948-49 Muslim, Orthodox, Protestant, and Roman 

Catholic religious organizations restrained or 
banned. 

1949 Joseph V. Stalin chooses Vulko Chervenkov to 

succeed Dimitrov; period of Stalinist cult of 
personality, purges of Bulgarian BCP, and 
strict cultural and political orthodoxy begins. 

1950 Large-scale collectivization of agriculture begins, 

continuing through 1958. 

1 953 Death of Stalin begins loosening of Chervenkov's 

control, easing of party discipline. 

1956 Todor Zhivkov becomes first secretary of BCP. 

1957-58 After Soviet invasion of Hungary, Bulgaria 

cracks down on nonconformism to party line 
in culture and politics. 

1962 Nikita S. Khrushchev annoints Todor Zhivkov 

as successor to Chervenkov; Zhivkov becomes 
prime minister and is unchallenged leader for 
the next twenty-seven years. 

1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia tightens 

government control in Bulgaria. 

1971 New constitution specifies role of BCP in Bul- 

garian society and politics. 

1978 Dissident Georgi Markov assassinated in Lon- 

don. 

1981 Economic restructuring in New Economic 

Model brings temporary economic upswing, 
no long-term improvement. 

1 98 1 Under direction of Liudmila Zhivkova, Bulgaria 

celebrates its 1,300th anniversary. 

1984 First program of assimilation of ethnic Turkish 

minority begins. 

1987-88 Dissident groups begin to form around environ- 

mental and human rights issues. 



XIX 



Table A. — Continued 



Period 



Description 



1989 Summer 



1989 Fall 



1990 



1990 June 



1990 July 

1990 August 
1990 September 

1990 November-December 



1991 January 

1991 Spring 
1991 July 



Second Turkish assimilation program brings 
massive Turkish emigration, increased dissi- 
dent activity, and international criticism. 

Massive antigovernment demonstrations trigger 
party dismissal of Zhivkov. 

Three BCP-dominated governments are formed 
and dissolved; round table discussions be- 
tween BCP and opposition parties begin to 
formulate reform legislation. 

First multiparty national election since World 
War II gives majority in National Assembly 
to Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP, formerly 
BCP) with large opposition block to Union 
of Democratic Forces (UDF), which has re- 
fused participation in government. 

Tent-city demonstrations begin in Sofia, con- 
tinue through summer. 

UDF leader Zheliu Zhelev chosen president. 

Zhelev meets with French and American lead- 
ers, receives pledges of economic support. 

General strike forces resignation of government 
of Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov; interim 
coalition government formed under Dimitur 
Popov. 

Initial phase of economic reform, including price 
decontrol on some commodities, goes into 
effect. 

Arable Land Law begins redistribution of land 
to private farmers. 

New constitution approved by National Assem- 
bly; national elections set for October. 



XX 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Republic of Bulgaria. 
Short Form: Bulgaria. 
Term for Citizens: Bulgarian(s). 
Capital: Sofia. 

Geography 

Size: Approximately 110,550 square kilometers. 

NOTE — The Country Profile contains updated information as available. 

xxi 



Topography: Mostly hills interspersed with plateaus, with major 
flatlands in north (Danubian Plateau, extending across entire coun- 
try) and center (Thracian Plain). Main mountain ranges Balkan 
(extending across center of country from west to east, forming cen- 
tral watershed of country) and Rhodope (west to east across southern 
section of country); Rhodope includes two major groups, Pirin (far 
southwest) and Rila (west central). 

Climate: Divided by mountains into continental (predominant in 
winter, especially in Danubian Plain) and Mediterranean (predom- 
inant in summer, especially south of Balkan Mountains). Rainfall 
also variable, with largest amounts at higher elevations. 

Society 

Population: 1990 estimate 8,989,172; 1990 growth rate negative 
0.35 percent; 1989 population density eighty-one per square kilo- 
meter. 

Languages: Official state language Bulgarian; main national 
minority language Turkish. 

Ethnic Groups: In 1991, Bulgarians (85.3 percent), Turks (8.5 
percent), Gypsies (2.6 percent), Macedonians (2.5 percent), Arme- 
nians (0.3 percent), Russians (0.2 percent). 

Religion: In 1991 Bulgarian Orthodox (85 percent), Muslim (13 
percent), Jewish (0.8 percent), Roman Catholic (0.5 percent). Sig- 
nificant increase in public worship and observance of religious holi- 
days beginning 1990. 

Health: In post-World War II era, state health care facilities be- 
came available to large part of population through polyclinic sys- 
tem, with all medical services free. In 1990 state control removed 
to promote diversity and specialization and reduce bureaucracy. 
Serious shortages of medical supplies and treatment, early 1990s. 

Education and Literacy: Education compulsory between ages 
seven and sixteen. Complete literacy claimed 1990. Extensive 
growth in education system in post-World War II era, with rigidly 
Marxist ideological curriculum; complete restructuring, moderni- 
zation, and depoliticization program begun 1990. 

Economy 

Gross National Product (GNP): Estimated at US$47.3 billion, 
or US$5,300 per capita in 1990. Growth rate of gross domestic 
product (GDP) 2.8 percent 1985-89, after continuous shrinkage 



xxu 



through 1980s. Economic growth slowed in 1991 because of large- 
scale restructuring of economy from centralized planning to priva- 
tized market system. 

Energy: Critical shortage of conventional fuels beginning with in- 
terruption of supplies from Soviet Union in 1990; heavy reliance 
on nuclear power from Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant. Some small 
hydroelectric power plants. Main coal source Maritsa Basin (low- 
calorie, high-pollutant lignite); little domestic natural gas, oil, or 
hard coal. 

Industry and Mining: Dramatic postwar growth in chemical, elec- 
tronics, ferrous metals, and machinery industries, at expense of 
light industries such as food processing and textiles. Relatively nar- 
row industrial base concentrated in several industrial centers, with 
inefficient use of fuels and raw materials. Major mining centers 
confined to lignite, iron ore, zinc, copper, and lead. 

Agriculture: Redistribution of land from large-scale state farms 
to private ownership begun 1991 ; private plots, much more produc- 
tive per hectare, vital to domestic food supply. Major crops: corn, 
tomatoes, tobacco (fourth largest exporter in world), attar of roses 
(world's largest exporter), grapes, wheat, barley, sugar beets, oil- 
seeds, soybeans, and potatoes. Most numerous livestock: pigs, 
sheep, and chickens. 

Exports: US$16 billion in 1989, of which 60.5 percent machinery 
and equipment, 14.7 percent agricultural products; 10.6 percent 
manufactured consumer goods; 8.5 percent raw materials, metals, 
and fuels. Largest export markets in 1989 Soviet Union, German 
Democratic Republic (East Germany), Czechoslovakia, Iraq, 
Libya. 

Imports: US$15 billion in 1989, of which raw materials and fuels 
45.2 percent, machinery and equipment 39.8 percent, manufac- 
tured consumer goods 4.6 percent, agricultural products 3.8 per- 
cent. Largest import suppliers in 1989 Soviet Union, German 
Democratic Republic (East Germany), Federal Republic of Ger- 
many (West Germany), Austria. 

Balance of Payments: Hard currency trade surpluses maintained 
through 1985, when hard currency shortage caused recurring major 
trade deficits. Economic crisis of 1990-91 caused moratorium on 
hard-currency interest payment on foreign debt (US$10 billion in 
1990). 

Exchange Rate: Floating exchange rate established 1990, ending 



xxin 



limitation of conversion to within Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (Comecon). First conversion tables issued by Bulgarian 
National Bank in 1991; official conversion value in 1991, 18 leva 
to U.S. dollar. 

Inflation: Removal of price controls on selected categories of goods 
in 1991 led to severe but uneven price rises. On average, housing 
rose by 3.7 times, clothing three times, food six times in 1991 com- 
pared with 1989. 

Fiscal Year: Calendar year. 

Fiscal Policy: Governmental economic planning system remained 
centralized under noncommunist administration in 1991. Profit tax- 
es (50 percent on profits of nonagricultural enterprises in 1990) 
most important state revenue source. Also turnover taxes on re- 
tail sales, excises on tobacco and alcohol, and individual income 
tax (less than 10 percent of total state revenue). Extensive state 
subsidies remained on selected economic activities in 1991. 

Transportation and Communications 

Railroads: Total freight carried 83 million tons in 1987; total pas- 
sengers carried 110,000,000 in 1987. In 1987, 4,300 kilometers of 
track, of which 4,055 kilometers standard gauge, 245 kilometers 
narrow gauge, 917 kilometers double track, 2,510 kilometers elec- 
trified. 

Civil Aviation: National line, Balkan Airline, carried 2,800,000 
passengers and 24,213 tons of freight in 1987, using eighty-six major 
transport aircraft. International flights to major European cities 
and Algiers, Damascus, Baghdad, Kuwait, and Tunis. Usable air- 
ports 380, of which 20 with runways longer than 2,400 meters, 120 
with permanent-surface runways. Major airports at Burgas, 
Khaskovo, Pleven, Plovdiv, Ruse, Silistra, Sofia, Stara Zagora, 
Turgovishte, Varna, Vidin, and Yambol. 

Highways: In 1987, 36,908 kilometers total, 33,535 kilometers hard 
surface, of which 242 kilometers motorway (highway); 940,000,000 
passengers and 917,000,000 tons of freight transported in 1987. 

Inland Waterways: In 1987, 470 kilometers; Danube River, along 
northern border, major commercial waterway. 

Ports: Burgas and Varna on Black Sea; Lorn, Ruse, Svishtov, and 
Vidin on Danube. 

Pipelines: For crude oil, 193 kilometers; for refined petroleum 



XXIV 



products, 418 kilometers; for natural gas, 1,400 kilometers in 1986. 
Conveyed 21,000,000 tons in 1987. 

Telecommunications: In 1987, 4,053 postal and telecommunica- 
tions offices, 2.23 million telephones, 80 radio and 43 television 
transmitters; in 1990, 1,980,000 radio and 2.1 million television 
receivers. Two television networks broadcast to nineteen stations 
in 1991, with amplification to rural receivers. Three radio networks. 
Membership in Intervision East European television network and 
access to French satellite broadcasts. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Strong central government, with system of nine 
provinces (consolidated in 1987 from 28 districts), run by people's 
councils with limited autonomy and authority over local services, 
publicly owned enterprises, and administration. After ouster of 
Todor Zhivkov in 1989, communist party retained control of 
government but titles of head of state and party chief were sepa- 
rated. First noncommunist government elected 1991. Since 1990, 
president was head of state, prime minister was chief executive and 
head of fourteen-member Council of Ministers (cabinet). Uni- 
cameral legislature (National Assembly, Narodno subranie) with 
400 delegates; election law simplified in 1991 for direct represen- 
tation by district. Legislative decision making slowed by distribu- 
tion of seats between Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) and 
Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP; formerly Bulgarian Communist 
Party, BCP). 

Politics: Until 1989, BCP had complete control in one-party sys- 
tem with only nominal opposition. Opposition parties legalized after 
Zhivkov ouster in 1989. In 1990 BCP/BSP lost control of Council 
of Ministers when internal splits and strong opposition forced resig- 
nation of its last government, replaced by caretaker coalition govern- 
ment representing major parties. UDF, coalition of over twenty 
parties and movements, assumed leading role in 1991 ; with Move- 
ment for Rights and Freedoms, it formed working legislative major- 
ity after 1991 election and controlled Council of Ministers. 
Numerous smaller parties, notably Bulgarian Agrarian National 
Union and Bulgarian Social Democratic Party, remained active. 

Foreign Relations: After collapse of Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact 
and Comecon in 1991, sought acceptance into European commu- 
nity and improved relations with Balkan neighbors. In absence of 
Warsaw Pact protection, national security sought through detente 
with former enemy Turkey and Western support. International 
image improved by major reform in diplomatic corps in 1991. 



xxv 



International Agreements and Memberships: Member of United 
Nations and most of its specialized agencies. Also member of In- 
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 

National Security 

Armed Forces: Included army, air force, and navy; until 1990 
under complete control of BCP. Administered in three military dis- 
tricts with president as commander in chief, advised by National 
Security Council, and chain of command through Ministry of Na- 
tional Defense to General Staff. Commission on National Secur- 
ity provided legislative oversight of national security decisions. In 
1990 army had 97,000 active-duty personnel, including 65,000 con- 
scripts; the air force 22,000, of which 16,000 were conscripts; the 
navy 10,000 active-duty personnel, half of which were conscripts. 
In 1991 total active-duty personnel reduced to 107,000, over 80 
percent of which conscripts. Significant manpower reductions and 
organizational streamlining continued in 1992. 

Major Military Units: In 1990, army organized in eight motor 
rifle divisions and five tank brigades. Major force structure change 
in 1991-92, reducing tank and mechanized infantry in favor of 
defensive systems (antitank, air defense). In 1991 navy, also being 
downsized, had small diesel submarines, small frigates, corvettes, 
missile craft, patrol vessels, coastal and inshore minesweepers, ad- 
ministered from Varna with bases at Atiya, Balchik, Burgas, and 
Sozopol. Air force had three MiG interceptor regiments, two MiG 
fighter regiments, limited numbers of fighter and other helicop- 
ters. Soviet SS-23 missile launchers remained in Bulgaria in 1992. 

Military Budget: In 1990 defense expenditures estimated as 
equivalent of US$1.7 billion, about 3.6 percent of GNP. 

Internal Security Forces: Drastic reform of State Security forces 
undertaken after ouster of Todor Zhivkov in 1989, to end their 
role as independent state enforcers of social discipline. In 1991 Na- 
tional Service for the Defense of the Constitution charged with iden- 
tifying subversive or terrorist activities. Ministry of Internal Affairs 
reorganized, and its domestic and foreign surveillance arms cut 
deeply and put under strict civilian control in 1991 . Power of militia 
(national police force, formerly chief enforcer of totalitarian rule) 
greatly reduced in 1990. 



xxvi 



MIKHAYLOVGRAD 

° Mikhaylovgrad 



N 



LOVECH 



Lovech 



. / 



Sofia s' 



~\grad ^ 

>SOFIYA/ 



SOFIYA 



.J 



r 
v 



/ 



I 



PLOVDIV 



Plovdiv 



r 
( 



Fzgttr*? 7. Administrative Divisions of Bulgaria, 1991 



xxvm 



Introduction 



FOR MOST OF ITS HISTORY, Bulgaria has been a small, 
agricultural nation whose location at the nexus of the European 
and Asian continents brought strong cultural and political influences 
from both east and west. Because of its location in the Balkans, 
on the border of Asiatic Turkey, and just across the Black Sea from 
the Russian and Soviet empires, Bulgaria received much attention 
from the commercial, political, and military powers surrounding 
it. Some of that attention was beneficial; much of it was harmful. 
In spite of foreign influences, which included centuries of occupa- 
tion by the Byzantine and Ottoman empires and absolute loyalty 
to the Soviet Union in the twentieth century, Bulgarian cultural 
and social institutions maintained a unique national identity that 
was again struggling to reemerge after the collapse of the Soviet 
Empire in 1989. 

When Bulgaria achieved autonomy within the Ottoman Empire 
in 1878, it was completely without modern political and social in- 
stitutions with which to govern itself and deal with the outside world. 
Over the next seventy years, the process of inventing those in- 
stitutions was rocky and uneven, both internally and in foreign 
relations. In spite of a very progressive constitution, Bulgaria's con- 
stitutional monarchy was plagued by frequent changes of gov- 
ernment and governmental philosophy until World War II. The 
impact of a world depression and being on the losing side of both 
world wars also hindered Bulgaria's development before another 
expanding power, the Soviet Union, incorporated it into another 
empire as a result of Soviet victory in World War II. Then, when 
it emerged from the shadow of the Soviet Union in 1989, Bulgaria 
was faced again with inventing institutions that would enable its 
society, its economy, and its government to prosper in a world that 
had been evolving apart from them for many years. 

The Byzantine and Ottoman occupations eclipsed the signifi- 
cant cultural developments of two golden ages (in the tenth and 
thirteenth centuries) when independent Bulgarian kingdoms domi- 
nated their region. Despite the centuries of occupation, village cul- 
tural and church life retained basic elements of ethnic identity that 
fostered a national revival as Ottoman power dwindled in the eigh- 
teenth and nineteenth centuries. 

After finally regaining its independence at the end of the nine- 
teenth century, modern Bulgaria stood in the shadow of European 



xxix 




xxviii 



power politics through the first nine decades of the twentieth cen- 
tury. In that period, three successive major geopolitical antagonisms 
largely determined Bulgaria's place in the world: the Ottoman Em- 
pire versus Slavic Europe, the Axis powers versus the Allies, then 
the Warsaw Pact (see Glossary) opposing the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO — see Glossary). In all three cases, Bulgaria 
stood as a minor player placed at the critical frontier separating 
the sides. Besides those conditions, Bulgaria's location amid the 
constant turmoil of the Balkans also shaped domestic life and for- 
eign policy, even in the relatively uneventful postwar totalitarian 
years. 

For the first forty-five years of the post- World War II era, Bul- 
garia was the East European country most closely allied to the Soviet 
Union, as well as the Warsaw Pact member most dependent eco- 
nomically on Soviet aid. During that time, all aspects of life that 
a totalitarian government could control were redrawn according 
to the Soviet model — from overemphasis on heavy industry to the 
content of works of literature. When the totalitarian era ended in 
1989, it left behind many of the rigid structures and stereotypes 
formed by such imitation. Although Bulgaria had strayed from the 
prescribed Soviet path in noncontroversial areas such as glorifica- 
tion of the nation's 1,300-year history and token decentralization 
of economic planning, the machinery of independent national policy 
making was decidedly rusty when the post-Soviet era suddenly 
dawned. 

At that point, Bulgaria was seemingly more independent of the 
power struggles of stronger neighbors than ever before in its his- 
tory. But this liberation also deprived the nation of the economic 
and military security those neighbors had provided. The early 1990s 
saw a major reshaping of the economic power balance on the Eu- 
ropean continent. Because most of Eastern Europe emerged from 
the economic and political dominance of the Soviet Union at the 
same time, competition among the former Soviet client states for 
new economic and political positions was very keen. In this new 
context, Bulgaria, a nation of about 9 million persons located at 
the periphery of Europe, required particular energy and leader- 
ship to establish itself as an integral part of Europe. At the same 
time, energy and leadership were necessarily diverted to solving 
internal ethnic and political problems — most notably the integra- 
tion into society of a substantial and vocal Turkish minority and 
the cultivation of an efficient government structure based on coa- 
litions among Bulgaria's traditionally numerous political parties. 
In the background of those issues was an economy impoverished 



xxx 



by decades of dependence on resources from the Soviet-led Come- 
con (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance — see Glossary) and 
poorly balanced Soviet-style central economic planning. 

Before World War II, Bulgarian society was overwhelmingly 
agricultural, supported by rich farmland that grew a variety of 
grains, vegetables, fruits, and tobacco for domestic use and export. 
Well into the twentieth century, rural life remained steeped in vil- 
lage traditions that had not changed for many centuries, even under 
Ottoman rule. Cities such as Sofia and Plovdiv were islands of com- 
mercial activity and points of contact with other cultures. The fast- 
paced industrialization and agricultural collectivization programs 
of the postwar communist regimes brought four decades of intense 
migration into urban areas; in 1990 two of every three Bulgarians 
lived in a city or town. The migration process also reduced the 
isolation of remaining rural populations, which maintained con- 
tact with friends and relatives in the cities. Despite this process, 
however, the traditional dichotomy between cities and villages was 
still quite visible in the national elections of 1990 and 1991: Bul- 
garia's urban population largely supported economic and political 
reform platforms, whereas the rural regions expressed skepticism 
about reform by supporting the more conventional programs of 
the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP, formerly the Bulgarian Com- 
munist Party (BCP)). 

Besides speeding urbanization, postwar industrial policy put most 
means of production under central BCP control. The state also took 
over the Bulgarian financial system, and agriculture underwent a 
series of collectivization phases between 1947 and 1958. Follow- 
ing the standard recipe for centralized economic planning, heavy 
industry received a high proportion of state investment compared 
with agriculture and consumer production. The ever-increasing 
quotas of five-year plans for all those sectors, however, reflected 
unrealistic expectations. Although later five-year plans aimed at 
more realistic goals, the centralized Bulgarian economic system 
failed consistently to increase output, although it devoted huge 
amounts of resources to the effort. Throughout the communist era, 
heavy industries lacked incentives because of state subsidies, and 
state-run agriculture never matched the productivity of small pri- 
vate plots. The Zhivkov government trumpeted major economic 
reform programs in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, but they all re- 
mained within the restrictions of the centralized system, contributing 
nothing to Bulgaria's economic advancement. 

As in the other East European countries, central planning of the 
economy produced severe environmental damage in Bulgaria. 
Damage was more localized in Bulgaria because its designated role 



xxxi 



in Comecon required fewer "smokestack industries" than that of 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, or the German Democratic Republic (East 
Germany). Nevertheless, cities such as Ruse, Dimitrovgrad, and 
Srednogorie suffered severe environmental deterioration from 
manufacturing activities under the communist regimes, which dis- 
regarded pollution in the name of progress. In 1988 public con- 
cern over environmental quality spawned the first Bulgarian protest 
groups, which played a central role in the overthrow of Zhivkov 
and then evolved into permanent opposition parties with strong 
public support. 

In October 1991, the Grand National Assembly passed a Law 
on Protection of the Environment, and the next cabinet included 
a member of the Ekoglasnost environmental group as minister of 
the environment. Despite these measures, however, the critical need 
for economic growth in the postcommunist era hindered environ- 
mental recovery efforts. In 1992 auto emissions, heavy industry 
emissions, and power plants remained beyond government con- 
trol although they contributed heavily to air pollution; excessive 
use of chemicals in agriculture polluted many Bulgarian lakes and 
streams; and reliance on nuclear power generated by unsafe equip- 
ment threatened a major radiation crisis. 

Besides industrialization and urbanization, other important 
changes had occurred under the conventional communist totalitar- 
ian dictatorships that ruled Bulgaria under Georgi Dimitrov 
(1947-49), Vulko Chervenkov (1949-56), and Todor Zhivkov 
(1956-89). Centuries before, the Russian Empire had fought the 
first in a long series of wars with the Turks. Those wars conferred 
on Russia the stature of protector of the Slavs in the Ottoman Em- 
pire. In 1944, as Axis power retreated in Europe, a strong Rus- 
sophile element remained in Bulgarian society. Accordingly, 
Bulgarians welcomed the arrival of the Red Army, whose presence 
ended Bulgaria's participation as an Axis ally in World War II and 
laid the foundation of the postwar political system. Interwar com- 
mercial and cultural relations with Western Europe (especially Ger- 
many and Italy) were curtailed when the postwar communist 
regimes intensified Bulgaria's traditionally close ties with the Rus- 
sian Empire/Soviet Union. In 1949 this policy shift was codified 
by Bulgaria's membership in Comecon, which created a new net- 
work of East European trade relationships and subsidies dominated 
by the Soviet Union. 

Between 1947 and 1989, Bulgarian foreign and economic pol- 
icy followed scrupulously the policies of the Soviet Union. Inter- 
mittent periods of rapprochement and hostility between the Soviet 
Union and the West were mirrored in relations between Bulgaria 



xxxn 



and the NATO countries of Europe. Thus, for example, Zhivkov 
pulled back from newly invigorated relations with Western Europe 
in order to lend vigorous support to the Soviet invasions of Czecho- 
slovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979. Bulgaria also followed 
the Soviet lead in assisting developing nations and supporting wars 
of national liberation. 

The Bulgarian constitutions of 1947 and 1971 borrowed heav- 
ily from Soviet constitutional models, and, especially in its early 
stages, the Bulgarian centrally planned economy followed Soviet 
guidelines. Periods of economic experimentation also coincided in 
the two countries; Zhivkov's first large-scale restructuring of the 
Bulgarian system occurred in the early 1960s, at the same time 
that Nikita S. Khrushchev experimented with unorthodox economic 
methodology in the Soviet Union. Zhivkov was able to experiment 
more freely because the Bulgarian system was much smaller and 
more homogeneous and because Bulgaria had earned a place as 
the most trusted and loyal of the Comecon member nations. By 
the mid-1980s, economic imitation of the Soviet Union had turned 
earlier skepticism into cynicism in large parts of the Bulgarian 
public. 

The communist regimes of the postwar era did accomplish sig- 
nificant improvement in national education and health care. 
Although the basic structure of prewar Bulgarian education re- 
mained intact after 1947, the primary goal of centralized educa- 
tion planning was to bring Marxist theory to as many Bulgarians 
as possible; hence promotion of literacy and expansion of primary 
and secondary education proceeded much more rapidly under the 
communist regimes. On a basic level, those goals were reached 
through a combination of rapid urbanization of the population and 
mandatory training for children and adults. But the state educa- 
tion program was a carefully regimented, technology-oriented im- 
itation of the Soviet Union's system. After Zhivkov, the public 
education system and universities officially banned political indoc- 
trination and activity in their institutions. Because many teachers 
and textbooks remained from the era when only the party line was 
acceptable, however, transition efforts encountered stubborn 
resistance in some quarters. 

The communist era had provided very basic health care in state 
regional clinics available to most Bulgarians. Under the socialist 
health system, indicators such as average life expectancy, infant 
mortality rate, and physicians per capita improved steadily between 
1947 and 1989. Nevertheless, post-Zhivkov governments embarked 
on decentralization and modernization programs to improve special- 
ized care and raise the incentives for health care personnel and 



xxxni 



entrepreneurs in private facilities. In the early 1990s, the new pro- 
grams underwent a difficult transition period that yielded uneven 
results. 

The overthrow of Zhivkov's orthodox communist regime in 1989 
produced especially dramatic changes in Bulgarian political and 
economic life. By the mid-1980s, the Zhivkov regime already had 
wielded power for thirty years; by that time, the regime's inability 
to deal with new political and economic realities was obvious to 
many Bulgarians, especially the educated classes. Zhivkov took 
token political restructuring measures in the late 1980s, but by 1988 
formidable opposition groups were forming around such issues as 
environmental standards and the chronic failure of the economic 
system to raise the standard of living. In 1989 Zhivkov's heavy- 
handed campaign to assimilate or exile Bulgaria's large Turkish 
minority depleted the labor force and evoked strong protest from 
the international community and many groups within Bulgaria. 
Shortly after an all-European environmental conference in Sofia 
provided an international audience for protesting groups, the Bul- 
garian Communist Party (BCP) ousted Zhivkov to avoid losing 
power entirely. 

Although the BCP strategy succeeded in the short run, Zhiv- 
kov's communist successors were unable to meet the multitude of 
demands that society unleashed upon them once the symbol of 
monolithic state power had disappeared. Having lost the solid sup- 
port of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union by 1990, the BCP 
hesitated between full commitment to political and economic re- 
form and maintaining its still formidable grip on such sectors of 
Bulgarian society as management of heavy industry and adminis- 
tration of provincial government. A few months after Zhivkov's 
ouster, the party had changed its name to the Bulgarian Socialist 
Party (BSP) and introduced a series of government reform pro- 
grams. But opposition groups, combined in the Union of Demo- 
cratic Forces (UDF), refused to form a coalition government with 
the BSP or to support BSP reform proposals. Because the UDF 
represented a growing majority of Bulgarian society, by the end 
of 1990 the UDF strategy of non-participation had forced a politi- 
cal stalemate and resignation of the last communist-dominated cabi- 
net, headed by Andrei Lukanov. This development negated the 
broad 100-day economic reform plan that Lukanov had proposed 
in the fall of 1990. 

The old central planning system that remained in place in 1990 
had included excessive emphasis on heavy industry, distorted pric- 
ing, declining agricultural productivity, and isolation from foreign 
markets. By the end of 1990, those failures had brought the Bulgarian 



xxxiv 



economy to a severe crisis that included a drop of 11.5 percent in 
net material product (NMP — see Glossary), drastic increases in 
unemployment, curtailment of all payments to foreign creditors, 
and a drop in the standard of living. 

The period following Lukanov's fall was one of extreme crisis; 
social unrest was very high, but political factions could not find 
an acceptable compromise course. Finally, Dimitur Popov, a judge 
with no political affiliation, became prime minister of a coalition 
cabinet that would run the government until the 1991 national elec- 
tions chose a new National Assembly. Resolution of this crisis was 
due in large part to the negotiating skills of President Zheliu Zhelev. 

In 1991 Bulgaria experimented with government coalitions to 
promote major reform programs. Important legislative packages 
included depoliticization of the army, the police, courts, state prose- 
cutors, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; amnesty for political 
prisoners; restoration of property to political emigres and victims 
of repression; and reform of the local government system that re- 
mained a stronghold of socialist bureaucrats. In 1991 such reform 
legislation encouraged loans from the World Bank (see Glossary) 
and other Western sources. 

In mid- 1991, all political factions agreed that economic reform 
was the government's top priority, but BSP members of parlia- 
ment obstructed reform proposals that would bring temporary but 
severe economic dislocation. Instead, they favored a more gradu- 
al approach that would not threaten party members still entrenched 
in state industrial policy making. Although the National Assem- 
bly passed major legislation in 1991 on land redistribution, pri- 
vate commercial enterprises, and foreign investment, the key step 
of enterprise privatization remained unresolved in early 1992, and 
the land act required wholesale revision. 

Privatization brought many difficult dilemmas for a system that 
until recently had been centrally planned. The new government 
had to distinguish state enterprises worth rehabilitation from those 
that should be replaced by totally new private enterprises. Resti- 
tution was needed for Bulgarians whose capital property had been 
seized by the communist state, but resolution of claims proved ex- 
tremely complex. And rapid privatization inevitably displaced large 
numbers of workers from former state enterprises, damaging 
productivity, national morale, and earning power. In February 
1992, the World Bank cited the lack of privatization legislation in 
delaying a loan of $US250 million. Both the Popov government 
and the government of Filip Dimitrov that followed spent months 
in fruitless debate of redistribution and regulation of large indus- 
tries formerly operated by the state. 



xxxv 



A vital economic support element, energy supply, became a crit- 
ical problem in late 1991 when the Soviet Union first ended coal 
supply and later when Russia ended subsidized electric power supply 
to Bulgaria following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Because 
Bulgaria's domestic energy base was quite inadequate to support 
an industrial system designed when outside energy supplies were 
plentiful and cheap, economic recovery depended on the single 
nuclear power plant at Kozloduy — a facility judged unsafe by both 
domestic and international authorities in 1991. Lacking foreign cur- 
rency to import fuels, however, Bulgarian policy makers placed 
their hopes on Kozloduy' s shaky technology to provide as much 
as half the country's electricity throughout the 1990s. 

Political developments in 1991 made accelerated economic re- 
form more likely. Remaining Zhivkov-era officials finally lost some 
of their power to obstruct the transition away from authoritarian 
government and a centrally planned economy. After considerable 
delay, in July the Grand National Assembly, which had been elected 
specifically to draft a new constitution, produced a document ap- 
proved by a majority, but far from all, of its legislators. Some con- 
stituent groups in UDF refused to sign because they believed the 
constitution defended interests of the BSP, which was still the 
majority party at that point. Among vital innovations in the con- 
stitution were government by separation of powers, specification 
of the principles of a market economy, and full protection of citizens' 
private property rights. 

The constitution also set conditions for election of a new Na- 
tional Assembly under reformed election laws. The new laws sim- 
plified the extremely cumbersome system used in 1990 and reduced 
the size of the National Assembly from 400 to 240. In the national 
election of October 1991, Bulgarian politics followed its long tra- 
dition of fragmentation when forty-two parties and other groups 
posted candidates. Of that number, thirty-five failed to receive 
enough votes for representation in the legislature. UDF candidates, 
running on three separate tickets, together won a plurality but not 
a majority of seats. The BSP held the next largest block of seats, 
making the twenty-four-vote block of the Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms (MRF) capable of swinging majority votes for the UDF 
or obstructing reform legislation. Because the MRF represented 
the substantial ethnic Turkish minority, many Bulgarians feared 
that the UDF would be coerced into pro-Turkish positions. The 
MRF blunted some criticism by announcing support of most of 
the UDF reform platform, however, shortly after the election. 

The fourteen-member cabinet formed by Prime Minister 
Dimitrov, leader of the UDF, was young (average age forty-nine), 



xxxvi 



professional, and included no BSP or MRF members. Among 
Dimitrov's structural reforms in the cabinet (reduced from seven- 
teen to fourteen members) was abolition of the Ministry of For- 
eign Economic Relations, formerly a stronghold of Zhivkovite 
officials. For the first time, a civilian was named minister of defense. 
Key cabinet figures were Minister of Defense Dimitur Ludzhev, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Stoian Ganev, and Minister of Inter- 
nal Affairs Iordan Sokolov. As in previous cabinets, economic policy 
was divided among several ministries. Dimitrov, who introduced 
no formal program when he was appointed, listed ending infla- 
tion, raising productivity, and stabilizing the economy as his chief 
goals. 

Despite the triumph of nonsocialist factions in the October elec- 
tions, however, the Bulgarian government remained unsettled in 
the winter of 1991-92. Key constituent groups such as labor unions 
and the Turkish population continued to be somewhat aloof from 
the UDF coalition as 1992 began, and the coalition itself was con- 
stantly strained by the diversity of its membership. In 1992 the 
former communists remained the country's largest party, and the 
oversized government bureaucracy created by the communist re- 
gimes still controlled many parts of the national administration. 
But, unlike his predecessor, Dimitrov had no opposition ministers 
in his cabinet, and the UDF possessed a legislative majority if it 
could avoid internal fragmentation and keep the loyalty of the MRF. 

With the environmental demonstrations of 1988, Bulgarian so- 
ciety renewed a long-dormant tradition of public protest, and such 
activities continued during the crisis years of 1990-92. The vola- 
tile ethnic issue of Turkish minority rights evoked many boycotts 
and protests by both Turks and Bulgarians between 1990 and 1992. 
And industrial strikes, most organized by the Podkrepa labor union, 
protested working conditions and unemployment throughout 1991 
and early 1992. 

Although Bulgarian society was ethnically relatively homogene- 
ous, especially compared with neighboring Yugoslavia, the Turk- 
ish minority of about one million (estimates varied from 900,000 
to 1.5 million in 1991) continued to present a delicate political 
problem in 1992. Bulgarian-Turkish animosity was based on the 
indelible Bulgarian memory of five centuries of occupation and cul- 
tural suppression by the Ottoman Empire. On the Turkish side, 
hostility was based on more recent memories of forced assimila- 
tion and restriction of human rights by the Zhivkov regime. The 
Zhivkov government had justified repression of the Turkish minor- 
ity by appealing to ethnic Bulgarian fears that empowering Turks 
within Bulgaria would once again threaten Bulgarian security. 



xxxvn 



When Zhivkov fell, restoration of long-withheld civil rights became 
a central issue in the newly open political atmosphere. 

Minority rights found expression in the new political order; the 
MRF was formed to advance those rights, and the UDF somewhat 
cautiously advocated full use of the Turkish language in schools 
and full civil rights for all Turkish citizens of Bulgaria. Especially 
in eastern Bulgaria where the Turkish population was largest, a 
strong undercurrent of hostility grew in 1991 and 1992 between 
ultranationalist Bulgarians and their Turkish neighbors. Only a 
Supreme Court decision allowed the MRF to post candidates in 
the 1991 election, and the issue of restoring the teaching of Turk- 
ish in Bulgarian schools remained quite sensitive in 1992. In late 
1991, the BSP, shorn of its parliamentary majority, accelerated 
its attacks on the MRF as a subversive organization working for 
Turkey — a desperate effort to build new support among Bulgari- 
ans fearful of new foreign domination. 

In early 1992, the political situation left Turkish citizens with 
only partially restorated civil rights, and school boycotts were called 
in some areas where the use of Turkish remained restricted. On 
this issue, the Bulgarian court system, which had been a purely 
political institution under the Zhivkov regime, was unable or un- 
willing to exercise fully the independence granted the judiciary in 
the new constitution. This was partly because the new antidiscrimi- 
nation language of that document had never before been tested and 
partly because of the lingering tradition of judicial dependency on 
political officials. Meanwhile, politicians generally treated the Turk- 
ish issue with great caution in 1991 and early 1992. Nationalist 
factions attacked the governing UDF for its legislative "alliance" 
with the MRF, suggesting that UDF compromises would jeopardize 
national security. These conditions lessened the likelihood that the 
National Assembly would finally attack and resolve the "national 
question. " 

Bulgarian foreign policy also changed markedly in the years fol- 
lowing 1989. As in domestic affairs, a strong body of opinion fa- 
vored maintaining pre- 1989 policy, in this case continuing to 
cultivate the Soviet Union as protector and economic benefactor. 
Actual policy sought a compromise that would not only change po- 
litical relations but also ensure continued supply of raw materials, 
especially fuels. Negotiations with the Soviet government yielded 
promises of continued supply, but by 1991 the Soviet republics 
responsible for delivery were able to ignore the commitment. This 
situation deteriorated further when the Soviet Union dissolved into 
constituent republics in the fall of 1991. By January 1992, Bul- 
garia had established relations with Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, and 



xxxvm 



the Baltic states in an effort to reestablish supply lines. In Novem- 
ber 1991, Bulgaria joined a new economic association for East Euro- 
pean cooperation and trade, formed by economic organizations in 
most of the former East European Comecon member countries, 
as well as in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. The aim was to 
restore economic relations among those countries on a new basis. 

A top foreign policy priority of the Dimitrov government was 
dismantling the bureaucracy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
which was still dominated by BSP functionaries under Prime 
Minister Popov. Shortly after his appointment, Minister of For- 
eign Affairs Ganev secured the recall of several ineffectual senior 
diplomats. In early 1992, he reviewed the performance of all minis- 
try personnel in order to streamline the organization and purge 
remaining members of Zhivkov's state security establishment, which 
had been notorious for conducting espionage from diplomatic 
outposts. 

Beginning in 1990, President Zheliu Zhelev and other Bulgar- 
ian officials met with Western officials to stress Bulgaria's com- 
mitment to economic and political reform and cement relations with 
the United States and the European Community (EC — see Glos- 
sary). The EC was the primary focus because Bulgarian policy mak- 
ers saw acceptance into the European federation as the best way 
to avoid isolation and hasten internal reform. With this goal in 
mind, top-level diplomatic attention was divided among many West 
European countries, while overtures to Eastern Europe declined 
noticeably. In late 1991, France, Germany, Greece, and Italy prom- 
ised to support Bulgarian membership in the EC, although at that 
point at least seven countries were ahead of Bulgaria on the list 
of prospective EC members. In 1991 Bulgaria did achieve associ- 
ate status in the EC, together with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and 
Poland. From the Western viewpoint, a stable Bulgaria offered a 
calming influence on the turbulent Balkans, where the disintegra- 
tion of Yugoslavia in 1991 threatened to trigger wider conflict over 
ethnic and economic issues. 

Bulgaria viewed the Yugoslav crisis of the second half of 1991 
as a serious threat to regional stability. President Zhelev reiter- 
ated Bulgaria's policy of nonintervention and the right of self- 
determination for all people in Yugoslavia. This declaration was 
mainly to reduce accusations and fears in Serbia that Bulgaria would 
assume a direct role in weakening the Yugoslav Federation (now 
reduced to Serbia and Montenegro) and renew century-old claims 
on Macedonian territory. Zhelev' s reassurances were also aimed 
at Greece, which feared annexation of its part of Macedonia into 



xxxix 



a state of Greater Macedonia. Following its advocacy of self- 
determination for Balkan states, Bulgaria recognized the four former 
Yugoslav secessionist republics, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia, 
Macedonia, and Slovenia, in the winter of 1991 . In late 1991 , Bul- 
garia strongly backed mediation of the conflict between Serbia and 
Croatia by the EC and the United Nations, and Bulgaria embar- 
goed military supplies and arms bound for Yugoslavia. 

Meanwhile, relations with Turkey improved after the triumph 
of the UDF in the fall 1991 election. The UDF-MRF coalition pur- 
sued a treaty of friendship, cooperation, and security to match the 
treaty signed with Greece in October 1991. By early 1992, high- 
level military talks had substantially eased tension with Turkey, 
which maintained troops in eastern Thrace close to the Bulgarian 
border. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Ganev was seeking a trilateral 
summit meeting with Turkey and Greece to enhance regional secu- 
rity as well as a "mini-Helsinki" conference of Balkan states, to 
enhance regional security. Cultivation of Turkey had the strategic 
role of counterbalancing Greece and Serbia, two regional powers 
potentially allied against Bulgaria over the Macedonia issue in 1992. 

The overthrow of Zhivkov revealed a deep fascination in Bul- 
garian society with the culture and ideals of the United States, and 
a desire for closer relations. Although United States aid to Bul- 
garia remained quite small compared with aid given to Poland, 
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia in the early 1990s, high-level offi- 
cial contacts in that period were more friendly and frequent than 
ever before. President Zhelev stated Bulgaria's position very force- 
fully on two visits to Washington (1990 and 1991), and Prime 
Minister Dimitrov had a productive stay in March 1992 that gained 
a promise that the United States would accord Bulgaria the same 
status as the three major East European aid recipients. In November 
1991, the United States officially granted Bulgaria most-favored- 
nation status. 

The demise of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 left Bulgaria without 
the military protection of the Soviet Union and its allies. To bol- 
ster its security position, Bulgaria obtained NATO assurances about 
Turkey's military ambitions and established a special relationship 
with NATO headquarters in 1991 . Meanwhile, the Bulgarian mili- 
tary establishment underwent reforms comparable to those else- 
where in society. A central aim of the Dimitrov government was 
to bring the military under civilian control, to end the separate, 
elite status that followed the Soviet model, and to make the mili- 
tary an open institution integrated into society. An immediate 
stimulus for this reform was the role of national military establish- 
ments in Yugoslavia's bloody internal conflict and in the failed coup 



xl 



in the Soviet Union in 1991. (The Bulgarian military had taken 
no part in any of the political turmoil of 1989-91 .) The depolitiza- 
tion of the military decreed by the Bulgarian government in 1990 
reduced BSP influence in the ranks. As in other phases of Bulgar- 
ian life, positions of power remained for some time thereafter in 
the hands of reactionaries from the Zhivkov era. By the end of 1991 , 
however, about 85 percent of generals active in 1989 had retired 
voluntarily or under pressure. The resignations resulted in a net 
reduction of ninety-three generals from a top-heavy officer corps. 
The military reform campaign also sought to lift the status of the 
military as a profession and to foster positive relations between the 
civilian and military communities. In 1992, however, a shortage 
of army officers was partly attributed to the military's negative 
image in society. 

Arms and spare-part supply to the Bulgarian military suffered 
greatly when the overthrow of Zhivkov caused the Soviet Union 
to abandon long-term contracts. At the same time, the dispropor- 
tionately large Bulgarian arms industry, a pillar of the centrally 
planned economy, was hit hard by the loss of its Soviet market. 
The new government limited the activities of Kintex, Bulgaria's 
notorious arms export agency, by prohibiting sales to terrorists and 
totalitarian regimes. A long-term conversion program begun in Oc- 
tober 1991 gave new civilian production assignments to many arms 
plants. 

The Bulgarian military had a long history of cooperation with 
its Soviet counterpart. Weapons systems, doctrine, and training 
were interchangeable throughout the postwar era, and the Bulgarian 
military relied on Soviet fuel supplies even more heavily than the 
civilian economy. The sudden end of the Soviet partnership in 1990, 
followed shortly by removal of the communist symbols and dogma 
that had supported military morale, caused considerable turbulence 
and confusion. 

New international responsibilities also affected the Bulgarian mili- 
tary establishment. To abide by the Treaty on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe signed by the Warsaw Pact and NATO in 1990, 
Bulgaria also faced reductions in military manpower and arma- 
ments beginning in 1991 . Bulgaria sought to retain the Soviet SS-23 
missiles installed in the 1980s, however, on the grounds that they 
predated the relevant nuclear disarmament treaty and were vital 
to national defense. 

As the 1990s began, Bulgaria was in a completely new phase 
of national existence. For this phase to succeed, Bulgaria needed 
both a substantive new self-image and a believable new interna- 
tional posture. The postwar communist period had changed society 



xli 



by forcible industrialization and urbanization; those processes were 
accompanied by regimentation that suppressed cultural and economic 
individuality, and by isolation from influences and challenges out- 
side the Soviet sphere. Then, in keeping with the wave of democrati- 
zation that had swept most of Eastern Europe in 1989, Bulgaria made 
an abrupt about-face and began experimenting with democratic in- 
stitutions in a manner unprecedented in the country's political his- 
tory. After nearly fifty years of totalitarianism, and having had 
marginal success with democratic institutions prior to World War 
II, Bulgaria's experimentation was quite cautious at first. By 1992, 
however, a new generation of capable leaders had instilled impres- 
sive momentum in the transformation process. Although the slow 
pace of economic restructuring promised continued hardship, a large 
part of Bulgarian society was committed to reform, and hard-line 
revisionism and social unrest had declined in early 1992. 

Besides adapting Western-type political and economic institu- 
tions to unique domestic requirements, Bulgaria's most difficult 
task was to overcome its Cold- War image as an obscure and some- 
what sinister nation whose total loyalty to the Soviet Union had 
led it to support terrorists and assassins. By 1992 progress in that 
direction was significant; Western approval raised Bulgaria's sta- 
tus closer to that of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, the 
three former Soviet client states whose democratization had given 
them a head start toward integration into the fabric of Europe. As 
it strengthened its connections to the West in 1992, Bulgaria fi- 
nally had an opportunity to develop social and political institutions 
appropriate to its needs under reduced pressure from large-power 
European politics. 

December 31, 1992 

* * * 

In the months following completion of this manuscript, Bulgaria 
underwent serious political upheaval, and its economy failed to 
move toward reform nearly as fast as planners had hoped. The 
Dimitrov government elected in late 1991 showed early promise 
in promoting economic reform and democratization. By mid- 1992, 
however, Dimitrov' s leverage was reduced by shifting factions in 
his political coalition and by rising public skepticism that Bulgaria's 
painful reform program would yield a better standard of living. 

In 1992 Dimitrov 's UDF coalition dominated political dialogue 
and enjoyed a narrow majority in the National Assembly. This po- 
sition required that the coalition remain unified within itself and 
allied with the much smaller MRF. But in the second half of 1992, 



xlii 



UDF policies increasingly alienated influential parts of Bulgarian 
society such as the Orthodox Church, parts of the media, trade 
unions, and private businessmen. An atmosphere of escalating con- 
frontation was the result. 

Meanwhile, the MRF was taking increasingly independent stands 
on many issues, using the influence provided by the party's swing- 
vote position in parliament. In October 1992, judging the UDF 
response to its demands inadequate, the MRF finally joined the 
Bulgarian Socialist Party and dissident UDF members in a parlia- 
mentary vote of no confidence in the Dimitrov government. By 
destroying the Dimitrov coalition, the vote created another crisis 
period in which Bulgaria was unable to choose a government. 
Nearly two months later, Liuben Berov, an unaffiliated econom- 
ics professor, was approved as prime minister after both the UDF 
and the BSP had failed to form governments. 

The fate of the leading parties thus changed drastically at the 
end of 1992. The BSP, which had remained aloof from political 
struggle during the UDF's dominant period, found itself with the 
political influence of a parliamentary plurality as the new govern- 
ment took office. This happened in spite of the continued split be- 
tween BSP conservatives allied with former communist party chief 
Aleksandur Lilov and the reformist branch of the party. Observ- 
ers questioned whether the BSP would use its new influence to pro- 
mote reform or to preserve the remaining Zhivkov-era party 
bastions in state industry and provincial government. In early 1993, 
BSP support of the Berov government was decidedly pragmatic, 
and experts saw a strong likelihood that support would be with- 
drawn (and the government automatically toppled) if policies dis- 
pleased the BSP or if a new election would be advantageous to the 
BSP. 

Meanwhile, the disparate membership of the UDF wrote another 
chapter in the acrimonious history of the coalition. The group again 
split formally when one faction of constituent parties formed a new 
coalition, the New Union for Democracy. Although Berov had 
pledged to continue the UDF reform program, UDF members of 
parliament refused all support for the Berov government. Rela- 
tions between the UDF and its former allies in the MRF remained 
hostile. Several attempts at forming new coalitions and alliances 
failed for various reasons in early 1993. The most notable coali- 
tion was the Bulgarian Democratic Center, whose loss of two key 
member parties left a void in the center of the political spectrum. 

Besides the confusion of a fragmented political base, the Dimitrov 
government left unforeseen financial woes. According to one 



xliii 



estimate, Bulgaria's internal debt doubled in 1992. The reasons 
were inflation (which reached 6.6 percent per month in early 1993), 
the Dimitrov government's concealing of budget deficits by with- 
holding funds from certain industries, and government assump- 
tion of the debts of state companies. After the government had 
borrowed heavily from the Bulgarian National Bank to pay its debts, 
only an estimated 5 percent of domestic credit remained for pri- 
vate investment. Experts forecast the same figure for 1993, leav- 
ing no prospect of meaningful support for a larger private sector. 

In April 1993, Berov's coalition government was able to draft 
a budget bill containing the same deficit as in 1992, despite the 
debt left by Dimitrov. To do this, spending on education, health 
care, culture, and national defense were reduced significantly; the 
Ministry of National Defense would receive only half the money 
it requested. Nevertheless, the proposed deficit, 7.9 percent of the 
gross national product (GNP — see Glossary), caused concern 
among international lenders. 

Economic reform in 1992 had limited success. The amended land 
redistribution law passed in March 1992 effectively abolished col- 
lective farms; nominally, nearly 80 percent of Bulgaria's total arable 
land had been reclaimed by individual owners by midyear. 
Although the legislative machinery was in place, however, by 
mid- 1993 less than 20 percent of designated land had actually been 
restored, and Zhelev criticized the Berov government for neglect- 
ing this aspect of economic policy. In April 1993, farmers demon- 
strated in Sofia against inequities they perceived in the land law. 

The political crisis stopped vital privatization legislation in late 
1992, delaying the pilot privatization of 100 companies. Berov had 
called privatization the top priority of his government when he took 
office, and adjustments were made in existing laws to make con- 
version easier. Nevertheless, almost no privatization activity took 
place in the first four months of 1993. In early 1993, President 
Zhelev recommended that privatization be delayed until a large- 
scale national program, similar to those used in the Czech Repub- 
lic, Hungary, and Poland, could be prepared. Meanwhile, ineffi- 
cient state industries went deep into recession, cancelling the effects 
of what had been a rather successful economic stabilization plan 
in 1991. 

International lenders, whose assistance was considered a vital 
ingredient in restructuring Bulgaria's economy, responded unevenly 
to the events of 1992. Lenders demanded faster progress toward 
a market system, but Bulgarian policy makers were wary of losing 
public support by further cutting state subsidies for social programs. 
In late 1992, Bulgaria agreed to repay part of the interest overdue 



xliv 



to its international commercial creditors, as a good- faith step toward 
a 1993 debt settlement agreement. The additional expense, how- 
ever, promised to exacerbate the budget deficit. 

Prospects for Bulgaria's commercial relations with Western Eu- 
rope improved in late 1992 and early 1993. In March 1993, Bul- 
garia signed an agreement with the EC to establish a free-trade 
zone with that group over a ten-year transition period. A strong 
incentive for the Europeans was bolstering Bulgaria as a stabiliz- 
ing influence in the chaotic Balkans. In an April resolution on its 
relations with Bulgaria, the European Parliament (the legislative 
assembly of the EC) declared that no further guarantees of reform 
were needed because Bulgaria was on an irreversible line toward 
a market economy — a judgment likely encouraged by Balkan geo- 
politics. The new EC-Bulgarian accords were to go into effect in 
June 1993. 

In March 1993, Bulgaria also signed a free-trade agreement with 
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Although at that 
point only 3.5 percent of Bulgaria's exports went to EFTA mem- 
ber nations (Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, 
Sweden, and Switzerland), the terms of the agreement made sub- 
stantial expansion possible. Were the agreement ratified, 95 per- 
cent of Bulgarian industrial exports would have tariff-free access, 
while agricultural exports would be governed by bilateral arrange- 
ments. 

Besides the drive for inclusion in West European economic group- 
ings, the primary issue of Bulgarian foreign policy in early 1993 
was preventing expansion of the Yugoslav crisis. In keeping with 
its own consistent policy of nonintervention, Bulgaria warned the 
other Balkan states to refrain from military involvement that might 
return the entire region to the chaos that preceded World War I. 
Bulgaria opposed lifting the arms embargo on Bosnian Muslims, 
predicting that such a move would expand the conflict between 
Muslims and Serbs. Meanwhile, Bulgarian diplomats remained 
in constant contact with Greece and Turkey while reiterating Bul- 
garian support for the independence of all four former Yugoslav 
republics: Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and 
Slovenia. Berov traveled to Moscow in March to discuss the Balkan 
situation, trade, repayment of Russian debts to Bulgaria, and eco- 
nomic cooperation. No concrete decisions were made, although the 
Bulgarian and Russian representatives noted their nations' har- 
mony on the Balkan question. In early 1993, Bulgaria confirmed 
its intention to rely on Russia and Ukraine as primary military 
suppliers, choosing to maintain longstanding relations rather than 
incur the greater expense of refitting Bulgarian forces with Western 



xlv 



equipment. According to official Bulgarian statements, no secu- 
rity threat was perceived from instability in any former Soviet 
republic. 

Ethnic minority issues remained without solution in 1992, 
although no major open conflict resulted from continued tension 
between minorities and Bulgarian nationalists. Although 1992 
human rights legislation improved the legal status of minorities, 
unemployment hit them especially hard, and as many as 40,000 
Turks left Bulgaria in 1992. In the fall of 1992, the Roma (Gyp- 
sies) formed their first-ever national political organization in 
response to their dire economic conditions. Prime Minister Berov, 
whose government was nominally based on the ethnic-Turkish 
MRF, openly discussed pressure tactics used by both Turks and 
Bulgarian nationalists to influence ethnic self-identification in eth- 
nically mixed regions. In 1993 those tactics still included campaigns 
against restoration of Turkish names (following Zhivkov's mass 
renaming campaign) and campaigns against use of Turkish in 
schools with Turkish populations, as well as forcible Turkicization 
of Bulgarian Muslims preferring to live as Bulgarians. Berov 
pledged to prevent human rights abuses on both sides, but little 
concrete change occurred in the first half of 1993. 

Bulgaria began the fourth year of the post-Zhivkov era with 
prospects less optimistic than in the previous years. The momen- 
tum of economic reform was slowed significantly by continued high 
unemployment, rising inflation, low productivity, the resistance 
of Zhivkov-era holdovers in large state industries, and, increas- 
ingly, the cynicism of the Bulgarian public toward the usefulness 
of short-term sacrifice on the road to a market economy. The 
ominously growing shadow of the former Bulgarian Communist 
Party hung over the country, whose political system again collapsed 
into chaos in late 1992. International prospects seemed somewhat 
better, mainly because Bulgaria's designated role as a Balkan is- 
land of stability prompted increased Western support even when 
internal political and economic conditions failed to match Western 
expectations. But in 1993, the road from communism was prov- 
ing much more rocky than most Bulgarians had anticipated; for 
many Bulgarians, living standards were lower than under the Zhiv- 
kov regime, and patience was wearing thin. 



May 15, 1993 Glenn E. Curtis 



xlvi 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 



Tsarevets Hill in Veliko Turnovo, capital of the Second Bulgarian Emp 



THE HISTORY OF THE LAND now known as Bulgaria has 
been determined by its location between Asia and Europe, by its 
proximity to powerful states competing for land and influence at 
the junction of trade routes and strategic military positions, and 
by the strong national territorial drive of various Bulgarian states. 
Before the Christian era, Greece and Rome conquered the region 
and left substantial imprints on the culture of the people they found 
there. The Bulgar tribes, who arrived in the seventh century from 
west of the Urals, have occupied the region continuously for thir- 
teen centuries. Over time Bulgarian culture merged with that of 
the more numerous Slavs, who had preceded the Bulgars by one 
century. After converting to Christianity and adopting a Slavic lan- 
guage in the ninth century, the Bulgarians consolidated a distinct 
Slavic culture that subsequently passed through periods of both ex- 
pansionist independence and subordination to outside political 
systems. 

From the ninth until the fourteenth century, Bulgaria was a 
dominant force in the Balkans because of its aggressive military 
tradition and strong sense of national identity. The chief rival and 
neighbor, the Byzantine Empire, left a lasting political imprint on 
two Bulgarian empires as it competed with them for regional domi- 
nation. Marking the deterioration of both the Byzantine and the 
Bulgarian political structures, the fall of Constantinople to the 
Ottoman Turks in 1453 began four centuries of Turkish suppres- 
sion of Bulgarian cultural and political institutions. 

By the eighteenth century, however, weakening Ottoman con- 
trol allowed a Bulgarian cultural revival. In the next century, 
Western political ideas gradually combined with the reborn Bul- 
garian national consciousness to form an independence movement. 
The movement was complicated by internal disagreement on aims 
and methods, the increasing weakness of the Ottoman foothold in 
Europe, and the conflicting attitudes of the major European pow- 
ers toward Bulgaria. Russia gained distinction as Bulgaria's pro- 
tector by driving out the Turks in 1877, but France and Britain 
curbed Russian power in the Balkans by forcing establishment of 
a limited autonomous Bulgarian state under Turkish rule. The in- 
strument of that limitation, the Treaty of Berlin, revived longstand- 
ing Bulgarian territorial frustrations by placing the critical regions 
of Macedonia and Thrace beyond Bulgarian control. Both of those 
disputed regions had substantial Bulgarian populations. During 



3 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

the next sixty years, Bulgaria would fight unsuccessfully in four 
wars, in a variety of alliances, to redress the grievance. None of 
the four wars brought substantial new territory to Bulgaria. 

Beginning in 1878, Bulgaria was nominally ruled by members 
of West European royal houses under a parliamentary form of 
government. Prime Minister Stefan Stambolov unified the coun- 
try during its first decade, but extremist political parties exerted 
substantial influence from the beginning. Between 1878 and the 
declaration of full independence in 1908, Bulgaria passed through 
a period of peaceful modernization with expansion in industry, 
science, education, and the arts. Modernization and industriali- 
zation sowed the seeds of class conflict, however, nurturing strong 
socialist and agrarian opposition parties in the decades that followed 
independence. 

The period between 1912 and 1944 was full of irredentist wars 
and internal political turmoil. By 1900 Serbia and Greece were the 
major territorial rivals, but a World War I alliance with Germany 
gained Bulgaria litde advantage over them. After the war, the agrar- 
ian reform government of Aleksandur Stamboliiski had failed to 
unite the country by 1923. The series of unstable factions and forms 
of government that followed Stamboliiski was broken only by Bul- 
garia' s participation as an Axis ally in World War II. Again no 
territory was gained, but World War II brought Soviet occupa- 
tion, the end of the monarchy, and forty-one years of unbroken 
communist rule beginning in 1948. During that entire period, Bul- 
garia was the closest East European imitator of Soviet internal and 
foreign policy. The years 1948 through 1989 were a time of collec- 
tivization, heavy industrialization, drastic restriction of human 
rights, and close adherence to Soviet Cold- War policy. 

Early Settlement and Empire 

The land now known as Bulgaria attracted human settlement 
as early as the Bronze Age. Almost from the first, however, exist- 
ing civilizations were challenged by powerful neighbors. 

Pre-Bulgarian Civilizations 

The first known civilization to dominate the territory of present- 
day Bulgaria was that of the Thracians, an Indo-European group. 
Although politically fragmented, Thracian society is considered to 
have been comparable to that of Greece in the arts and econom- 
ics; these achievements reached a peak in the sixth century B.C. 
Because of political disunity, however, Thrace then was suc- 
cessively occupied and divided by the Greeks, the Persians, the 
Macedonians, and the Romans. After the decline of the Macedo- 
nian Empire of Alexander the Great, a new Thracian kingdom 



4 



Thracian burial mound near Shipka Pass, central Bulgaria 
Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg 

emerged in the third century B.C. Occupied by the Romans, it 
remained a kingdom within the Roman Empire until the emperor 
Vespasian incorporated it as a district in the first century A.D. 
Roman domination brought orderly administration and the estab- 
lishment of Serditsa (on the site of modern Sofia) as a major trad- 
ing center in the Balkans. In the fourth century A.D., when the 
Roman Empire split between Rome and Constantinople, Thrace 
became part of the Eastern, or Byzantine, Empire. Christianity 
was introduced to the region at this time. Both the Latin culture 
of Rome and the Greek culture of Constantinople remained strong 
influences on ensuing civilizations. 

The Slavs and the Bulgars 

Waves of Huns, Goths, Visigoths, and Ostrogoths invaded and 
plundered the Balkans beginning in the third century A.D. None 
of these invaders permanently occupied territory. Small Slavic 
groups began settling outlying regions in the fifth century, and by 
the seventh century the Slavs had overcome Byzantine resistance 
and settled most of the Balkans. The Slavs brought a more stable 
culture, retained their own language, and substantially slavicized 
the existing Roman and Byzantine social system. 

The immigration of the first Bulgars overlapped that of the Slavs 



5 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

in the seventh century. Of mixed Turkic stock (the word Bulgar 
derives from an Old Turkic word meaning "one of mixed nation- 
ality"), the Bulgars were warriors who had migrated from a region 
between the Urals and the Volga to the steppes north of the Caspian 
Sea, then across the Danube into the Balkans. Besides a formid- 
able reputation as military horsemen, the Bulgars had a strong po- 
litical organization based on their khan (prince). In A.D. 630 a 
federation of Bulgar tribes already existed; in the next years the 
Bulgars united with the Slavs to oppose Byzantine control. By 681 
the khan Asparukh had forced Emperor Constantine V to recog- 
nize the first Bulgarian state. The state, whose capital was at Pliska, 
near modern Shumen, combined a Bulgarian political structure 
with Slavic linguistic and cultural institutions. 

The First Golden Age 

The First Bulgarian Empire was able to defeat the Byzantine 
Empire in 81 1 and expand its territory eastward to the Black Sea, 
south to include Macedonia, and northwest to present-day Belgrade 
(see fig. 2). The kingdom reached its greatest size under Tsar 
Simeon (893-927), who presided over a golden age of artistic and 
commercial expansion. After moving deep into Byzantine terri- 
tory, Simeon was defeated in 924. 

Meanwhile, Rome and Byzantium competed for political and 
cultural influence in Bulgaria. The Eastern Empire won in 870, 
when Bulgaria accepted Eastern Rite (Orthodox) Christianity and 
an autocephalous Bulgarian Church was established. This decision 
opened Bulgaria to Byzantine culture (and territorial ambitions) 
through the literary language devised for the Slavs by the Ortho- 
dox monks Cyril and Methodius. Establishment of a common, offi- 
cial religion also permanently joined the Bulgarian and Slavic 
cultures. 

After reaching its peak under Simeon, the First Bulgarian Em- 
pire declined in the middle of the tenth century. Byzantine oppo- 
sition and internal weakness led to a loss of territory to the Magyars 
and the Russians. Bulgaria remained economically dependent on 
the Byzantine Empire, and the widespread Bogomil heresy (see 
Glossary) opposed the secular Bulgarian state and its political am- 
bitions as work of the devil. Seeking to restore a balance of power 
in the Balkans, the Byzantines allied with the Kievan Russians 
under Yaroslav and invaded Bulgaria several times in the late tenth 
century. Although the Bulgarians expanded their territory again 
briefly under Tsar Samuil at the end of the tenth century, in 1014 
the Byzantines under Basil II inflicted a major military loss. By 
1018 all of Bulgaria was under Byzantine control. For nearly two 



6 



Historical Setting 



centuries, the Byzantines ruled harshly, using taxes and the polit- 
ical power of the church to crush opposition. The first and second 
Crusades passed through Bulgaria in this period, devastating the 
land. 

The Second Golden Age 

By 1185 the power of the Byzantine Empire had again waned 
because of external conflicts. The noble brothers Asen and Peter 
led a revolt that forced Byzantine recognition of an autonomous Bul- 
garian state. Centered at Turnovo (present-day Veliko Turnovo), 
this state became the Second Bulgarian Empire. Like the First Bul- 
garian Empire, the second expanded at the expense of a preoccupied 
Byzantine Empire. In 1202 Tsar Kaloian (1197-1207) concluded 
a final peace with Byzantium that gave Bulgaria full independence. 
Kaloian also drove the Magyars from Bulgarian territory and in 
1204 concluded a treaty with Rome that consolidated Bulgaria's 
western border by recognizing the authority of the pope. By the 
middle of the thirteenth century, Bulgaria again ruled from the 
Black Sea to the Adriatic. Access to the sea greatly increased com- 
merce, especially with the Italian Peninsula. Turnovo became the 
center of Bulgarian culture, which enjoyed a second golden age. 

The final phase of Bulgaria's second Balkan dominance was the 
reign of Kaloian 's successor, Ivan Asen II (1218-41; see fig. 3). 
In this period, culture continued to flourish, but political instabil- 
ity again threatened. After the death of Ivan Asen II, internal and 
external political strife intensified. Sensing weakness, the Tatars 
began sixty years of raids in 1241, the Byzantines retook parts of 
the Second Bulgarian Empire, and the Magyars again advanced. 
From 1257 until 1277, aristocratic factions fought for control of 
the Bulgarian throne. Heavy taxation by feudal landlords caused 
their peasants to revolt in 1277 and enthrone the "swineherd tsar" 
Ivailo. After 1300 Tatar control ended, and a new period of ex- 
pansion followed under Mikhail Shishman (1323-1330) and Ivan 
Aleksandur (1331-1370). As before, however, military and com- 
mercial success paralleled internal disorder; the social chaos of the 
previous century continued to erode the power of Bulgarian lead- 
ers. Meanwhile, Serbia had risen as a formidable rival in the 
Balkans, and the Ottoman Turks had advanced to the Aegean coast. 
In the late fourteenth century, Bulgaria was weakened by the di- 
vision of its military defenses between the two perceived threats. 

Ottoman Rule 

The Ottoman Empire was founded in the early fourteenth cen- 
tury by Osman I, a prince of Asia Minor (see Glossary) who began 



7 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 




Figure 2. The First Bulgarian Empire under Simeon, A.D. 893-927 

pushing the eastern border of the Byzantine Empire westward toward 
Constantinople. Present-day European Turkey and the Balkans, 
among the first territories conquered, were used as bases for ex- 
pansion far to the West during the fifteenth and sixteenth centu- 
ries. The capture of Constantinople in 1453 completed Ottoman 
subjugation of major Bulgarian political and cultural institutions. 
Nevertheless, certain Bulgarian groups prospered in the highly or- 
dered Ottoman system, and Bulgarian national traditions continued 
in rural areas. When the decline of the Ottoman Empire began about 
1600, the order of local institutions gave way to arbitrary repres- 
sion, which eventually generated armed opposition. Western ideas 
that penetrated Bulgaria during the 1 700s stimulated a renewed con- 
cept of Bulgarian nationalism that eventually combined with decay 
in the empire to loosen Ottoman control in the nineteenth century. 



8 



Historical Setting 



Introduction of the Ottoman System 

Ottoman forces captured the commercial center of Sofia in 1385. 
Serbia, then the strongest Christian power in the Balkans, was deci- 
sively defeated by the Ottomans at the Battle of Kosovo Polje in 
1389, leaving Bulgaria divided and exposed. Within ten years, the 
last independent Bulgarian outpost was captured. Bulgarian re- 
sistance continued until 1453, when the capture of Constantino- 
ple gave the Ottomans a base from which to crush local uprisings. 
In consolidating its Balkan territories, the new Ottoman political 
order eliminated the entire Bulgarian state apparatus. The Otto- 
mans also crushed the nobility as a landholding class and poten- 
tial center of resistance. The new rulers reorganized the Bulgarian 
church, which had existed as a separate patriarchate since 1235, 
making it a diocese under complete control of the Byzantine Patri- 
archate at Constantinople. The sultan, in turn, totally controlled 
the patriarchate. 

The Ottomans ruled with a centralized system much different 
from the scattered local power centers of the Second Bulgarian Em- 
pire. The single goal of Ottoman policy in Bulgarian territory was 
to make all local resources available to extend the empire westward 
toward Vienna and across northern Africa. Landed estates were 
given in fiefdom to knights bound to serve the sultan. Peasants paid 
multiple taxes to both their masters and the government. Territorial 
control also meant cultural and religious assimilation of the populace 
into the empire. Ottoman authorities forcibly converted the most 
promising Christian youths to Islam and trained them for govern- 
ment service. Called pomaks, such converts often received special 
privileges and rose to high administrative and military positions. 
The Ottoman system also recognized the value of Bulgarian arti- 
sans, who were organized and given limited autonomy as a separate 
class. Some prosperous Bulgarian peasants and merchants became 
intermediaries between local Turkish authorities and the peasants. 
In this capacity, these chorbadzhi (squires) were able to moderate 
Ottoman policy. On the negative side, the Ottoman assimilation 
policy also included resettlement of Balkan Slavs in Asia Minor 
and immigration of Turkish peasants to farm Bulgarian land. Slavs 
also were the victims of mass enslavement and forcible mass con- 
version to Islam in certain areas. 

Bulgarian Society under the Turks 

Traditional Bulgarian culture survived only in the smaller vil- 
lages during the centuries of Ottoman rule. Because the adminis- 
trative apparatus of the Ottoman Empire included officials of many 
nationalities, commerce in the polyglot empire introduced Jews, 



9 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 




Source: Based on information from Christ Atanasoff, The Bulgarians, Hicksville, New York, 
1977, 37; and Hermann Kinder and Werner Hilgemann, The Anchor Atlas of World 
History, 1, Garden City, New York, 1974, 204. 

Figure 3. The Second Bulgarian Empire under Ivan Asen, 1218-41 

Armenians, Dalmatians, and Greeks into the chief population 
centers. Bulgarians in such centers were forcibly resettled as part 
of a policy to scatter the potentially troublesome educated classes. 
The villages, however, were often ignored by the centralized Otto- 
man authorities, whose control over the Turkish landholders often 
exerted a modifying influence that worked to the advantage of the 
indigenous population. Village church life also felt relatively little 
impact from the centralized authority of the Greek Orthodox Church. 
Therefore, between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries, the 
villages became isolated repositories of Bulgarian folk culture, 
religion, social institutions, and language. 

Early Decay and Upheaval in the Empire 

Notable Bulgarian uprisings against the Ottomans occurred in 



10 



Historical Setting 



the 1590s, the 1680s and the 1730s; all sought to take advantage 
of external crises of the empire, and all were harshly suppressed. 
Beginning in the 1600s, local bandits, called hajduti (sing. , hajdutin), 
led small uprisings (see fig. 4). Some writers now describe these 
uprisings as precursors of a Bulgarian nationalist movement. Most 
scholars agree, however, that hajdutin activities responded only to 
local misrule and their raids victimized both Christians and Mus- 
lims. Whatever their motivation, hajdutin exploits became a cen- 
tral theme of national folk culture. 

By 1600 the Ottoman Empire had reached the peak of its power 
and territorial control. In the seventeenth century, the empire began 
to collapse; the wealth of conquest had spread corruption through 
the political system, vitiating the ability of the central government 
to impose order throughout the farflung empire. For the majority 
of people in agricultural Bulgaria, centralized Ottoman control had 
been far from intolerable while the empire was orderly and strong. 
But the growing despotism of local authorities as the central govern- 
ment declined created a new class of victims. Increasingly, Bul- 
garians welcomed the progressive Western political ideas that 
reached them through the Danube trade and travel routes. Already 
in the 1600s, Catholic missionaries in western Bulgaria had stimu- 
lated creation of literature about Bulgaria's national past. Although 
the Turks suppressed this Western influence after the Chiprovets 
uprising of 1688, the next century brought an outpouring of histor- 
ical writings reminding Bulgarian readers of a glorious national 
heritage. 

National Revival, Early Stages 

For Bulgaria the eighteenth century brought transition from static 
subservience within a great Asian empire toward intellectual and 
political modernization and reestablishment of cultural ties with 
Western Europe. The monasteries of an increasingly independent 
Bulgarian church fostered national thought and writing; Western 
influences altered the nature of commerce and landholding in the 
Balkans; and the forcible assimilation of Bulgarian culture into a 
cosmopolitan Asian society ended, allowing Bulgarian national con- 
sciousness to reawaken. At the same time, social anarchy inhib- 
ited the liberation process. These developments set the stage for 
a full national revival. 

The Written Word 

In the eighteenth century, all Slavic cultures moved away from 
the formal Old Church Slavonic language that had dominated their 
literatures for centuries. The literary language that emerged was 



11 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 




• Populated place 

j' | Area of hajdutin activity lOO 200 Kilometers 

100 200 Miles 



Source: Based on information from Ilcho Dimitrov (ed.), Kratka istoriia na Bulgariia, Sofia, 
1981, 153; and Hermann Kinder and Werner Hilgemann, The Anchor Atlas of World 
History, 1, Garden City, New York, 1974, 208. 

Figure 4. Hajdutin Activity in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1800 

much closer to the common vernacular, eventually making books 
accessible to a much wider readership. In 1741 Hristofor Zhefarovich 
published his Stematografia, a discussion of the cultural history of 
the Serbs and the Bulgarians. The book displayed the Bulgarian 
coat of arms and praised the glorious past of the Bulgarian people. 
In 1762 Father Paisi of Hilendar wrote a history of the Bulgarian 
peoples in a mixture of Old Church Slavonic and vernacular lan- 
guage. Circulated in manuscript form for nearly one hundred years, 
the book was a lively, readable celebration of the Bulgarian past 
and a call for all Bulgarians to remember their heritage and culti- 
vate their native language. Paisi' s history inspired generations of 
writings on Bulgarian patriotic themes. In part, its influence was 
strong because Paisi wrote at a monastery on Mt. Athos, the larg- 
est spiritual center in the Balkans and an early receptacle of ideas 



12 



Historical Setting 



of the European Enlightenment (see Glossary). Paisi's follower 
Sofronii Vrachanski further developed the literature by using a 
much more vernacular language to advance secular ideas of the 
Enlightenment in translations of Greek myths and his original Life 
and Tribulations of the Sinner Sofronii. Sofronii also published the first 
printed book in Bulgaria in 1806. 

Commerce and Western Influences 

Under the Ottoman Empire, the Mediterranean and Asian trade 
routes met in Bulgaria. Fairs and regional markets eventually 
brought tradesmen into contact with their foreign counterparts. 
After centuries of exclusion from population centers by Turkish 
policy, Bulgarians began migrating back to the towns, establish- 
ing an urban ethnic presence. By the eighteenth century, trade 
guilds included many workers in cloth, metal, wood, and decora- 
tive braid. The estate holders of Macedonia also profited from grow- 
ing European cotton markets. Some Bulgarian merchants assumed 
positions as intermediaries between Turkish and European mar- 
kets, grew rich from such connections, and established offices in 
the major European capitals. As the Bulgarian cultural revival 
spread from the monasteries into secular society, these newly 
wealthy groups promoted secular art, architecture, literature, and 
Western ideals of individual freedom and national consciousness. 
Of particular impact were the ideals of the French Revolution, in- 
troduced through commercial connections at the start of the 
nineteenth century. 

The end of centralized Ottoman power over Bulgarian territory 
brought several decades of anarchy, called the kurdzhaliistvo, at the 
end of the eighteenth century. As at the end of the Second Bulgar- 
ian Empire four hundred years before, local freebooters controlled 
small areas, tyrannized the population, and fought among them- 
selves. Political order was not reestablished in Bulgaria until 1820. 
Meanwhile, large population shifts occurred as Bulgarians fled the 
taxation and violence inflicted by this anarchic condition; the new 
communities they founded in Romania and southern Russia were 
important sources of cultural and political ideas in the nineteenth 
century. 

The Bulgarian national revival took place in the larger context 
of Christian resistance to Turkish occupation of Eastern and Cen- 
tral Europe — a cause whose momentum increased as the Ottoman 
Empire crumbled from within. Russia fought a series of wars with 
the Turks between 1676 and 1878, and was given the right to pro- 
tect Christians living under Ottoman rule in treaties signed in 1774 
and 1791 . Those treaties granted semiautonomy to the Romanian 



13 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

regions of Wallachia and Moldavia, which gave hope that Russia 
might provide similar help to Bulgaria during the kurdzhaliistvo. In- 
tellectual ties between Bulgaria and Russia promoted the adoption 
of Russian revolutionary thought along with Western influences. 
In 1804 Sofronii offered the help of the entire Bulgarian people 
to Russian armies fighting the Turks and moving toward Bulgar- 
ian territory. By 1811 a special volunteer army of several thou- 
sand Bulgarians had been formed, in the hope that Russian success 
against the Turks would liberate Bulgaria. Although the Russians 
did not aid the Bulgarians directly at that time, Russia remained 
crucial to Bulgarian foreign relations from that time to the late twen- 
tieth century. 

European and Russian Policies, 1800 

By 1800 the Ottoman Empire was universally labeled ''The Sick 
Man of Europe." The empire was precariously near total collapse 
and ready to be dismantled by a powerful neighbor, just as the 
Byzantine Empire had been dismantied by the Ottomans. In this 
case the logical successor was Russia, an expanding empire with 
strong religious and cultural ties to the captive Slavic groups. Russia 
also had a continuing desire to achieve access to the Mediterra- 
nean Sea. Russian military power reached its peak with the defeat 
of Napoleon's invading army in 1812, but throughout the nine- 
teenth century France and Britain used diplomatic and military 
means to counterbalance Russian influence in the Balkans and the 
Bosporus. This implicit defense of the Ottoman Empire delayed 
Bulgarian independence, but the intellectual basis of revolution grew 
rapidly in the nineteenth century. 

The Bulgarian Independence Movement 

Revolution in the Balkans 

In 1804 Serbia began a series of uprisings that won it autonomy 
within the Ottoman Empire by 1830. Especially in the campaigns 
of 1804 and 1815. many Bulgarians in areas adjacent to Serbia 
fought beside the Serbs. When the Greeks revolted against Tur- 
kish rule in 1821, Bulgarian towns provided money and soldiers. 
Several hundred Bulgarians fought in the six-year Greek uprising, 
some of them as commanders, and some became part of the govern- 
ment of independent Greece. Bulgarians also fought the Turks in 
Crete: in addition, they fought with the Italian revolutionary 
Giuseppe Garibaldi and with other nationalist uprisings against 
the Habsburgs in 1848-49. In spite of Bulgarian sympathy for na- 
tional liberation movements nearby, and although the ideals of those 



14 



Turkish mosque, Kyustendil 
Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg 

movements permeated the Balkans from 1804 on, the anarchy of 
the early 1800s confined expression of Bulgarian national feeling 
primarily to the cultural realm until the 1860s. 

Cultural Expressions of Nationalism 

In 1824 Dr. Petur Beron, a member of the Bulgarian emigrant 
community in Romania, published the first primer in colloquial Bul- 
garian. His book also explained a new system of secular education 
to replace the outdated precepts of monastery pedagogy, and Beron' s 
suggestions strongly influenced the development of Bulgarian edu- 
cation in the nineteenth century. In 1835 a school was opened in 
Gabrovo according to Beron 's design. Under direction of the monk 
Neofit Rilski, it was the first school to teach in Bulgarian. Similar 
schools opened in the ensuing years, and in 1840 the first school 
for girls opened in Pleven. Education grew especially fast in trad- 
ing towns such as Koprivshtitsa and Kalofer in the foothills of the 
Balkans, where textiles and other trades created a wealthy merchant 
class. In the 1840s, the first generation of Western-educated Bul- 
garians returned home. Forming a cosmopolitan intelligentsia, they 
diversified and expanded Bulgarian schools in the following decades. 

In the first half of the 1800s, special educational and cultural ties 
developed with Russia and France. In 1840 the Russian government 



15 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

began awarding grants for Bulgarian students to study in Russia. 
The total number of students in the Russian program was never 
high, but several graduates were leaders in the independence drive 
of the 1870s. Several notable Bulgarians of that generation also 
were educated in France and at Robert College, founded as a mis- 
sionary institution in Constantinople. 

Parallel with educational advancement, Bulgarian book print- 
ing advanced substantially after 1830. Before that date only seven- 
teen original Bulgarian titles had been printed; but by mid-century, 
printing had replaced manuscript copying as the predominant 
means of distributing the written word. The first periodical was 
printed in Bulgarian in 1844, beginning an outpouring of mostly 
ephemeral journals through the nineteenth century. Censorship be- 
fore 1878 meant that the majority of such journals were printed 
in the Romanian emigrant centers, outside the Ottoman Empire. 
Most Bulgarian-language periodicals printed within the empire 
came from Constantinople, showing the cultural importance of that 
city to the Bulgarian National Revival. After 1850 Bulgarian emigre 
periodicals, supporting a wide variety of political views toward the 
national independence movement, played a vital role in stimulat- 
ing Bulgarian political consciousness. 

In the mid- 1800s, a number of cultural and charitable organi- 
zations founded in Constantinople supported and directed Bulgarian 
national institutions that resisted Ottoman and Greek influence. 
The social institution of the chitalishte (literally "reading room") 
played an important cultural role beginning in 1856. Established 
in population centers by adult education societies, the chitalishte was 
a center for social gatherings, lectures, performances, and debates. 
Because it was available to the entire public, this institution spread 
national cultural and political ideals beyond the intelligentsia to 
the larger society. By 1878 there were 131 such centers. 

The Bulgarian National Revival also stimulated the arts in the 
nineteenth century. Dobri Chintulov wrote the first poetry in 
modern Bulgarian in the 1840s, pioneering a national literary 
revival that peaked in the 1870s. Translation of Western European 
and Russian literature accelerated, providing new influences that 
broke centuries of rigid formalism. Painting and architecture now 
also broke from the prescribed forms of Byzantine church art to 
express secular and folk themes. Bulgarian wood-carving and church 
singing assumed the forms that survive today. 

Religious Independence 

The Bulgarian church achieved new independence in the nine- 
teenth century. The Ottoman Empire had left the Bulgarian church 



16 



Historical Setting 



hierarchy under the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople for four 
centuries, disregarding the differences between the two Orthodox 
churches. (The last separate Bulgarian church jurisdiction, the arch- 
bishopric of Ohrid, was absorbed in 1767.) Early in the 1800s, few 
of the Bulgarian church leaders most closely connected with En- 
lightenment ideas sought separation from the Greek Orthodox 
Church. But in 1839, a movement began against the Greek 
Metropolitan of Turnovo, head of the largest Bulgarian diocese, 
in favor of local control. In 1849 the active Bulgarian community 
of Constantinople began pressing Turkish officials for church 
sovereignty. Other large Bulgarian dioceses both inside and out- 
side Bulgaria sought a return to liturgy in the vernacular and ap- 
pointment of Bulgarian bishops. The first concession came in 1848, 
when the Greek patriarch of Constantinople allowed one Bulgar- 
ian church in that city. 

Because a decade of petitions, demonstrations, and Ottoman re- 
form suggestions had brought no major change, in 1860 Bishop 
Ilarion Makariopolski of Constantinople declared his diocese in- 
dependent of the Greek patriarchate. This action began a move- 
ment for ecclesiastical independence that united rural and urban 
Bulgarians and began a bitter Greek-Bulgarian dispute. The Turks 
and the Russians began to mediate in 1866, seeking a compromise 
that would ensure the security of each in the face of increasing 
regional unrest. In 1870 the Ottoman sultan officially declared the 
Bulgarian church a separate exarchate. The Greek patriarchate, 
which never recognized the separation, excommunicated the en- 
tire Bulgarian church; but the symbolism of the Ottoman decree 
had powerful political effect. The new exarchate became the lead- 
ing force in Bulgarian cultural life; it officially represented the Bul- 
garians in dealing with the Turks, and it sponsored Bulgarian 
schools. The novel administrative system of the exarchate called 
for lay representation in governing bodies, thus introducing a note 
of self-government into this most visible institution. 

Early Insurrections 

The social and cultural events of the National Revival moved 
parallel to important political changes. Bulgarian aid to the Rus- 
sians in the Russo-Turkish wars of 1806-12 and 1828-29 did noth- 
ing to loosen Ottoman control. Then the Ottoman Empire ruthlessly 
quelled major Bulgarian uprisings in 1835 (in Turnovo), 1841 (in 
Nis), and in 1850-51 (in Vidin). Those uprisings still bore the 
disorganized qualities of the hajduti, but, together with smaller move- 
ments in intervening years, they established a tradition of insur- 
rection for the next generation. Meanwhile, beset by European 



17 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

enemies and internal revolutions, the Turks entered a reform period 
in 1826. They replaced the elite but increasingly untrustworthy 
Janissary forces with a regular army and officially abolished the 
feudal land system. These changes reduced oppression by the local 
Turkish rulers in Bulgaria. In the 1830s, Sultan Mahmud II recen- 
tralized and reorganized his government to gain control over his 
corrupt officials and follow European administrative models. 
Although these changes had little direct effect on Bulgaria, they 
clearly signaled to the Slavic subjects of the empire that reform was 
now possible. 

Balkan Politics of the Mid-Nineteenth Century 

By 1850 the emerging Bulgarian nationalist movement had split 
into two distinct branches. The moderates, concentrated in Con- 
stantinople, favored gradual improvement of conditions in Bulgaria 
through negotiations with the Turkish government. This was the 
approach that created a separate Bulgarian exarchate in 1870. The 
moderates believed that the protection of the Ottoman Empire was 
necessary because a free Bulgaria would be subject to Balkan poli- 
tics and great-power manipulation. The radical faction, however, 
saw no hope of gradual reform. Following their understanding of 
European liberal tradition and Russian revolutionary thought, the 
leaders of this faction aimed first for liberation from all outside con- 
trols. Liberation, they believed, would automatically lead to com- 
plete modernization of Bulgarian society. 

The crushing of the large-scale Vidin peasant revolt in 1851 
brought intervention by Britain and France, who bolstered and pro- 
tected the Ottoman Empire throughout the nineteenth century as 
a counterweight to Russian expansion. To prevent destabilizing 
unrest, Britain and France forced the Turks to introduce land re- 
form in western Bulgaria in the early 1850s and a series of major 
social reforms in 1856 and 1876. Nominally, those measures in- 
cluded equal treatment for non-Muslims in the empire and 
parliamentary representation for Bulgarians and Serbs. These 
changes, however, were the cosmetic product of Turkey's need for 
Western support in major wars with Russia. They did nothing to 
blunt the nationalist drive of the Bulgarian radicals. 

The First Independence Organizations 

In 1862 Georgi Rakovski assembled the first armed group of Bul- 
garians having the avowed goal of achieving independence from 
the Ottoman Empire. Rakovski, well-educated and experienced 
in the 1841 uprising and the drive for ecclesiastical independence, 
envisioned a federal republic including all Balkan nations except 



18 



Historical Setting 



Greece. His fighters were to stir a full-scale national uprising after 
crossing into Bulgaria from assembly points in Romania and Serbia. 
But the Serbs, who had supported the Bulgarians while they were 
useful in opposing the Turks, disbanded the Bulgarian legions in 
Serbia when they no longer served that purpose. Although Rakovski 
died in 1867 without achieving Bulgarian independence, he united 
the emigre intelligentsia, and the presence of his army influenced 
Turkish recognition of the Bulgarian church in 1870. 

The Bulgarian Secret Central Committee, founded by emigre 
Bulgarians in Bucharest in 1866, continued Rakovski 's mission 
under the leadership of Vasil Levski and Liuben Karavelov. These 
ideologues refined Rakovski' s idea of armed revolutionary groups, 
creating a cadre of intellectuals who would prepare the people to 
rise for independence. Beginning in 1868, Levski founded the first 
revolutionary committees in Bulgaria. Captured by the Turks, he 
became a national hero when he was hanged in 1873. In 1870 
Karavelov founded the Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Commit- 
tee (BRCC) in Bucharest. The death of Levski temporarily shat- 
tered the group, but the committee resumed its activities when 
Georgi Benkovski joined its leadership in 1875. By this time, the 
political atmosphere of the Balkans was charged with revolution, 
and the Ottoman Empire looked increasingly vulnerable. Britain, 
Russia, and Austria-Hungary were growing concerned about the 
implications of those trends for the European balance of power. 
In 1875 Bosnia and Hercegovina revolted successfully against the 
Turks, and the next year Serbia and Montenegro attacked the Otto- 
man Empire. 

The Final Move to Independence 

In the early 1870s, the BRCC had built an intricate revolution- 
ary organization, recruiting thousands of ardent patriots for the 
liberation struggle. Finally, in 1875 the committee believed that 
external distractions had weakened the Ottoman Empire enough 
to activate that struggle. Local revolutionary committees in Bul- 
garia attempted to coordinate the timing and strategy of a general 
revolt. Armed groups were to enter Bulgaria from abroad to sup- 
port local uprisings, and diversionary attacks on Ottoman mili- 
tary installations were planned. Despite these efforts at coordination, 
the BRCC strategy failed. Although planned as a general revolt, 
the September Uprising of 1875 occurred piecemeal in isolated lo- 
cations, and several local revolutionary leaders failed to mobilize 
any forces. The Turks easily suppressed the uprising, but the harsh- 
ness of their response attracted the attention of Western Europe; 
from that time, the fate of Bulgaria became an international issue. 



19 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

Following the failure of the September Uprising, Benkovski re- 
organized the BRCC and made plans for a new revolt. The April 
Uprising of 1876 was more widespread, but it also suffered from 
poor coordination. Poor security allowed the Turks to locate and 
destroy many local groups before unified action was possible. Mas- 
sacres at Batak and other towns further outraged international opin- 
ion by showing the insincerity of recent Turkish reform proposals. 
The deaths of an estimated 30,000 Bulgarians in these massacres 
spurred the Bulgarian national movement. An international con- 
ference in Constantinople produced proposals to curb the Muslim 
fanaticism responsible for the Bulgarian massacres and give local 
self-government to the Christians on European territory in the em- 
pire. Two autonomous Bulgarian regions were proposed, one cen- 
tered at Sofia and the other at Turnovo. When the sultan rejected 
the reforms, Russia declared war unilaterally in early 1877. This 
was Russia's golden opportunity to gain control of Western trade 
routes to its southwest and finally destroy the empire that had 
blocked this ambition for centuries. Shocked by the Turkish mas- 
sacres, Britain did not oppose Russian advances. 

San Stefano, Berlin, and Independence 

In eight months, Russian troops occupied all of Bulgaria and 
reached Constantinople. At this high point of its influence on Balkan 
affairs, Russia dictated the Treaty of San Stefano in March 1878. 
This treaty provided for an autonomous Bulgarian state (under Rus- 
sian protection) almost as extensive as the First Bulgarian Empire, 
bordering the Black and Aegean seas. But Britain and Austria- 
Hungary, believing that the new state would extend Russian in- 
fluence too far into the Balkans, exerted strong diplomatic pres- 
sure that reshaped the Treaty of San Stefano four months later into 
the Treaty of Berlin. The new Bulgaria would be about one-third 
the size of that prescribed by the Treaty of San Stefano; Mace- 
donia and Thrace, south of the Balkans, would revert to complete 
Ottoman control. The province of Eastern Rumelia would remain 
under Turkish rule, but with a Christian governor (see fig. 5). 

Whereas the Treaty of San Stefano called for two years of Rus- 
sian occupation of Bulgaria, the Treaty of Berlin reduced the time 
to nine months. Both treaties provided for an assembly of Bulgar- 
ian notables to write a constitution for their new country. The as- 
sembly would also elect a prince who was not a member of a major 
European ruling house and who would recognize the authority of 
the Ottoman sultan. In cases of civil disruption, the sultan retained 
the right to intervene with armed force. 

The final provisions for Bulgarian liberation fell far short of the 



20 




Statue of lane Sandanski, nineteenth- century revolutionary, Melnik 

Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg 



21 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



goals of the national liberation movement. Large populations of 
Bulgarians remained outside the new nation in Macedonia, Eastern 
Rumelia, and Thrace, causing resentment that endured well into 
the next century. (Bulgarians still celebrate the signing of the Treaty 
of San Stefano rather than the Treaty of Berlin as their national 
independence day.) In late 1878, a provisional Bulgarian govern- 
ment and armed uprisings had already surfaced in the Kresna and 
Razlog regions of Macedonia. These uprisings were quelled swiftly 
by the Turks with British support. During the next twenty-five 
years, large numbers of Bulgarians fled Macedonia into the new 
Bulgaria, and secret liberation societies appeared in Macedonia 
and Thrace. One such group, the Internal Macedonian Revolu- 
tionary Organization (IMRO), continued terrorist activities in the 
Balkans into the 1930s. 

The Decades of National Consolidation 

Despite strong dissatisfaction with the frontiers imposed by the 
European powers, a new Bulgarian state was born in 1878. And 
despite early political uncertainty, the first thirty-four years of 
modern Bulgaria were in many ways its most prosperous and 
productive. 

Forming the New State 

In 1879 a constituent assembly was duly convened in Turnovo. 
Partly elected and partly appointed, the assembly of 230 split into 
conservative and liberal factions similar to those that had existed 
before independence. The liberals advocated continuing the alli- 
ance of peasants and intelligentsia that had formed the indepen- 
dence movement, to be symbolized in a single parliamentary 
chamber; the conservatives argued that the Bulgarian peasant class 
was not ready for political responsibility, and therefore it should 
be represented in a second chamber with limited powers. The frame- 
work for the Turnovo constitution was a draft submitted by the 
Russian occupation authorities, based on the constitutions of Ser- 
bia and Romania. As the assembly revised that document, the lib- 
eral view prevailed; a one-chamber parliament or subranie would 
be elected by universal male suffrage. Between the annual fall ses- 
sions of the subranie, the country would be run jointly by the 
monarch and a council of ministers responsible to parliament. The 
liberals who dominated the assembly incorporated many of their 
revolutionary ideals into what became one of the most liberal con- 
stitutions of its time. The final act of the Turnovo assembly was 
the election of Alexander of Battenburg, a young German nobleman 



22 



Historical Setting 



who had joined the Russians in the war of 1877, to be the first 
prince of modern Bulgaria. 

From the beginning of his reign, Alexander opposed the liberal 
wing in Bulgaria and the Turnovo constitution. After two years 
of conflict with the liberal council of ministers headed by Dragan 
Tsankov, Alexander received Russian backing to replace Tsankov. 
When the Russian Tsar Alexander II was assassinated, Russian 
policy changed to allow a grand national assembly to consider the 
constitutional changes desired by Prince Alexander. The assassi- 
nation had spurred conservatism in Russia, and the Bulgarian liber- 
als had alarmed the Russians by refusing foreign economic aid in 
the early 1880s. To the dismay of the liberals, Russia intervened 
in the election of the constitutional subranie, frightening voters into 
electing a group that passed the entire package of amendments. 
Liberal influence was sharply reduced by amendments limiting the 
power of the subranie. But, because the conservative approach to 
governing Bulgaria had little popular support, Alexander made a 
series of compromises with liberal positions between 1881 and 1885. 
The Turnovo constitution was essentially restored by agreement 
between Tsankov and the conservatives in 1883, and the constitu- 
tional issue was resolved. In only the first two years of Bulgaria's 
existence, two parliaments and seven cabinets had been dissolved, 
but more stable times lay ahead. 

By 1884 the conservative faction had left the government, but 
the liberals split over the high price of purchasing the Ruse-Varna 
Railway from the British, as required by the Treaty of Berlin. As 
on earlier issues, the more radical faction sought to reduce the in- 
fluence of the European powers who had imposed the Treaty of 
Berlin. This group was led by Petko Karavelov, brother of revolu- 
tionary leader Liuben Karavelov and prime minister in the mid- 
18808. 

The most important issue of that period was Bulgaria's chang- 
ing relationship with Russia. Bulgarian hostility towards the Rus- 
sian army, refusal to build a strategic railway for the Russians 
through Bulgaria, and poor relations between Prince Alexander 
and Tsar Alexander III of Russia all contributed to increasing alie- 
nation. Because conservative Russia now feared unrest in the 
Balkans, Karavelov tried to appease the tsar by quelling the upris- 
ings that continued in Macedonia. Radical factions in Bulgaria were 
persuaded to lower their goals from annexation of Macedonia and 
Thrace to a union between Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. When 
a bloodless coup achieved this union in 1885, however, Russia 
demanded the ouster of Prince Alexander and withdrew all Russian 



23 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 




® Capital Boundary according to 

Treaty of San Stefano, 

• Populated place March 1878 100 200 Kilometers 

I ' 1 1 1 

Boundary according to 100 200 Miles 

Treaty of Berlin, 

July 1878 



Source: Based on information from R.J. Crampton, A Short History of Bulgaria, Cambridge, 
1987, frontispiece. 

Figure 5. Territorial Changes in Bulgaria, 1878-85 

officers from the Bulgarian army. Greece and Serbia saw their 
interests threatened, and the latter declared war on Bulgaria. 

The Bulgarian army won a brilliant victory over Serbia, with 
no Russian aid, at the Battle of Slivnitsa. Although the victory was 
a source of great national pride for Bulgaria, Russia continued to 
withhold recognition of the union with Eastern Rumelia until Prince 
Alexander abdicated. Finally, Russian-trained Bulgarian army 
officers deposed the prince in August 1886. 

The Stambolov Years 

When Alexander left behind a three-man regency headed by 
Stefan Stambolov, the Bulgarian government was as unstable as 
it had been in its first year. A Russian-educated liberal, Stambolov 
became prime minister in 1887 and ceased tailoring Bulgarian policy 
to Russian requirements. The tsar's special representative in 



24 



Historical Setting 



Bulgaria returned to Russia after failing to block a subranie called 
to nominate a new prince. Russo-Bulgarian relations remained 
chilly for the next ten years, and this break further destabilized 
Bulgarian politics and society. Stambolov brutally suppressed an 
army uprising in 1887 and began seven years of iron control that 
often bypassed the country's democratic institutions but brought 
unprecedented stability to Bulgaria. Meanwhile, Ferdinand of Saxe- 
Coburg-Gotha, a Catholic German prince, accepted the Bulgar- 
ian throne in August 1887. 

Independence from the Ottoman Empire brought drastic eco- 
nomic and social changes to Bulgaria at the end of the nineteenth 
century. Industrialization proceeded rapidly (thirty-six major fac- 
tories opened between 1878 and 1887), and a new class of indus- 
trial labor formed from displaced artisans and agricultural workers. 
Harsh working conditions led the urban poor to the cause of so- 
cialism, and in 1891 the Social Democratic Party was formed. (Later 
transformation of one of its factions into the Bulgarian Communist 
Party made that organization the oldest communist party in the 
world.) Town-centered trade and the guild structure were swept 
away by an influx of West European commerce to which Bulgaria 
had been opened by the terms of the Treaty of Berlin. 

Despite industrialization, Bulgaria remained primarily an agricul- 
tural country. Liberation eliminated the Ottoman feudal landhold- 
ing system. Bulgarian peasants were able to buy land cheaply or 
simply occupy it after Turkish landlords left, and a system of village- 
based small landholding began. Agricultural production rose in spite 
of heavy government land taxes. Many peasants were forced into 
the urban work force by taxes or high interest on borrowings for 
land purchase. Until the end of the nineteenth century, the vast 
majority of the Bulgarian population were small landholders or in- 
dependent small tradesmen. 

Russia and the other great powers did not recognize Ferdinand 
as rightful prince of Bulgaria until 1896. Supporters of Prince Alex- 
ander who remained in power used this failure as a weapon against 
the policies of Ferdinand and Stambolov. In 1890 a widespread 
plot against the government was discovered. As before, the basis 
of the plot was dissatisfaction with Stambolov 's refusal to inter- 
cede with the Turks on behalf of Macedonian independence. In 
a masterful diplomatic stroke, Stambolov represented the insur- 
rection to the Turks as an example of potential chaos that could 
be avoided by minor concessions. Fearing the Balkan instability 
that would follow an overthrow of Ferdinand, the Turks then ceded 
three major Macedonian dioceses to the Bulgarian exarchate. Stam- 
bolov thus gained solid church support and an overwhelming victory 



25 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

in the 1890 election, which legitimized his government among all 
Bulgarian factions and reduced the threat of radical plots. 

In the next years, Stambolov and the People's Liberal Party he 
had founded in 1886 exerted virtually dictatorial power to suppress 
extreme nationalism and opposing parties and create conditions 
for economic growth. After the 1886 coup, the army was strictly 
controlled. Voters were intimidated to ensure the reelection of in- 
cumbent officials, and political patronage grew rampant. Using 
his own and Ferdinand's ties with Germany and Austria-Hungary, 
Stambolov built a capitalist Bulgarian economic system on foreign 
loans, protectionism, an expanded industrial and transport infras- 
tructure, and a strict tax system for capital accumulation. Espe- 
cially important to the Bulgarian economy was completion of the 
Vienna-to-Constantinople Railway through Bulgaria in 1888 and 
the Burgas- Yambol Railway in the early 1890s. Stambolov derived 
strong political support from the entrepreneurs who benefited from 
his industrial policy. The Stambolov era marked the victory of 
executive over legislative power in the Bulgarian political system. 

Legitimacy of the Bulgarian throne remained an important sym- 
bolic issue in the early 1890s, and the threat of assassination or 
overthrow of the prince remained after Stambolov consolidated his 
power. Therefore, Stambolov found a Catholic wife for Ferdinand 
and maneuvered past Orthodox Church objections in 1893 to en- 
sure Ferdinand an heir that would stabilize the throne. That heir, 
Boris, was born the next year. Meanwhile, Stambolov' s autocratic 
maneuvering and tough policies won him many enemies, especially 
after the stabilization of the early 1890s appeared to make such 
tactics unnecessary. In 1894 Ferdinand dismissed his prime minister 
because the prince sought more power for himself and believed that 
Stambolov had become a political liability. The next year, Macedo- 
nian radicals assassinated Stambolov. 

The Rule of Ferdinand 

The new administration was mainly conservative, and Ferdinand 
became the dominant force in Bulgarian policy making. His posi- 
tion grew stronger when Russia finally recognized him in 1896. The 
price for recognition was the conversion of Prince Boris to Ortho- 
doxy from Catholicism. The Russian attitude had changed for two 
reasons: Alexander III had died in 1894, and new Turkish mas- 
sacres had signaled a collapse of the Ottoman Empire that would 
threaten Russian and Bulgarian interests alike. In the next twenty 
years, no strong politician like Stambolov emerged, and Ferdinand 
was able to accumulate power by manipulating factions. Several lib- 
eral and conservative parties, the descendants of the two preliberation 



26 



Historical Setting 



groups, held power through 1912 in a parliamentary system that 
seldom functioned according to the constitution. The Bulgarian 
Social Democratic Party took its place in the new political order, 
advocating class struggle, recruiting members from the working 
class, and organizing strikes. 

After relations with Russia had been repaired, Bulgaria's in- 
ternational position stabilized, allowing the economy to continue 
growing undisturbed until 1912. In this period, the government 
continued active intervention in agriculture and industry; it pro- 
moted new agricultural methods that improved the yield from fer- 
tile lands still being reclaimed from the Turks in 1900. Bulgarian 
economic growth continued because of a combination of factors: 
borrowing from West European industrial countries, a strong bank- 
ing system, and a generally sound investment policy. Between 1887 
and 1911, the number of industrial plants grew from 36 to 345. 
But the government's financial policy greatly increased the national 
debt, which by 1911 was three times the national budget and re- 
quired 20 percent of the budget for interest payment. New land 
taxes and grain tithes were levied in the 1890s, leading to peasant 
revolts. In 1899 the Bulgarian Agrarian Union was founded, the 
result of a decade of growing rural discontent and resentment 
against the intellectual and governing class. Within two years, the 
union had evolved into an official party, the Bulgarian Agrarian 
National Union (BANU), which was accepted by most Bulgarian 
peasants as truly representing their interests. Soon, Bulgarian poli- 
ticians viewed BANU as the most potent political group in the 
country. 

The Macedonian Issue 

Macedonian unrest continued into the twentieth century. Be- 
tween 1894 and 1896, the government of Konstantin Stoilov 
reversed Stambolov's policy of controlling Macedonian extremists. 
When he sought to negotiate with the Turks for territorial conces- 
sions in Macedonia at the end of the century, Stoilov found that 
he could not control IMRO. By 1900 that group, which advocated 
Macedonian autonomy over the standard Bulgarian policy goal of 
annexation, had gained control of the Macedonian liberation move- 
ment inside Bulgaria. Russia and the Western powers now held 
Ferdinand responsible for all disruptions in Macedonia, causing 
suspicion of all Bulgarian activity in the Balkans. Greece and Ser- 
bia also laid claim to parts of Macedonia, giving them vital interests 
in the activities of IMRO as well. In 1902 Russia and Austria- 
Hungary forced Serbia and Bulgaria to cut all ties with IMRO. 



27 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

In 1903 Macedonian liberation forces staged a widespread revolt, 
the Ilinden-Preobrazhensko Uprising. Despite strong public sup- 
port for the Macedonian cause, Bulgaria sent no help, and the Turks 
again suppressed opposition with great violence. Large numbers 
of refugees now entered Bulgaria from Macedonia. 

In the next four years, Austria-Hungary and Russia sought a 
formula by which to administer Macedonia in a way satisfactory 
to Bulgarian, Serbian, and Greek interests and approved by Con- 
stantinople. Although nominal agreement was reached in 1905, Ser- 
bian, Greek, and Bulgarian sympathizers clashed in Macedonia 
in 1906 and 1907. After the death of its leader Gotse Delchev in 
the 1903 uprising, IMRO's influence decreased. Bulgarian public 
sympathy for the Macedonian cause also diminished, and by 1905 
the government's attention turned to internal matters. 

Inspired by the 1905 uprisings in Russia, a series of riots and 
demonstrations between 1905 and 1908 were a reaction by work- 
ers, the poor, and some of the intelligentsia to several issues: domes- 
tic repression, government corruption, and the handling of the 
Macedonian issue. In 1906 anti-Greek riots and destruction of 
Greek property were ignited in some parts of Bulgaria by Greek 
claims to Macedonia. In spite of heavy fines and prohibitions against 
striking, a rail strike occurred in 1906, and in 1907 Prime Minister 
Nikola Petkov was assassinated. 

Full Independence 

The strikes and demonstrations remained isolated and had little 
practical effect, so Ferdinand remained in firm control. In 1908 
the Young Turks, an energetic new generation of reformers, gained 
power in the Ottoman Empire. Their ascendancy temporarily re- 
stored the international self-confidence of the empire and threat- 
ened a renewed Turkish influence in the Balkans. To protect the 
territory it occupied in Bosnia and Hercegovina, Austria-Hungary 
annexed those regions. While the Turks were preoccupied with that 
situation, Ferdinand nationalized the Bulgarian section of his main 
international rail line and declared himself tsar of a fully inde- 
pendent Bulgaria. The Western powers, again seeing the threat 
of Ottoman collapse, were appeased by Russian-arranged finan- 
cial compromises that saved face for the Turks. But tension be- 
tween Bulgaria and Turkey increased dramatically after Ferdinand's 
declaration. 

The arbitrary nature of Ferdinand's declaration also brought loud 
criticism from democratic-minded Bulgarian factions. Nonetheless, 
the grand national assembly held at Turnovo in 1911 to incorporate 



28 



Historical Setting 



the terms of independence into the constitution, ratified Ferdinand's 
title and expanded his power in conducting foreign affairs. 

By 1911 the BANU, led by Aleksandur Stamboliiski, had be- 
come the largest and most vocal opposition faction. Although the 
BANU never gained more than 15 percent of a national vote be- 
fore World War I, the party had a large, unified following in the 
peasant class victimized by poor harvests, usurious interest rates, 
and high taxes. Stamboliiski 's political philosophy put the peasant 
and rural life ahead of all other classes and lifestyles. Hating 
bureaucrats and urban institutions, he proposed a government that 
would provide representation by profession rather than party, to 
ensure a permanent peasant majority. His goal was to establish 
a peasant republic that would replace the conventional parliamen- 
tary apparatus established at Turnovo. The BANU was a controver- 
sial and powerful force in Bulgarian politics for the next two decades. 

The Balkan Wars and World War I 

Full independence made Bulgaria a more aggressive party in the 
complex of Balkan politics. The end of Ottoman occupation height- 
ened territorial ambitions that involved Bulgaria and its neighbors 
in three wars within four years. 

The First Balkan War 

The period from 1908 to 1912 was one of colliding interests in 
the Balkans and collapse of the system created by the Treaty of 
Berlin. Beginning in 1908, the Young Turks attempted to consoli- 
date Turkish influence in the Balkans while ensuring equality for 
all nationalities in their empire. Rivals Italy and Austria threatened 
to intervene on behalf of an Albanian revolt against the Turks in 
1909. Russia then urged a Bulgarian-Serbian alliance to keep such 
foreign powers at bay and ensure continued Slavic control in the 
region. In 1912, after long negotiations, Serbia and Bulgaria 
reached temporary agreement on the disposition of Macedonia, 
the chief issue dividing them. Subsequent agreements by Greece 
with Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro completed the Balkan 
League — an uneasy alliance designed by Russia to finally push the 
Turks out of Europe and curtail great-power meddling in the 
Balkans. The First Balkan War, which began in October 1912, 
coincided with Italy's campaign to liberate Tripoli from the Turks. 
Bulgarian forces moved quickly across Ottoman Europe, driving 
the Turks out of Thrace. However, the Bulgarians then over- 
extended their position by a fruitless attack toward Constantinople. 
In the peace negotiations that followed, Bulgaria regained Thrace, 



29 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

but the fragile alliance against the Turks collapsed over the un- 
resolved issue of Macedonia. 

The Second Balkan War 

The final removal of the Turks from Europe posed the problem 
of dividing Ottoman territory and heightened the worries of the 
European great powers about balancing influence in that strategic 
region. Disagreement about the disposition of Macedonia quickly 
rearranged the alliances of the First Balkan War and ignited a Sec- 
ond Balkan War in 1913. The Treaty of London that had ended 
the first war stipulated only that the Balkan powers resolve exist- 
ing claims among themselves. The Bulgarians, having had the 
greatest military success, demanded compensation on that basis; 
the Serbs and Greeks demanded adjustment of the 1912 treaty of 
alliance to ensure a balance of Balkan powers; and the Romani- 
ans demanded territorial reward for their neutral position in the 
first war. Even before the First Balkan War ended, a strong fac- 
tion in Bulgaria had demanded war against Serbia to preserve Bul- 
garia' s claim to Macedonia. Ferdinand sided with that faction in 
1913, and Bulgaria attacked Serbia. Turkey, Greece, and Roma- 
nia then declared war on Bulgaria because they all feared Bulgar- 
ian domination of the Balkans if Macedonia were not partitioned. 
Because most Bulgarian forces were on the Serbian frontier, Tur- 
kish and Romanian troops easily occupied Bulgarian territory by 
mid- 1913, and Bulgaria was defeated. The Treaty of Bucharest 
(1913) allowed Bulgaria to retain only very small parts of Macedonia 
and Thrace; Greece and Serbia divided the rest, humiliating Bul- 
garian territorial claims and canceling the gains of the First Balkan 
War (see fig. 6). This loss further inflamed Bulgarian nationalism, 
especially when Bulgarians in Serbian and Greek Macedonia were 
subjected to extreme hardship after the new partition. At this point, 
Russia, whose warnings Bulgaria had defied by attacking Serbia, 
shifted its support to the Serbs as its Balkan counterbalance against 
Austro-Hungarian claims. 

World War I 

The settlement of the Second Balkan War had also inflamed Bos- 
nian nationalism. In 1914 that movement ignited an Austrian- 
Serbian conflict that escalated into world war when the European 
alliances of those countries went into effect. 

Prewar Bulgarian Politics 

Supported by Ferdinand, the government of Prime Minister Vasil 
Radoslavov declared neutrality to assess the possible outcome of 



30 



Historical Setting 



the alliances and Bulgaria's position relative to the Entente (Rus- 
sia, France, and Britain) and the Central Powers (Austria-Hungary 
and Germany). From the beginning, both sides exerted strong pres- 
sure and made territorial offers to lure Bulgaria into an alliance. 
Ferdinand and his diplomats hedged, waiting for a decisive mili- 
tary shift in one direction or the other. The Radoslavov govern- 
ment favored the German side, the major opposition parties favored 
the Entente, and the agrarians and socialists opposed all involve- 
ment. By mid- 191 5 the Central Powers gained control on the Rus- 
sian and Turkish fronts and were thus able to improve their 
territorial offer to Bulgaria. Now victory would yield part of Tur- 
kish Thrace, substantial territory in Macedonia, and monetary com- 
pensation for war expenses. In October 1915, Bulgaria made a 
secret treaty with the Central Powers and invaded Serbia and 
Macedonia. 

Early Successes 

Catching the Entente by surprise, Bulgarian forces pushed the 
Serbs out of Macedonia and into Albania and occupied part of 
Greek Macedonia by mid-1916. British, French, and Serbian troops 
landed at Salonika and stopped the Bulgarian advance, but the 
Entente's holding operation in Greece turned into a war of attri- 
tion lasting from late 1916 well into 1917. This stalemate diverted 
500,000 Entente troops from other fronts. Meanwhile, Romania 
had entered the war on the Entente side in 1916. Bulgarian and 
German forces pushed the poorly prepared Romanians northward 
and took Bucharest in December 1916. The Bulgarians then faced 
Russia on a new front in Moldavia (the part of Romania border- 
ing Russia), but little action took place there. 

Stalemate and Demoralization 

Once the Bulgarian advance into Romania and Greece halted, 
conditions at the front deteriorated rapidly and political support 
for the war eroded. By 1916 poor allocation of supplies created short- 
ages for both civilians and soldiers, and a series of government re- 
organizations provided no relief. By 1917 the military stalemate 
and poor living conditions combined with news of revolution in 
Russia to stir large-scale unrest in Bulgarian society. The agrari- 
ans and socialist workers intensified their antiwar campaigns, and 
soldiers' committees formed in army units. Bolshevik antiwar 
propaganda was widely distributed in Bulgaria, and Russian and 
Bulgarian soldiers began fraternizing along the Moldavian front. 
In December 1917, Dimitur Blagoev, founder and head of the So- 
cial Democratic Party, led a meeting of 10,000 in Sofia, demanding 



31 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



\ MONTENEGRO 

SERBIA 



I 



N I, 



Skopji 



(to Serbia 



Ohrid 



ALBANIA 



GREECE 



BULGARIA 



Razlog 




International boundary 
Boundary of Macedonia 



Partition line 

• Populated place 



Source: Based on information from Christ Atanasoff, The Bulgarians . Hicksville. New York, 
1977. 214. 



Figure 6. Division of Macedonia at the Treaty of Bucharest, 1913 

an end to the war and overthrow of the Bulgarian government. 
A wave of unrest and riots, including a "women's revolt" against 
food and clothing shortages, swept through the country in 1918. 

The government position weakened further when the Treaty of 
Bucharest, which divided the territory of defeated Romania among 
the central powers, left part of the disputed Romanian territory 
of Dobruja outside Bulgarian control. Having failed to secure even 
the least important territory promised by its war policy, the Rado- 
slavov government resigned in June 1918. The new r prime minister, 
Aleksandur Malinov, tried to unite the country by appointing the 
agrarian Aleksandur Stambolhski to his cabinet. But Malinov had 
vowed to fight, and the BANU leader refused the post as long as 
Bulgaria remained in the war. By September the Bulgarian army 
was thoroughly demoralized by antiwar propaganda and harsh con- 
ditions. A batde with the British and French at Dobro Pole brought 



32 



Historical Setting 



total retreat, and in ten days Entente forces entered Bulgaria. On 
September 29, the Bulgarians signed an armistice and left the war. 

Capitulation and Settlement 

The retreat from Dobro Pole brought a soldier revolt that was 
crushed by German troops near Sofia. But the parties in power 
forced Ferdinand to abdicate at the end of September because they 
feared full-scale revolution and blamed the tsar for the country's 
chaotic state. Ferdinand's son Boris was named tsar, becoming Boris 
III. The immediate cause of social upheaval ended with the arm- 
istice, but shortages and discontent with the Bulgarian government 
continued. An ineffective coalition government ruled for the next 
year, then a general election was called. Meanwhile, Bulgaria was 
again left far short of the territorial goals for which it had declared 
war. In the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine (November 1919), Thrace 
was awarded to Greece, depriving Bulgaria of access to the Aegean 
Sea. The newly formed Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slo- 
venes took Macedonian territory adjoining its eastern border, and 
Southern Dobruja went to Romania (see fig. 7). 

The treaty limited the postwar Bulgarian Army to a small volun- 
teer force; Yugoslavia, Romania, and Greece were to receive repa- 
rations in industrial and agricultural goods; and the victorious Allies 
were to receive monetary reparations for the next thirty-seven years. 
On the other hand, the payment schedule was significantly im- 
proved in 1923, and Bulgaria's loss of 14,100 square kilometers 
was much less than the territorial losses of its wartime allies. Na- 
tionalist resentment and frustration grew even stronger because 
of this outcome, however, and Bulgaria remained close to Germany 
throughout the interwar period. 

The Interwar Period 

The period after World War I was one of uneasy political coali- 
tions, slow economic growth, and continued appearance of the 
Macedonia problem. Although social unrest remained at a high 
level, Boris kept firm control of his government as World War II 
approached. 

Stambolirski and Agrarian Reform 

The 1919 election reflected massive public dissatisfaction with 
the war reparations, inflation, and rising taxes that prolonged the 
chaotic living conditions of the war. The socialist and agrarian par- 
ties tightened their organizations and increased membership. The 
left wing of the Bulgarian Workers' Socialist-Democratic Party 
(BWSDP) numbered only 25,000 in 1919, and the BANU emerged 



33 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 




Source: Based on information from RJ. Crampton, A Short History of Bulgaria, Cambridge, 
1987, frontispiece. 

Figure 7. Territorial Changes According to the Treaty of Neuilly-sur- Seine, 
1919 

as the largest party in the country. The BANU received 28 percent 
of the 1919 vote, giving it a plurality but not a majority in the new 
subranie. Stamboliiski sought to include the Bulgarian Communist 
Party (BCP) — which had finished second in the election — and the 
BWSDP in a coalition government. (The BCP and the BWSDP 
were the two factions of the Bulgarian communist movement that 
had sprung from the Social Democratic Party founded in 1891 ; they 
would remain separate until the former was disbanded after World 
War II.) Stamboliiski could not permit the two factions the control 
they desired, however, so they refused participation. 

The postwar governing coalition thus included only factions to 
Stamboliiski 's right. The first major test for the Stamboliiski govern- 
ment was a transport strike that lasted from December 1919 until 
February 1920. Fomented by the communists and the social 
democrats and joined by urban workers and middle-class Bulgari- 
ans, the striker protests were quelled harshly by the army and the 



34 



Historical Setting 



Orange Guard, a quasi-military force that Stamboliiski formed to 
counter mass demonstrations by the parties of the left. 

Suppression of the strike, mobilization of the peasant vote, and 
intimidation at the polls gave the BANU enough support to win 
the parliamentary election of 1920 over the communists and form 
a non-coalition government. Tsar Boris and much of the Bulgar- 
ian middle class preferred the agrarians to the communists and social 
democrats, whom they feared much more. Stamboliiski immedi- 
ately began drastic economic reforms. He abolished the merchants' 
trade monopoly on grain, replacing it with a government consor- 
tium; broke up large urban and rural landholdings and sold the 
surplus to the poor; enacted an obligatory labor law to ease the 
postwar labor shortage; introduced a progressive income tax; and 
made secondary schooling compulsory. All aspects of the radical 
reform policy aimed at ridding society of "harmful" classes of so- 
ciety such as lawyers, usurers, and merchants, distributing capital 
and obligations more evenly through society, and raising the liv- 
ing standards of the landless and poor peasants. 

In foreign policy, Stamboliiski officially abandoned Bulgaria's 
territorial claims, which he associated with a standing army, monar- 
chy, large government expenditures, and other prewar phenome- 
na that the agrarians deemed anachronistic. After the war, no major 
power was available to protect Bulgarian interests in the Balkans. 
For this reason, the traditional approach to foreign policy was dis- 
carded in favor of rapprochement with all European powers and 
the new government of Kemal Atatiirk in Turkey, membership 
in the League of Nations (see Glossary), and friendship with the 
new Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (later the King- 
dom of Yugoslavia). Relations with Turkey were greatly improved 
by Bulgarian support of Atatiirk' s revolutionary Turkish Repub- 
lic in 1920. 

Reconciliation with Yugoslavia was a necessary step toward 
Stamboliiski 's ultimate goal of a multiethnic Balkan peasant fed- 
eration. Improved Yugoslav relations required a crackdown on the 
powerful Macedonian extremist movement. Accordingly, Stam- 
boliiski began a two-year program of harsh suppression of IMRO 
in 1921; in 1923 Yugoslavia and Bulgaria agreed at the Nis Con- 
vention to cooperate in controlling extremists. 

The Fall of Stamboliiski 

Led by a large Macedonian group in Sofia, the strong nation- 
alist elements remaining in Bulgaria found the new pacifist policy 
alarming. The urban working class, unaided by agrarian reforms, 
gravitated to the communists or the socialist workers. Inflation and 



35 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

industrial exploitation continued. Many of Stamboliiski's subor- 
dinates inflamed social tensions by taking very dogmatic positions 
in favor of peasant rights. The Bulgarian right, silent since the war, 
reorganized into a confederation called the National Alliance. Stam- 
boliiski's Orange Guard jailed the leaders of that group in 1922, 
temporarily stopping its momentum. Meanwhile, in late 1922 and 
early 1923, Macedonian nationalists occupied Kiustendil along the 
Yugoslav border and attacked government figures to protest rap- 
prochement with Yugoslavia and Greece. Stamboliiski responded 
with mass arrests, an accelerated campaign against IMRO ter- 
rorism, a purge of his own fragmented and notoriously corrupt 
party, and a new parliamentary election. These dictatorial meas- 
ures united the agrarians' various opponents (IMRO, the National 
Alliance, army factions, and the social democrats) into a coalition 
led by Aleksandur Tsankov. The communists remained outside 
the group. Bulgaria's Western creditors would not protect a govern- 
ment that had rejected their reparations policy. In June 1923, Stam- 
boliiski was brutally assassinated by IMRO agents, and the 
conspirators shortly took control of the entire country with only 
scattered and ineffectual agrarian resistance. 

The Tsankov and Liapchev Governments 

Tsankov formed a new government, which Boris III quickly 
approved. An uprising by the communists, who had hoped the two 
major coalition factions would destroy each other, was easily 
suppressed in September 1923. Nonetheless, dominated by the 
Macedonian freedom factions and the National Alliance, Tsankov' s 
government failed to restore order. When Tsankov outlawed the 
Bulgarian Communist Party in 1924, the militant communists led 
by exiles Georgi Dimitrov and Vasil Kolarov became dominant 
in that organization. The first response to this change was the bomb- 
ing of Sveta Nedelia Cathedral in Sofia while the tsar was present 
in 1925, killing over 100. This attack brought a new government 
reign of terror against the communists and the agrarians. Disunited 
Macedonian factions also continued terrorist attacks from their vir- 
tually separate state at Petrich, causing alarm in Western Europe. 
In 1926 Tsankov was replaced by Andrei Liapchev, a Macedonian 
who remained prime minister for five years. 

Liapchev generally was more lenient toward political opposition 
than Tsankov; the communists resurfaced in 1927 under cover of 
the labor-based Bulgarian Workers' Party, and an Independent 
Workers' Trade Union became the center of political activity by 
labor. IMRO also had much more latitude under the Macedonian 
prime minister; this meant that political assassinations and terrorism 



36 



Historical Setting 



continued unabated. IMRO raids into Yugoslavia ended Bulgar- 
ian rapprochement with that country, and the Macedonians 
demanded preferential economic treatment under Liapchev. But 
compared with the years preceding, the late 1920s brought rela- 
tive political stability to Bulgaria. Liapchev led a conservative 
majority in the subranie and had the confidence of Boris. The press 
was relatively free, and educational and judicial institutions func- 
tioned independently. Industrial and agricultural output finally ex- 
ceeded prewar levels, and foreign investment increased. But even 
after substantial reduction, Bulgaria's reparations payments were 
20 percent of her budget in 1928, and the return to the gold stan- 
dard that year weakened the economy one year before the onset 
of world depression. 

In foreign policy, Liapchev tried unsuccessfully to improve British 
and French World War I reparation terms and bring Bulgaria out 
of its postwar diplomatic isolation. The country had already im- 
proved its international image by participating enthusiastically in 
the League of Nations, which reciprocated by forcing Greek inva- 
sion troops to leave southern Bulgaria in 1926. Boris made two 
European tours in the late 1920s to strengthen diplomatic ties. 

In the late 1920s, the Macedonian independence movement split 
over the ultimate goal of its activity. The supremacist faction sought 
incorporation of all Macedonian territory into Bulgaria, while the 
federalist faction (including the IMRO terrorists) sought an au- 
tonomous Macedonia that could join Bulgaria or Yugoslavia in a 
protective alliance if necessary. Violence between the two groups 
reinforced a growing public impression that the Liapchev govern- 
ment was unstable. 

The Crises of the 1930s 

Political Disorder and Diplomatic Isolation 

The world economic crisis that began in 1929 devastated the Bul- 
garian economy. The social tensions of the 1920s were exacerbated 
when 200,000 workers lost their jobs, prices fell by 50 percent, 
dozens of companies went bankrupt, and per capita income among 
peasants was halved between 1929 and 1933. A wave of strikes hit 
Bulgaria in 1930-31, and in 1931 the Liapchev government was 
defeated in what would be the last open election with proportional 
representation of parliamentary seats. 

Liapchev' s coalition fell apart, his defeat hastened by the rise 
of a supra-party organization, Zveno — a small coalition with con- 
nections to most of the major Bulgarian parties and to fascist Italy. 
The main goal of Zveno was to consolidate and reform existing 



37 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

political institutions so that state power could be exerted directly 
to promote economic growth. After 1931 Zveno used the economic 
crisis to instill this idea in the Bulgarian political system. In 1931 
the new government coalition, the People's Bloc, readmitted the 
BANU in an attempt to reunite Bulgarian factions. But the BANU 
had become factionalized and isolated; its representatives in the 
coalition largely pursued political spoils rather than the interests 
of their peasant constituency. 

Meanwhile, the Macedonian situation in the early 1930s blocked 
further attempts to heal Balkan disputes. Four Balkan conferences 
were held to address the Macedonian problem; but Bulgaria, fearing 
IMRO reprisals, steadfastly refused to drop territorial demands 
in Macedonia or quell Macedonian terrorist activities in the region. 
Such activities had continued under all Bulgaria's postwar govern- 
ments, but the People's Bloc was especially inept in controlling 
them. The situation eventually led to the Balkan Entente of 1934, 
by which Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, and Romania pledged to 
honor existing borders in the Balkans. For Bulgaria the isolation 
inflicted by this pact was a serious diplomatic setback in southeastern 
Europe. 

In 1932 Aleksandur Tsankov founded Bulgaria's first serious fas- 
cist party, the National Socialist Movement, which imitated the 
methods of Hitler's Nazi party. Although Tsankov' s party never 
attracted a large following, its activities added to the chaotic frag- 
mentation that forced the People's Bloc from power in May 1934. 

Fragmentation of the People's Bloc coalition and the threat posed 
by the Balkan Entente led Zveno and various military factions to 
stage a right-wing coup. Under the leadership of Colonel Damian 
Velchev and Kimon Georgiev, the new prime minister, the new 
government began taking dictatorial measures. The government 
also took immediate steps to improve relations with Yugoslavia and 
made overtures to Britain and France. Diplomatic relations resumed 
with the Soviet Union in 1934, despite a marked increase in inter- 
nal repression of communists and suspected communists. A con- 
certed drive by the Bulgarian military against IMRO permanently 
reduced the power of that organization, which by 1934 had ex- 
hausted most of its support in Bulgarian society. The fact that spon- 
sorship of Balkan terrorism finally ceased to hinder Bulgarian 
foreign policy was the single lasting contribution of the Velchev- 
Georgiev government. 

The Zveno group abolished all political parties, citing the failure 
of such institutions to provide national leadership. The press was 
muzzled. Henceforward the state would be authoritarian and cen- 
tralized; the subranie would represent not political parties but the 



38 



Historical Setting 



classes of society: peasants, workers, artisans, merchants, the in- 
telligentsia, bureaucrats, and professionals. Velchev also proposed 
a wide-ranging program of social and technical modernization. In 
1935, however, Tsar Boris III became an active political force in 
Bulgaria for the first time. Disillusioned by the results of the 1934 
coup, Boris took action to regain his power, which the new regime 
had also curtailed. Boris used military and civilian factions alarmed 
by the new authoritarianism to maneuver the Zveno group out of 
power and declare a royal dictatorship. 

The Royal Dictatorship 

In the years following 1935, Boris relied on a series of uncharis- 
matic politicians to run Bulgaria, weaken the political power of 
Zveno and the military, and keep other factions such as the BANU, 
the communists, and the national socialists from forming alliances 
against him. Boris chose not to restore the traditional political 
supremacy of the subranie and ignored demands by many public 
figures to write a new Bulgarian constitution. In 1936 a broad coa- 
lition, the People's Constitutional Bloc, brought together nearly 
all leftist and centrist factions in a nominal opposition that had the 
blessing of the tsar. Boris delayed holding a national election until 
1938. At that time, only individual candidates were allowed in a 
carefully controlled election procedure that excluded party candi- 
date lists. Boris claimed that domination of the new subranie by pro- 
government representatives justified his nonparty system, although 
the People's Constitutional Bloc seated over sixty delegates. Elec- 
tions in the next two years were strictly limited in order to main- 
tain Boris's control over his parliament. 

The Interwar Economy 

In the years between the world wars, Bulgarian efforts to raise 
agricultural and industrial standards closer to those of Western Eu- 
rope yielded uneven results. Until the mid-1 930s, political unrest, 
steep reparations payments, and the world financial crisis stymied 
growth. Reparations payments were finally canceled in 1932, 
however, and the stability of the royal dictatorship brought eco- 
nomic improvement in the late 1930s. Half the European average 
in 1930, per-capita agricultural production improved markedly 
when government control forced diversification, new methods, and 
new markets into the system. In the 1930s, a 75 percent increase 
in membership of agricultural cooperatives bolstered the financial 
stability of the agricultural sector, particularly benefiting small land- 
holders. The most notable agricultural trend between the wars was 



39 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



the switch to industrial crops, especially tobacco, which replaced 
wheat as Bulgaria's top agricultural export. The predominance of 
small agricultural plots increased, however; in 1944 only 1 per- 
cent of holdings were over twenty hectares and the number of land- 
less families had decreased (see Agriculture, ch. 3). 

In the 1930s, Germany bought a huge percentage of Bulgaria's 
agricultural exports (67.8 percent in 1939), reinforcing economic 
dependency by selling finished industrial products for nonconvert- 
ible currency — a distinct advantage for the Bulgarian economy and 
a boon to the Bulgarian standard of living. Boris tried to balance 
German trade by expanding British and French markets, but he 
found little interest in either country. Although industry remained 
distinctly secondary to agriculture, contributing only 5.6 percent 
of the Bulgarian gross national product (GNP — see Glossary) in 
1938, between 1929 and 1939 Bulgarian industry grew at an aver- 
age rate of 4.8 percent, well ahead of the European average for 
the period. The role of state-owned enterprises dwindled steadily 
in the 1930s; by 1944, only coal mines, electrical power, railroads, 
and banks remained predominantly in that category. While large 
state-sponsored enterprise diminished, small private industries 
flourished in the 1930s. At the same time, Bulgarian commerce 
became largely state-controlled and centralized in Sofia, and the 
social and political dichotomy between rural and urban Bulgaria 
was even sharper as World War II began. 

Foreign Policy in the Late 1930s 

By 1939 Bulgaria had moved inexorably into the fascist sphere 
of Germany and Italy. The country was tied to the former for eco- 
nomic reasons and because Germany promised territorial revision 
for Bulgaria, and to the latter because Boris was married to the 
daughter of King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy. In the late 1930s, 
Bulgaria continued to seek rapprochement with Yugoslavia; a 
friendship treaty was signed in 1937 and a renunciation of armed 
intervention in 1938. Germany's takeover of the Sudetenland from 
Czechoslovakia in 1938 ended the anti-German Little Entente al- 
liance of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania and pushed 
Yugoslavia closer to Bulgaria. When World War II began in Sep- 
tember 1939 with the German invasion of Poland, Bulgaria declared 
neutrality, but this position was inevitably altered by big-power 
relationships. 

The Nazi-Soviet alliance of 1939 improved Bulgaria's relations 
with the Soviet Union, which had remained cool, and yielded a 
Bulgarian-Soviet commercial treaty in 1940. The pro- Western 



40 



Historical Setting 



Bulgarian Prime Minister Georgi Kioseivanov was deposed that 
year in favor of pro-German Bogdan Filov, who reduced cultural 
ties with the West and instituted a Nazi-type youth league. Mean- 
while, Boris strove to maintain neutrality, rejecting Soviet treaty 
offers in 1939 and 1940. Boris also rejected membership in the 
Balkan Entente and in a proposed Turkish- Yugoslav-Bulgarian 
defense pact because such moves would anger Italy, Germany, the 
Soviet Union, or all three. Under pressure from Hitler, Romania 
ceded southern Dobruja to Bulgaria by the Treaty of Craiova in 
1940. Needing Bulgaria to anchor its Balkan flank, Germany in- 
creased diplomatic and military pressure that year. The massing 
of German troops in Romania prior to Germany's invading Greece 
removed all remaining flexibility; aware that German troops would 
have to pass through Bulgaria to reach Greece, Bulgaria signed 
the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in March 1941. 

World War II 

As in the case of World War I, Bulgaria fought on the losing 
German side of World War II but avoided open conflict with the 
Russian/Soviet state. Again the strains of war eroded public sup- 
port and forced the wartime Bulgarian government out of office. 
But World War II heralded a drastic political change and a long 
era of totalitarian governance. 

The Passive Alliance 

Having failed to remain neutral, Boris entered a passive alliance 
with the Axis powers. The immediate result was Bulgarian occu- 
pation (but not accession) of Thrace and Macedonia, which Bul- 
garian troops took from Greece and Yugoslavia, respectively, in 
April 1941. Although the territorial gains were initially very popular 
in Bulgaria, complications soon arose in the occupied territories. 
Autocratic Bulgarian administration of Thrace and Macedonia was 
no improvement over the Greeks and the Serbs; expressions of 
Macedonian national feeling grew, and uprisings occurred in 
Thrace. Meanwhile, the Germans pressured Bulgaria to support 
the eastern front they had opened by invading the Soviet Union 
in June 1941. Boris resisted the pressure because he believed that 
Bulgarian society was still sufficiently Russophile to overthrow him 
if he declared war. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor ended 
United States neutrality, Bulgaria declared war on Britain and the 
United States, but continued diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union throughout World War II. Acceleration of domestic war 
protests by the BCP in 1941 led to an internal crackdown on 



41 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

dissident activities of both the right and left. In the next three years, 
thousands of Bulgarians went to concentration and labor camps. 

The German eastern front received virtually no aid from Bul- 
garia, a policy justified by the argument that Bulgarian troops had 
to remain at home to defend the Balkans against Turkish or Allied 
attack. Hitler reluctantly accepted this logic. Boris's stubborn 
resistance to committing troops was very popular at home, where 
little war enthusiasm developed. Nazi pressure to enforce anti- 
Jewish policies also had little support in Bulgarian society. Early 
in the war, laws were passed for restriction and deportation of the 
50,000 Bulgarian Jews, but enforcement was postponed using var- 
ious rationales. No program of mass deportation or extermination 
was conducted in Bulgaria. 

Wartime Crisis 

In the summer of 1943, Boris died suddenly at age 49, leaving 
a three-man regency ruling for his six-year-old son, Simeon. Be- 
cause two of the three regents were figureheads, Prime Minister 
Bogdan Filov, the third regent, became de facto head of state in 
this makeshift structure. 

The events of 1943 also reversed the military fortunes of the Axis, 
causing the Bulgarian government to reassess its international po- 
sition. Late in 1943, the Allies delivered the first of many disas- 
trous air raids on Sofia. The heavy damage sent a clear message 
that Germany could not protect Bulgaria from Allied punishment. 
Once the war had finally intruded into Bulgarian territory, the 
winter of 1943-44 brought severe social and economic dislocation, 
hunger, and political instability. The antiwar factions, especially 
the communists, used urban guerrilla tactics and mass demonstra- 
tions to rebuild the organizational support lost during the govern- 
ment crackdown of 1941. Partisan activity, never as widespread 
as elsewhere in the Balkans during the war, increased in 1944 as 
the Red Army moved westward against the retreating Germans. 
To support antigovernment partisan groups, in 1942 the com- 
munists had established an umbrella Fatherland Front coalition 
backing complete neutrality, withdrawal from occupied territory, 
and full civil liberties. 

Early in 1944, Bulgarian officials tried to achieve peace with the 
Allies and the Greek and Yugoslav governments-in-exile. Fearing 
the German forces that remained in Bulgaria, Filov could not simply 
surrender unconditionally; meanwhile, the Soviets threatened war 
if Bulgaria did not declare itself neutral and remove all German 
armaments from Bulgaria's Black Sea coast. Unable to gain the 
protection of the Allies, who had now bypassed Bulgaria in their 



42 



Historical Setting 



strategic planning, Bulgaria was caught between onrushing Soviet 
forces and the last gambits of the retreating Nazis. At this point, 
the top priority of Bulgarian leaders was clearing the country of 
German occupiers while arranging a peace with the Allies that would 
deprive Soviet forces of an excuse to occupy Bulgaria. But in Sep- 
tember 1944, the Soviet Union unexpectedly declared war on Bul- 
garia, just as the latter was about to withdraw from the Axis and 
declare war on Germany. 

The Soviet Occupation 

When Soviet troops arrived in Bulgaria, they were welcomed 
by the populace as liberators from German occupation. On Sep- 
tember 9, 1944, five days after the Soviet declaration of war, a 
Fatherland Front coalition deposed the temporary government in 
a bloodless coup. Headed by Kimon Georgiev of Zveno, the new 
administration included four communists, five members of Zveno, 
two social democrats, and four agrarians. Although in the minor- 
ity, the communists had been the driving force in forming the coa- 
lition as an underground resistance organization in 1942. The 
presence of the Red Army, which remained in Bulgaria until 1947, 
strengthened immeasurably the communist position in dealing with 
the Allies and rival factions in the coalition. At this point, many 
noncommunist Bulgarians placed their hopes on renewed relations 
with the Soviet Union; in their view, both Germany and the Al- 
lies had been discredited by the events of the previous fifteen years. 
In 1945 the Allies themselves expected that a benign Soviet Union 
would continue the wartime alliance through the period of post- 
war East European realignment. 

The armistice signed by Bulgaria with the Soviet Union in Oc- 
tober 1944 surrendered all wartime territorial gains except Southern 
Dobruja; this meant that Macedonia returned to Yugoslavia and 
Thrace to Greece. The peace agreement also established a Soviet- 
dominated Allied Control Commission to run Bulgaria until con- 
clusion of a peace treaty. Overall war damage to Bulgaria was 
moderate compared to that in other European countries, and the 
Soviet Union demanded no reparations. On the other hand, Bul- 
garia held the earliest and most widespread war crimes trial in post- 
war Europe; almost 3,000 were executed as war criminals. Bulgaria 
emerged from the war with no identifiable political structure; the 
party system had dissolved in 1934, replaced by the pragmatic 
balancing of political factions in Boris's royal dictatorship. This 
condition and the duration of the war in Europe eight months after 
Bulgaria's surrender gave the communists ample opportunity to 
exploit their favorable strategic position in Bulgarian politics. 



43 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

Communist Consolidation 

Initial Maneuvering 

In the months after the surrender, the communist element of 
the Fatherland Front gradually purged opposition figures, exiled 
Tsar Simeon II, and rigged elections to confirm its power. In De- 
cember 1945, a conference of foreign ministers of the United States, 
Britain, and the Soviet Union theoretically allocated two seats to 
the newly consolidated opposition BANU in the Bulgarian Coun- 
cil of Ministers, but BANU leaders demanded an immediate na- 
tional election and removal of communist ministers. Because the 
BANU was now a unified party with substantial political backing, 
these demands created a governmental stalemate with the Father- 
land Front for one year. In a national referendum in September 

1946, however, an overwhelming majority voted to abolish the 
monarchy and proclaim Bulgaria a people's republic. 

The next month, a national election chose a subranie to draft a 
new constitution. In a widely questioned process, Fatherland Front 
candidates won 70 percent of the votes. At this point, however, 
opposition to the front remained strong, as communist power grew 
steadily. In early 1947, opposition to aggressive communist tac- 
tics of confiscation and collectivization generated a loose anticom- 
munist coalition within and outside the Fatherland Front, under 
BANU leader Nikola Petkov. The power struggle, which centered 
on the nature of the new constitution, reached its peak when the 
Paris peace treaty of February 1947 required that Soviet forces and 
the Allied Control Commission leave Bulgaria immediately. Once 
the United States ratified its peace treaty with Bulgaria in June 

1947, the communist-dominated Fatherland Front arrested and exe- 
cuted Petkov and declared Bulgaria a communist state. Petkov' s 
coalition was the last organized domestic opposition to communist 
rule in Bulgaria until 1989. 

After 1946 Fatherland Front governments maintained nominal 
representation of noncommunist parties. But those parties increas- 
ingly bowed to the leadership of communist Prime Minister Georgi 
Dimitrov, who had been appointed in 1946. After two years of post- 
war turmoil, Bulgarian political and economic life settled into the 
patterns set out by the new communist constitution (referred to 
as the Dimitrov Constitution) ratified in December 1947. Dimitrov 
argued that previous Bulgarian attempts at parliamentary democ- 
racy were disastrous and that only massive social and economic 
restructuring could ensure stability. By the end of 1947, Bulgaria 
had followed the other East European states in refusing reconstruc- 
tion aid from the Marshall Plan (see Glossary) and joining the 



44 



Graffiti-covered tomb of Georgi Dimitrov, first president of communist 

Bulgaria, Sofia, 1991 
Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg 

Communist Information Bureau (Cominform — see Glossary). In 
1948 the Fatherland Front was reorganized into an official worker- 
peasant alliance in accordance with Cominform policy. In Decem- 
ber 1947, BANU leader Georgi Traikov had repudiated traditional 
agrarian programs; after a thorough purge that year, his party re- 
tained only nominal independence to preserve the illusion of a two- 
party system. All other opposition parties disbanded. 

The Dimitrov Constitution 

Dimitrov guided the framing of the 1947 constitution on the 
model of the 1936 constitution of the Soviet Union. The Bulgar- 
ian document guaranteed citizens equality before the law; freedom 
from discrimination; a universal welfare system; freedom of speech, 
the press, and assembly; and inviolability of person, domicile, and 
correspondence. But those rights were qualified by a clause pro- 
hibiting activity that would jeopardize the attainments of the na- 
tional revolution of September 9, 1944. Citizens were guaranteed 
employment but required to work in a socially useful capacity. The 
constitution also prescribed a planned national economy. Private 
property was allowed, if its possession was not "to the detriment 
of the public good." By the end of 1947, all private industry had 



45 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

been confiscated and financial enterprises nationalized in the cul- 
mination of a gradual government takeover that began in 1944. 
The first two-year plan for economic rehabilitation began in 1947 
(see Postwar Economic Policy, ch. 3). 

Chervenkov and Stalinism in Bulgaria 

In 1948 the newly formed Soviet empire in Eastern Europe was 
threatened by a split between Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito 
and Soviet leader Joseph V. Stalin. After expelling Yugoslavia from 
the Cominform, Stalin began exerting greater pressure on the other 
East European states, including Bulgaria, to adhere rigidly to Soviet 
foreign and domestic policy. He demanded that the communist par- 
ties of those countries become virtual extensions of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) by purging all opposition figures. 
The Bulgarian government curtailed religious freedom by forcing 
Orthodox clergy into a Union of Bulgarian Priests in 1948, taking 
control of Muslim religious institutions, and dissolving Bulgarian 
branches of Roman Catholic and Protestant churches in 1949. The 
most visible political victim of the new policy was Traicho Rostov, 
who with Georgi Dimitrov and Vasil Kolarov had led the BCP to 
power in 1944. Accused by Dimitrov of treason, Rostov was shot 
in December 1949. Dimitrov died before Rostov's execution, 
Rolarov soon afterward. To fill the power vacuum left by those 
events, Stalin chose Vulko Chervenkov, a trusted protege. Cher- 
venkov would complete the conversion of the BCP into the type 
of one-man dictatorship that Stalin had created in the Soviet Un- 
ion. Chervenkov assumed all top government and party positions 
and quickly developed a cult of personality like that of his Soviet 
mentor. At Stalin's command, Chervenkov continued purging party 
members from 1950 until 1953, to forestall in Bulgaria the sort of 
Titoist separatism that Stalin greatly feared. Rigid party hierar- 
chy replaced the traditional informal structures of Bulgarian gover- 
nance, and the purges eliminated the faction of the BCP that 
advocated putting Bulgarian national concerns ahead of blind sub- 
servience to the CPSU. 

The Chervenkov period (1950-56) featured harsh repression of 
all deviation from the party line, arbitrary suppression of culture 
and the arts along the lines of Soviet-prescribed socialist realism, 
and an isolationist foreign policy. By early 1951, Chervenkov had 
expelled one in five party members, including many high officials, 
in his campaign for complete party discipline. In 1950 a new agricul- 
tural collectivization drive began. In spite of intense peasant 
resistance, the collectivization drive continued intermittently until 
the process was virtually complete in 1958. 



46 



Historical Setting 



Foreign and Economic Policies 

The independent course taken by Tito's Yugoslavia in 1948 
caused Bulgaria to seal the Yugoslav border; a 1953 Balkan Pact 
among Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey further isolated Bulgaria, 
which by that time had cut all relations with Western countries. 
The Soviet Union now was Bulgaria's only ally. It supplied mili- 
tary and economic advisers and provided the model for Bulgarian 
social services, economic planning, and education in the early 1950s. 
Over 90 percent of Bulgarian exports and imports involved Soviet 
partnership, although the Soviets often paid less than world prices 
for Bulgarian goods. Because the primitive, mainly agricultural Bul- 
garian economy closely resembled that of the Soviet Union, Soviet- 
style centralized planning in five-year blocks had more immediate 
benefits there than in the other European states, where it was first 
applied in the early 1950s. 

After Stalin 

The death of Joseph Stalin in March 1953 had strong repercus- 
sions in Bulgaria. By that time, Chervenkov had already moved 
slightly away from hard-line Stalinist domestic repression and in- 
ternational isolation, but the lack of clear ideological guidance from 
post-Stalin Moscow left him in an insecure position. Official ap- 
proval in 1951 of Dimitur Dimov's mildly heretical novel Tiutiun 
(Tobacco) had loosened somewhat the official constraints on liter- 
ature and other cultural activities. In 1953 Bulgaria resumed rela- 
tions with Greece and Yugoslavia, some political amnesties were 
granted, and planners discussed increasing production of consumer 
goods and reducing the prices of necessities. At the Sixth Party 
Congress in 1954, Chervenkov gave up his party leadership but re- 
tained his position as prime minister. Todor Zhivkov, most promi- 
nent in the postwar generation of Bulgarian communist leaders, 
assumed the newly created position of first secretary of the party 
Central Committee. Several purged party leaders were released from 
labor camps, and some resumed visible roles in the party hierarchy. 

In spite of the 1954 party shifts, Chervenkov remained the un- 
challenged leader of Bulgaria for two more years. The economic 
shift away from heavy industry toward consumer goods continued 
in the mid-1950s, and direct Soviet intervention in Bulgarian eco- 
nomic and political life diminished. By 1955, some 10,000 politi- 
cal prisoners had been released. In an attempt to win political 
support from the peasants, Chervenkov eased the pace of collec- 
tivization and increased national investment in agriculture. 
However, events in the Soviet Union ended this brief period of calm. 



47 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

The Fall of Chervenkov 

In 1955 the Belgrade Declaration restored Soviet-Yugoslav friend- 
ship and reinstated Tito to the fraternity of world communist lead- 
ers. Because Chervenkov had branded Tito and the Yugoslavs as 
arch-villains during his rise to power, this agreement eroded his 
position. Then, in February 1956, Nikita S. Khrushchev denounced 
Chervenkov' s patron Stalin and Stalin's cult of personality at the 
twentieth congress of the CPSU. Unwilling to stray from the Soviet 
party line, the BCP also condemned the cult of personality (and, 
implicitly, Chervenkov's authoritarianism), advocating instead col- 
lective leadership and inner-party democracy. In his 1956 report 
to party leaders, Zhivkov expressed this condemnation and 
promised that the party would make amends for past injustices — 
a clear reference to the fate of Kostov and Chervenkov's other purge 
victims in the party. Having had his entire regime repudiated by 
the party leader, Chervenkov resigned. Zhivkov, who had thus far 
remained below Chervenkov in actual party power, now assumed 
the full powers of his party first secretary position. The 1956 April 
Plenum became the official date of Bulgarian de-Stalinization in 
party mythology; after that event, the atmosphere of BCP politics 
changed significantly. 

Intellectual Life 

The thaw in Bulgarian intellectual life had continued from 1951 
until the middle of the decade. Chervenkov's resignation and the 
literary and cultural flowering in the Soviet Union encouraged the 
view that the process would continue, but the Hungarian revolu- 
tion of fall 1956 frightened the Bulgarian leadership away from en- 
couragement of dissident intellectual activity. In response to events 
in Hungary, Chervenkov was appointed minister of education and 
culture; in 1957 and 1958, he purged the leadership of the Bulgar- 
ian Writers' Union and dismissed liberal journalists and editors 
from their positions. His crackdowns effectively ended the "Bul- 
garian thaw" of independent writers and artists inspired by Khrush- 
chev's 1956 speech against Stalinism. Again mimicking the Soviet 
party, which purged a group of high officials in 1957, the BCP 
dismissed three party leaders on vague charges the same year. 
Among those removed was deputy prime minister Georgi Chankov, 
an important rival of Zhivkov. The main motivation for this purge 
was to assure the Soviet Union that Bulgarian communists would 
not fall into the same heretical behavior as had the Hungarian party 
in 1956. Through the political maneuvers of the mid-1950s, Todor 
Zhivkov enhanced his position by identifying with the "Bulgarian" 



48 



Historical Setting 



rather than "Soviet" branch of the BCP at the same time as he 
aligned himself with the new anti-Stalinist faction in the Soviet Un- 
ion. He established especially close ties with Khrushchev at this 
time. 

Domestic Policy and Its Results 

Most aspects of life in Bulgaria continued to conform strongly 
to the Soviet model in the mid-1950s. In 1949 the Bulgarian educa- 
tional system had begun a restructuring process to resemble the 
Soviet system, and the social welfare system followed suit. In the 
mid-1950s, Soviet-style centralized planning produced economic 
indicators showing that Bulgarians were returning to their prewar 
lifestyle in some respects: real wages increased 75 percent, con- 
sumption of meat, fruit, and vegetables increased markedly, medical 
facilities and doctors became available to more of the population, 
and in 1957 collective farm workers benefited from the first agricul- 
tural pension and welfare system in Eastern Europe. 

In 1959 the BCP borrowed from the Chinese the phrase "Great 
Leap Forward" to symbolize a sudden burst of economic activity 
to be injected into the Third Five-Year Plan (1958-1962). whose 
original scope was quite conservative. According to the revised plan, 
industrial production would double and agricultural production 
would triple by 1962; a new agricultural collectivization and con- 
solidation drive would achieve great economies of scale in that 
branch; investment in light industry would double, and foreign 
trade would expand (see The First Five-Year Plans, ch. 3). Fol- 
lowing the Chinese model, all of Bulgarian society was to be 
propagandized and mobilized to meet the planning goals. Two 
purposes of the grandiose revised plan were to keep Bulgaria in 
step with the Soviet bloc, all of whose members were embarking 
on plans for accelerated growth, and to quell internal party con- 
flicts. Zhivkov, whose "theses" had defined the goals of the plan, 
purged Politburo members and party rivals Boris Taskov (in 1959) 
and Anton Yugov (in 1962). citing their criticism of his policy as 
economically obstructionist. Already by i960, however, Zhivkov 
had been forced to redefine the impossible goals of his theses. Lack 
of skilled labor and materials made completion of projects at the 
prescribed pace impossible. Harvests were disastrously poor in the 
early 1960s; peasant unrest forced the government to raise food 
prices; and the urban dissatisfaction that resulted from higher prices 
compounded a crisis that broke in the summer of 1962. Blame fell 
on Zhivkov 's experiments with decentralized planning, which was 
totally abandoned by 1963. 



49 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

The Zhivkov Era 

Beginning in 1961, Todor Zhivkov skillfully retained control of 
the Bulgarian government and the BCP. His regime was a period 
of unprecedented stability, slavish imitation of Soviet policies, and 
modest economic experimentation. 

Zhivkov Takes Control 

Zhivkov was able to weather the social unrest of 1962 by find- 
ing scapegoats, juggling indicators of economic progress, and re- 
ceiving help from abroad. In 1961 Khrushchev had once again 
denounced Stalin, requiring similar action in the loyal Soviet satel- 
lites. In October Chervenkov, who had retained considerable party 
power, was ousted from the Politburo as an unrepentant Stalinist 
and obstructor of Bulgarian economic progress (see The Cher- 
venkov Era, ch. 4). When Khrushchev visited Bulgaria in 1962, 
the Soviet leader made clear his preference for Zhivkov over other 
Bulgarian party leaders. Within months Yugov had lost his party 
position, and Chervenkov was expelled from the party. Thus, in 
spite of disastrously unrealistic economic experimentation of the 
sort that contributed to Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, Zhivkov had 
greatly strengthened his position as party first secretary by the time 
his Soviet patron had fallen. 

In the early 1960s, Zhivkov improved ties with the Bulgarian 
intelligentsia by liberalizing censorship and curbing the state security 
forces (see Zhivkov and the Intelligentsia, ch. 4). He also mended 
relations with the agrarians by granting amnesties to BANU mem- 
bers and appointing the leader of the party as head of state. These 
measures gave Zhivkov a political base broad enough to survive 
the fall of Khrushchev, but they did not prevent an army plot against 
him in 1965. Zhivkov used the plot as a reason to tighten control 
over the army and move security functions from the Ministry of 
the Interior to a new Committee of State Security, under his per- 
sonal control. Several other plots were reported unofficially in the 
late 1960s, but after 1962 Zhivkov's position as sole leader of Bul- 
garia went without serious challenge. 

Zhivkov's Political Methodology 

In the 1960s, Zhivkov moved slowly and carefully to replace the 
deeply entrenched Old Guard in party positions. He believed that 
only an energetic, professional party cadre could lead Bulgaria 
effectively. Therefore, he gradually moved a younger group, in- 
cluding his daughter Liudmila Zhivkova and future party leader 
Aleksandur Lilov, into positions of power. At the same time, he 



50 



Historical Setting 



juggled party positions enough to prevent any individual from be- 
coming a serious rival. Unlike Chervenkov, with his Stalinist per- 
sonality cult, Zhivkov cultivated an egalitarian persona that kept 
him in contact with the Bulgarian people. Unlike contemporane- 
ous communist leaders in other countries, Zhivkov displayed a sense 
of humor even in formal state speeches. Because of the strong tra- 
dition of egalitarianism in Bulgarian political culture, the contrast 
of his approach with that of Chervenkov served Zhivkov very well. 

The Constitution of 1971 

In 1968 the Prague Spring outbreak of heretical socialism in 
Czechoslovakia caused the BCP to tighten control over all social 
organizations, calling for democratic centrism and elimination of 
unreliable elements from the party. This policy kept the BCP on 
a unified path in complete support of Soviet interests; it also led 
to a new Bulgarian constitution and BCP program in 1971. Ap- 
proved by the Tenth Party Congress and a national referendum, 
the 1971 constitution detailed for the first time the structure of the 
BCP (highly centralized, in keeping with policy after 1968) and 
its role in leading society and the state. BANU was specified as 
the partner of the BCP in the cooperative governing of the coun- 
try. A new State Council was created to oversee the Council of 
Ministers and exercise supreme executive authority (see The Con- 
stitution of 1971, ch. 4). In 1971 Zhivkov resigned as prime minister 
to become chairman of the State Council, a position equivalent 
to Bulgarian head of state. The new constitution also defined four 
forms of property: state, cooperative, public organization, and pri- 
vate. Private property was limited to that needed for individual 
and family upkeep. 

Foreign Affairs in the 1960s and 1970s 

In the first decade of the Zhivkov regime, Balkan affairs remained 
central to Bulgarian foreign policy, and relations with the Soviet 
Union remained without significant conflict. Because the Soviet 
Union showed relatively little interest in the Balkans in the 1950s 
and 1960s, Bulgaria was able to improve significantly its relations 
with its neighbors. In 1964 an agreement with Greece ended the 
long postwar freeze caused by Greek membership in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO — see Glossary). Bulgaria 
paid partial wartime reparations to Greece, and relations were nor- 
malized in culture, trade, and communications after the initial 
agreement. Turkish-Bulgarian relations were hindered by irrita- 
tion over the Turkish minority issue: throughout the postwar period, 
wavering Bulgarian policy on internal treatment and emigration 



51 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



of Bulgarian Turks was the chief obstacle to rapprochement, 
although bilateral agreements on emigration and other issues were 
reached in the 1960s and 1970s i see The Turkish Problem, ch. 4: 
Foreign Policv. ch. 4). 

Relations with Yugoslavia also were strained in the postwar years. 
The age-old Macedonian dispute was the principal reason that 
Yugoslavia remained untouched by Zhivkov' s Balkan detente pol- 
icy. In the mid-1960s. Tito and Zhivkov exchanged visits, but by 
1967 official Bulgarian spokesmen were again stressing the Bul- 
garian majority in Yugoslav-ruled Macedonia, and a new decade 
of mutually harsh propaganda began. Although the polemic over 
Macedonia continued through the 1980s, it served both countries 
mainly as a rallying point for domestic political support, and Bul- 
garia avoided taking advantage of Yugoslav vulnerabilities such 
as the unrest in the province of Kosovo. In the early 1980s, much 
oi Bulgaria's anti-Yugoslav propaganda aimed at discrediting 
heretical economic policv applications (feared by every orthodox 
communist neighbor of Yugoslavia i in Yugoslav Macedonia. In 
1981 Zhivkov called for establishment of a Balkan nuclear-free zone 
that would include Romania. Greece. Turkey, and Yugoslavia. 
The concept was notable not because of its practical implications 
(Bulgaria was generally unsupportive of regional cooperation, and 
the potential participants had strongly differing international po- 
sitions i. but as a Soviet device to remove NATO nuclear weapons 
from Greece and Turkev at a time of superpower tension over Euro- 
pean weapons installations. 

In the 1970s. Zhivkov actively pursued better relations with the 
West, overcoming conservative opposition and the tentative, 
tourism-based approach to the West taken in the 1960s. Emulat- 
ing Soviet detente policv of the 1970s. Bulgaria gained Western 
technology, expanded cultural contacts, and attracted Western in- 
vestments with the most liberal foreign investment policy in Eastern 
Europe. Between 1966 and 1975, Zhivkov visited Charles de Gaulle 
and the pope and established full diplomatic relations with the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany (West Germany). As in 1956 and 1968, 
however. Soviet actions altered Bulgaria's position. The Soviet in- 
vasion of Afghanistan in late 1979. which Bulgaria supported 
vigorously, renewed tension between Bulgaria and the West. Bul- 
garian implication in the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul 
II in 1981 exacerbated the problem and kept relations cool through 
the earlv 1980s. 

Bulgaria also followed the Soviet example in relations with Third- 
World countries, maintaining the image of brotherly willingness 
to aid struggling \dctims of Western imperialism. Student exchanges 



52 



Historical Setting 



already were common in the 1960s, and many Bulgarian techni- 
cians and medical personnel went to African, Asian, and Latin 
American countries in the 1970s and 1980s. Cultural exchange pro- 
grams targeted mainly the young in those countries. Between 1978 
and 1983, Zhivkov visited seventeen Third-World countries and 
hosted leaders from at least that many. 

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Bulgaria gave official mili- 
tary support to many national liberation causes, most notably in 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), Indone- 
sia, Libya, Angola, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and the Mid- 
dle East. In 1984 the 9,000 Bulgarian advisers stationed in Libya 
for military and nonmilitary aid put that country in first place 
among Bulgaria's Third-World clients. Through its Kintex arms 
export enterprise, Bulgaria also engaged in covert military sup- 
port activities, many of which were subsequently disclosed (see Arms 
Sales, ch. 5). In the 1970s, diplomatic crises with Sudan and Egypt 
were triggered by Bulgarian involvement in coup plots. Repeated 
discoveries of smuggled arms shipments from Bulgaria to Third- 
World countries gave Bulgaria a reputation as a major player in 
international arms supply to terrorists and revolutionaries. Arms 
smuggling into Turkey periodically caused diplomatic problems 
with that country in the 1970s. 

Domestic Policy in the 1960s and 1970s 

Zhivkov's domestic policy in the late 1960s and 1970s empha- 
sized increased production by Bulgaria's newly completed base of 
heavy industry, plus increased consumer production. The indus- 
trial base and collectivization of Bulgarian agriculture had been 
achieved largely by emulating Khrushchev's approaches in the early 
1960s; but after Khrushchev fell, Zhivkov experimented rather 
freely in industrial and agricultural policy. A 1965 economic re- 
form decentralized decision making and introduced the profit mo- 
tive in some economic areas. The approach, a minor commitment 
to "planning from below" in imitation of Yugoslavia's self- 
management program, was abandoned in 1969. Taking its place, 
a recentralization program gave government ministries full plan- 
ning responsibility at the expense of individual enterprises (see The 
Era of Experimentation and Reform, ch. 3). 

Meanwhile, a new program for integration and centralization 
of agriculture was born in 1969. The agricultural-industrial com- 
plex (agropromishlen kompleks — APK) merged cooperative and 
state farms and introduced industrial technology to Bulgarian 
agriculture. In the 1970s, the APK became the main supporting 
structure of Bulgarian agriculture (see Agriculture, ch. 3). The social 



53 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



and political goal of this program was to homogenize Bulgarian 
society, ending the sharp dichotomy that had always existed be- 
tween rural and town populations and weakening the ideological 
force of the BAXU. If the traditional gulf between Bulgarian 
agricultural and industrial workers were eliminated, the BCP could 
represent both groups. Despite this large-scale reorganization ef- 
fort, the Bulgarian tradition of small peasant farming remained 
strong into the 1980s. 

In keeping with the detente of the 1970s. Bulgaria sought in- 
dependent trade agreements with the West throughout that decade, 
to furnish technology and credit not available within the Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon — see Glossary). Eco- 
nomic cooperation and license agreements were signed with several 
West European countries, most notably West Germany. .Although 
the Western demand for Bulgarian goods remained generally low 
and Western commodities proved unexpectedly expensive in the 
late 1970s. Bulgaria's expansion of Western trade in that decade 
was unusually high for a Comecon member nation ^see Foreign 
Trade, ch. 3). 

The Political Atmosphere in the 1970s 

Through the mid-1970s. Zhivkov continued balancing the older 
and younger generations and the reformist and conservative fac- 
tions in his party, with only occasional purges of key officials. But 
in 1977. the purge of liberal Politburo member Boris Yelchev in- 
troduced a massive reorganization of provincial party organiza- 
tions that ousted 38.500 party members. This move was designed 
to limit the atmosphere of liberalization that had followed the 1975 
Helsinki Accords (see Glossary). That mood and an economic cri- 
sis caused by oil shortages in the 1970s aroused discontent and 
demonstrations in Bulgaria in the late 1970s. 

At the end of the decade, two more crises confronted Zhivkov: 
in 1978 the murder of exiled writer Georgi Markov was widely at- 
tributed to Bulgarian State Security, damaging the country's in- 
ternational image: and in 1980 the Polish Solidarity (see Glossary) 
movement alarmed the entire Soviet Bloc by attracting an active 
anticommunist following in a key Warsaw Pact (see Glossary) coun- 
try. .Although the magnitude of Bulgarian social discontent was 
much less than that in Poland, the BCP ordered production of more 
consumer goods, a reduction of party privileges, and limited media 
coverage of Poland in the early 1980s as an antidote to the "Pol- 
ish infection." 

Meanwhile, in 1980 Zhivkov had improved his domestic posi- 
tion by appointing his daughter Liudmila Zhivkova as chair of the 



54 



Historical Setting 



commission on science, culture, and art. In this powerful position, 
Zhivkova became extremely popular by promoting Bulgaria's 
separate national cultural heritage. She spent large sums of money 
in a highly visible campaign to support scholars, collect Bulgarian 
art, and sponsor cultural institutions. Among her policies was closer 
cultural contact with the West; her most visible project was the 
spectacular national celebration of Bulgaria's 1 ,300th anniversary 
in 1981 . When Zhivkova died in 1981 , relations with the West had 
already been chilled by the Afghanistan issue, but her brief ad- 
ministration of Bulgaria's official cultural life was a successful phase 
of her father's appeal to Bulgarian national tradition to bind the 
country together. 

Bulgaria in the 1980s 

Despite the resumption of the Cold War, by 1981 several long- 
standing problems had eased in Bulgaria. Zhivkova had bolstered 
national pride and improved Bulgaria's international cultural im- 
age; Zhivkov had eased oppression of Roman Catholics and 
propaganda against the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in the 1970s, 
and used the 1 ,300th anniversary of the Bulgarian state for formal 
reconciliation with Orthodox church officials; the Bulgarian media 
covered an expanded range of permissible subject matter; Bulgaria 
contributed equipment to a Soviet space probe launched in 1981, 
heralding a new era of technological advancement; and the New 
Economic Model (NEM), instituted in 1981 as the latest economic 
reform program, seemingly improved the supply of consumer goods 
and generally upgraded the economy. 

However, Zhivkova' s death and East- West tensions dealt seri- 
ous blows to cultural liberalization; by 1984 the Bulgarian Writers' 
Conference was calling for greater ideological content and opti- 
mism in literature. Once fully implemented in 1982, NEM was 
unable to improve the quality or quantity of Bulgarian goods and 
produce. In 1983 Zhivkov harshly criticized all of Bulgarian in- 
dustry and agriculture in a major speech, but the reforms gener- 
ated by his speech did nothing to improve the situation. A large 
percentage of high-quality domestic goods were shipped abroad in 
the early 1980s to shrink Bulgaria's hard-currency debt, and the 
purchase of Western technology was sacrificed for the same rea- 
son, crippling technical advancement and disillusioning consumers. 
By 1984 Bulgaria was suffering a serious energy shortage because 
its Soviet-made nuclear power plant was undependable and 
droughts reduced the productivity of hydroelectric plants (see 
Energy Generation, ch. 3). Like the cutback in technology imports, 
this shortage affected all of Bulgarian industry. Finally, Bulgarian 



55 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



implication in the plot to assassinate Pope John Paul II in 1981 
and in international drugs and weapons trading impaired the coun- 
try's international image and complicated economic relations with 
the West (see Security and Intelligence Services, ch. 5). 

The problem of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria continued into 
the 1980s. Because birth rates among the Turks remained rela- 
tively high while Bulgarians approached a zero-growth birth rate 
m 1980. Bulgarian authorities sought to mitigate the impact of grow- 
ing Turkish enclaves in certain regions. Hence. Bulgaria dis- 
continued its liberal 1969 emigration agreement with Turkey 
(ostensibly to prevent a shortage of unskilled labor resulting from 
free movement of Turkish workers back to their homeland), and 
in 1984 began a massive campaign to erase the national identity 
of Turkish citizens by forcing them to take Bulgarian names. Official 
propaganda justified forced assimilation with the assertion that the 
only * 'Turks" in Bulgaria were descended from the Bulgarians who 
had adopted Islam after the Ottoman occupation in the fourteenth 
centurv. This campaign brought several negative results. Bulgaria's 
international ima?e. already damaged by events in the early 1980s, 
now included official discrimination against the country's largest 
ethnic mmontv. The resumption of terrorist attacks on civilians, 
absent for many years, coincided with the new policy. And Bul- 
garia's relations with Turkey, which had improved somewhat after 
a visit by Turkish President Kenan Evren to Bulgaria in 1982. 
suffered another setback. 

Bulgaria's close reliance on the Soviet Union continued into the 
1980s, but differences began to appear. Much of Zhivkov' s suc- 
cess had come from the secure support of Xikita Khrushchev's suc- 
cessor. Leonid Brezhnev, with whom Zhivkov had a close personal 
relationship. By contrast, relations between Zhivkov and Brezh- 
nev's successor. Iuri! V. Andropov, were tense because Zhivkov 
had supported Andropov's rival Konstantm Chernenko as successor 
to Brezhnev. The advent of Mikhail S. Gorbachev as Soviet party 
leader in 1985 defined a new generational difference between Soviet 
and Bulgarian leadership. Gorbachev immediately declared that 
Bulgaria must follow his example in party reform if traditional re- 
lations were to continue. 

By this time, the image of the BCP had suffered for several years 
from well-publicized careerism and corruption, and from the re- 
moteness and advancing age of the party leadership (Zhivkov was 
seventy-four in 1985). The state bureaucracy, inordinately large 
in Bulgaria since the first post-liberation government of 1878. con- 
stituted 13.5 percent of the total national work force in 1977. Peri- 
odic anticorruption campaigns had only temporary effects. The 



56 



Historical Setting 



ideological credibility of the party also suffered from the apparent 
failure of the NEM, whose goals were being restated by 1984. 
Although the BCP faced no serious political opposition or internal 
division in the early 1980s, the party launched campaigns to in- 
volve Bulgarian youth more fully in party activities. But these ef- 
forts had little impact on what party leaders perceived as serious 
and widespread political apathy (see The Bulgarian Communist 
(Socialist) Party, ch. 4). Thus, by 1985 many domestic and inter- 
national signs indicated that the underpinning of the long, stable 
Zhivkov era was in precarious condition. 

* * * 

The most comprehensive English-language treatment of Bulgar- 
ian history is Richard J. Crampton's A Short History of Modern Bul- 
garia, which covers in detail the period from liberation (1878) to 
1985. The Bulgarian Communist Party from Blagoev to Zhivkov, by John 
D. Bell, provides a political history from the viewpoint of the BCP, 
beginning with the pre- 1900 origins of that party and concluding 
in 1984. Modern Bulgaria: History, Policy, Economy, Culture, edited 
by Georgi Bokov, contains a long historical section whose useful 
detail can be separated from its bias as a state publication of the 
Zhivkov era. Cyril Black's chapter "Bulgaria in Historical Per- 
spective" in Bulgaria (edited by L.A.D. Dellin) is a balanced over- 
view and perspective of all periods of Bulgarian history. And the 
"History and Political Traditions" chapter of Robert J. Mclntyre's 
Bulgaria: Politics, Economics, and Society describes the evolution of po- 
litical institutions from the First Bulgarian Empire to the late 1980s. 
(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



57 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 




Man in traditional costume, playing gaida, a folk instrument 



IN THE PAST 150 YEARS, vast changes have completely trans- 
formed the political and economic situation in Bulgaria, as well 
as the country's way of life. Poor peasants who served a foreign 
ruler first became land-owning peasants, then industrial workers 
who were mostly urbanized and disconnected from the land. Bul- 
garians who had traveled no farther than the next village began 
to migrate, often to gain a better education or to get a job in a 
growing industry. As villages and towns became less isolated, both 
internal migration and emigration became easier. 

The decline in the agricultural way of life also made people sus- 
ceptible to changes on a national level rather than on a village or 
regional level. People were less self-sufficient for their basic needs 
and therefore more vulnerable to fluctuations in the national econ- 
omy. The traditional support systems of the extended family and 
cooperative work in the village were replaced by a vast network 
of national social welfare programs. Instead of receiving help from 
family and neighbors, the poor, elderly, and disabled grew depen- 
dent on governmental programs. The sick no longer relied solely 
on traditional village healers once villagers and city people alike 
fell under coverage of a national health system. 

After 1944 much was written about the contrast between Bul- 
garia's traditional past and the modern way of life to which com- 
munism had accustomed Bulgarians. Indeed, during the postwar 
era, Bulgaria made great progress in establishing the structure of 
a modern, urbanized way of life. Mortality decreased markedly, 
life expectancy increased greatly, and the educational level of the 
population improved significantly. However, the modern way of 
life also generated much greater expectations for housing, educa- 
tion, health standards, work standards, and other aspects of life 
than the communist system could deliver. The centralization and 
bureaucracy of traditional communist social policy established a 
single, rather low standard for everyone, regardless of individual 
needs. Also, massive industrialization brought pollution and other 
environmental problems to a land that had been relatively unspoiled 
before World War II. 

After democratization began in 1989, Bulgarians began look- 
ing westward and found that many aspects of their way of life were 
sadly lacking by the standards of Western Europe and the United 
States. The sense that Bulgaria needed to do fifty years' worth of 
catching up made the transition to democracy even harder. 



61 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

Natural Features 

The land area of Bulgaria is 110,550 square kilometers, slightly 
larger than that of the state of Tennessee. The country is situated 
on the west coast of the Black Sea, with Romania to the north, 
Greece and Turkey to the south, and Yugoslavia to the west. Con- 
sidering its small size, Bulgaria has a great variety of topographi- 
cal features. Even within small parts of the country, the land may 
be divided into plains, plateaus, hills, mountains, basins, gorges, 
and deep river valleys. 

Boundaries 

Although external historical events often changed Bulgaria's na- 
tional boundaries in its first centuries of existence, natural terrain 
features defined most boundaries after 1944, and no significant 
group of people suffered serious economic hardship because of bor- 
der delineation. Postwar Bulgaria contained a large percentage of 
the ethnic Bulgarian people, although numerous migrations into 
and out of Bulgaria occurred at various times. None of the coun- 
try's borders was officially disputed in 1991, although nationalist 
Bulgarians continued to claim that Bulgaria's share of Macedonia — 
which it shared with both Yugoslavia and Greece — was less than 
just because of the ethnic connection between Macedonians and 
Bulgarians (see Macedonians, this ch.). 

In 1991 Bulgaria had a total border of about 2,264 kilometers. 
Rivers accounted for about 680 kilometers and the Black Sea coast 
for 400 kilometers; the southern and western borders were mainly 
defined by ridges in high terrain. The western and northern bound- 
aries were shared with Yugoslavia and Romania, respectively, and 
the Black Sea coastline constituted the entire eastern border. The 
Romanian border followed the Danube River for 464 kilometers 
from the northwestern corner of the country to the city of Silistra 
and then cut to the east-southeast for 136 kilometers across the 
northeastern province of Varna. The Danube, with steep bluffs 
on the Bulgarian side and a wide area of swamps and marshes on 
the Romanian side, was one of the most effective river boundaries 
in Europe. The line through Dobruja was arbitrary and was 
redrawn several times according to international treaties (see The 
Balkan Wars and World War I, ch. 1). In that process, most in- 
habitants with strong national preferences resettled in the country 
of their choice. Borders to the south were with Greece and Tur- 
key. The border with Greece was 491 kilometers long, and the Tur- 
kish border was 240 kilometers long. 

Topography 

The main characteristic of Bulgaria's topography is alternating 



62 



The Society and Its Environment 



bands of high and low terrain that extend east to west across the 
country (see fig. 8). From north to south, those bands are the Danu- 
bian Plateau, the Balkan Mountains (called Stara Planina, mean- 
ing old mountains in Bulgarian), the central Thracian Plain, and 
the Rhodope Mountains. The easternmost sections near the Black 
Sea are hilly, but they gradually gain height to the west until the 
westernmost part of the country is entirely high ground. 

More than two-thirds of the country is made up of plains, 
plateaus, or hilly land at an altitude less than 600 meters. Plains 
(below 200 meters) make up 31 percent of the land, plateaus and 
hills (200 to 600 meters) 41 percent, low mountains (600 to 1,000 
meters) 10 percent, medium-sized mountains (1,000 to 1,500 
meters) 10 percent, and high mountains (over 1,500 meters) 3 per- 
cent. The average altitude in Bulgaria is 470 meters. 

The Danubian Plateau extends from the Yugoslav border to the 
Black Sea. It encompasses the area between the Danube River, 
which forms most of the country's northern border, and the Balkan 
Mountains to the south. The plateau slopes gently from cliffs along 
the river, then it abuts mountains of 750 to 950 meters. The plateau, 
a fertile area with undulating hills, is the granary of the country. 

The southern edge of the Danubian Plateau blends into the 
foothills of the Balkan Mountains, the Bulgarian part of the Car- 
pathian Mountains. The Carpathians resemble a reversed S as they 
run eastward from Czechoslovakia across the northern portion of 
Romania, swinging southward to the middle of Romania and then 
running westward, where they are known as the Transylvanian 
Alps. The mountains turn eastward again at the Iron Gate, a gorge 
of the Danube River at the Romanian-Yugoslav border. At that 
point, they become the Balkan Mountains of Bulgaria. 

The Balkan Mountains originate at the Timok Valley in Yugo- 
slavia and run southward towards the Sofia Basin in west central 
Bulgaria. From there they run east to the Black Sea. The Balkans 
are about 600 kilometers long and 30 to 50 kilometers wide. They 
retain their height well into central Bulgaria, where Botev Peak, 
the highest point in the Balkan Mountains, rises to about 2,376 
meters. The range then continues at lower altitude to the cliffs of 
the Black Sea. Through most of Bulgaria, the Balkan Mountains 
form the watershed from which rivers drain north to the Danube 
River or south to the Aegean Sea. Some smaller rivers in the east 
drain directly to the Black Sea. The Sredna Gora (central hills) 
is a narrow ridge about 160 kilometers long and 1 ,600 meters high, 
running east to west parallel to the Balkans. Just to the south is 
the Valley of Roses, famous for rose oil used in perfume and li- 
queurs. 



63 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

The southern slopes of the Balkan Mountains and the Sredna 
Gora give way to the Thracian Plain. Roughly triangular in shape, 
the plain originates at a point east of the mountains near Sofia and 
broadens eastward to the Black Sea. It includes the Maritsa River 
valley and the lowlands that extend from the river to the Black Sea. 
Like the Danubian Plateau, much of the Thracian Plain is some- 
what hilly and not a true plain. Most of its terrain is moderate 
enough to cultivate. 

The Rhodope Mountains occupy the area between the Thracian 
Plain and the Greek border to the south. The western Rhodopes 
consist of two ranges: the Rila Mountains south of Sofia and the 
Pirin Mountains in the southwestern corner of the country. They 
are the most outstanding topographic feature of Bulgaria and of 
the entire Balkan Peninsula. The Rila range includes Mount 
Musala, whose 2,975-meter peak is the highest in any Balkan coun- 
try. About a dozen other peaks in the Rilas are over 2,600 meters. 
The highest peaks are characterized by sparse bare rocks and re- 
mote lakes above the tree line. The lower peaks, however, are cov- 
ered with alpine meadows that give the range an overall impression 
of green beauty. The Pirin range is characterized by rocky peaks 
and stony slopes. Its highest peak is Mount Vikhren, at 2,915 meters 
the second-highest peak in Bulgaria. 

The largest basin in Bulgaria is the Sofia Basin. About twenty- 
four kilometers wide and ninety-six kilometers long, the basin con- 
tains the capital city and the area immediately surrounding it. The 
route through basins and valleys from Belgrade to Istanbul (for- 
merly Constantinople) via Sofia has been historically important 
since Roman times, determining the strategic significance of the 
Balkan Peninsula. Bulgaria's largest cities were founded on this 
route. Paradoxically, although the mountains made many Bulgarian 
villages and towns relatively inaccessible, Bulgaria has always been 
susceptible to invasion because no natural obstacle blocked the route 
through Sofia. 

A significant part of Bulgaria's land is prone to earthquakes. Two 
especially sensitive areas are the borders of the North Bulgarian 
Swell (rounded elevation), the center of which is in the Gorna 
Oryakhovitsa area in north-central Bulgaria, and the West 
Rhodopes Vault, a wide area extending through the Rila and north- 
ern Pirin regions to Plovdiv in south-central Bulgaria. Especially 
strong tremors also occur along diagonal lines running between 
Skopje in the Republic of Macedonia and Razgrad in northeast 
Bulgaria, and from Albania eastward across the southern third of 
Bulgaria through Plovdiv. Sixteen major earthquakes struck Bul- 
garia between 1900 and 1986, the last two in Strazhitsa on the 



64 




Figure 8. Topography and Drainage 
66 



The Society and Its Environment 



Skopje-Razgrad fault line. Together the two quakes damaged over 
16,000 buildings, half of them severely. One village was almost 
completely leveled, others badly damaged. Many inhabitants were 
still living in temporary housing four years later. 

Drainage 

The Balkan Mountains divide Bulgaria into two nearly equal 
drainage systems. The larger system drains northward to the Black 
Sea, mainly by way of the Danube River. This system includes 
the entire Danubian Plateau and a stretch of land running forty- 
eight to eighty kilometers inland from the coastline. The second 
system drains the Thracian Plain and most of the higher lands of 
the south and southwest to the Aegean Sea. Although only the 
Danube is navigable, many of the other rivers and streams in Bul- 
garia have a high potential for the production of hydroelectric power 
and are sources of irrigation water. 

Of the Danube's Bulgarian tributaries, all but the Iskur rise in 
the Balkan Mountains. The Iskur flows northward to the Danube 
from its origin in the Rila Mountains, passing through Sofia's 
eastern suburbs and through a Balkan Mountain valley. 

The Danube gets slightly more than 4 percent of its total volume 
from its Bulgarian tributaries. As it flows along the northern border, 
the Danube averages 1.6 to 2.4 kilometers in width. The river's 
highest water levels usually occur during June floods; it is frozen 
over an average of forty days per year. 

Several major rivers flow directly to the Aegean Sea. Most of 
these streams fall swiftly from the mountains and have cut deep, 
scenic gorges. The Maritsa with its tributaries is by far the larg- 
est, draining all of the western Thracian Plain, all of the Sredna 
Gora, the southern slopes of the Balkan Mountains, and the north- 
ern slopes of the eastern Rhodopes. After it leaves Bulgaria, the 
Maritsa forms most of the Greek-Turkish border. The Struma and 
the Mesta (which separate the Pirin Mountains from the main 
Rhodopes ranges) are the next largest Bulgarian rivers flowing to 
the Aegean. The Struma and Mesta reach the sea through Greece. 

Climate 

Considering its small area, Bulgaria has an unusually variable 
and complex climate. The country lies between the strongly con- 
trasting continental and Mediterranean climatic zones. Bulgarian 
mountains and valleys act as barriers or channels for air masses, 
causing sharp contrasts in weather over relatively short distances. 
The continental zone is slightly larger because continental air masses 
flow easily into the unobstructed Danubian Plain. The continental 



67 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

influence, stronger during the winter, produces abundant snow- 
fall; the Mediterranean influence increases during the summer and 
produces hot, dry weather. The barrier effect of the Balkan Moun- 
tains is felt throughout the country: on the average, northern Bul- 
garia is about one degree cooler and receives about 192 more 
millimeters of rain than southern Bulgaria. Because the Black Sea 
is too small to be a primary influence over much of the country's 
weather, it only affects the immediate area along its coastline. 

The Balkan Mountains are the southern boundary of the area 
in which continental air masses circulate freely. The Rhodope 
Mountains mark the northern limits of domination by Mediterra- 
nean weather systems. The area between, which includes the Thra- 
cian Plain, is influenced by a combination of the two systems, with 
the continental predominating. This combination produces a plains 
climate resembling that of the Corn Belt in the United States, with 
long summers and high humidity. The climate in this region is 
generally more severe than that of other parts of Europe in the same 
latitude. Because it is a transitional area, average temperatures and 
precipitation are erratic and may vary widely from year to year. 

Average precipitation in Bulgaria is about 630 millimeters per 
year. Dobruja in the northeast, the Black Sea coastal area, and 
parts of the Thracian Plain usually receive less than 500 millimeters. 
The remainder of the Thracian Plain and the Danubian Plateau 
get less than the country average; the Thracian Plain is often sub- 
ject to summer droughts. Higher elevations, which receive the most 
rainfall in the country, may average over 2,540 millimeters per year. 

The many valley basins scattered through the uplands have tem- 
perature inversions resulting in stagnant air. Sofia is located in such 
a basin, but its elevation (about 530 meters) tends to moderate sum- 
mer temperature and relieve oppressive high humidity. Sofia also 
is sheltered from the northern European winds by the mountains 
that surround its troughlike basin. Temperatures in Sofia average 
-2°C in January and about 21°C in August. The city's rainfall 
is near the country average, and the overall climate is pleasant. 

The coastal climate is moderated by the Black Sea, but strong 
winds and violent local storms are frequent during the winter. 
Winters along the Danube River are bitterly cold; however, 
sheltered valleys that open to the south along the Greek and Tur- 
kish borders may be as mild as areas along the Mediterranean or 
Aegean coasts. 

Environment 

Like the other European members of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (Comecon — see Glossary), Bulgaria saw 



68 



The Society and Its Environment 



unimpeded industrial growth as a vital sign of social welfare and 
progress toward the socialist ideal. Because this approach made 
environmental issues a taboo subject in socialist Bulgaria, the degree 
of damage by postwar industrial policy went unassessed until the 
government of Todor Zhivkov (1962-89) was overthrown in late 
1989. The Zhivkov government's commitment to heavy industry 
and lack of money to spend on protective measures forced it to con- 
ceal major environmental hazards, especially when relations with 
other countries were at stake. Factories that did not meet environ- 
mental standards paid symbolic fines and had no incentive to in- 
stitute real environmental protection measures. Even as late as 1990, 
socialist officials downplayed the effects on Bulgaria of radiation 
from the 1986 nuclear power plant accident at Chernobyl'. Citizens 
were informed that they need not take iodine tablets or use any 
other protective measures. 

In 1991 Bulgarian environmentalists estimated that 60 percent 
of the country's agricultural land had been damaged by excessive 
use of pesticides and fertilizers and by industrial fallout. By 1991 
two-thirds of Bulgarian rivers were polluted, and the Yantra River 
was classified as the dirtiest river in Europe. Bulgaria's forests had 
also been damaged. By 1991, about two-thirds of the primary forests 
had been cut. However, despite its recognition of the need for 
greater environmental protection, Bulgaria budgeted only 10.4 bil- 
lion leva (for value of the lev — see Glossary) to remedy ecological 
problems in 1991 . 

Perhaps the most serious environmental problem in Bulgaria was 
in the Danube port city of Ruse. From 1981 to 1989, the chemical 
pollution that spread from a chlorine and sodium plant across the 
Danube in Giurgiu, Romania, was a forbidden subject in Bulgaria 
because it posed a threat to good relations between two Warsaw 
Pact (see Glossary) countries. Chemical plants in Ruse also con- 
tributed to the pollution. Citizen environmentalists opposing the 
situation in Ruse organized the first demonstrations and the first 
independent political group to oppose the Zhivkov regime (see Other 
Political Organizations, ch. 4). During the Giurgiu plant's first year 
of operation, chlorine levels in Ruse almost doubled, reaching two 
times the permissible maximum in the summer of 1990. Over 3,000 
families left the city in the 1980s despite government restrictions 
aimed at covering up the problem. Besides chlorine and its by- 
products, the plant produced chemical agents for the rubber in- 
dustry, and in 1991 some sources reported that the plant was 
processing industrial waste from Western countries — both activi- 
ties likely to further damage Ruse's environment. International 
experts claimed that half of Ruse's pollutants came from Giurgiu, 



69 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

and the others came from Bulgarian industries. In response to the 
formidable Bulgarian environmental movement, some Bulgarian 
plants have been closed or have added protective measures; the 
Giurgiu plant, however, was planning to expand in 1991. 

Pollution of agricultural land from a copper plant near the town 
of Srednogorie provoked harsh public criticism. The plant emit- 
ted toxic clouds containing copper, lead, and arsenic. In 1988 it 
released toxic wastewater into nearby rivers used to irrigate land 
in the Plovdiv-Pazardzhik Plain, which includes some of Bulgaria's 
best agricultural land. The groundwater beneath the plain also was 
poisoned. Work has begun on a plan to drain toxic wastewater from 
the plant's reservoir into the Maritsa River. Environmental im- 
provements for the copper plant and three other factories in the 
Plovdiv area (a lead and zinc factory, a chemical factory, and a 
uranium factory) also were planned, but they would take years to 
implement. 

None of Bulgaria's large cities escaped serious environmental 
pollution. Statistics showed that 70 to 80 percent of Sofia's air pol- 
lution was caused by emissions from cars, trucks, and buses. Tem- 
perature inversions over the city aggravated the problem. Two other 
major polluters, the Kremikovtsi Metallurgy Works and the Bu- 
khovo uranium mine (both in southwestern Bulgaria), contami- 
nated the region with lead, sulfur dioxide, hydrogen sulfide, ethanol, 
and mercury. The city of Kurdzhali became heavily polluted with 
lead from its lead and zinc complex. In 1973 the petroleum and 
chemical plant near the Black Sea port of Burgas released large 
amounts of chlorine in an incident similar to the one in Srednogorie. 
Environmentalists estimated that the area within a thirty-kilometer 
radius of the plant was rendered uninhabitable by that release. The 
air in Burgas was also heavily polluted with carbon and sulfur di- 
oxide in 1990. 

In 1990 environmental scientists claimed that two-thirds of Bul- 
garia's population suffered from the polluted environment to some 
degree (see Health, this ch.). In 1991 Bulgaria began seeking in- 
ternational assistance in solving environmental problems. Besides 
joining Romania, Turkey, and the Soviet Union in joint scientific 
studies of the critically polluted Black Sea, Bulgaria actively sought 
environmental technology and expertise from Western Europe and 
the United States. 

Population 

Since ancient times, Bulgaria has been a crossroads for popula- 
tion movement. Early settlement occurred mainly in the most fer- 
tile agricultural lands. After World War II, however, Bulgarian 



70 



The Society and Its Environment 



cities grew rapidly at the expense of rural population in concert 
with state industrialization policy. 

Administrative Subdivisions 

In 1991 Bulgaria was divided into nine provinces (oblasti; sing. 
oblast). These administrative units included the city of Sofia (Grad 
Sofiya) and eight provincial districts: Burgas, Khaskovo, Lovech, 
Mikhaylovgrad, Plovdiv, Razgrad, Sofiya (the region outside the 
city), and Varna (see fig. 1). Each province was named for the city 
that was its administrative center. Excluding the city of Sofia, the 
provinces encompassed territories ranging from 9.5 percent of the 
country to 17.2 percent, and their population ranged from 7.5 per- 
cent to 14 percent of the national total (see table 2, Appendix). 
The eight provinces were divided into a total of 273 communities 
(obshtini; sing., obshtina)\ the city of Sofia was divided into districts 
(rawni; sing., raion). Because this system was established in 1987, 
references to another type of district, the okrug (pi. okruzi), remained 
common in the early 1990s. The new government that took office 
in 1991 announced that yet another change was needed in Bul- 
garia's political subdivisions because the 1987 system reflected the 
discredited policies of the Zhivkov regime. 

Settlement Patterns 

The first settlements sprang up in Bulgaria very early in the area's 
history (see Early Settlement and Empire, ch. 1). The biggest and 
most numerous villages appeared on fertile lands such as the Danu- 
bian Plateau, the Dobruja region, and the Maritsa and Tundzha 
river valleys. Settlements also took hold at very high altitudes (up 
to 1,500 meters in the Rhodope Mountains and up to 1,200 meters 
in the Balkans), but only in areas where it was warm enough to 
grow grain or other crops. During the rule of the Ottoman Em- 
pire, many Bulgarians were forced to move into villages at higher 
altitudes. After Bulgaria became independent in 1878, many peo- 
ple returned to the lower altitudes, but most of the upland villages 
remained. The process of urbanization began at that point, but 
it progressed slowly because of wars, lack of employment in popu- 
lation centers, and the emigration of the ethnic Turks who had sup- 
ported the economies of some cities during the Ottoman era. The 
massive industrialization of the communist era again stimulated 
temporary settlement at high altitudes for mining or forestry. Gener- 
ally, only the highest areas in the Rila, Pirin, and Rhodope moun- 
tains remained comparatively unsettled. These regions became 
known for their national parks and seasonal resort areas. 



71 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 
Cities 

Bulgaria's cities grew much more rapidly after 1944. In 1946 
only Sofia and Plovdiv had populations numbering over 100,000. 
By 1990, there were ten cities having populations exceeding 
250,000: Burgas, Dobrich (formerly Tolbukhin), Pleven, Plodiv, 
Ruse, Shumen, Sliven, Sofia, Stara Zagora, and Varna (see fig. 9; 
table 3, Appendix). In 1990 nearly one-third of Bulgaria's popu- 
lation lived in the ten largest cities; two-thirds of the population 
was urban. Although the urban birth rate declined after the mid- 
1970s, large-scale migration from rural areas to cities continued 
through 1990 (see table 4, Appendix). At the same time, migra- 
tion from cities to rural areas more than doubled from the 1960s 
to the 1980s, mainly because more mechanical and service jobs be- 
came available in agriculture during that period. In cities such as 
Sofia and Plovdiv, where industrialization started earliest, the popu- 
lation stabilized, and the repercussions of rapid population growth 
were less obvious in the 1980s. 

The population of the average Bulgarian city grew by three to 
four times between 1950 and 1990. The rapidity of this growth 
caused some negative trends. The cities often lacked the resources 
to serve the needs of their growing populations: in particular, hous- 
ing and social services could not grow fast enough. The cities' great 
need for social resources in turn diverted resources from smaller, 
more scattered population centers. The overall rural-to-urban 
migration pattern caused shortages of agricultural labor, especi- 
ally in the villages surrounding large cities. The government dis- 
couraged new industries from locating in outlying areas because 
of the lack of workers. 

Sofia was founded by the Thracians and has remained an im- 
portant population center for 2,000 years. Its location in a basin 
sheltered by the Vitosha Mountains was strategically and estheti- 
cally desirable. Long-established communication routes pass though 
Sofia, most notably the route from Belgrade to Istanbul. Sofia's 
climate and location caused the Roman Emperor Constantine to 
consider the city when he selected an eastern capital for his em- 
pire in the early fourth century. Hot springs, which still exist today, 
were an added attraction. After it became the Bulgarian capital 
in 1879, Sofia became the administrative, educational, and cul- 
tural center of the country. Because of Sofia's rapid postwar growth 
(it grew by 36 percent between 1965 and 1986), in 1986 its city 
government closed the city to all internal immigrants except scho- 
lars and technical experts. 

Plovdiv, the country's second most important city, was found- 
ed in the fourth century B.C. by Philip of Macedonia. Its exposed 



72 




Source: Based on information from Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.), Bulgarien, Gottingen, Germar 

Figure 9. Population Centers, 1990 
74 



The Society and Its Environment 



location on the route from Belgrade to Istanbul gave the city a vio- 
lent history that included several instances of capture and 
devastation — both by non-Christian invaders and by Christian 
armies during the Crusades. At the end of the twentieth century, 
Plovdiv remained an important commercial city. More rail lines 
radiated from Plovdiv than from Sofia, and the city had a univer- 
sity, important museums and art treasures, and an old town center 
with a unique mid-nineteenth century architectural style. Part of 
old Plovdiv was declared a national monument. 

The three main port cities were Varna and Burgas on the Black 
Sea and Ruse on the Danube River. A relatively young city, Bur- 
gas gained most of its size in the late 1800s. Until the 1950s, it 
was the most active Bulgarian port. Varna, which was founded 
by Greeks in the sixth century B.C. , eclipsed Burgas by attracting 
the naval academy and the chief naval base and acquiring most 
of Bulgaria's shipbuilding industry. Ruse, founded by the Romans 
in the first century B.C., grew into a major industrial center and 
transportation hub after World War II. The first bridge across the 
Danube between Bulgaria and Romania was built just north of 
Ruse. 

Internal Migration 

The urbanization of Bulgaria began with independence from the 
Ottoman Turks, but the process did not become widespread until 
the massive industrialization of the communist era. In 1900 city 
dwellers composed barely 20 percent of Bulgaria's population, and 
in 1945 they made up only 24 percent. By the end of 1990, however, 
more than 6 million people lived in the cities while fewer than 3 
million lived in the villages. Bulgarian demographers predicted that 
75 percent of the population would live in cities by the year 2000. 

During the 1950s and 1960s, when the industrialization process 
was most intense, most Bulgarians who moved were of working 
age, had a basic education or less, and wished to obtain new jobs 
in industry (see The Era of Experimentation and Reform, ch. 3). 
Fully 85 percent of internal migrants in the early 1960s went to 
work in an industry. The trend of moving to locations with indus- 
trial jobs continued at a reduced rate in the next decades, and 
migrants in the 1980s tended to be younger and better educated 
than those of earlier years. The migrant population generally in- 
cluded more women than men. The number reflected women who 
moved to join the work force as well as women who married and 
moved to join their husbands. 

About two-thirds of migrant Bulgarians relocated within the same 
province; hence no region showed a marked population decline. 



75 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

The decline in village population, however, concerned demo- 
graphers, who feared that villages would be completely vacated and 
the country's population distribution severely skewed. By 1990 this 
population shift had occurred most noticeably in the southeastern 
and southern regions, but a similar trend was evident in the north- 
west. 

As workers continued to leave, village populations aged demo- 
graphically. The share of villages with an average population age 
above fifty increased from 23 percent in 1956 to 41 percent in 1985. 
Natural growth in villages, negative after 1975, fell to negative 6 
percent in 1985. Some villages recorded no births for an entire year. 
As the younger population decreased, schools and health facilities 
closed. The closures, in turn, drove more people to leave their 
villages. 

Meanwhile, demographers and sociologists encouraged youn- 
ger Bulgarians to return to the villages. Generally, those who fol- 
lowed this advice because of housing shortages, transportation 
problems, or pollution in the cities found hard, uncongenial work, 
a lower standard of living, and scant public services and recrea- 
tion. Many village workers were forced to raise animals to supple- 
ment their regular income. The beginning of democratization in 

1990 sparked much debate about whether the rural standard of liv- 
ing would rise if the government's agricultural privatization pro- 
gram could stimulate agricultural activity (see Agricultural 
Products, ch. 3). 

Foreign Citizens in Bulgaria 

During the Zhivkov era, Bulgaria signed several friendship treaties 
with other Comecon nations to ease the exchange of workers. In 
the 1980s, for example, a large number of Bulgarians worked in 
the construction and timber industries of the Komi Autonomous 
Soviet Socialist Republic (Komi ASSR) under an exchange agree- 
ment with the Soviet Union. Workers were expected to return to their 
own countries when their contracts ended, but they did not always do 
so. For example, some Vietnamese construction workers sent to Bul- 
garia under a Comecon agreement in the 1980s remained, and in 

1991 the Vietnamese population of Bulgaria was 11,000. Because 
they arrived completely unprepared for life in Bulgaria and began 
working after only one month of training and language courses, the 
Vietnamese who remained in Bulgaria generally received the hardest 
and lowest-paying jobs and often became involved in criminal ac- 
tivity. In 1991 several violent incidents involving Vietnamese pro- 
voked calls for their repatriation. In response, the government made 
plans to expel all resident Vietnamese from Bulgaria in 1992. 



76 



The Society and Its Environment 

Population Trends 

The 1985 census recorded Bulgaria's population at 8,948,649, 
an increase of 220,878 over the 1975 census figure. At the end of 
1990, the Central Statistical Bureau had estimated an updated figure 
of 8,989,172, including about 100,000 more women than men. 
However, the estimates for 1989 and 1990 did not account for major 
emigrations in those years: first the massive emigration of Turks 
in 1989, then the emigration of ethnic Bulgarians in 1990. Adjust- 
ing for emigration figures, the population figure actually decreased 
between 1985 and 1990. Bulgaria's 1989 population density figure 
of eighty-one people per square kilometer made it one of the least 
densely populated countries in Europe. 

Bulgaria's rate of population growth began a steady decrease 
in the mid- 1920s, and the trend accelerated thereafter (see table 5, 
Appendix). Before World War II, a man's status in his commu- 
nity was determined by how many children (especially sons) he 
had. Women who did not marry, or who married but had no chil- 
dren, were seen as failures. As the country became more urbanized, 
however, such traditional views gradually disappeared. Large fam- 
ilies were no longer the economic necessity they had been in agricul- 
tural society, and extra children became a burden rather than a 
boon. As women became more educated and less accepting of the 
traditional patriarchal family norms, their attitude toward child- 
bearing changed. In 1990 the majority of Bulgarian women be- 
lieved two children ideal for a family, but because of economic and 
social conditions, their personal preference was to raise only one. 
By the 1980s, this change in attitude had begun to prevail even 
in villages and with less-educated women. In 1985, 75 percent of 
Bulgarian women indicated that they would not like to have any 
more children. Families with three or more children became a rarity, 
and women who opted for more than two children had a lower stan- 
dard of living and were generally less respected in society. 

Although few social planners advocated a return to the large fam- 
ilies of the past, Bulgarian policy makers were dismayed that the 
population did not increase. During the Zhivkov era, the mass 
media and scholarly journals expressed concern that the nine mil- 
lionth Bulgarian had not yet been born, and that families were un- 
willing to have two children instead of one. By 1985 population 
experts were urging that 30 to 40 percent of families have three 
children to make up for those which had none or only one. Mean- 
while, although the 1973 Politburo had affirmed a family's right 
to decide how many children to have and when they should be born, 
in the 1970s and 1980s contraceptives were not available in sufficient 



77 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

quantity for family planning. The Zhivkov regime had placed strict 
restrictions on abortions; these restrictions were not repealed until 
1990. Partly because contraceptives were in short supply, abor- 
tions had surpassed births by 1985 despite the restrictions. Until 
1990 bachelors and unmarried women had to pay a 5 to 15 per- 
cent "bachelors' tax" depending on their age. In a more positive 
step, laws provided family allowances for children under sixteen. 
The age limit for the family allowance was raised to eighteen in 
1990 for children still in school. 

In 1990 Bulgarian demographers recorded a negative growth rate 
(negative 35 births per 1 ,000 population) for the first time. At that 
point, the number of live births per woman was 1.8. Demographers 
reported that the figure must increase to 2.1 to maintain the coun- 
try's natural rate of population replacement. Mortality figures in 
Bulgaria were also much higher than those of the developed Euro- 
pean countries (see Health, this ch.). 

The most alarming demographic trend of the late 1980s, however, 
was substantially greater emigration totals. The 1989 Turkish exo- 
dus caused by the Zhivkov assimilation campaigns had a severe im- 
pact on the Bulgarian labor force (see Turks, this ch.). Then, in 
1990, economic reform brought harsh living conditions that stimu- 
lated a wave of emigration by ethnic Bulgarians (see Standard of 
Living, ch. 3.). As of March 1991, some 460,000 Bulgarians had 
emigrated, bringing the total number of Bulgarians living abroad 
to about 3 million. The majority of the emigre population remained 
in nearby countries (1.2 million in Yugoslavia, 800,000 in other 
Balkan countries, and 500,000 in the Soviet Union). Smaller num- 
bers went as far as the United States (100,000 to 120,000), Canada 
(100,000), Argentina (18,000), and Australia (15,000). 

Ethnographic Characteristics 

Throughout its past, Bulgaria, like the rest of the Balkan Penin- 
sula, had been home to many diverse ethnic groups that were able 
to preserve their national identities despite being shifted among 
the jurisdictions of powerful empires. In modern Bulgaria, the op- 
posite has been true: the largest minority ethnic group, the Turks, 
remained in territory that their Ottoman ancestors had occupied. 
After the fall of the Zhivkov government, Bulgaria was forced to 
moderate its minority policy in order to improve its delicate rela- 
tions with neighboring countries such as Turkey and Yugoslavia. 

Government Minority Policy 

The 1893 census listed the following nationalities and religious 
groups in order of prevalence: Eastern Rite Orthodox Bulgarians, 



78 



Gypsy with trained bear, Varna 
Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg 

Turks, Romanians, Greeks, Gypsies, Jews, Muslim Bulgarians, 
Catholic Bulgarians, Tatars, Gagauz (a Turkish-speaking people 
of the Eastern Orthodox faith), Armenians, Protestant Bulgarians, 
Vlachs (a Romanian-speaking people in southwest Bulgaria), and 
foreigners of various nationalities, mainly Russians and Germans. 

Migrations and boundary changes after the two world wars 
reduced the list somewhat; few Greeks and Romanians remained 
in Bulgaria by 1990 (see table 6, Appendix). However, Bulgaria's 
communist leaders often tried to deny the existence of minority 
groups by manipulating or suppressing census data or by forcibly 
assimilating "undesirable" groups. In 1985, at the height of the 
last anti-Turkish assimilation campaign, a leading Bulgarian Com- 
munist Party official declared Bulgaria "a one-nation state" and 
affirmed that "the Bulgarian nation has no parts of other peoples 
and nations." 

After the fall of Todor Zhivkov in 1989, all the minorities in Bul- 
garia progressed somewhat toward self-determination and freedom 
of expression. New minority organizations and political parties 
sprang up, and minority groups began publishing their own 
newspapers and magazines. Non-Bulgarian nationalities regained 
the right — curtailed in the Zhivkov era — to use their original names, 
speak their language in public, and wear their national dress. In 



79 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

1991 significant controversy remained, however, as to how far the 
rights of minorities should extend. Legislators making policy on 
such issues as approval of non-Bulgarian names and Turkish- 
language schools faced mass protests by nationalist Bulgarians, who 
successfully delayed liberalization of government policy on those 
issues (see The Turkish Problem, ch. 4). 

Bulgarians 

Bulgarians have been recognized as a separate ethnic group on 
the Balkan Peninsula since the time of Tsar Boris I (852-89), under 
whom the Bui gars were converted to Christianity. Early historians 
began mentioning them as a group then; however, it is not clear 
whether such references were to the earliest Bulgarians, who were 
Asiatic and migrated to the Balkan Peninsula from the Ural Moun- 
tains of present-day Russia, or to the Slavs that preceded them in 
what is now Bulgaria. By the end of the ninth century, the Slavs 
and the Bulgarians shared a common language and a common 
religion, and the two cultures essentially merged under the name 
"Bulgarian" (see The Slavs and the Bulgars, ch. 1). 

Acceptance of the Eastern Orthodox church as the state religion 
of the First Bulgarian Empire in A.D. 864 shaped the Bulgarian 
national identity for many centuries thereafter. The Bulgarian lan- 
guage, which was the first written Slavic language, replaced Greek 
as the official language of both church and state once the Cyrillic 
alphabet (see Glossary) came into existence in the ninth century. 
National literature flourished under the First Bulgarian Empire, 
and the church remained the repository of language and national 
feeling during subsequent centuries of occupation by the Byzan- 
tine and Ottoman empires. 

Ottoman rule was the most formidable test of Bulgarian ethnic 
identity. The Ottoman Turks forced many of their Christian sub- 
jects to convert to Islam, and the Turks differentiated their sub- 
jects only by religion, not by nationality. The latter policy meant 
that the empire usually considered the Bulgarians as Greeks be- 
cause of their common Orthodox religion. Turkish recognition of 
the Greek Orthodox Church gave the Greeks the power to replace 
Bulgarian clergy and liturgy with Greek, further threatening Bul- 
garian national identity. Under the Ottomans, some Bulgarians 
who had converted to Islam lost their national consciousness and 
language entirely. Others (the Pomaks) converted but managed 
to retain their old language and customs. 

During the Ottoman occupation, the monasteries played an im- 
portant role in preserving national consciousness among educated 
Bulgarians. Later, during the National Revival period of the 



80 



The Society and Its Environment 

nineteenth century, primary schools and reading rooms (chitalishta) 
were established to foster Bulgarian culture and literacy in cities 
throughout Bulgaria. The vast majority of uneducated peasants, 
however, preserved their customs in the less accessible regions in 
the mountains. Traditional folk songs and legends flourished there 
and became richer and more widely known than the literature 
created by educated Bulgarians (see The Written Word, ch. 1). 

Bulgarian is classified as a South Slavic language, together with 
Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian, and Macedonian. One of the oldest 
written languages in Europe, Bulgarian influenced all the other 
Slavic languages, especially Russian, in early medieval times. In 
turn, the Bulgarian language was enriched by borrowings from 
other civilizations with which it came into contact. Besides 2,000 
words from the pre-Cyrillic Old Slavonic language, Bulgarians bor- 
rowed religious terms and words used in daily life from the Greeks; 
vocabulary relating to political, economic, and day-to-day life from 
Turkish; and many Russian words to replace their Turkish equiva- 
lents as Ottoman influence waned during the National Revival pe- 
riod. In the postwar era, many West European words began to 
appear in Bulgarian, especially in technological fields. 

Turks 

Because of their status as former occupiers, the Turks have had 
a stormy relationship with Bulgaria since the beginning of its in- 
dependence. In 1878 Turks outnumbered Bulgarians in Bulgaria, 
but they began emigrating to Turkey immediately after inde- 
pendence was established. The movement continued, with some 
interruptions, through the late 1980s. Between 1923 and 1949, 
219,700 Turks left Bulgaria. Then a wave of 155,000 emigrants 
either were "expelled" (according to Turkish sources) or were "al- 
lowed to leave" (according to Bulgarian sources) between 1949 and 
1951. The number would have been far greater had Turkey not 
closed its borders twice during those years. In 1968 an agreement 
reopened the Bulgarian-Turkish border to close relatives of per- 
sons who had left from 1944 to 1951. The agreement remained 
in effect from 1968 to 1978. 

The biggest wave of Turkish emigration occurred in 1989, 
however, when 310,000 Turks left Bulgaria as a result of the 
Zhivkov regime's assimilation campaign. That program, which 
began in 1984, forced all Turks and other Muslims in Bulgaria 
to adopt Bulgarian (Christian or traditional Slavic) names and 
renounce all Muslim customs. Bulgaria no longer recognized the 
Turks as a national minority, explaining that all the Muslims in 
Bulgaria were descended from Bulgarians who had been forced into 



81 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

the Islamic faith by the Ottoman Turks. The Muslims would there- 
fore "voluntarily" take new names as part of the "rebirth process" 
by which they would reclaim their Bulgarian identities. During the 
height of the assimilation campaign, the Turkish government 
claimed that 1.5 million Turks resided in Bulgaria, while the Bul- 
garians claimed there were none. (In 1986 Amnesty International 
estimated that 900,000 ethnic Turks were living in Bulgaria.) 

The motivation of the 1984 assimilation campaign was unclear; 
however, many experts believed that the disproportion between 
the birth rates of the Turks and the Bulgarians was a major factor. 
The birth rate for Turks was about 2 percent at the time of the 
campaign, while the Bulgarian rate was barely above zero. The 
upcoming 1985 census would have revealed this disparity, which 
could have been construed as a failure of Zhivkov government pol- 
icy. On the other hand, although most Turks worked in low-prestige 
jobs such as agriculture and construction, they provided critical 
labor to many segments of the Bulgarian economy. The emigra- 
tion affected the harvest season of 1989, when Bulgarians from all 
walks of life were recruited as agricultural laborers to replace the 
missing Turks. The shortage was especially acute in tobacco, one 
of Bulgaria's most profitable exports, and wheat. 

During the name-changing phase of the campaign, which saw 
Turkish towns and villages surrounded by army units, citizens were 
issued new identity cards with Bulgarian names. Failure to present 
a new card meant forfeiture of salary, pension payments, and bank 
withdrawals. Birth or marriage certificates were issued only in Bul- 
garian names. Traditional Turkish costumes were banned; homes 
were searched and all signs of Turkish identity removed. Mosques 
were closed. According to estimates, 500 to 1,500 people were killed 
when they resisted assimilation measures, and thousands of others 
went to labor camps or were forcibly resettled. 

Before Zhivkov 's assimilation campaign, official policy toward 
use of the Turkish language had varied. Before 1958, instruction 
in Turkish was available at all educational levels, and university 
students were trained to teach courses in Turkish in the Turkish 
schools. After 1958, Turkish-language majors were taught in Bul- 
garian only, and the Turkish schools were merged with Bulgarian 
ones. By 1972, all Turkish-language courses were prohibited, even 
at the elementary level. Assimilation meant that Turks could no 
longer teach at all, and the Turkish language was forbidden, even 
at home. Fines were levied for speaking Turkish in public. 

After the fall of Zhivkov in 1989, the National Assembly at- 
tempted to restore cultural rights to the Turkish population. In 1991 
a new law gave anyone affected by the name-changing campaign 



82 



Woman in folk costume, Koprivshtitsa 
Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg 



three years to officially restore original names and the names of 
children born after the name change. The Slavic endings -ov, 
-ova, -ev, or -eva could now be removed if they did not go with 
one's original name, reversing the effect of a 1950s campaign to 
add Slavic endings to all non-Slavic names. The law was impor- 
tant not only for Turks, but also for the minority Gypsies and Po- 
maks who had been forced to change their names in 1965 and 1972 



83 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



respectively. In January 1991, Turkish-language lessons were rein- 
troduced for four hours per week in parts of the country with a 
substantial Turkish population, such as the former Kurdzhali and 
Razgrad districts. 

Pomaks 

Pomaks — a term that loosely translates as collaborators — were the 
descendants of ethnic Bulgarians who accepted the Islamic faith 
during Ottoman rule, mostly between the sixteenth and eighteenth 
centuries. In 1990 about 150.000 Pomaks lived in mountain vil- 
lages in southern and southwestern Bulgaria. They were chiefly 
employed in agriculture, forestry, and mining. Because of their 
relative isolation in the mountains, the Pomaks did not become 
ethnically mixed with their coreligionist Turks during the occupa- 
tion, and they largely retained their Slavic physical features. Be- 
cause the Ottoman Turks showed little interest in Pomak lands, 
and because the Pomaks were converted rather late, most of their 
traditional Bulgarian customs remained intact. Thus, for exam- 
ple, the Pomaks never learned to speak Turkish. The Bulgarian 
government always considered the Pomaks as Bulgarians rather 
than as a separate minority. 

As a result of the 1972-73 assimilation campaign, about 550 Po- 
maks were arrested and imprisoned at Belene in north central Bul- 
garia and in Stara Zagora. Unrest flared in 1989 when Pomaks 
from the Gotse Delchev area in southwest Bulgaria were refused 
passports that would have enabled them to emigrate with the Turks. 
Some Pomaks in southwest Bulgaria were subjected to a second 
name change because the names they received the first time were 
not definitely Bulgarian. Riots, work stoppages, and hunger strikes 
ensued. According to reports from the Plovdiv region, local offi- 
cials banned public gatherings of more than three Pomaks and for- 
bade residents to leave their villages. 

Macedonians 

Beginning with the withdrawal of the Ottoman occupation, the 
region known as Macedonia was divided among two or more Euro- 
pean states. The entire region was never included in a single po- 
litical unit. In 1990 Macedonia included all of the Yugoslav republic 
of Macedonia, the Pirin region of southwest Bulgaria, the part of 
northern Greece bordering the Aegean Sea and including Thes- 
saloniki. and a very small part of eastern .Albania. The Macedoni- 
an language, in which no written documents are known to have 
existed before 1790. had three main dialects. One dialect was closest 



84 



The Society and Its Environment 



to Serbian, one most resembled Bulgarian, and a third, more 
distinctive group became the basis for the official language. 

The region's location in the middle of the Balkans and its lack 
of defined ethnic character made the dispute over the existence and 
location of a separate Macedonian nationality and control over its 
territory one of the most intractable Balkan issues of the late 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In general, Bulgaria and Greece 
asserted that the Macedonians within their jurisdiction were eth- 
nically indistinguishable from the majority population. Yugoslavia 
saw the Macedonians of all jurisdictions as a distinct ethnic group. 
But, beginning with independence in 1878, Bulgarians also claimed 
various segments of non-Bulgarian territory based on the ethnic 
Slavic commonality of the Bulgarians and the Macedonians. 
Residual claims on Macedonian territory were a primary reason 
for Bulgaria's decision to side with Germany during both world 
wars. In the division of territory after World War I, most of 
Macedonia became part of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes (later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia), and was renamed 
"South Serbia." After World War II, Yugoslavia strengthened its 
hold by making Macedonia a separate republic and recognizing 
the Macedonians as a distinct nationality (see World War I and 
Foreign Policy in the Late 1930s, ch. 1). 

The Bulgarian position maintained that leading patriots such as 
Gotse Delchev and lane Sandanski (who had fought for Macedo- 
nian independence from the Turks) and cultural figures such as 
the Miladinov brothers (who promoted education and the Slavic 
vernacular during the National Revival period) were products of 
Bulgarian culture and considered themselves Bulgarians, not 
Macedonians. In 1990 many people in the Pirin region identi- 
fied themselves as Bulgarian, but some opposition Macedonian 
organizations such as Ilinden (named after the 1903 Ilinden- 
Preobrazhensko uprising for Macedonian independence on St. 
Elijah's Day) sought recognition by the Bulgarian government as 
a minority separate from the Bulgarians. This position was based 
on the assertion that Macedonians were a separate nationality with 
a distinct language and history. 

No reliable data showed how many people in Bulgaria, or in all 
of Macedonia, considered themselves Macedonian or spoke a 
Macedonian dialect in 1990. Those who considered the Slavs in 
Macedonia as Bulgarians cited statistics for the whole region at the 
time it was first divided after World War I. At that time, 1 ,239,903 
Bulgarians, or 59 percent of the population, were listed. The Bul- 
garians were a majority in both Yugoslav (Vardar) Macedonia 
(759,468 people) and in Bulgarian (Pirin) Macedonia (226,700 



85 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

people). Later Bulgarian censuses, however, showed sharply varying 
numbers of Macedonians according to what political agenda was 
to be supported by a given census. The 1946 census, for example, 
identified over 250,000 Macedonians, reportedly to back President 
Georgi Dimitrov's short-lived plan for federation with Yugoslavia. 
Then, between the censuses of 1956 and 1965, the number of 
Macedonians dropped from 187,789 to 9,632. After that time, the 
Bulgarian census ceased identifying citizens by nationality. 

Gypsies 

Although Gypsies are known to have lived in Bulgaria since the 
fourteenth century, most of the Gypsy population arrived in the 
past few centuries. The last known group was forced to settle in 
1958, having remained nomadic until that time. The Gypsy popu- 
lation was divided into three groups. According to the 1965 cen- 
sus, the last that enumerated Bulgarians by nationality, 42.5 percent 
were Orthodox and spoke Bulgarian; 34.2 percent were Orthodox 
and spoke Romanian or Romany, the Gypsy language; and 22.8 
percent were Muslim, spoke Turkish, and considered themselves 
ethnic Turks. Estimates in 1990 put the Gypsy population at about 
450,000, some 10 percent of whom lived in the southeastern city 
of Sliven. 

The Gypsies had a long history as one of Bulgaria's most dis- 
advantaged and maligned nationalities. They were the focus of offi- 
cial name-changing campaigns in every postwar decade between 
1950 and 1990. Despite their numbers, Gypsies did not contrib- 
ute much to Bulgarian society because only about 40 percent of 
them attained the educational and cultural level of the average Bul- 
garian. The other 60 percent lived in extremely disadvantaged con- 
ditions, isolated from the mainstream of society by the Gypsy 
tradition of preserving ethnic customs and by Bulgarian government 
policy. Government programs to improve the lot of the Gypsies 
usually meant construction of new, separate Gypsy neighborhoods 
rather than integration into Bulgarian society. Housing in Gypsy 
neighborhoods was always poor and overcrowded. In 1959 when 
a new neighborhood was built in Sofia, 800 people moved into 252 
apartments. Each apartment had one and one-half rooms and no 
kitchen or inside plumbing. By 1990 about 3,000 people lived in 
these same apartments. 

The education of Gypsies who spoke Romany was inhibited be- 
cause the language has no alphabet or written literature. Gypsy 
children were exposed to Bulgarian only in school, hampering com- 
pletion of studies for many. The illiteracy rate among Gypsies was 
believed to be still quite high in 1990, although no statistics were 



86 



The Society and Its Environment 



available. According to the only known literacy figures for nation- 
alities, given in the 1926 census, 8.2 percent of Gypsies were liter- 
ate compared with 54.4 percent of Bulgarians overall (see 
Education, this ch.). The Gypsy community exerted littie pressure 
on students to finish school; many dropped out before reaching 
legal working age, increasing the tendency to marry and begin hav- 
ing children early. 

In 1990 about 70 percent of Gypsy workers were unskilled and 
worked as general laborers, custodians, street cleaners, dishwash- 
ers, or in other minimum- wage occupations. About 20 percent of 
Gypsies worked at skilled jobs. The small Gypsy intelligentsia, 
which included musicians, scholars, professionals in various fields, 
and political figures, tried to influence their countrymen to gain 
more education and job skills. Pressure also was exerted for elimi- 
nation of separate Gypsy neighborhoods and official replacement 
of the derogatory Bulgarian word tsiganin with rom, the Romany 
word for Gypsy. 

Other Minorities 

Because of official suppression of nationality statistics, little in- 
formation was available on less numerous minorities in Bulgaria 
between 1965 and 1990. Most of the Tatar population (6,430 in 
1965) had migrated from the Crimea to the cities of the Dobruja 
area in the nineteenth century. The Greek minority (8,241 in 1965) 
comprised political emigres from Greece and the remainder of a 
population in southern Bulgaria that had been largely forced out 
of Bulgaria by government oppression and violence between the 
world wars. The Armenian population (20,282 in 1965) was mostly 
added between 1896 and 1924 during the massive emigration of 
Armenians from the Ottoman Empire. The Armenians were con- 
centrated in the cities, especially Sofia and Plovdiv. In 1946 some 
44,209 Jews remained in Bulgaria, which had conducted no large- 
scale persecution despite its wartime alliance with Nazi Germany. 
But massive emigration of Jews to Israel in the 1950's substan- 
tially reduced that number. 

Religion 

The Bulgarian Orthodox Church, which played a crucial role 
in preserving Bulgarian culture during the Ottoman occupation, 
remained central to the sense of Bulgarian nationhood even under 
the postwar communist regimes. In spite of the official status of 
Orthodoxy, Bulgaria also had a tradition of tolerance toward other 
Christian religions. Tolerance of Islam, however, remained prob- 
lematic under all forms of government because of that religion's 



87 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

historical identification with the occupation and subjugation of 
Bulgaria. 

Eastern Orthodoxy 

In 1991 most Bulgarians were at least nominally members of 
the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, an independent national church 
like the Russian Orthodox Church and the other national branches 
of Eastern Orthodoxy. Because of its national character and its status 
as the national church in every independent Bulgarian state until 
the advent of communism, the church was considered an insepara- 
ble element of Bulgarian national consciousness (see Bulgarians, 
this ch.). Baptism, before 1944 an indispensable rite establishing 
individual identity, retained this vital role for many even after the 
communists took power. The power of this tradition caused the 
communist state to introduce a naming ritual called "civil baptism." 

Although communist regimes could not eliminate all influence, 
they did undermine church authority significantly. First, the com- 
munists ruled that the church only had authority on church mat- 
ters and could not take part in political life. Second, although the 
constitution made the church separate from the state, the clergy's 
salaries and the fees needed to maintain the churches were paid 
by the state. This meant that the clergy had to prove its loyalty 
to the state. From 1949 until 1989, religion in Bulgaria was mainly 
controlled by the Law on Religious Organizations, which enumer- 
ated the limitations on the constitution's basic separation of church 
and state. 

The number of Orthodox priests declined from 3,312 in 1947 
to 1,700 in 1985. Priests associated with the prewar regime were 
accused of engaging in illegal or antisocialist activities, supporting 
the opposition, and propagandizing against the state. Upon tak- 
ing control of all church property, the state had the choice of main- 
taining churches or closing them down. Thus, for example, Rila 
Monastery, the largest monastery in Bulgaria, became a national 
museum in 1961. 

In 1987 the Orthodox Church in Bulgaria had 3,720 churches 
and chapels, 120 monasteries, 981 regular and 738 retired priests, 
135 monks, and 170 nuns. The church was administered by a Holy 
Synod. Under communist rule, the synod had the authority to pub- 
lish limited quantities of religious material such as magazines, 
newspapers, and church calendars. A new translation of the Bible 
was published in 1982, but in such small quantities that the size 
of the printing could not be determined. By 1988 the 1982 edition 
was being resold at ten times the original price. 



88 



Rila Monastery, for many centuries a cultural and religious center 

Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg 

After the fall of Zhivkov, the Orthodox Church and other 
churches in Bulgaria experienced a revival. Church rituals such 
as baptisms and church weddings attracted renewed interest, and 
traditional church holidays were observed more widely. Christmas 
1990, the first Christmas under the new regime, was widely cele- 
brated and greatly promoted in the mass media. During the post- 
war years, Christmas had received little public attention. The 
government returned some church property, including the Rila 
Monastery, and religious education and Bible study increased in 
the early post-Zhivkov years. The Orthodox seminary in Sofia 
returned to its original home in 1990 and attracted over 100 male 
and female students in its first year of operation. The Konstantin 
Preslavski Higher Pedagogical Institute added a new theology 
department to train theology, art, and music teachers as well as 
priests. The Holy Synod planned to publish 300,000 Orthodox 
Bibles in 1992. 

Islam 

The Muslim population of Bulgaria, including Turks, Pomaks, 
Gypsies, and Tatars, lived mainly in northeastern Bulgaria and 
in the Rhodope Mountains. Most were Sunni Muslims (see Glos- 
sary) because Sunni Islam had been promoted by the Ottoman 



89 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

Turks when they ruled Bulgaria. Shia sects (see Glossary) such as 
the Kuzulbashi and the Bektashi also were present, however. About 
80,000 Shia Muslims lived in Bulgaria, mainly in the Razgrad, 
Sliven, and Tutrakan (northeast of Ruse) regions. They were main- 
ly descendants of Bulgarians who had converted to Islam to avoid 
Ottoman persecution but chose a Shia sect because of its greater 
tolerance toward different national and religious customs. For 
example, Kuzulbashi Bulgarians could maintain the Orthodox cus- 
toms of communion, confession, and honoring saints. This integra- 
tion of Orthodox customs into Islam gave rise to a type of syncretism 
found only in Bulgaria. 

As of 1987, Muslims in Bulgaria had 1,267 mosques served by 
533 khodzhai, or religious community leaders. The Muslim hierar- 
chy was headed by one chief mufti and eight regional muftis, in- 
terpreters of Muslim law, all of whom served five-year terms. The 
largest mosque in Bulgaria was the Tumbul Mosque in Shumen, 
built in 1744. 

Bulgarian Muslims were subject to particular persecution in the 
later years of the Zhivkov regime, partly because the Orthodox 
Church traditionally considered them foreigners, even if they were 
ethnically Bulgarian. In addition, the Bulgarian communist regimes 
declared traditional Muslim beliefs to be diametrically opposed to 
communist and Bulgarian beliefs. This view justified repression 
of Muslim beliefs and integration of Muslims into the larger soci- 
ety as part of the class and ideological struggle. 

Like the practitioners of the other faiths, Muslims in Bulgaria 
enjoyed greater religious freedom after the fall of the Zhivkov re- 
gime. New mosques were built in many cities and villages; one 
village built a new church and a new mosque side by side. Some 
villages organized Quran (also seen as Koran) study courses for 
young people (study of the Quran had been completely forbidden 
under Zhivkov). Muslims also began publishing their own 
newspaper, Miusiulmani, in both Bulgarian and Turkish. 

Roman Catholicism 

Roman Catholic missionaries first tried to convert the Bulgari- 
ans during the reign of Boris I. They were unsuccessful, and Boris 
I led the Bulgarians in their conversion to Orthodoxy. In 1204 the 
Bulgarian Tsar Kaloian (1197-1207) formed a short-lived union 
between the Roman Catholic Church and the Bulgarian Ortho- 
dox Church as a political tactic to balance the religious power of 
the Byzantine Empire. The union ended when Rome declared war 
on Bulgaria, and the Bulgarian patriarchate was reestablished in 



90 



The Society and Its Environment 



1235. The Catholic Church had no influence in the Bulgarian 
Empire after that date. 

Catholic missionaries renewed their interest in Bulgaria during 
the sixteenth century, when they were aided by merchants from 
Dubrovnik on the Adriatic. In the next century, Vatican mission- 
aries converted most of the Paulicians, the remainder of a once- 
numerous heretical Christian sect, to Catholicism. Many believed 
that conversion would bring aid from Western Europe in liberat- 
ing Bulgaria from the Ottoman Empire. By 1700, however, the 
Ottomans began persecuting Catholics and preventing their Or- 
thodox subjects from converting. 

After Bulgaria became independent, the Catholic Church again 
tried to increase its influence by opening schools, colleges, and hos- 
pitals throughout the country, and by offering scholarships to stu- 
dents who wished to study abroad. Prince Ferdinand of Saxe- 
Coburg-Gotha, first ruler of independent Bulgaria, was himself 
Catholic and supported the Vatican in these efforts. The papal 
nuncio Angelo Roncalli, who later became Pope John XXIII, 
played a leading role in establishing Catholic institutions in Bul- 
garia and in establishing diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and 
the Vatican in 1925. 

The communist era was a time of great persecution for Catho- 
lics, nominally because Catholicism was considered the religion of 
fascism. Bulgarian communists also deemed Catholicism a foreign 
influence because, unlike Orthodoxy, it had no ties to Russia. The 
logic was that anything anti-Russian must also be anti-Bulgarian. 
Under the communist regimes, Catholic priests were charged with 
following Vatican orders to conduct antisocialist activities and help 
opposition parties. In 1949 foreign priests were forbidden to preach 
in Bulgaria, and the papal nuncio was forbidden to return to Bul- 
garia. Relations between the Vatican and Bulgaria were severed 
at that time. During the "Catholic trials" of 1951-52, sixty priests 
were convicted of working for Western intelligence agencies and 
collecting political, economic, and military intelligence for the West. 
Four priests were executed on the basis of these charges. In the 
early 1950s, the property of Catholic parishes was confiscated, all 
Catholic schools, colleges, and clubs were closed, and the Catho- 
lic Church was deprived of its legal status. Only nominal official 
toleration of Catholic worship remained. 

In 1991 about 44,000 Roman Catholics remained in Bulgaria, 
mostly in Ruse, Sofia, and Plovdiv. Another 18,000 Uniate Catho- 
lics were concentrated in Sofia. (Uniate Catholics recognize the 
pope as their spiritual leader, but practice the Eastern Orthodox 
rite.) Bulgaria reestablished relations with the Vatican in 1990, and 



91 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



the Bulgarian government invited the pope to visit Bulgaria. Uniate 
Catholics began assisting Western-rite Catholics in conducting 
masses in Bulgarian, making the Liturgy more accessible, and 
prompting predictions that the two branches would unite. Rela- 
tions had not been established between the Bulgarian Orthodox 
Church and the Roman Catholic Church in 1991. however, and 
Catholics blamed official Orthodox intolerance for the continued 
rift. 

Protestantism 

Protestantism was introduced in Bulgaria by missionaries from 
the United States in 1857-58. amid the National Revival period. 
The two main denominations, the Methodists and Congregation- 
alists, divided their areas of influence. The former predominated 
in northern Bulgaria and the latter in the south. In 1875 the Pro- 
testant denominations united in the Bulgarian Evangelical Philan- 
thropic Society, which later became the Union of Evangelical 
Churches in Bulgaria. Besides setting up churches, the Protestants 
established schools, clinics, and youth clubs in Bulgaria, and dis- 
tributed copies of the Bible and their own religious publications. 
The Union of Evangelical Churches produced the first translation 
of the entire Bible into Bulgarian in 1871 and founded the non- 
denominational Robert College in Constantinople, where many 
Bulgarian leaders of the post-independence era were educated. After 
independence in 1878. the Protestants gained influence because 
they used the vernacular in services and in religious literature. 

The communist regimes subjected Protestants to even greater 
persecution than they did the Catholics. In 1946 church funding 
was cut off by a law curbing foreign currency transactions. Because 
many ministers had been educated in the West before World War 
II. they were automatically suspected of supporting the opposition 
parties. In 1949 thirty-one Protestant clergymen were charged with 
working for American intelligence and running a spy ring in Bul- 
garia. All church property was confiscated, and the churches' legal 
status was revoked. Most of the mainstream Protestant denomi- 
nations maintained the nominal right to worship, as guaranteed 
by the constitution of 1947. 

According to estimates in 1991. the 5.000 to 6.000 Pentecostals 
in Bulgaria made that sect the largest Protestant group (see table 
7. Appendix). The Pentecostal movement was brought to Bulgaria 
in 1921 by Russian emigres. The movement later spread to Varna, 
Sliven. Sofia, and Pleven. It gained popularity in Bulgaria after 
freedom of religion was declared in 1944. and the fall of Zhivkov 
brought another surge of interest. In 1991 the Pentecostal Church 



92 



The Society and Its Environment 



had thirty-six clergy in forty-three parishes, with sufficient con- 
centration in Ruse to petition the government to establish a Bible 
institute there. 

In 1991 the Adventist Church had 3,500 Bulgarian members, 
two-thirds of them young people. The Adventist movement began 
in the Dobruja region of Bulgaria at the turn of the century and 
then spread to Tutrakan, Ruse, Sofia, and Plovdiv. It gained mo- 
mentum in Bulgaria after 1944. Under the communist regimes, 
mainstream Adventists maintained the right to worship. Some 
twenty parishes with forty pastors remained active through that 
era, although a breakaway reformed group was banned because 
of its pacifist beliefs. Some Adventists were imprisoned for refusal 
of military service. 

Judaism 

The Bulgarian communist regimes officially considered Jews a 
nationality rather than a religious group. For that reason, and be- 
cause nearly 90 percent of the country's Jewish population emi- 
grated to Israel after World War II, the Jewish society that remained 
in Bulgaria was mainly secular. Under the Zhivkov regime, syna- 
gogues rarely were open in Sofia, Samokov, and Vidin. In 1990 
the Jewish population was estimated at about 71,000. At that time, 
only two rabbis were active, although several synagogues report- 
edly were reopened under the new regime. Most of the Jews in 
Bulgaria were Sephardic, descended from Spanish Jews who spoke 
Hebrew or Ladino (a Judeo-Spanish dialect). A much smaller num- 
ber were Ashkenazi, with Yiddish-speaking ancestors. However, 
very few Jews in postcommunist Bulgaria remembered their an- 
cestral languages, and frequent mixed marriages further diluted 
feelings of Jewish identity. The Jews of Bulgaria assimilated eas- 
ily into Bulgarian society, partly because they traditionally lived 
in cities and worked as tradesmen or financiers. 

The fate of Bulgarian Jews during World War II was a source 
of Bulgarian pride. The approximately 50,000 Jews then living in 
Bulgaria had long been well integrated into the fabric of Bulgar- 
ian city life. Because of this integration, neither society in general 
nor Tsar Boris III was inclined to follow the anti-Jewish policies 
of Bulgaria's Nazi ally. Boris tried to appease the Nazis by pass- 
ing comparatively benign anti-Jewish laws, which nevertheless 
were protested widely, especially by the Bulgarian Orthodox 
Church. Twice in 1943, Boris personally blocked orders to deport 
Bulgarian Jews, sending them instead to so-called labor camps in- 
side Bulgaria. Many Jews also received transit visas to Palestine 
at this time. 



93 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



Social System 

Most manifestations of traditional Bulgarian familial and socie- 
tal relations disappeared in the initial postwar wave of moderniza- 
tion. Some traditions, however, proved surprisingly persistent and 
survived into the 1990s, especially in parts of western and south- 
western Bulgaria. Although postwar communist regimes nominally 
emphasized emancipation of women, strong elements of paternal- 
ism and emphasis on traditional female roles remained in Bulgar- 
ian society. By 1990 economic forces had eliminated traditional 
extended families and limited the number of children, especially 
in urban areas. Some evidence of resuming traditional relation- 
ships was seen in the immediate post-Zhivkov years. 

Traditional Society 

Traditional Bulgarian society had three classes: the peasants 
(almost everyone in the villages), the chorbadzhii (a small wealthy 
class that owned large tracts of land and hired peasants to work 
them), and the esnafi (skilled tradespeople in towns, who later be- 
came the bourgeoisie). Most references to traditional Bulgarian 
society described village or peasant society because until the com- 
munist era the great majority of Bulgarians were peasants. 

The most important institution of traditional Bulgarian society 
was the zadruga, an extended family composed of ten to twenty small 
families, related by blood, who lived and worked together, owned 
property jointly, and recognized the authority of a single patriarch. 
The extended family most often included four generations of men, 
the wives whom these men brought into the household through mar- 
riage, and the children produced through these marriages. Once 
a girl married, she would leave the zadruga of her parents for that 
of her husband. No member of the zadruga had any personal 
property other than clothes or the women's dowries. 

Traditional Bulgarian society was strongly patriarchal. The zadruga 
leader, called the "old man" or the "lord of the house," had ab- 
solute power over his family and was treated with the utmost respect. 
He was considered the wisest because he had lived the longest. His 
duties included managing the purchase and sale of all household 
property, division of labor among zadruga members, and settling 
personal disputes. Older men within the household could offer ad- 
vice, but the "old man" had the final word. Obligatory signs of 
familial respect included rising whenever he appeared and eating 
only after he had begun and before he had finished his meal. The 
"old man's" wife (or the senior woman if he were widowed) had 
similar authority over traditional women's activities such as tending 



94 



The Society and Its Environment 



the garden, observing holiday rituals, and sewing. The senior 
woman commanded similar respect from zadruga members, but she 
was never allowed to interfere in functions designated for men. 

When a zadruga broke up (normally because it became too large 
for easy management), property was divided equally among its 
members. Before the twentieth century, many villages were formed 
as outgrowths of an enlarged zadruga. The largest of the extended 
family organizations in Bulgaria began breaking up in the 1840s. 
At that time, the Ottoman Empire instituted new inheritance laws 
that did not take zadruga property patterns into account. A second 
stage of fragmentation occurred as the expectation of automatic 
integration into the extended family gradually weakened in youn- 
ger generations: sons began leaving the zadruga at the death of the 
"old man," and newly arrived wives failed to adjust to the tradi- 
tional system. As a result of such pressures, smaller households 
began to proliferate in the nineteenth century. 

The zadruga breakup accelerated after Bulgaria gained its indepen- 
dence and began instituting Western-style laws that gave women 
equal inheritance rights, although in many parts of Bulgaria women 
did not begin demanding their legal inheritance until well into the 
twentieth century. The disintegration of large family holdings 
gradually led to the impoverishment of the peasants as land owner- 
ship became more fragmented and scattered with each generation. 
The durability of the extended family was reflected in the 1934 cen- 
sus, however, which still listed a category of household size as 
"thirty-one and over." Furthermore, even after extended fami- 
lies broke up, many peasants continued to work cooperatively. 

The familial system sometimes extended to include godparents 
and adopted brothers and sisters — unrelated individuals enjoying 
the same status as close relatives. Godparenthood included another 
set of traditional relationships that knit village society together. God- 
parents kept close ties with their godchildren throughout their lives, 
and the godparent/godchild relationship could be transferred from 
generation to generation. Godparents were treated with the utmost 
respect and had an important role in all important events in a god- 
child's life, beginning with baptism. The familial relationship was 
so strong that a taboo developed against the marriage of children 
related to the same family only through godparenthood. 

After the decline of the zadruga, the patriarchal system continued 
to flourish in the smaller families, where husbands gained owner- 
ship of family property and all the patriarchal status the old men 
once had. The status of wives remained distinctly secondary. Upon 
marriage a woman still severed all ties with her family if her hus- 
band's family lived in another village. Thus, couples always looked 



95 



Town of Melnik in Pirin Mountains 
Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg 



97 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

forward to the birth of sons rather than daughters because sons 
would always remain family members. Men traditionally married 
between the ages of twenty and twenty-two; women, between eigh- 
teen and twenty. In areas where daughters were needed as laborers 
at home, marriage might be postponed until age twenty-five. Ar- 
ranged marriages, common until the communist era, persisted in 
the most traditional villages until the 1960s. 

Only in the twentieth century did men begin to consult their wives 
in family decisions. Until that time, wives were expected to give 
blind obedience to their husbands. A woman who dared question 
or interfere in a man's work was universally condemned. Women 
waited for a man to pass rather than crossing his path, and wives 
often walked with heavy loads while their husbands rode on horse- 
back. The wife was responsible for all work inside the house and 
for helping her husband in the field as well. 

Children typically began to share in household work at the age 
of five or six. At that age, girls began to do household work, and 
by age twelve they had usually mastered most of the traditional 
household skills. By age twelve or thirteen, boys were expected to 
do the same field work as adults. Alternatively, boys might begin 
learning a trade such as tailoring or blacksmithing at six or seven. 
As the size of farmland parcels diminished and field labor became 
less critical, more families sent children away from home to learn 
trades. Village boys apprenticed in cities sometimes became ac- 
customed to city life and did not return to the village. 

Family Life and Modern Society 

Throughout the era of postwar communist modernization, fam- 
ily life remained one of the most important values in Bulgarian 
society. In a 1977 sociological survey, 95 percent of women re- 
sponded that "one can live a full life only if one has a family." 
From the beginning of the twentieth century until the 1970s, the 
marriage rate in Bulgaria was stable at close to 10 percent per year. 
The rate was slightly higher just after the two world wars. The rate 
fell beginning in 1980, however, reaching 7 percent in 1989. Slightly 
more couples married in the cities than in the villages, a natural 
development considering the aging of the village population. Most 
women married between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five, most 
men between twenty and twenty-five. Village men and less edu- 
cated city men typically married before they were twenty. The first 
men to marry often were those who had completed their military 
service, did not plan further education, and could support them- 
selves financially (see Recruitment and Service Obligations, ch. 5; 
Education, this ch.). Those who continued their education often 



98 



The Society and Its Environment 



delayed marriage until their late twenties. In choosing their spouses, 
the less educated and those from more traditional regions of Bul- 
garia sought qualities most highly valued in traditional society: love 
of hard work, modesty, and good character. Among the educated 
classes, values such as personal respect, commonality of interests, 
and education were more often predominant in the choice of a 
spouse. 

Until 1944 divorce was quite rare in Bulgaria, and great stigma 
was attached to all individuals who had divorced. After 1944 the 
divorce rate rose steadily until 1983, when it reached 16.3 percent. 
Between 1983 and 1986, however, the rate fell to 11.2 percent. In 
the 1980s, the divorce rate in the cities was more than twice that 
in the villages, in part because the village population was older. 
The divorce rate was especially high for couples married five years 
or less; that group accounted for 44 percent of all divorces. In 1991 
the rate was increasing, however, for those married longer than 
five years. 

Concerned about Bulgaria's low birth rate, the government is- 
sued new restrictions on divorce in its 1985 Family Code. The fee 
to apply for a divorce was more than three months' average sal- 
ary, and every application for a divorce required an investigation. 
The grounds most often listed in a divorce application were infi- 
delity, habitual drunkenness, and incompatibility. 

In 1991 the average Bulgarian family included four people. Fam- 
ilies of two to five people were common, whereas families of six 
or more were rare. In the larger families, moreover, the additional 
members usually included one or two of the couple's parents. In 
1980 extended families spanning three or even four generations 
made up 17 percent of all households, indicating the persistence 
of the extended family tradition. Although the tradition was more 
prevalent in the villages of western and southern Bulgaria than in 
the cities, many urban newly weds lived with their parents because 
they could not afford or obtain separate apartments. 

Socialist Bulgaria greatly emphasized the emancipation of 
women. The 1971 constitution expressly stated that "all citizens 
of the People's Republic of Bulgaria are equal before the law, and 
no privileges or limitations of rights based on national, religious, 
sex, race, or educational differences are permitted" and that 
"women and men in the People's Republic of Bulgaria have the 
same rights." Bulgaria's Family Code also affirmed equal rights 
for men and women. 

In 1988 Bulgaria's work force included an almost equal num- 
ber of men (50. 1 percent) and women (49.9 percent). By 1984 nearly 
70 percent of working women surveyed said that they could not 



99 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

imagine life without their professional work, even if they did not 
need the pay. Only 9 percent of the women preferred being house- 
wives. However, most men surveyed in 1988 cited economics as 
the reason for their wives to work, asserting that the wives should 
give up their work if they were needed at home. 

Household chores remained primarily the responsibility of 
women, including most working wives. In 1990 the average work- 
ing woman spent eight and one-half hours at her job and over four 
and one-half hours doing housework: cooking, washing dishes, 
washing clothes, ironing, mending, and tending the children. In 
many households, such tasks were still considered "women's work," 
to which husbands contributed little. 

In their social planning, Bulgarian legislators usually viewed their 
country's women mainly as mothers, not as workers. Besides the 
laws passed in an effort to increase the country's birth rate, legis- 
lators passed laws giving certain privileges to women in the work- 
place, often keeping their reproductive capability in mind. Women 
were prohibited by law from doing heavy work or work that would 
adversely affect their health or their capacities as mothers. Women 
sought such jobs because they generally offered better pay and 
benefits. The list of prohibited jobs changed constantly. Depend- 
ing on the type of work, women could retire after fifteen or twenty 
years, or after reaching age forty-five, fifty, or fifty-five. Women 
who had raised five or more children could retire after fifteen years 
of work, regardless of their age or type of work. Men were gener- 
ally offered retirement after working twenty-five years or reach- 
ing age fifty, fifty-five, or sixty. Some jobs were restricted to women 
unless no women were available. Without exception these were low- 
skill, low-paying jobs such as archivist, elevator operator, ticket 
seller, coat checker, and bookkeeper. Other jobs, such as secre- 
tary, stenographer, librarian, cashier, and cleaning person were 
considered "appropriate for women. " Men in the workplace often 
expressed resentment of women in positions of authority. 

Social Groups and Their Work 

Postwar Bulgarian society was divided into three social groups, 
according to type of work: Workers, who held jobs in the "produc- 
tive" manufacturing sector of the economy; Employees, who worked 
in "non-productive" service and education jobs; and Agricultural 
workers. The intelligentsia, usually considered a subsector of the 
employee category, held professional or creative positions requir- 
ing specific qualifications. In 1987 nonagricultural workers made 
up 63 percent of the population, employees made up 18 percent, 
and agricultural workers made up 19 percent. The intelligentsia 



100 




Male dance ensemble at folk festival held every five years at Koprivshtitsa 

Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg 

made up 13.5 percent of the total population in 1985. Both the 
nonagricultural worker and the employee category grew about 1 5 
percent between the censuses of 1975 and 1985, but the number 
of agricultural workers dropped steadily through the 1970s and 
1980s (see table 8, Appendix). Of all people in the work force in 
1990, only 21.7 percent were rated as highly qualified. According 
to sociologists, that figure would have to more than double if Bul- 
garia were to become economically competitive with the West. 

Most of those registered as workers had jobs in industry. Be- 
tween 1975 and 1985, the number of workers in the machine- 
building, spare-parts and metal-processing industries increased. 
Other industries, such as the food industry, the lumber industry, 
and the fuel industry, lost workers. Most workers were compara- 
tively young, with little education and few work qualifications (see 
table 9, Appendix). In 1990 some 66.8 percent of industrial work- 
ers had a basic education or less. However, young workers were 
valued because they were considered most capable of adapting to 
new technology — a critical requirement for upgrading Bulgaria's 
outdated industrial infrastructure (see Labor Force, ch. 3). 

In the 1980s, employment grew in the trade, supply, construc- 
tion, and transportation sectors. Growing the fastest, however, were 
the sectors requiring primarily intellectual work: research and 



101 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

research services, education, and administration. After growing 
by 90 percent between 1965 and 1985, administration included 26 
percent of all employees and was the largest division of this category. 
The housing sector was the only component of the employee 
category that lost jobs between 1975 and 1990. 

The number of agricultural workers decreased markedly from 
50 percent of all workers in 1965 to 20 percent in 1985. As agricul- 
tural production intensified, many agricultural workers were trans- 
ferred to nonagricultural jobs. In the late 1980s, however, a shortage 
of agricultural workers occurred because so many people had left 
the villages. For this reason, labor-intensive farm activities such 
as harvesting required recruitment of brigades from schools and 
nonagricultural enterprises. Many of the remaining farm workers 
could not adapt to new technology. This lack of adaptation inhibited 
the modernization and mechanization of agricultural processes. 

The democratization that followed the Zhivkov regime raised the 
problem of unemployment, unknown in Bulgaria after 1944 (see 
Labor and Economic Reform, ch. 3). As of April 1991, some 124,000 
Bulgarians were unemployed. With the country in the midst of eco- 
nomic restructuring, enterprise shutdowns, and scarcity of raw 
materials, employment figures showed no sign of improvement. The 
highest unemployment rates occurred in Plovdiv and Sofia. Most 
unemployed persons were under age thirty, and over 60 percent 
were women. Job vacancies continued to decline in 1991; most re- 
maining opportunities were in low-skilled jobs or jobs requiring hard 
physical labor. Persons with the highest level of education, such as 
engineers, economists, and teachers, were least likely to find suit- 
able positions. In 1990 the lack of skilled professional positions 
spurred a "brain drain" emigration that further threatened Bul- 
garia's ability to compete on technologically oriented world mar- 
kets. In the meantime, the country's economy had lost its protected 
position as a member of the defunct Comecon, putting more pres- 
sure on the domestic labor force (see Bulgaria in Comecon, ch. 3). 

Because the national welfare system could only accommodate 
those who lost their jobs because of enterprise shutdown, in 1990 
the Bulgarian government began seeking ways to create more jobs. 
It considered rewarding businesses that added shifts or offered part- 
time or seasonal work, and it encouraged development of small 
business. One proposed solution, replacing working pensioners with 
young unemployed workers, was unworkable because enterprises 
found it less expensive to continue hiring pensioners. 

Social Services 

Between independence and the communist era, the Bulgarian 
government had used its social welfare funds mainly for government 



102 



St. Paraskeva Orthodox Church, Nesebur 
Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg 

workers, army officers, white-collar workers, craftsmen, and trades- 
men. The 1949 social welfare law founded a new social welfare sys- 
tem that endured into the 1990s. The new system greatly expanded 
the categories of people eligible and the amounts they could receive. 
The social welfare system in 1991 was largely based on the 1951 
section of the Labor Code that regulated monetary compensation 
and supplements, and the 1957 Law on Pensions. Both laws were 
revised countless times and no longer agree with each other. The 
National Assembly delayed creation of a new law until the new 
constitution was ratified in the summer of 1991. 

In 1991 two-thirds of Bulgaria's social welfare budget was spent 
on pensions; the rest went for monthly child-care allowances and 
other programs. As of late 1990, the Bulgarian government provided 
over 4 billion leva per year to 2,300,000 pensioners — about one 
fourth of the entire population. To keep pace with the rising cost 
of living in the transition to a Western economic system, the govern- 
ment had to index pensions several times in 1990. By the begin- 
ning of 1991, some 165 leva were being added monthly to every 
pension, casting doubt on the long-term possibility of maintain- 
ing the program. The ratio of Bulgaria's pensioners to its total popu- 
lation was the largest in the world, almost twice that of most Western 
countries. Because the society was aging, some experts declared 



103 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

that workers should be encouraged to remain in the work force and 
participate actively in society much longer than had been the prac- 
tice under the communist regimes. 

In early 1991, in a further effort to keep pace with the rising 
cost of living, the Council of Ministers established a new minimum 
wage and new subsidy levels for all social welfare programs. Any- 
one who had received the old monthly minimum wage of 165 leva 
would now be compensated 270 leva to provide for a new mini- 
mum wage of 435 leva. This minimum wage was subsequently 
changed three times in 1991, peaking at 518 leva. The 1991 pro- 
gram also gave 242 leva to pregnant or nursing women and to those 
on temporary workers' disability. Child-care compensation for 
households with children under three years of age was raised to 
90 leva, with a monthly supplement of 100 leva per child. In 1991 
several cost-of-living increases were added to those categories as 
well. In 1991 unemployment compensation was set at 270 leva per 
month; students over eighteen received 130 leva per month; gradu- 
ate students, 230 leva. Those payments were funded from the state 
budget and from enterprise salary budgets, neither of which seemed 
adequate to keep pace with rapidly changing prices in 1991. 

Under socialism all citizens who had been awarded the title "ac- 
tive fighter against fascism and capitalism" for military or civilian 
contributions in World War II received a large pension and spe- 
cial privileges such as free public transportation, free medical 
prescriptions, and free vacations at special resorts. After much con- 
troversy, those privileges were abolished in 1990. 

Health 

Until the 1920s, peasants relied on traditional medicine and went 
to a doctor or hospital only as a last resort. Traditional healers be- 
lieved that many illnesses were caused by evil spirits (baiane) and 
could therefore be treated with magic, with chants against the spirits, 
with prayers, or by using medicinal herbs. The knowledge of healing 
herbs was highly valued in village society. For healing one could 
also drink, wash, or bathe in water from mineral springs, some 
of which were considered holy. Even in postcommunist Bulgaria, 
some resorted to herbal medicine or to persons with reputed extra- 
sensory healing powers. Herbalists and "extrasenses" regained pop- 
ularity in Bulgaria after the overthrow of Zhivkov. Because of the 
skepticism of conventional doctors, little research was done on the 
validity of traditional herbal medicine, but in 1991 doctors began 
to consider rating skilled herbalists as qualified specialists. 

Beginning in 1944, Bulgaria made significant progress in increas- 
ing life expectancy and decreasing infant mortality rates. In 1986 



104 



The Society and Its Environment 



Bulgaria's life expectancy was 68.1 years for men and 74.4 years 
for women. In 1939 the mortality rate for children under one year 
had been 138.9 per 1,000; by 1986 it was 18.2 per 1,000, and in 
1990 it was 14 per 1,000, the lowest rate in Eastern Europe. The 
proportion of long-lived people in Bulgaria was quite large; a 1988 
study cited a figure of 52 centenarians per 1 million inhabitants, 
most of whom lived in the Smolyan, Kurdzhali, and Blagoevgrad 
regions. 

The steady demographic aging of the Bulgarian population was 
a concern, however. In the 1980s, the number of children in the 
population decreased by over 100,000. The prenatal mortality rate 
for 1989 was 1 1 per 1 ,000, twice that in West European countries. 
In 1989 the mortality rate for children of ages one to fourteen was 
twice as great as in Western Europe. The mortality rate for vil- 
lage children was more than twice the rate for city children. 
However, in 1990 some Bulgarian cities had mortality rates as low 
as 8.9 per 1,000, which compared favorably with the rates in 
Western Europe. 

Poor conditions in maternity wards and shortages of baby needs 
worried new and prospective mothers. Hospital staff shortages 
meant that doctors and nurses were overworked and babies received 
scant attention. Expensive neonatal equipment was not available 
in every hospital, and transferral to better-equipped facilities was 
rare. In 1990 the standard minimum weight to ensure survival at 
birth was 1 ,000 grams, compared with the World Health Organi- 
zation standard of 500 grams. 

The number of medical doctors, nurses, and dentists in Bulgaria 
increased during the 1980s. Bulgaria had 27,750 doctors in 1988, 
almost 6,000 more than in 1980. This meant one doctor for every 
323 Bulgarians. Some 257 hospitals were operating in 1990, with 
105 beds per 1,000 people. 

Like other aspects of society, health services underwent signifi- 
cant reform after 1989. In 1990 health officials declared that the 
socialist system of polyclinics in sectors serving 3,000 to 4,000 people 
did not satisfy the public's need for more complex diagnostic ser- 
vices. They claimed the system was too centralized and bureau- 
cratic, provided too few incentives for health personnel, and lacked 
sufficient modern equipment and supplies. Thereafter, new em- 
phasis was placed on allowing free choice of a family doctor and 
providing more general practitioners to treat families on an on- 
going basis. Beginning in 1990, Bulgaria began accepting dona- 
tions of money and medicine from Western countries. During the 
reform period, even common medicines such as aspirin were some- 
times in short supply. Prices for medicines skyrocketed. Shortages 



105 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



of antibiotics, analgesics, dressings, sutures, and disinfectants were 
chronic. 

In November 1989. the Council of Ministers decreed that doc- 
tors could be self-employed during their time off from their assigned 
clinics. Doctors could work for pay either in health facilities or in 
patients' homes, but with significant restrictions. When acting pri- 
vately, they could not certify a patient's health or disability, issue 
prescriptions for free medicine, perform outpatient surgery or abor- 
tions, conduct intensive diagnostic tests, use anesthetics, or serve 
patients with infectious or venereal diseases. In 1990 the National 
Assembly extended the right of private practice to all qualified med- 
ical specialists, and private health establishments and pharmacies 
were legalized. Church-sponsored facilities were included in this 
provision. The 1990 law did not provide for a health insurance sys- 
tem, however, and establishment of such a system was not a high 
legislative priority for the early 1990s. 

In 1991 the government created a National Health Council to 
be financed by 2.5 billion leva from the state budget plus funds 
from donors and payments for medical services. The goal of the 
new council was to create a more autonomous health system. Also 
in 1991. the Ministry of Health set up a Supreme Medical Coun- 
cil and a Pharmaceuticals Council to advise on proposed private 
health centers, pharmacies, and laboratories and to regulate the 
supply and distribution of medicine. 

In 1988 the top three causes of death in Bulgaria were cardio- 
vascular illnesses, cancer, and respiratory illnesses. An expert esti- 
mated that 88 percent of all deaths were caused by "socially 
significant diseases" that resulted from an unhealthy lifestyle and 
were thus preventable. Strokes, the most prevalent cause of death, 
killed a higher percentage of the population in Bulgaria than any- 
where else in the world. In 1985 nearly 58.000 Bulgarians suffered 
strokes, and nearly 24.000 of them died. The mortality rate for 
strokes was especially high in northern Bulgaria, where it some- 
times exceeded 300 fatalities per 100.000 persons. In villages the 
rate was three times as high as in the cities. Doctors cited unhealthy 
eating habits, smoking, alcohol abuse, and stress as lifestyle causes 
of the high stroke rate. 

In 1990 about 35 percent of Bulgarian women and 25 percent 
of men were overweight. Sugar provided an average of 22 percent 
of the calories in Bulgarian diets, twice as much as the standard 
for balanced nutrition. Another 35 percent of average calories came 
from animal fat. also twice as much as the recommended amount. 
That percentage was likely much higher in the villages, where many 
animal products were made at home. Modernization of the food 



106 



The Society and Its Environment 



supply generally led to increased consumption of carbohydrates and 
fats. In contrast, the traditional Bulgarian diet emphasized dairy 
products, beans, vegetables, and fruits. Large quantities of bread 
were always a key element of the Bulgarian diet. Average salt 
consumption was also very high. In 1990 the average Bulgarian 
consumed 14.5 kilograms of bread, 4.4 kilograms of meat, 12.6 
kilograms of milk and milk products, 15 eggs, and 15 kilograms 
of fruits and vegetables per month. 

In the 1980s, Bulgaria ranked tenth in the world in per capita 
tobacco consumption. Tobacco consumption was growing, espe- 
cially among young people. Each Bulgarian consumed 7.34 liters 
of alcohol per month, not including huge amounts of homemade 
alcoholic beverages. Between 1962 and 1982, recorded alcohol con- 
sumption increased 1.6 times. 

In 1990 an estimated 35 percent of the population risked seri- 
ous health problems because of environmental pollution (see En- 
vironment, this ch.). In the most polluted areas, the sickness rate 
increased by as much as twenty times in the 1980s. By 1990, pol- 
lution was rated the fastest-growing cause of "socially significant 
diseases," particularly for respiratory and digestive disorders. Doc- 
tors in the smelting center of Srednogorie found that the incidence 
of cancer, high blood pressure, and dental disorders had increased 
significantly in the 1980s. 

Pollution had an especially adverse effect on the immune sys- 
tems of children. In the first few years of the Giurgiu plant's oper- 
ation, the number of deformed children born across the Danube 
in Ruse increased 144 percent. From 1985 to 1990, this number 
increased from 27.5 to 39.7 per 1,000. Miscarriages, stillbirths, 
and premature, low- weight births doubled during that period. The 
infant mortality rate in Srednogorie was three times the national 
average in 1990. Excessive lead in the soil and water at Kurdzhali 
had caused a great increase in skin and infectious diseases in chil- 
dren there. In 1990 environmental authorities named the village 
of Dolno Ezerovo, near Burgas, the "sickest village in Bulgaria" 
because over 60 percent of its children suffered from severe respira- 
tory illnesses and allergies. 

In 1987 Bulgarian health authorities instituted limited manda- 
tory testing for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), which causes 
acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). All prospective 
marriage partners, all pregnant women, and all transportation 
workers arriving from outside Bulgaria were required to be tested. 
Hemophiliacs, Bulgarian navy sailors who had traveled abroad after 
1982, and students and workers visiting vacation resorts also fell 
under this rule. As of October 1989, some 2.5 million people in 



107 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

Bulgaria, including about 66,000 foreigners, had been tested for 
HIV, and 81 Bulgarians were diagnosed as HIV-positive. Accord- 
ing to government figures, six of that number had contracted AIDS. 
Foreigners diagnosed as HIV-positive were ordered to leave the 
country. Bulgaria estimated it would spend over US$4 million to 
treat AIDS and HIV-positive patients in 1991. 

Housing 

In the postwar era, housing in Bulgaria improved significantly 
as more and better-quality homes were built. Expectations for hous- 
ing availability also increased significantly in that time, however. 
According to a 1990 survey, 51 percent of all Bulgarians were dis- 
satisfied with their current housing, and 73 percent (especially young 
families) did not believe that their current housing would be ade- 
quate for their future needs. 

In 1990 the average home in Bulgaria had three rooms and an 
area of 65 square meters. This small average size reflected the policy 
of the command economy, which was to build many small one- 
or two-room apartments in large prefabricated housing complexes 
in order to maximize the number of available housing units and 
meet growing demand. In 1985 some 15.6 percent of all homes 
had one room, 31.5 percent had two rooms, 29.6 percent had three 
rooms, 14.4 percent had four rooms, and only 8.9 percent had five 
or more rooms. As a result, 65 percent of the population averaged 
only half a room per family member. Only 36 percent of families 
with children under eighteen had a separate children's room; 65 
percent used the living room as a bedroom; and 57 percent used 
the kitchen as a bedroom. By 1990 communal apartments were 
becoming rarer, however; at that time, 12 percent of families shared 
a kitchen with another family. 

The predominance of small housing units put larger families at 
a disadvantage. The situation was also difficult for young couples, 
60 percent of whom were forced to stay in their parents' homes 
after marriage. In 1990 over 40 percent of homes included two or 
more families or other relatives of one family. Members of three 
or even four generations often lived together. Traditional accep- 
tance of the extended family contributed to this situation, but long 
waits for separate housing also played a critical role. In 1979 the 
government established a special Young Newlywed Families Fund 
that ensured that new families would receive at least 25 percent 
of new government housing. This program delivered more hous- 
ing to young families in the 1980s, but waiting lists also grew longer 
during that period. 



108 



The Society and Its Environment 



Living space was much more available in villages than in cities. 
One-room homes were unusual in villages, and villagers were much 
more likely to live in separate homes than in apartment complexes. 
Village houses usually had more rooms, but they lacked many of 
the modern conveniences available in city apartments. 

In 1985 hot running water, a shower or bathtub, and an indoor 
toilet were available in only 42.4 percent of homes. Between the 
1975 and 1985 censuses, the number of households with bathtubs 
or showers almost doubled, from 34.0 percent to 63.7 percent. Still, 
only 39.3 percent of villagers had a bathtub or shower, and only 
7.3 percent of them had an indoor toilet. In 1990 many villages 
lacked a sewage system and relied on wells for water. At that time, 
about 30 percent of Bulgarian homes had electric heating, and 34 
percent were connected to a steam central heating system. 

Housing planners often overlooked the need for convenient 
schools, stores, and recreational facilities. (For Bulgarians, prox- 
imity generally meant fifteen minutes' walk.) On the average, 70 
to 80 percent of construction funds went to constructing the hous- 
ing complexes themselves, and only 20 to 30 percent went to build- 
ing facilities to serve the residents of the complexes. This was 
especially true in Sofia, where some of the newest neighborhoods 
were isolated from the rest of the city. 

Housing was affected by the drastic reform-period price hikes 
in Bulgaria. At the end of 1990, apartment owners in Sofia were 
offering to sell two-room apartments at between 100,000 and 
200,000 leva, or to rent them for 600 leva per month. Moreover, 
the new economic system gave landlords the right to evict tenants 
for nonpayment of rent. In 1990 prospective homebuyers frustrated 
by the steeper housing prices established a tent city in Sofia to 
dramatize the threat of homelessness (see The Ferment of 1988-90, 
ch. 4). 

Also at risk for homelessness were many Bulgarian Turks who 
had emigrated in 1989 but returned after the overthrow of Zhiv- 
kov. By 1991 the state had bought many of the Turks' homes and 
resold them; other homes were occupied illegally. In 1991 many 
who lost their homes in this way went through the bureaucratic 
process of reclaiming their property. In 1990 Sofia created a new 
foundation to help the homeless, especially elderly and single peo- 
ple, and to aid in the building and financing of homes. 

Education 

Before the National Revival of the mid-nineteenth century, educa- 
tion usually took the form of memorization of the liturgy and other 
religious material. Supporters of the National Revival movement 



109 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

were instrumental in establishing and supporting Bulgarian schools 
in the cities — first for boys, and later for girls as well. These ac- 
tivists also introduced the chitalishta. Often located next to a school, 
the chitalishta served as community cultural centers as well as reading 
rooms. The first schools, which began opening in the early nine- 
teenth century, often did not go beyond a basic education; students 
wishing to continue their education had to go abroad. 

The educational system established after Bulgaria gained its in- 
dependence retained the same basic structure through 1989. The 
1878 Temporary Law on National Schools established free com- 
pulsory education in primary school for both sexes. The schools 
were designed to teach reading, writing, and basic arithmetic. In 
practice, not everyone received that education, but the law gave 
the villages an incentive to open new schools. By the turn of the 
century, one-third of all Bulgarian villages had primary schools. 
In the early days, the immediate demand for a large number of 
teachers meant that many new teachers had little more education 
than their students. Later reforms specified a seven-year standard 
education with a curriculum based on a West European model. 
Some peasants, especially uneducated ones, withdrew their chil- 
dren from school because they believed the classes were unrelated 
to peasant life. This situation led to the offering of textbooks and 
prizes as an incentive for students from poorer families to remain 
in school. 

Communist rule in Bulgaria brought forth a new approach to 
education as a means of indoctrinating Marxist theory and com- 
munist values. Literacy was promoted so that the communist- 
controlled press could be disseminated throughout society. New 
classes for both adults and children aimed at providing as many 
as possible with a high-school education and abolishing illiteracy. 
Schools switched their focus from liberal arts to technical training 
and introduced a curriculum modeled on that of the Soviet Union. 
Russian language study was introduced for all, from kindergart- 
ners to adults who had already completed their education. Copies 
of Pravda, the primary newspaper of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union, were distributed even in isolated villages. After the 
overthrow of Zhivkov, however, English became the most studied 
foreign language in Bulgaria, and the study of Russian declined 
dramatically. 

In 1979 Zhivkov introduced a sweeping educational reform, 
claiming that Marxist teachings on educating youth were still not 
being applied completely. Zhivkov therefore created Unified Secon- 
dary Polytechnical Schools (Edinna sredna politekhnicheska uchilishta, 
ESPU), in which all students would receive the same general 



110 



The Society and Its Environment 



education. The system united previously separate specialized middle 
schools in a single, twelve- grade program heavily emphasizing tech- 
nical subjects. In 1981 a national program introduced computers 
to most of the ESPUs. The change produced a chaotic situation 
in which teaching plans and programs had to be completely over- 
hauled and new textbooks issued to reflect the new educational 
emphasis. This project proved unworkable, and by 1985 new 
specialized schools again were being established (see table 10, Ap- 
pendix). 

The fall of Zhivkov resulted in a complete restructuring of the 
country's educational system. In retrospect Bulgarian educators 
recognized that the socialist way of educating was not only 
bureaucratic, boring, and impersonal, but also led to disregard for 
the rights of the individual, intolerance of the opinions of others, 
and aggressive behavior. The centralized system with its regional 
hierarchies was therefore scrapped in favor of a system of educa- 
tional councils in which every 400 teachers could elect a delegate 
to the National Council of Teachers. The first goal of the new or- 
ganization was to depoliticize the schools in cooperation with the 
Ministry of Public Education. 

In 1991 the Bulgarian educational system consisted of three types 
of schools: state, municipal, and private (including religious). The 
grade levels were primary (first to fourth grade), basic (fifth to 
seventh grade), and secondary (eighth to twelfth grade). Children 
began first grade at age six or seven and were required to attended 
school until age sixteen. Parents also had the option of enrolling 
their children in kindergarten at age five. Secondary school stu- 
dents had the choice of studying for three years at professional- 
vocational schools or for four years at technical schools or general 
high schools. Religious schools operated only on the high-school 
level. Specialized high schools taught foreign languages, mathema- 
tics, and music; admittance to them was by special entrance exams. 
Special programs for gifted and talented children began as early 
as the fifth grade. Special schools also operated for handicapped 
children. Children suffering from chronic illnesses could receive 
their schooling in a hospital or sanatorium. 

Prior to the postcommunist reform era, about 25,000 students 
dropped out every year before reaching their sixteenth birthday; 
another 25,000 failed to advance to the next grade. Under the new 
system, parents could be fined 500 to 1,000 leva if their children 
failed to attend school; fines also were levied for pupils retained 
in grade for an extra year. 

Public opinion on the educational reform focused mainly on 
depolitization. By the 1990-91 school year, new textbooks had been 



111 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



introduced in many subjects, but many of them were not completely 
free of socialist rhetoric. A first-grade mathematics textbook pub- 
lished in 1990 contained the following exercise: "Count how many 
words there are in this sentence: 'I am grateful to the Party, for 
it leads my country to beautiful, radiant life and vigilantly pro- 
tects us from war. '"A newly published music book contained songs 
about the party, a communist youth organization, and Lenin. Many 
teachers likewise continued to espouse the communist rhetoric in 
which their profession had been long and firmly indoctrinated. In 
late 1990, about 50,000 Sofia University students demonstrated 
against poor education and against continued requirements to at- 
tend courses in Marxism. Their protest caused the university to 
eliminate compulsory political indoctrination courses. The 1991 
Law on Public Education declared that "no political activity is al- 
lowed in the system of public education." 

Depolitization was expected to be a slow process because of the 
extent to which the schools had been politicized before 1990. At 
the end of 1990, over 90 percent of all teachers were still members 
of the Bulgarian Socialist (formerly Communist) Party. For this 
reason, the Law on Public Education prohibited teachers from be- 
coming members of political parties for a period of three years, 
beginning in 1991 . Because the Zhivkov regime had tinkered often 
with Bulgaria's educational system, longtime teachers had devel- 
oped a cynicism toward reform of any type. This attitude ham- 
pered the removal of the old socialist structures from the educational 
system. 

Some students married and began families while they were still 
in school, and two- student families were not uncommon. Such fam- 
ilies often depended on help from parents because of their low in- 
come and because of a shortage of student family housing. By 1990 
most Bulgarian students worked in their free time, unlike their 
predecessors in the 1970s and early 1980s. 

Reform also reached higher education. In 1990 a new law on 
academic freedom emphasized the concept of an intellectual mar- 
ket in which universities, teachers, and students must maintain high 
performance levels to stay competitive. The law gave every insti- 
tution of higher learning the right to manage its teaching and 
research activities without government interference. This right in- 
cluded control over curriculum, number of students, standards for 
student admissions and teacher hirings, training and organization 
of faculty, and the level of contact with other institutions of higher 
learning in Bulgaria and abroad. Students received the right to 
choose their own professors. The higher education law was criticized 



112 



The Society and Its Environment 



for withholding students' rights and because the legislature had 
failed to consult students in the law's formulation. 

In 1991 experts evaluated the state university system as weak 
in critically needed technical fields of study. The availability of in- 
terested students was also questioned. In the 1990-91 school year, 
no graduate students with enterprise scholarships majored in sub- 
jects such as computer systems, artificial intelligence systems, or 
ecology and environmental protection. Graduate programs in cri- 
tical nontechnical fields such as management economics, market- 
ing, production management, and finance also had no students. 

After the overthrow of Zhivkov, France and Germany made early 
commitments to help Bulgaria carry out educational reforms. In 
1991 the United States began planning a new American college 
in Blagoevgrad, where students would be taught in English using 
American educational methods. The first 200 students were to in- 
clude 160 Bulgarians, 20 students from neighboring European coun- 
tries, and 20 Americans majoring in Balkan studies. The University 
of Maine was to supply the teachers. Plans called for business and 
economics to be the major areas of concentration. Affordability was 
a potential barrier to participation in this plan by Bulgarian stu- 
dents; the cost was low by American standards, but far above the 
average Bulgarian's price range. And the tuition-free Bulgarian 
university system was expected to lure many qualified students from 
the new university. Nevertheless, Western education assistance was 
an important symbolic step in moving the social institutions of Bul- 
garia into the European mainstream, from which they had been 
isolated for forty-five years. 

* * * 

Because the societal change stimulated in Bulgaria by the process 
of democratization is likely to continue through the 1990s, trans- 
lations of the Bulgarian press are an invaluable source of current 
information. A wide variety of articles and broadcasts on social 
topics, as well as government documents and laws, is translated 
in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service's Daily Report: East 
Europe and the Joint Publication Research Service's JPRS Report: 
East Europe. Amnesty International's Bulgaria: Imprisonment of Eth- 
nic Turks is an impartial source of information on the Turks and 
other minorities during the assimilation campaign of the 1980s. 
Hugh Poulton's The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict includes 
material on ethnic policy and regional issues after the overthrow 
of Zhivkov. Kak Zhiveem (How We Live) is a new Bulgarian- 
language sociological magazine that includes Western-style surveys 



113 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



on topics such as housing and the standard of living. Bulgarien, 
volume six in the German series of southeast European handbooks, 
offers chapter-length treatment of most aspects of society, includ- 
ing education, minorities, population, and religion; some articles 
are in English, most are in German. (For further information and 
complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



114 



Chapter 3. The Economy 



A potter, one of many artisans practicing their trade in modern Bulgaria 



FROM THE END OF WORLD WAR II until widespread revo- 
lution in Eastern Europe swept aside most communist governments 
in 1989, the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) exerted complete 
economic control in Bulgaria. The party's ascent to power in 1944 
had marked the beginning of radical economic change for Bulgaria. 
After World War II, Bulgaria followed the Soviet model of eco- 
nomic development more closely than any other East Bloc coun- 
try. The new regime shifted much of the labor force from the 
countryside to the city to provide workers for new large-scale in- 
dustrial complexes. At the same time, the focus of Bulgarian in- 
ternational trade shifted from Central Europe to Eastern Europe. 

These new policies resulted in impressive initial rates of growth. 
But this was partly because the country was starting from a low 
level of economic development. Throughout the postwar period, 
economic progress also was assisted substantially by a level of in- 
ternal and external political stability unseen in other East Euro- 
pean countries during the same period and unprecedented in 
modern Bulgarian history. 

Nonetheless, beginning in the early 1960s low capital and labor 
productivity and expensive material inputs plagued the Bulgarian 
economy. With disappointing rates of growth came a high degree 
of economic experimentation. This experimentation took place 
within the socialist economic framework, however, and it never 
approached a market-based economy. 

In the late 1980s, continuing poor economic performance brought 
new economic hardship. By that time, the misdirection and irra- 
tionality of BCP economic policies had become quite clear. Fi- 
nally, on November 10, 1989, a popular movement toppled Todor 
Zhivkov, long-time party leader and head of state, and orthodox 
communist dictatorship ended. But unlike the communist parties 
in most other East European states, the BCP retained majority 
power after the transition in Bulgaria by winning the first free na- 
tional elections in June 1990. By that time, however, changes in 
party leadership and reduction of the BCP's power base permit- 
ted economic reorientation toward a market system. This difficult 
transition combined with political instability to seriously worsen 
economic conditions during 1990. 

Bulgaria's success in transforming its economy from central plan- 
ning to a market-based system remained unmeasured in 1991. Un- 
doubtedly, any form of Bulgarian government faced a daunting 



117 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



task at that point. Because its financial and productive resources 
had been allocated ineffectively for many years, the economy ur- 
gently needed major reforms. The manufacturing sector was un- 
competitive in world markets, was technologically outmoded, and 
consumed energy and materials at enormously wasteful rates. The 
agricultural sector, once the most productive sector of the Bulgar- 
ian economy, had degenerated to the point that the country could 
scarcely feed its own people. A new trade regime with traditional 
partners would strain already low hard currency reserves, restricting 
access to raw materials and sophisticated technology. External and 
internal debt was enormous when Zhivkov fell. Inflation was high, 
environmental problems were severe, and skilled labor was in- 
sufficient. 

Several factors complicate the quantification of socialist econo- 
mies from a capitalist perspective. Prices in socialist economies serve 
primarily an accounting function; they do not reflect relative scar- 
cities and demand for a product as they do in capitalist economies. 
Hence, comparisons of value indicators are difficult. In addition, 
some socialist statistics simply are calculated differendy. For ex- 
ample, the socialist equivalent of national income, referred to as 
net material product (NMP — see Glossary), excludes the value of 
most services, including government, that are unrelated to physi- 
cal production. 

Accurate assessment of Bulgarian economic policies and perfor- 
mance under communist regimes also is complicated by incom- 
plete, inaccurate, or misleading statistics. Some Western economists 
have attempted, however, to extrapolate data based on a combi- 
nation of Bulgarian statistics, various economic assumptions, and 
statistical techniques. 

Resource Base 

Bulgaria is relatively poor in both quantity and quality of natural 
resources. This situation has been an important factor in planning 
the national economy and foreign trade. The primary indigenous 
mineral resources are coal, copper, lead. zinc, and iron ore. 

Coal and Minerals 

Lignite, by far the most prevalent form of coal, is mined chiefly 
in the Maritsa-zapad (West Maritsa) and Maritsa-iztok (East 
Maritsa) sections of the Maritsa Basin (see fig. 10). The main source 
of other grades of brown coal is the Bobov Dol deposit in the Rila 
Mountains of southwest Bulgaria. There is little bituminous coal 
in the country. Copper is mined chiefly in the Sredna Gora (cen- 
tral hills) in the western Balkans, and at Chelopets in south-central 
Bulgaria. There are also large deposits of lead. zinc, and iron ore. 



118 




Source: Based on information from Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.), Bulgarien, Gottingen, Gei 

Figure 10. Energy and Mineral Resources 
120 



The Economy 



the largest of which are at Kremikovtsi. Bulgaria became self- 
sufficient in the production of pig iron in 1987. Manganese, ura- 
nium, gold, salt, and chromium also are mined. Small amounts 
of oil are extracted offshore in the Black Sea and inland near Pleven. 

Agricultural Resources 

In 1987 approximately 56 percent of Bulgaria's total land mass 
of 11,055,000 hectares was used for agriculture. Of that total, 
3,825,000 hectares, or 35 percent of the total land mass, was arable. 
Although natural conditions are very good for some crops, not all 
of the land is ideal for agricultural purposes. Large portions of the 
western uplands are suitable only for tobacco and vegetable culti- 
vation. Grain fields on the rolling plain to the north of the Balkan 
Mountains receive limited rainfall and experience periodic droughts. 

Environmental Problems 

Although Bulgaria has had serious environmental problems for 
some time, they were not openly discussed until the overthrow of 
Zhivkov. Ecological groups were at the forefront of anti-Zhivkov 
demonstrations in 1989, when an all-European ecology conference 
focused world attention on Sofia. After acknowledging the problem, 
post-Zhivkov policy makers rated degradation of the air, water, and 
soil as one of the most serious problems facing Bulgaria. In April 
1990, the Ministry of Public Health declared the cities of Asenov- 
grad, Dimitrovgrad, Kurdzhali, Panagyurishte, Plovdiv, Ruse, and 
Vratsa ecologically endangered regions and announced that resi- 
dents of these regions would be given medical examinations. But 
after forty years of touting heavy industry as the pathway to na- 
tional advancement, Bulgaria could not easily remedy the intense 
pollution emitted by chemical plants in Ruse and Dimitrovgrad or 
the copper smelters at Srednogorie without further damaging its al- 
ready shaky economy. Likewise, the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant 
on the Maritsa River, provider of over 20 percent of the country's 
electric power but a persistent emitter of radiation, could not be closed 
without severe impact on the economy. Radiation from the 1986 
Chernobyl' accident in the Soviet Union also remained an environ- 
mental hazard in 1991 (See Environment, ch. 2). 

Labor Force 

Because of a low birth rate, labor shortages began to appear in 
Bulgaria in the 1980s. Then in 1989, deportation of 310,000 eth- 
nic Turks created critical shortages in certain economic sectors. 
The dislocation caused by the large-scale economic reform that 
began in 1990 introduced high rates of unemployment and social 
insecurity to a system that nominally had no unemployment under 



121 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

the central planning regime. A period of protracted readjustment 
of labor to enterprise needs was expected to begin in 1991. 

Factors of Availability 

The total labor force in Bulgaria was 4.078 million in 1988. Of 
that total, 35.9 percent were classified as industrial workers, 19 
percent as agricultural workers, and 18.9 percent as service work- 
ers. In 1985 some 56 percent of the population was of working age 
(16 to 59 years old for men and 16 to 54 for women); 22.9 percent 
were under working age, and 21.1 percent were over working age. 
These figures indicate that the population had aged demographi- 
cally since 1946, when 30 percent of the population was under the 
working age and only 12 percent was over. Small growth rates and 
occasional declines of the Bulgarian labor force increasingly inhib- 
ited economic growth in the 1980s. The meager growth in the labor 
force was caused primarily by a birthrate that began declining be- 
fore World War II. 

Declining population growth did not affect Bulgarian economic 
planning and performance for a number of years. In the 1950s and 
1960s, the expanding labor requirements of industrial growth were 
accommodated by a steady influx of peasant labor from the country- 
side and by the nationalization of artisan shops in 1951 . This migra- 
tion slowed, however, and complaints of an industrial labor shortage 
were common by the late 1960s. The situation was exacerbated in 
1974 when the government reduced the work week from 48 to 42.5 
hours (see Agriculture, this ch.). By the early 1980s, Bulgaria's urban 
working- age population had begun to decline in absolute terms. Then 
in May 1989, ethnic strife caused thousands of ethnic Turks to leave 
Bulgaria for Turkey. In August Turkish authorities finally closed 
the border, but only after 310,000 ethnic Turks had left the country, 
taking with them a substantial chunk of the Bulgarian work force. 
In addition, a significant "brain drain" threatened in 1990 when 
large numbers of young, highly educated Bulgarians applied to leave 
the country. In the first four months of 1990, at a time when the 
country desperately needed its professional class to restructure so- 
ciety and the economy, 550,000 such applications were received. 

Labor statistics reflect a distinct change of economic priorities 
from agriculture to industry under communist regimes. From 1948 
to 1988, the shares of labor in industry and agriculture shifted dra- 
matically. Industry's share rose from 7.9 to 38 percent, while 
agriculture's share fell from 82.1 to 19.3 percent. Among other 
sectors, in 1988 construction, transportation and communications, 
and trade respectively accounted for 8.3, 6.7, and 8.7 percent of 
employment. 



122 



The Economy 



Labor and Economic Reform 

Under communist rule, unemployment officially was nonexis- 
tent. Like many other Soviet-style economies, however, the Bul- 
garian system included much underemployment and hoarding of 
surplus workers, particularly in industry. While in power, the BCP 
set wage and work norms. Average annual earnings rose from 2, 185 
leva (for value of the lev, see Glossary) in 1980 to 2,953 leva in 
1988. Earnings were highest in the research, state administration, 
construction, transport, and finance sectors, in that order. Agricul- 
ture and forestry were among the lowest paid sectors. 

After the overthrow of Zhivkov, reasonable use of industrial capac- 
ity was expected to maintain a tight labor market for the foreseeable 
future because the labor force had ceased to grow. Women already 
accounted for approximately 50 percent of the labor force in 1988; 
therefore, little additional growth was expected from that part of the 
population. Similarly, little growth was expected from among volun- 
tarily employed pensioners and invalids. However, the tight labor 
supply was not the most pressing concern of the first post-Zhivkov 
economic planners. The economic transformation from centralized 
planning to a market economy meant increased influence by mar- 
ket factors on wage and unemployment rates in the future. This 
transformation also made high unemployment likely as state enter- 
prises closed and generation of goods and services shifted to an ex- 
panded private sector. But this intermediate dislocation was thought 
necessary to achieve correlation between wages and productivity. 

Unemployment, which stood at 72,000 at the beginning of 1991, 
was expected to jump to at least 250,000 by the end of that year 
because of the planned transition to a market structure. In 1990 
the interim government of Petur Mladenov created a national labor 
exchange to assist in placing unemployed workers. Unemployment 
assistance remained a state responsibility, but the state had very 
little money for this purpose in 1991 . Plans called for eventual con- 
tribution by private employers to a designated unemployment fund. 

Economic Structure and Control Mechanisms 

Until late 1989, Bulgaria had a command economy based on cen- 
tralized planning rather than on market forces. In such a system, 
crucial economic decisions such as allocation of output, rates of ex- 
pansion of various sectors, values of goods and services, and the 
exchange rate of the national currency were made administratively, 
not by the market. Bulgaria's faithful adherence to the Soviet model 
of economic planning included rapid industrialization, large-scale 
investments, and other resource allocation to heavy industry at the 
expense of light industry and agriculture, higher rates of spending 



123 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

for capital investment than for consumption purchases, and forced 
nationalization of industry and collectivization of agriculture. 

The Centrally Planned Economy 

Proponents of centrally planned economies (CPEs) maintained 
that the advantages of such systems far outweighed the disadvan- 
tages. They believed that in many respects economic competition 
wasted society's resources. In other words, what Marx called the 
"anarchy of the market" led producers and consumers to expend 
resources in activities that became unnecessary when they worked 
in harmony rather than in competition. Planning could give pri- 
ority to social goals over economic ones. Should the government 
decide that the development of health professionals was important 
to society, for example, it could earmark funds for that purpose. 
Proponents of CPEs also claimed that they could insulate their econ- 
omies from the ups and downs of the business cycle, a phenome- 
non that Western economies never have been able to avoid. 
Theoretically, CPEs were designed to be immune to economic (and 
social) losses such as reduced output and unemployment associ- 
ated with economic downturns. (As their national economies be- 
came more interrelated with international markets, however, CPE 
proponents admitted the difficulty of isolating themselves from 
swings in world economic conditions.) Another theoretical advan- 
tage was that economic decisions could be based on long-range goals 
because the financial losses of any individual enterprise or indus- 
try could be offset by profits in other areas of the economy. And, 
since the organization of the entire industrial and agricultural base 
was determined administratively, economies of scale could easily 
be incorporated into the planning process. 

Western economists were generally critical of the CPE, however. 
Their criticisms had two essential components. First, central eco- 
nomic planners often were unable to plan an economy efficiently; 
and second, even when they could plan well, they were unable to 
achieve the goals they planned. These general assertions proved 
true regarding specific aspects of Bulgaria's command economy, 
and they had ramifications for efforts to reorganize that economy 
in the 1990s. 

The CPE induced enterprises to seek low production targets, con- 
cealing productive capacity and never overfulfilling the plan by too 
much, lest higher targets be set in the next plan. The result was 
underutilized resources. Plans tended to stress quantity over qual- 
ity. Simply requiring a particular level of output was insufficient 
if that output were of such poor quality that no one bought it, or 
if there were no need for such a product in the beginning. The 



124 



The Economy 



consumer had no effective control over the producer when quality 
was low, and the artificial price structure prevented price signals 
from alerting producers to consumer preferences. Also, because 
enterprises were judged on their fulfillment of the plan, producers 
geared production levels for satisfying the plan, not consumers. 

The CPE could induce technical progress from above, but it could 
not stimulate it from below. The plan discouraged enterprise in- 
novation, because innovation meant interrupting current pro- 
duction, hence jeopardizing plan fulfillment. The system also 
encouraged waste and hoarding of fixed and working capital, and 
the wage system failed to encourage workers to work harder or man- 
agers to economize on labor. Under Zhivkov, Bulgaria attempted 
to deal with these problems by a series of reforms in both industry 
and agriculture. These reforms included alternately centralizing 
and decentralizing economic management; adding and deleting eco- 
nomic ministries and committees; revising the economic indica- 
tors for plan fulfillment; and encouraging or discouraging elements 
of private enterprise. Despite such experimentation, however, Bul- 
garia remained faithful to the general Soviet model for over four 
decades. In the years after the end of communist rule, the CPE 
remained the predominant structural element in the Bulgarian econ- 
omy, especially in large enterprise management. 

The Planning System 

Prior to 1990, the planning hierarchy in Bulgaria included several 
levels. The ultimate economic authority was the BCP. The party 
determined general economic policies, identified economic reforms 
and their structure, and monitored economic activity. Planning 
and control were the responsibility of the Council of Ministers, 
which was roughly equivalent to a Western cabinet. The most im- 
portant planning committee within the Council of Ministers was 
the State Planning Committee (SPC). Within the Council of 
Ministers were specialized economic ministries, such as the Ministry 
of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and various govern- 
mental committees and commissions. The composition and author- 
ity of the ministries underwent frequent change. In 1986, for 
example, six ministries with economic powers were eliminated and 
five cabinet-level "voluntary associations" were formed. The after- 
math of these changes, however, showed few new power relation- 
ships. In the later Zhivkov years, the prime responsibilities of 
ministry-level agencies included forecasting development of their in- 
dustries, assessing development bottlenecks, and generally overseeing 
state development policy. However, the ministries were not to par- 
ticipate actively in planning. That was a function of the associations. 



125 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

The associations, also known as trusts, were an intermediary 
organization between the ministries and the lowest level of the plan- 
ning hierarchy, the enterprise. The association integrated produc- 
tion, research and development, design, construction, and foreign 
trade functions. Unlike associations in the Soviet Union, which 
were merely an intermediary link in the chain of economic com- 
mand, Bulgarian associations retained several essential decision- 
making prerogatives and were in direct contact with centers of eco- 
nomic power such as the SPC, the Ministry of Finance, and the 
Bulgarian National Bank (BNB). At the bottom of the economic 
hierarchy, enterprises were distinct economic entities that operated 
under an independent accounting system. They were expected to 
earn a planned amount of profit, a portion of which went to the 
state as a profits tax. 

In the Bulgarian command economy, almost all economic ac- 
tivity was directed toward plan fulfillment. Economic directives were 
outlined extensively in the plans, which were not merely guide- 
lines but binding, legal documents. The best known of these was 
the Five-Year Plan, although planning was done for longer and 
shorter periods as well. Most important for the day-to-day opera- 
tions of enterprises were the annual and monthly plans. 

One of the most important tasks of central planning was what 
was referred to as material balances — planning for correspondence be- 
tween supply and demand of goods. At the draft plan stage, this 
required that supply (planned output, available stocks, and planned 
imports) equal demand (domestic demand and exports) for every 
industry. When demand exceeded supply, planners could increase 
planned output, increase imports, or reduce domestic demand. The 
SPC usually favored the last alternative. This manipulation limited 
the flow of inputs to low-priority industrial branches, which most 
often made consumer items, resulting in shortages of those goods. 

The party began the planning process by providing priorities 
and output targets for critical commodities to the SPC, which recon- 
ciled them with required inputs. A draft plan then was created by 
a process of negotiation and information exchange up and down 
the planning hierarchy. After negotiating with the SPC on targets 
and resources and formulating specific guidelines, the associations 
then negotiated with their individual enterprises to establish final 
figures. The output targets then went back to the SPC for a final 
negotiation with the associations. 

The final version of the plan was submitted to the Council of 
Ministers for approval or modification, after which the approved 
targets were sent down the hierarchy to the individual firms. Thus 
enterprises were informed of their binding norms for a planning 
period, including volume and mix of output, procurement limits, 



126 



The Economy 



level of state investment, foreign currency earnings, foreign cur- 
rency limits for imports, and wage rates. An important element 
of the plan fulfillment stage was manipulation of resources by minis- 
tries and the SPC to ensure fulfillment of priority targets and 
minimize bottlenecks. Occasionally, reforms allowed enterprises 
rather than higher echelons to make many of these decisions. For 
most of the communist era, however, this was not the case. 

Economic Policy and Performance 

Bulgarian postwar economic development can be divided into 
four phases: the revolutionary period (1944 through 1948); the de- 
velopment of socialism (1949 through 1960); the age of intermit- 
tent reform (1961 through 1989); and the transformation to a market 
economy (beginning in 1990). 

Postwar Economic Policy 

After the BCP came to power in 1944, the transition to social- 
ism began slowly. Before World War II, the Bulgarian economy 
had been agrarian and decentralized; as a result, the industrial base 
was relatively undeveloped (see The Interwar Economy, ch. 1). 
Following the Soviet model, the BCP first sought control over as 
many facets of the economy as possible. Thus, restructuring in- 
cluded collectivizing agriculture, confiscating private enterprises, 
nationalizing industry, and enacting various fiscal and monetary 
measures. 

In the 1940s, the BCP viewed the agricultural sector as a major 
obstacle to the transformation of the economy. Although collec- 
tivization proceeded slowly at first, state power in the agricultural 
markets was quickly established by nationalizing internal and for- 
eign commodity trade. To accomplish this, the BCP used the war- 
time organizations that had overseen distribution of major crops. 

Industry continued to decentralize from 1944 until 1947. In those 
years, the majority of labor leaving the military and the farms en- 
tered small factories and unmechanized artisan shops. These small 
enterprises were quite the opposite of the modern, large-scale in- 
dustry that the BCP was committed to creating. Small enterprises 
also competed with state enterprises for scarce raw materials and 
skilled labor. Labor discipline also was a major problem during 
this phase; unexcused absences, sporadic strikes, and high labor 
turnover plagued the new state enterprises. In September 1947, 
a decision to accelerate the nationalization of industry was taken 
at a meeting of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform — 
see Glossary). As a result, in December 1947 trained groups of party 
members entered all the approximately 6,100 remaining private 



127 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

enterprises, seized their capital, and announced their immediate 
nationalization. This act effectively erased Bulgaria's small class 
of private industrial entrepreneurs. Also in 1947, government mo- 
nopolies were established over all items of retail trade. By the end 
of 1948, 85 percent of the means of production were run by the state. 

Although Bulgaria had few private banks when the BCP came 
to power, by December 1947 those few were merged with the BNB. 
The BCP also enacted a series of fiscal and monetary measures 
to gain control over Bulgaria's financial resources by the end of 
1947. Monetary reform froze all bank accounts over 20,000 leva, 
and a tax was imposed on the remaining accounts. These actions 
reduced the money supply by two-thirds. The new policy also levied 
high taxes on private income and high profits to absorb any potential 
new deposits. 

This first phase of postwar economic development included a 
tentative Two-Year Plan (1947-48) that foreshadowed later poli- 
cies. Aimed principally at speedy recovery from wartime stress, 
the program began large-scale industrialization and electrification; 
it sought to raise industrial production by 67 percent and agricul- 
tural production by 34 percent over prewar levels. The first plan 
disproportionately allocated funds away from agriculture and en- 
countered severe organizational and technical problems, mistakes 
by inexperienced management, and shortages of energy and produc- 
tion equipment — problems that would continue in ensuing develop- 
ment phases. 

The First Five-Year Plans 

The next phase of Bulgarian postwar economic development in- 
cluded the First Five-Year Plan. This plan made an important con- 
tribution to the pattern of Bulgaria's socialist economic development 
by creating the institutional apparatus for long-term industrial plan- 
ning. Already in 1945, the wartime Directorate for Civilian Mobili- 
zation had been replaced by a Supreme Economic Council that 
extended the previous organization's authority over resource 
allocation. Now the state's existing economic ministries were sub- 
divided into one ministry for each branch of production. By Janu- 
ary 1948, a separate and politically powerful State Production 
Committee (SPC) was established. By October 1948, representa- 
tives of the new SPC and the existing Main Directorate for Statis- 
tics had set out the criteria for calculating plan fulfillment. 

The announced targets for the First Five-Year Plan (1949-53) 
confirmed the economic priorities indicated by the previous Two- 
Year Plan. Agriculture was to receive 17 percent of new invest- 
ment and industry 47 percent. Gross industrial output was to grow 
by 119 percent, primarily because of a 220 percent increase in heavy 



128 



The Economy 



industry. Light industry and agriculture were to raise output by 
75 and 59 percent, respectively. The rapid collectivization and 
mechanization of agriculture were expected to achieve the last tar- 
get while freeing labor for industry, construction, and transporta- 
tion. Because about 25 percent of the country's national income 
was invested in the economic infrastructure, the standard of liv- 
ing remained low. 

In 1952 the plan was declared fulfilled a year ahead of schedule, 
but statistics on the period were too incomplete and contradictory 
to evaluate its actual results. Substantial bottlenecks existed in 
material inputs and outputs. Agriculture received less investment 
than planned (only 13 percent) and showed no growth through the 
period (see table 12, Appendix). The effect of low agricultural output 
rippled through other sectors of the economy, hindering produc- 
tion in related industries. Substantial material and technical aid 
came from the Soviet Union, but with a steep price: Bulgaria was 
expected to sell products to the Soviet market at below-market 
prices, and the arrogance of Soviet economic advisers caused seri- 
ous resentment. 

Continuing problems with excessive labor turnover forced the 
regime to cut back the targets for heavy industry in the Second 
Five- Year Plan (1953-57), and average annual industrial growth 
fell from 20.7 to 12.7 percent during that period. This was the first 
of several dramatic swings that characterized Bulgarian economic 
development throughout the postwar period. The average annual 
growth rate of agriculture increased from negative 0.9 percent to 
4.9 percent in the Second Five-Year Plan, but the same indicator 
for the overall NMP dropped from 8.4 to 7.8 percent. The indus- 
trial share of the NMP exceeded that of agriculture for the first 
time in this period. 

Two important economic events occurred at the Seventh Party 
Congress of the BCP, which met in mid- 1958. The party declared 
that Bulgaria was the first country besides the Soviet Union to 
achieve full collectivization of agriculture (estimates put the figure 
at 92 percent at this time), and it announced the goals for the Third 
Five-Year Plan. That plan, which began in 1958, set relatively 
moderate initial quotas that included substantially more produc- 
tion of consumer goods. In 1959, however, a BCP decision to make 
a "Great Leap Forward" (borrowed by the press from Mao 
Zedong's concurrent program for the Chinese economy) drasti- 
cally raised quotas: by 1965 industrial output was to be three to 
four times the 1957 level, and by 1961 agriculture was to produce 
three times as much as it had in 1957. To achieve the latter goal, 
agriculture was again reorganized. Amalgamation of collective 
farms cut their number by 70 percent, after which average farm 



129 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

acreage was second only to the Soviet Union among countries in 
Eastern Europe. The grandiose Zhivkov Theses, as the quota pro- 
gram came to be known, were tempered noticeably by 1961, when 
the economy's inability to achieve such growth was obvious to all. 

Meanwhile, throughout the late 1950s urban unemployment had 
been a major problem. The new collectivization drive brought 
another wave of peasant migration to urban centers. Compound- 
ing this problem was a cutback in Soviet imports of industrial in- 
puts, which created some excess capacity in heavy industry. Thus, 
the intensified industrialization of the Third Five-Year Plan also 
aimed at absorbing surplus labor. 

Trade relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe also 
played a large role in the investment priorities of the Third Five- 
Year Plan. Food processing and agriculture were earmarked for 
greatest growth because these sectors, together with chemical fer- 
tilizers and small electric equipment, were now areas of Bulgarian 
responsibility in the plans of the Council for Mutual Economic As- 
sistance (Comecon — see Glossary) for greater East European trade. 
After a reduction in 1955, Bulgaria faced greatly increased export 
obligations to the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and the German Demo- 
cratic Republic (East Germany) in the late 1950s. The latter two 
could provide badly needed industrial machinery in return, and 
the USSR provided vital raw materials and energy. 

The party leadership initially resolved to fulfill the third plan, 
like the first, within three or four years; although none of its goals 
were reached, the party declared fulfillment in 1960, and Zhivkov 
survived the popular disillusionment and economic upheaval caused 
by his totally unrealistic theses. At that point, the twelve years of 
the second phase of Bulgarian postwar economic development had 
wrought major structural changes in the Bulgarian economy. In- 
dustry's share of the NMP increased from 23 percent to 48 per- 
cent as agriculture's share fell from 59 percent to 27 percent. By 
1960 the value produced by heavy industry matched that of light 
industry, although food processing for export also grew rapidly. 
Throughout the second phase, budget expenditures consisted 
primarily of reinvestment in sectors given initial priority. Mean- 
while, the completion of collectivization had shifted 678,000 
peasants, about 20 percent of the active labor force, into indus- 
trial jobs. The average annual increase in industrial employment 
peaked at 11.5 percent between 1955 and 1960. 

The Era of Experimentation and Reform 

The first full five-year plans proved the Bulgarian system's ca- 
pacity for extensive growth in selected branches of industry, based 



130 



The Economy 



on massive infusions of labor and capital. In the first postwar de- 
cades, that system was much more successful in reaching goals than 
were the command economies in the other East European coun- 
tries, largely because Bulgaria had started with a much more primi- 
tive industrial infrastructure. By the early 1960s, however, changes 
to the system were obviously needed to achieve sustained growth 
in all branches of production, including agriculture. Specific incen- 
tives to reform were shortages of labor and energy and the growing 
importance of foreign trade in the "thaw" years of the mid-1960s. 
Consequently, in 1962 the Fourth Five-Year Plan began an era 
of economic reform that brought a series of new approaches to the 
old goal of intensive growth. 

Industrial Decentralization 

In industry the "New System of Management" was introduced 
in 1964 and lasted until 1968. This approach intended to stream- 
line economic units and make enterprise managers more responsible 
for performance. In June 1964, about fifty industrial enterprises, 
mostly producers of textiles and other consumer goods, were placed 
under the new system. Wages, bonuses, and investment funds were 
tied to enterprise profits, up to 70 percent of which could be re- 
tained. Outside investment funds were to come primarily from bank 
credit rather than the state budget. In 1965 state subsidies still ac- 
counted for 63 percent of enterprise investment funds, however, 
while 30 percent came from retained enterprise earnings and only 
7 percent from bank credits. By 1970 budget subsidies accounted 
for only 27 percent of investment funds, while bank credits jumped 
to 39 percent, and retained enterprise earnings reached 34 percent. 
The number of compulsory targets for the Fourth Five-Year Plan 
was cut to four: physical output, investment funds, input utiliza- 
tion, and foreign trade targets. The pilot enterprises did very well, 
earning profits that were double the norm. By 1967 two-thirds 
of industrial production came from firms under the new system, 
which by that time had embraced areas outside consumer produc- 
tion. 

Another distinctive feature of the Bulgarian economy during the 
1960s was the high level of net capital investment (total investment 
minus depreciation). The average of 12 percent from 1960 to 1970 
was the highest in all of Eastern Europe. As in the past, invest- 
ment in heavy industry received the lion's share — over 80 percent 
of total industrial investment. Capital accumulation (net invest- 
ment plus net inventories) averaged 29 percent from 1960 to 1970, 
also a very high level. 



131 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

Industrial Recentralization 

Before the end of the 1960s, however, Bulgarian economic plan- 
ning moved back toward the conventional CPE approach. Many 
Western analysts attributed the Bulgarian retreat from the reforms 
of the 1960s to tension caused by the Soviet invasion of Czecho- 
slovakia in 1968. International events may well have played a role, 
but the timing of the retreat and the invasion suggest another com- 
ponent: dissatisfaction among the BCP elite with the results and 
ideological implications of the reform. For example, in July 1968, 
one month before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria's un- 
orthodox, three-tiered pricing system was eliminated. The party 
leadership had never accepted the concept of free and flexible pricing 
for some products, which was an important Bulgarian departure 
from centralized planning in the 1960s. Resistance to reform was 
further encouraged by a series of cases in which major enterprise 
directors used newly decentralized financial resources to line their 
own pockets. 

Despite the general retreat from reform, two important measures 
remained intact, one each in agriculture and industry. The first 
involved new operating procedures introduced on the larger col- 
lective farms in the early 1960s. To better exploit the new equip- 
ment introduced during the consolidation of the late 1950s, farms 
were assigned more agronomists and labor was specialized by es- 
tablishing fixed brigades. Production target negotiations between 
the Ministry of State Planning and the agricultural collectives also 
were simplified. 

The industrial reform that survived retrenchment in 1968 gave 
associations, not ministries, responsibility to supervise the new sys- 
tem of supply contracts between enterprises. This system continued 
to grow, with prices determined on the basis of enterprise bargaining 
rather than ministerial fiat. Interenterprise allocations clearly func- 
tioned more efficiently with this arrangement. 

Larger Economic Units 

Just as most reforms were being rescinded, the BCP began the 
last phase of postwar agricultural restructuring. Prompted by the 
labor shortage, the new streamlining of collective farms that be- 
gan in 1969 introduced the so-called agricultural-industrial com- 
plex (agrompromishlen kompleks — APK). The new structure was to 
industrialize agricultural production, boost the value-added com- 
ponent in Bulgarian exports by processing more agricultural goods, 
and raise the food supply to cities without diverting labor back from 
industry. In the late 1960s, relatively poor agricultural performance 



132 




133 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

under the existing structure had prevented those goals from being 
reached. 

The idea of combining existing enterprises into a smaller, 
presumably more manageable number of units spread quickly from 
agriculture to industry. By the end of the 1970s, the number of 
associations into which industrial enterprises were grouped was 
reduced by half. The sixty-four new, larger associations were 
granted the authority to make decisions for their enterprises about 
new investments, bank credits, and budget subsidies. Within an 
association, the larger enterprises (called subsidiaries) still could 
sign their own supply contracts and maintain their own bank ac- 
counts, but they ceased to be legal entities. Smaller enterprises 
(called subdivisions) became fully dependent on their association. 

The main advantage of this streamlined organization was seen 
as economy of scale through increased specialization and a simpli- 
fied flow of information. Associations also were assumed to be better 
able to make investment decisions and oversee material and labor 
distribution than either a small number of ministries or a large num- 
ber of enterprises. The new structure would link specific indus- 
trial enterprises with scientific institutes in the same way as the 
agricultural complexes had linked them. 

These reforms proved disappointing. Reformed planning tech- 
niques continued to leave unused industrial capacity, and quality 
control failed to improve. Both Western and domestic customers 
remained dissatisfied with the quality of many Bulgarian manufac- 
tures. New planning indicators that set norms for cost reduction 
actually reduced quality in a number of cases. Individual mem- 
bers of institutes could not convey their ideas to associations or 
ministries, where decisions to import or to invest in new technol- 
ogy were made. Thus the new framework only accentuated the 
dangers of socialist monopoly. Party meetings and the press criti- 
cized monopolistic abuses resulting from irrational decisions at the 
top and poor implementation of rational policies at the enterprise 
level. By the end of the 1970s, a new set of reforms was prescribed. 

The New Economic Model 

Initiated in 1981, the next program of reforms was designated 
the New Economic Model (NEM). This program involved both 
agricultural complexes and industrial enterprises. Goals of the NEM 
included updating the technical infrastructure of Bulgarian indus- 
try and improving the quality of Bulgarian exports to raise hard- 
currency income. Centralized planning now was relegated to setting 
gross profits and overseeing the national scientific program. In 



134 



The Economy 



1982-83 the NEM's principal instruments were financial incen- 
tives and accounting regulations aimed at all levels of management, 
but especially at the smallest unit of labor, the brigade. Brigades, 
each containing thirty to fifty workers, now would set labor and 
material input levels and dispose of finished products. In an effort 
to remedy the chronic distribution problems of the central econo- 
my, higher economic institutions became financially accountable 
for damage inflicted by their decisions on subordinate levels. 

Several important initiatives were launched in 1978. The long- 
standing limits on enterprise investment were lifted. In their place, 
a new investment plan was based on the enterprises' contractual 
obligations and credits with the BNB. The bank monitored the cash 
balance of enterprise contracts with customers and suppliers, grant- 
ing credits only when required. Three separate reinvestment funds 
received first claim on the net income of the enterprise. Although 
budgetary subsidies were not eliminated, the NEM directives as- 
signed responsibility for financial losses to all levels of enterprises. 
Self-financing became the watchword for all economic 
organizations. 

Another major change eliminated the automatic first claim of 
salaries and wages on gross enterprise income. This meant that 
wages could rise only after an increase in labor productivity, and 
then only by 50 percent of that increase. Moreover, management 
salaries could be cut by as much as 20 percent if the complex or 
enterprise failed to meet its norms for production and productivity. 
The formula for sanctions against management salaries changed 
several times. Finally, binding performance criteria were limited 
to five financial indicators for agricultural complexes and indus- 
trial associations, and to four for individual enterprises. Profit cri- 
teria were set only for the complexes or associations. Complexes 
and associations were given explicit freedom to sign their own con- 
tracts with suppliers and customers at home and abroad. 

The BNB was granted some flexibility in restricting its terms 
of lending and in charging interest rates above the nominal 2 per- 
cent. These measures were designed to bestow greater rewards for 
efficiency and to reduce the number of unfinished or unprofitable 
new projects. The latter accounted for 57 percent of all Bulgarian 
investment as late as 1976. A provision for joint ventures with for- 
eign firms met little enthusiasm from abroad. 

The Last Round of Zhivkov Reforms 

By 1982 economists and the party leadership admitted that the 
NEM had not led to the anticipated upturn in overall productivity 
and efficiency. Even upwardly skewed official statistics indicated 



135 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

that aggregate economic growth had dropped to its lowest postwar 
level. Under the NEM, enterprises could still get approval from 
state pricing authorities for price increases with marginal or non- 
existent quality improvement — an important factor in evaluating 
official figures. 

The differences between the Western concept of gross national 
product (GNP — see Glossary) and NMP make performance com- 
parisons problematic. However, a Western economist who cal- 
culated growth rates for the Bulgarian economy according to the 
conventional GNP standard used in market economies determined 
the official Bulgarian growth rates between 1961 and 1980. The 
calculated rate for 1981-2 was 2.9 percent. 

The Bulgarian response to declining growth rates under NEM 
was to initiate a second set of NEM reforms. Measures in 1982 
and 1983 concentrated almost exclusively on financial incentives 
and prices. Net income was identified as the major basis forjudg- 
ing plan fulfillment. The only other targets were tax payments, 
domestic and imported input limits, and minimum export levels. 
The emphasis on self-supporting net income was extended down- 
ward to the brigade and upward to the associations. Guarantees 
of a minimum wage were removed for workers and all levels of 
management. Ministers themselves now were subject to salary 
reductions if their industrial association failed to meet the stream- 
lined list of targets. Ministry access to budgetary subsidies for new 
investment was drastically cut and limited to a fixed term. Most 
investment capital outside net income had to be procured from the 
BNB. The bank's increasingly independent guidelines included the 
authorization to hold regional competitions for investment funds. 
Interest rates remained low however, ranging between 2.5 and 8 
percent. 

All these reforms did little to invigorate economic growth. In 
the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1981-5), the NMP growth rate dropped 
to 3.7 percent, its lowest postwar level. Officially, industry grew 
at a rate of 7 percent and construction at 5.4 percent, but agricul- 
ture declined by 3.9 percent per year. 

In 1985 Mikhail S. Gorbachev visited Bulgaria and reportedly 
pressured Zhivkov to make the country more competitive econom- 
ically. This pressure led to a Bulgarian version of the Soviet peres- 
troika program (see Glossary). New Regulations on Economic 
Activity took effect in January 1987. These directives, intended 
to stimulate "socialist competition," allowed enterprises to retain 
a much greater share of their profits and also required them to com- 
pete for investment capital from newly formed commercial banks. 
In June 1987, in response to widespread dissatisfaction and 



136 



The Economy 



confusion over the measures, a decree on collective and individual 
labor activities made it possible for state economic organizations 
to lease small trading and catering facilities to private individuals 
by offering contracts at public auctions. The auctions were an ab- 
ject failure, however, because of high taxes, high rents, restricted 
access to capital, uncertain supplies, the short duration of the con- 
tracts, and legal insecurity. The idea was quietly abandoned. 

Finally, in January 1989, the party issued Decree Number 56. 
This decree established "firms" as the primary unit of economic 
management. Theoretically, four types of firm could be created: 
joint-stock firms, firms with limited responsibility, firms with un- 
limited responsibility, and citizens' firms. The differences among 
the first three types of firms were small. But citizens' firms offered 
the potential of individual, collective, and associative ownership 
arrangements. In a fundamental departure from the socialist pro- 
hibition of private citizens hiring labor, as many as ten people could 
now be hired permanently, and an unlimited number could be hired 
on temporary contracts. A wave of reorganizations produced new, 
larger firms, depriving numerous enterprises of their self-manage- 
ment status. Nonetheless, hundreds of private and cooperative firms 
were authorized by Decree Number 56. 

Other elements of the decree allowed firms to issue shares and 
bonds and pay dividends, with a number of restrictions. Some 
clauses sought to encourage foreign investment in the country. State- 
owned enterprises that were transformed into joint-stock firms now 
could have foreign shareholders. Although tax incentives and legal 
guarantees were provided for joint ventures, little foreign invest- 
ment was stimulated. In 1989 and 1990, only 117 joint ventures 
were consummated, totaling US$10 million in Western capital. In 
all probability, low labor costs were not enough to attract foreign 
investment given remaining organizational disadvantages, poor in- 
frastructure, low political credibility, the nonconvertability of the 
lev, and close economic ties to the Soviet Union. 

This last round of reforms by the Zhivkov regime confused rather 
than improved economic performance. Statistics on growth for 
1986-88 indicated a 5.5 percent annual rate, up from the 3.7 per- 
cent rate achieved during the previous five-year plan. However, 
these statistics were internally inconsistent and widely disputed in 
the press. Expert observers speculated that they were the minimum 
growth the regime could tolerate given the 6 percent target rate 
in the five-year plan. 

Ultimately, the reforms failed to radically change the economic 
conditions in the country. Public discontent increased, and, finally, 
emboldened by revolutions throughout Eastern Europe, the public 



137 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

erupted in a popular revolt that ousted Todor Zhivkov in Novem- 
ber 1989. By early 1990, the first attempts were being made to es- 
tablish a market-based economy. 

Economic Sectors 

Bulgaria's consistent emphasis on developing heavy industry at 
any cost created raw material demands well beyond the country's 
domestic resources. This problem was compounded by the ineffi- 
cient industrial use of energy and raw materials: Bulgaria used more 
energy per unit of NMP than any Western economy. For this rea- 
son, one of the most salient aspects of the Bulgarian postwar econ- 
omy was reliance on imported Soviet natural resources. 

Fuels 

In 1989 Soviet imports supplied Bulgaria with 95 percent of its 
coal, 90 percent of its crude oil, and 100 percent of its natural gas 
(see fig. 10). Although Bulgaria imported the majority of its raw 
materials for energy and industrial requirements, some domestic 
fuels and minerals were available. A small supply of hard coal was 
depleted rapidly in the 1980s; in 1987 only 198,000 tons were mined. 
More ample deposits of low-quality lignite yielded 31,400,000 tons 
in 1987, but those fuels were relatively inefficient energy producers 
and high polluters. In 1990 the Maritsa Basin in south-central Bul- 
garia was expected to remain the prime source of lignite for the fore- 
seeable future; yearly production at its Maritsa-iztok open-pit mines 
was projected to reach forty million tons after the year 2000. 

Energy Generation 

In 1988 Bulgaria produced approximately 43 billion kilowatt 
hours of electricity (in contrast to 384 billion for France and 83.5 
billion for Yugoslavia). At that point, planners expected power con- 
sumption to increase by about 3.5 percent per year through the 
year 2000. The 1988 Program for Energy Development through 
1995 and in Perspective until 2005 set general long-term goals for 
the Bulgarian power industry, including more effective integration 
of machine building and construction industries into power projects, 
improved balance between supply and demand of energy, and more 
effective use of low-quality coal and local hydroelectric plants. In 
1988 Bulgaria and the Soviet Union signed a bilateral agreement 
for scientific and technical cooperation in thermoelectric, hydro- 
electric, and nuclear power generation. That year 59 percent of 
Bulgaria's electricity came from thermoelectric plants (primarily 
coal-powered); 35 percent came from nuclear reactors, the re- 
mainder from hydroelectric stations. Total generating capacity in 



138 



The Economy 



1988 was 11,300 megawatts (in contrast to 103,400 for France, 
20,000 for Yugoslavia). 

Conventional Power Generation 

About 1 ,500 megawatts of Bulgaria's thermoelectric generation 
capacity were idle in the late 1980s because of inefficient fuel delivery 
or equipment breakdown. About half the capacity of local heat and 
power plants, relied upon to supplement major electrical plants and 
provide heat for industries and homes, was unavailable for the same 
reasons. 

In the early 1990s, Bulgarian energy planners faced serious dilem- 
mas. At the Maritsa-iztok- 1 , Maritsa-iztok-2 and Dimo Dichev ther- 
moelectric plants, located in the Maritsa-iztok coal fields, long-term 
plans called for gradual replacement of old generating equipment 
in existing stations. But most such projects were far behind sched- 
ule in 1990. The 1990 decision not to complete the Belene Nuclear 
Power Plant meant increased reliance on Maritsa-iztok coal for heat 
and power generation. In 1990 that source provided 70 percent 
of the country's coal, and its three power stations contributed about 
25 percent of total power generation. 

The Maritsa-iztok Industrial-Power Complex (with its machine 
building and repair enterprises one of the largest industrial centers 
in Bulgaria, employing 22,000 people in 1991) had been in opera- 
tion since 1951; by 1991 the quality of its coal and the reliability 
of its infrastructure were steadily declining. But at that crisis point 
in the national economy, funds were unavailable for capital invest- 
ment, especially to buy expensive foreign technology (see Market 
Reform, this ch.). At the same time, industry authorities acknowl- 
edged burning high-sulfur coal and strip mining at Maritsa-iztok 
as a severe environmental problem whose amelioration would cost 
at least a billion leva, mostly hard currency. 

Hydroelectric power generation was concentrated in southwestern 
Bulgaria, but few Bulgarian rivers offered large-scale hydroelectric 
potential. The major hydroelectric project in the Ninth Five- Year 
Plan (1986-90) was completion of the Chaira station, which would 
add 864 megawatts of generating capacity. Development of local 
hydroelectric stations on small streams was a planning priority for 
the 1990s. 

Nuclear Power 

Nuclear power provided Bulgaria a way of easing its dependence 
on imported fuels, although the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia 
provided the expertise and equipment on which Bulgaria built its 
nuclear power industry. Lacking hard currency to buy enough oil, 



139 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

and reaching the toleration limit for pollution by coal-burning 
plants, Bulgaria increasingly made nuclear power the center of its 
energy policy in the 1980s. In 1974 the first nuclear power plant 
was opened at Kozloduy north of Sofia on the Danube River. After 
completing the original four- reactor complex in 1982, Kozloduy 
added a fifth unit in late 1987. This was the first 1 ,000-megawatt 
reactor in Eastern Europe outside the Soviet Union. A sixth unit 
was installed in 1989. At that point, Bulgaria ranked third in the 
world in per capita nuclear power generation, and the extent of 
its reliance on a sole nuclear power plant was unsurpassed in the 
world. 

The Bulgarian nuclear power industry was beset with major 
problems from the beginning. The Kozloduy station had a history 
of technical difficulties and accidents, many of which were related 
to the low quality or poor design of Soviet and Czechoslovak equip- 
ment. The fifth reactor, a constant source of trouble, was out of 
commission for several months in 1991 because of extensive tur- 
bine damage. This setback put the entire country on a brownout 
schedule that shut off electricity two out of every four hours. 

The Chernobyl' disaster in 1986 made nuclear safety a sensi- 
tive political issue in Bulgaria, and by the late 1980s public opin- 
ion, now a much more significant factor for policy makers, had 
turned strongly against the nuclear industry. A second nuclear 
power complex was started at Belene, to add six 1 ,000-megawatt 
reactors by the end of the Tenth Five- Year Plan. But construction 
was halted in 1989 by public opposition and disclosure that both 
Kozloduy and Belene were located in earthquake-prone regions. 
Long-term plans for nuclear heat generation also were shelved at 
that time. In 1991 the government's Commission on Nuclear Power 
Supply reported that the supply system was poorly organized and 
managed, and that managers relied on expensive foreign techni- 
cal help instead of available domestic engineers. The commission 
also reported that, once Soviet specialists left, a shortage of quali- 
fied personnel delayed activation of the sixth reactor at Kozloduy 
(considered a top priority once Belene was rejected), and that most 
monitoring instruments in the first four Kozloduy reactors were 
out of operation. 

In mid- 1991 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
declared the Kozloduy reactors unsafe. Two reactors were shut 
down. Meanwhile, also in 1991, the planned activation of the two 
newest reactors at Kozloduy raised the problem of nuclear waste 
disposal because the Soviet Union had begun charging hard cur- 
rency to reprocess waste from East European reactors, formerly 
one of its functions under Comecon. In 1991 Bulgaria requested 



140 



The Economy 



European Economic Community (EEC — see Glossary) aid to build 
its first permanent domestic repository for nuclear waste. 

The Bulgarian power transmission network was supplemented 
in 1988 when a high-capacity transmission line from the South 
Ukraine Nuclear Power Station in the Soviet Union reached the 
northeastern port city of Varna. But like Soviet fuels, imported 
Soviet electricity required hard currency in 1991, mitigating the 
advantages of the old Comecon agreement. 

Industry 

From 1956 through 1988, industrial production rose an aver- 
age of 8.9 percent per year according to official figures, but the 
actual rates declined steadily during the thirty-three-year period. 
The annual average rate of industrial growth for the periods 
1956-60, 1961-70, 1971-80, and 1981-88 was 15.5, 11.6, 7.5, and 
4.4 percent, respectively. By the late 1980s, Bulgarian industry had 
completely exhausted the advantages it had used in earlier decades 
to post impressive growth statistics (see table 12, Appendix). 

Industrial Policy 

The cost of Bulgaria's industrial growth was substantial. Besides 
environmental problems, the commitment to heavy industry came 
at the expense of light industry — especially food processing and 
textiles — and agriculture. These were sectors in which prewar Bul- 
garia had relatively high production potential. But de-emphasis held 
the official annual NMP growth figures for light industry and 
agriculture to 7.5 and 2.8 percent, respectively, between 1956 and 
1988. 

In the postwar command economy, the chief beneficiaries of this 
emphasis were the chemical, electronics, and machinery industries. 
Their respective share of total industrial production rose from 1.9, 
0, and 2.4 percent in 1939 to 8.8, 14.4, and 15 percent in 1988. 
Similar statistics indicate big drops in production shares for the 
food processing and textiles industries — from 51.2 to 23.3 percent, 
and from 19.8 to 5.1 percent, respectively, in the same period. 

Besides the unchanging commitment to heavy industry, two other 
major trends appeared in postwar industrial policy. The first was 
steady and substantial support for a basic ferrous metals industry, 
regardless of cost, in order to reduce dependence on imports. The 
second was an effort to produce machinery competitive in inter- 
national markets, with special emphasis on electrical equipment. 

A result of the first policy was the Kremikovtsi Metallurgical 
Complex. In 1954 Soviet-supported geological surveys indicated 
major new deposits of higher quality iron ore that would support 



141 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

a second complex to supplement the existing V.I. Lenin Ferrous 
Metals Combine at Pernik. Although the deposits were actually 
found to be inadequate, the extremely expensive Kremikovtsi plant 
finally opened in 1963 and used Soviet iron ore to produce over 
half of the national production of steel and iron through 1978. 

The Kremikovtsi complex brought numerous problems. By the 
mid-1970s, over 75 percent of its ore and coking coal was imported. 
Costs were inflated by premium wages paid to maintain the labor 
force and by delays in construction and delivery. Production at 
Kremikovtsi consistently failed to meet planned targets, and less 
than three-quarters of plant capacity was used. The enterprise never 
showed a profit; in 1989 it lost 99.5 million leva despite receiving 
600 million leva in state subsidies. Using 15 percent of the coun- 
try's total energy output, Kremikovtsi generated only 1 percent 
of national income in the late 1980s. 

The strategy of heavy equipment production for export fared 
better than did metallurgy in the 1970s and 1980s. In fact, the most 
competitive Bulgarian industries were those most committed to ex- 
port markets. The machine building and electronics industries aver- 
aged 16 percent growth between 1960 and 1980 while their 
combined share of export value jumped from 13 to 55 percent from 
1960 to 1982. The primary exports in these sectors were forklift 
trucks and electrical hoisting gear produced by the Balkancar 
enterprise. Computer equipment and chemicals also showed im- 
proved export performance. 

Bulgaria's postwar industrialization was clearly positive in some 
sectors. Two notable examples were the construction of electric 
power plants in the 1950s, which made possible the nationwide 
spread of industry and the development of an electrical equipment 
industry that produced exportable products. Nonetheless, as the 
1980s drew to a close, it became increasingly clear that even the 
most competitive sectors had serious problems that the BCP's half- 
way reforms could not solve. After the initial postwar climb, four 
decades of socialist central planning had left the industrial sector 
in a very poor state. 

Industrial Centers 

Bulgarian heavy industries, mostly machine building, chemicals, 
and electronics, were concentrated in relatively few production 
centers. Important machine tool plants were the Bolshevik Tool 
Plant at Gabrovo, the Nikola Vaptsarov Combine at Pleven, and 
the Radomir Heavy Equipment Plant in southwest Bulgaria. The 
Electronic Materials Processing and Equipment Scientific- 
Production Combine was a combined scientific and industrial center 



142 



The Economy 



at Sofia. Electronic instrument production centers were located at 
the Plovdiv Power Electronics Plant, the Shabla Electromechani- 
cal Plant on the northeast coast, the Stara Zagora Industrial Robot 
Plant, the Pravets Instrument Plant in the southwest, and the 
Petkov Instrument Plant at Turgovishte. Major chemical and petro- 
chemical producers were the Industrial Petrochemical Plant at 
Pleven (specializing in vehicle lubricants and oils), the Burgas 
Petrochemical Combine (plastics), the Vratsa Industrial Chemi- 
cal Combine (chemical fertilizers), and four chemical plants at 
Dimitrovgrad (see fig. 10). Bulgaria also built large numbers of 
ships, many for Soviet customers, at its Ruse and Varna shipyards 
on the Black Sea. The Shumen Vehicle Plant assembled LIAZ- 
Madara heavy trucks in a three-way arrangement with the Liberac 
Auto Plant of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. 

Obstacles to Industrial Growth 

In 1989 the domestic market still featured little or no competi- 
tion. Over 80 percent of exports went to Comecon countries, and 
75 percent of that total went to the Soviet Union. This situation 
insulated the computers, industrial robots, microprocessors, and 
other high-technology exports of Bulgarian industry from the market 
competition that would require backing by substantial investment 
in research and development. Bulgaria thus developed a practice 
of expending a small proportion of its national income on applied 
science, even compared with other East European states. 

Falling productivity was a major problem in a number of key 
industries. Many of these industries were inherently uncompeti- 
tive, and attempts to raise productivity through large-scale produc- 
tion concentrated industrial and research facilities into enormous 
enterprises that further reduced industrial flexibility. Unprofita- 
bility made Bulgarian industry dependent on a system of widespread 
state subsidies. It was reported at the BCP Central Committee ple- 
num in December 1989 that a quarter of all state companies had 
received state support during the year, totaling 7 billion leva — 
almost a quarter of the national income. Machine building, one 
of Bulgaria's key export industries, became a problem area for the 
economy in the 1980s. Because it was the chief consumer of the 
overpriced, low-quality output of the metallurgical industry, the 
machine industry eventually became unprofitable as well. In 1990 
Balkancar, the country's biggest company, one of its most successful 
exporters, and another major customer of the metallurgy enter- 
prises, lost money for the first time. 

A critical economic policy decision in the late 1980s was Zhivkov's 
special emphasis on several energy-intensive industries, despite the 



143 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

inadequacy of domestic energy supply. In the early 1990s, the new 
regime faced a choice of dismantling many of those enterprises, 
finding less expensive energy sources to keep them running, or 
acquiring enough hard currency to upgrade their technological level 
and make them less energy-intensive. To further complicate in- 
dustrial policy, beginning in 1991 the Soviet Union began charg- 
ing market prices in hard currency for its oil and gas. 

Finally, emergence of a significant, fast-growing environmen- 
tal movement cast the tradeoff of environmental quality for eco- 
nomic growth in starkly negative terms. Barring substantial 
technical aid (most likely from the West) to reduce industrial waste, 
public demand for environmentally sound economic policy stood 
as a formidable obstacle to industrial expansion. 

Agriculture 

Prior to World War II, agriculture was the leading sector in the 
Bulgarian economy. In 1939 agriculture contributed 65 percent 
of NMP, and four out of every five Bulgarians were employed in 
agriculture (see fig. 11). The importance and organization of Bul- 
garian agriculture changed drastically after the war, however. By 
1958 the BCP had collectivized a high percentage of Bulgarian 
farms; in the next three decades, the state used various forms of 
organization to improve productivity, but none succeeded. Mean- 
while, private plots remained productive and often alleviated 
agricultural shortages during the Zhivkov era. 

Early Collectivization Campaigns 

When the BCP came to power, Bulgarian agriculture consisted 
primarily of 1 . 1 million peasant smallholdings. The party saw con- 
solidation of these holdings as its most immediate agricultural ob- 
jective. It dismantled the agricultural bank that had been a primary 
source of investment for the agriculture and food processing sec- 
tors before World War II. 

The first attempts at voluntary collectivization yielded modest 
results, partly because open coercion was impossible until a peace 
treaty was signed with the Allies. The labor-cooperative farm 
(trudovo-kooperativno zemedelsko stopanstvo — TKZS) received official 
approval in 1945. It closely resembled Soviet cooperatives in or- 
ganization, although members were guaranteed a share of profits 
and membership was (nominally) completely voluntary. By 1947 
only 3.8 percent of arable land had been collectivized. After the 
communists won the first postwar election and the peace was 
concluded in 1947, pressure on private landholders increased. 
Although most small farmers had joined collectives, by 1949 only 



144 



The Economy 



12 percent of arable land was under state control — mainly because 
the collectivization program alienated many peasants. But between 
1950 and 1953, the Stalinist regime of Vulko Chervenkov used 
threats, violence, and supply discrimination to produce the fastest 
pace of collectivization in Eastern Europe. Sixty-one percent of 
arable land had been collectivized by 1952. The process was declared 
complete in 1958 when 92 percent of arable land belonged to the 
collective farms. This ended the first phase of Bulgarian postwar 
agricultural restructuring. 

Farm Consolidation in the 1960s 

At this stage, Bulgarian collectives were much smaller than the 
Soviet organizations on which they were modeled. To fulfill the 
ambitious goals contained in the Zhivkov Theses (January 1959) 
for the Third Five- Year Plan (1958-60), further consolidation was 
deemed necessary. This process reduced the number of collectives 
from 3,450 to 932, and the average size of a collective grew from 
1,000 to 4,500 hectares. 

In the late 1960s, an agricultural labor shortage combined with 
fascination for China's agrarian amalgamation to prompt further 
consolidation of collective farms into APKs. By the end of 1971, 
all of Bulgaria's 744 collectives and 56 state farms had been merged 
into 161 complexes, most of which were designated APKs. These 
units averaged 24,000 hectares and 6,500 members. The consoli- 
dation continued until there were only 143 complexes in 1977. 
Several complexes were larger than 100,000 hectares, and twenty- 
five were between 36,000 and 100,000 hectares. In the short term, 
they were to achieve horizontal integration by specializing in three 
or fewer crops and one type of livestock. In the longer term, they 
would be the basis for linking agriculture with manufacturing and 
commerce. On the political level, this consolidation was to be a 
symbolic merger of the agricultural and urban workers, who had 
remained quite distinct parts of the Bulgarian population since the 
nineteenth century in defiance of the theory of the unified socialist 
society. 

The new organizations never met the higher agricultural quotas 
of the late 1970s, however. For some products, yield did not keep 
pace with investment. Overall growth in agriculture continued to 
fall after the creation of the APKs. And the goal of freeing farm 
workers to take industrial jobs was not reached. On the contrary, 
the annual reduction in agricultural employment dropped from 4 
to 2 percent while farm labor productivity declined. As a result, 
agriculture's share of gross investment in fixed capital fell to 18 
percent by 1976, a level last seen in the mid-1950s. In 1978 this 



147 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

failure triggered a new policy emphasizing smaller complexes. 
Reduced agricultural quotas in the Eighth Five- Year Plan (1981-85) 
were an admission that too much had been expected from the con- 
stant tinkering process. 

Reform in the 1980s 

By 1982 the total of old and new APKs reached 296, the aver- 
age size was halved to 16,000 hectares, and the management hier- 
archy was simplified. Most importantly, the number of annual 
indicators of plan fulfillment was reduced from fourteen to four. 
The new, simpler approach also allowed greater freedom for APKs 
to negotiate prices on surplus production and to purchase their own 
supplies. 

In the last Zhivkov years, the communist regime attempted other 
agricultural reforms, including autonomy for the collectives. At that 
point, the only funds the state received from agriculture were 60 
percent of foreign currency from exports. Even then, government 
delivery prices remained so low that state foodstuff monopolies 
received only the absolute minimum supply. In 1989 the exodus 
of 310,000 ethnic Turks, many of whom had cultivated personal 
plots, also hurt agricultural output. 

Despite these handicaps, the United States Department of 
Agriculture estimated that within Eastern Europe Bulgaria was sec- 
ond only to Hungary in agricultural trade surpluses through 1987. 
After that time, however, agricultural output dropped so far that 
the country could no longer feed its own people. In 1990 the first 
rationing and shortages since World War II were the most obvi- 
ous indications of this situation. Because of domestic shortages, 
export of several agricultural products was banned in 1990. 

Agricultural Products 

Two long-term policies strongly determined priorities in Bul- 
garian agricultural production after 1960. First, livestock was 
promoted at the expense of crop cultivation, mainly to meet ex- 
port demand. Between 1970 and 1988, the share of livestock in 
agricultural production rose from 35.3 to 55.6 percent. As a result, 
less land was available for crops in that period. Pig and poultry 
production increased the most, but large numbers of sheep also 
were raised. The second policy was a shift away from industrial 
crops (primarily tobacco and cotton), toward production of fruit 
(most notably apples), vegetables (most notably tomatoes), and 
grapes. Bulgaria remained an important exporter of tobacco, 
however, averaging 65 percent of East European exports of that 
crop in the 1980s. Grain production concentrated on wheat, corn, 



148 



Maize combine at work in Vratsa District 
Courtesy Sofia Press Agency 
Coal dredger, used in opencast mining, receives final adjustments 

at the Radomir plant. 



149 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

and barley, crops that are vulnerable to weather conditions. Poor 
harvests in 1985 and 1986 led to grain imports of 1.8 and 1.5 mil- 
lion tons, respectively. Sugar beets, potatoes, sunflower seeds, and 
soybeans also were important crops at the end of the 1980s. In 1990 
Bulgaria was the world's largest exporter of attar of roses, used 
in making perfume (see fig. 11). 

The Role of Private Plots 

After 1970 the only consistent contribution to agricultural produc- 
tion growth was family farming on private plots leased from the 
agricultural complexes. These plots could not be bought or sold 
or worked by hired labor, but their yield belonged to the tenant. 
In 1971 special measures were instituted to increase the number 
and the availability of personal plots. Beginning in 1974, peasant 
households were permitted to lease additional plots and given free 
access to fertilizer, fodder seed, and equipment belonging to their 
agricultural complexes. To encourage this practice, the government 
extended loans and waived income taxes. More importantly, deliv- 
ery prices increased for agricultural products. In the mid-1970s, 
a reduced work week for urban workers and relaxed requirements 
for plot leasing encouraged weekend cultivation of personal plots 
by the nonagricultural population. Plot size limits were removed 
in 1977. 

By 1982 personal plots accounted for 25 percent of Bulgaria's 
agricultural output and farm worker income. In 1988 personal plots 
accounted for large shares of basic agricultural goods: corn, 43.5 
percent; tomatoes, 36.8 percent; potatoes, 61.5 percent; apples, 
24.8 percent; grapes, 43.2 percent; meat, 40.8 percent; milk, 25.2 
percent; eggs, 49.4 percent; and honey, 86 percent. The sales from 
plots to town markets meant that despite low overall agricultural 
growth rates in the 1980s, the urban food supply actually improved 
in many areas during the early and mid-1980s. 

Post-Zhivkov Agricultural Reform 

In 1991 privatization of agriculture was a top priority of the 
government of Prime Minister Dimitur Popov. That spring the 
National Assembly passed a new Arable Land Law, revising the 
conditions for ownership and use of agricultural land. The law al- 
lowed every Bulgarian citizen to own as much as thirty hectares 
of land, or twenty in areas of intensive cultivation. Use of this land 
was at the complete discretion of the owner. Conditions were stated 
for voluntary formation of cooperatives by private landowners and 
resale of their land. With some limitations, landowners whose 
property had been incorporated into state farms were to receive 



150 



The Economy 



"comparable" plots elsewhere or other appropriate compensation. 
The state or municipality retained title to land not in private hands. 
Another provision described redistribution of land seized by the 
state from cooperatives and individuals during Zhivkov's several 
agricultural consolidations. A National Land Council under the 
Council of Ministers was to oversee land distribution and arbitrate 
disputes, aided by a system of municipal land commissions. 

As was true for reform elsewhere in the Bulgarian economy, 
agricultural reform encountered stout resistance from entrenched 
local Zhivkovite officials. Pre-collectivization land ownership records 
were destroyed, and farmers were threatened or bribed to remain 
in collectives rather than seeking private farms. Although the Arable 
Land Law was widely hailed as an equitable and useful economic 
reform, its association with the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP, 
formerly the BCP) majority brought criticism from the opposition 
Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). Some farmers circumvented 
the law simply by seizing land. The government, meanwhile, an- 
nounced that no state land would be redistributed before the 1991 
harvest. 

In early 1991, staples such as sugar and olive oil were unavail- 
able in many areas; livestock feed rations had been cut by more 
than half; a grain shortfall of 1.7 million tons was expected; meat, 
withheld from markets until new government prices were an- 
nounced, was very scarce and expensive in cities; and fertilizers 
for the year's crops were in very short supply. Western firms ex- 
pressed interest in joint agricultural ventures in Bulgaria, but hesi- 
tated because of uncertainty about political and legal conditions 
for such projects. A new round of government price-fixing in Febru- 
ary 1991 substantially raised food prices but did restore supplies 
of some items. 

Transportation 

The Bulgarian transportation system in 1987 was poorly devel- 
oped compared with systems elsewhere in Europe. The rail system 
totaled 4,300 kilometers of track, of which 4,055 were standard 
gauge, 2,510 were electrified, and 917 were double track. In the 
1980s, Bulgaria moved away from diesel engines toward electrical 
rail haulage. By 1988 some 83 percent of freight was moved by this 
method, compared with 60 percent in 1980. In 1987 the rails car- 
ried 83 million tons of freight and 110,000,000 passengers. In 1987 
Bulgaria had 36,908 kilometers of roads, 33,535 of which were hard 
surfaced and 242 of which were classified as motorways (highways). 
In 1987 some 940 million passengers and 917 million tons of freight 



151 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

traveled by road. No major extension of the rail or the road sys- 
tem was built in the late 1980s. 

In 1988 the freight system moved 103 billion ton kilometers (see 
Glossary) of freight, the majority (62.9 percent) by seagoing trans- 
port (see fig. 12). Of the dozen Bulgarian ports on the Danube, 
the most important was Ruse. The remaining freight was moved 
by rail (17.1 percent), road (16.9 percent), inland waterway (2.1 
percent), and pipeline (1 percent). In 1988 the national airline, 
Balkan Airline, totalled 32 billion passenger kilometers (see Glos- 
sary). Rail provided 25.5 percent of passenger transport, roads 62.2 
percent, and air 12.2 percent. 

The Bulgarian transportation system suffered financial neglect 
through most of the communist era. Investment in this sector was 
never extremely high, but in 1988 overall investment fell almost 
25 percent. The largest drops were in sea transport (96 percent), 
river transport (63 percent), pipeline transport (62 percent), and 
rail transport (18 percent). The Bulgarian State Railroad typified 
the neglect and overuse of the transportation system. In 1990 
authorities estimated that 27 million leva would be needed to re- 
store the railroads to satisfactory operating condition. Meanwhile, 
rail revenues fell by 10 million leva during the first five months 
of 1990 as a result of lower industrial production and equipment 
breakdowns. At that point, about one-third of Bulgaria's passenger 
railcars and two-thirds of railroad equipment were completely 
depreciated, and 78 locomotives and 3,500 freight cars were idle 
due to breakdowns. Some 300 kilometers of track were classified 
as urgently needing repair. 

Communications 

Throughout the communist period, the state controlled all media. 
In 1987 Bulgaria had eighty radio and forty-three television trans- 
mitters. Two television networks broadcast over nineteen stations 
in 1991 , with 250 low-power repeaters extending coverage to rural 
areas. The radio system featured three networks with twenty long- 
and medium-wave stations. Foreign-language programming in 
Albanian, Arabic, English, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portu- 
guese, Serbo-Croatian, Spanish, and Turkish was broadcast from 
short- and medium-wave stations in Vidin, Stolnik, Kostinbrod, 
and Plovdiv. Bulgaria was a member of the Intervision East Euro- 
pean television network, but in 1991 it had not joined the Interna- 
tional Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat). In 1990 
approximately 2 million radio receivers and 2.1 million television 
sets were in use. Some 2.23 million telephones were in operation 
in 1987 (see table 14, Appendix). 



152 




Vidint 



AN! 



(Mikhaylovgrad 



Pleven 



Lovech 




Plovdiv 



Khaskc 



Smolyan 



Aegean Sea 



Figure 12. Transportation System, 1988 
154 



The Economy 



In 1991 Bulgaria began privatizing its communications sector. 
The Commission on Communications and Information Science, 
with the help of West European communications experts, developed 
a plan for formation of ten independent companies to operate in 
communications services, the equipment industry, construction, 
and other related areas. The companies would operate under au- 
thority of a state regulatory organization similar to those in Western 
Europe. This plan would mean gradually dismantling the national 
communications monopoly while retaining the unified national tele- 
graph, postal, telephone, radio, and television services. Meanwhile, 
private companies outside the existing networks were to be en- 
couraged to compete for new customers, and prices were to rise 
accordingly from the artificially low levels of the command econ- 
omy period. 

Banking and Finance 

Under the Zhivkov regime, Bulgaria followed the customary com- 
munist pattern of a single state-run bank performing all banking 
and investment functions. Investment policy was the province of 
state planning agencies, with substantial input from the BCP and 
the national bank. Post-Zhivkov reform aimed at privatizing and 
compartmentalizing the banking system, a goal that would likely 
require years of gradual reform. 

Currency and Exchange 

The national currency of Bulgaria is the lev (plural, leva — see 
Glossary), which is divided into 100 stotinki (sing., stotinka). 
Throughout the communist era, the lev could be used only in 
domestic transactions because it was not convertible into foreign 
currency. Bulgarian nationals were prohibited from owning for- 
eign currency, and the law prohibited citizens and foreigners from 
entering or leaving the country with leva. As was true for domes- 
tic prices, the value of the lev was administratively determined. 
This fact led to frequent overvaluing of the lev in terms of hard 
currencies and black market rates well below official exchange rates. 
Besides official rates, which were based on a gold parity developed 
after World War II, a commercial rate was used for business trans- 
actions and statistical purposes, and a tourist rate determined the 
amount received by foreigners in Bulgaria for their domestic cur- 
rencies. None of these arbitrary rates reflected the relationship of 
domestic and foreign prices. Trade with Western countries was con- 
ducted in hard currency, while the transferable ruble, an account- 
ing device with no convertible value, was primarily used to clear 
commercial accounts within Comecon. In 1990 the lev was devalued 



155 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

several times, finally settling at rates of about 0.76 lev to the United 
States dollar (official), 3 leva to the dollar (commercial), and 7 leva 
to the dollar (tourist). The black market rate fluctuated consider- 
ably, but ended 1990 at approximately 11 leva to the dollar. In 
mid- 1991 the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) issued conversion 
tables for the lev into major world currencies (see table 15, Ap- 
pendix). The official value at that time was 18 leva to the United 
States dollar. 

Banking System 

As the chief financial instrument of economic policy making, the 
BNB assumed virtually all of the financial functions in the coun- 
try under the centrally planned economy. Only the granting of for- 
eign trade and consumer credits were separate functions, performed 
respectively by the Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank and the State 
Savings Bank — both of which were subordinate to the BNB. The 
BNB worked with the Ministry of Finance to finance capital in- 
vestments in the economy. The BNB also monitored the economic 
organizations that received investment funds to ensure their use 
for accomplishing plan targets. As enterprises became more self- 
fmancing in the 1970s, a greater share of their investment capital 
was composed of bank credits granted by the BNB. Between 1965 
and 1975, the BNB share of investment funds jumped from 7 per- 
cent to 54 percent; the trend then moderated as enterprises began 
to rely more on retained earnings to finance investments. 

Like industry and agriculture, banking under the BCP ex- 
perimented occasionally with decentralization but remained quite 
centralized until shortly before the overthrow of Zhivkov. A 1987 
reform nominally split Bulgarian banking into a two-tiered system. 
The function of the BNB was restricted to money supply, although 
it also retained significant supervisory power. The reform also 
created several specialized banks including the Agricultural and 
Cooperative Bank, the Biochemical Bank, the Construction Bank, 
the Electronics Bank, the Transportation Bank, and the Transport, 
Agricultural, and Building Equipment Bank — each responsible for 
an industrial sector. 

Post-Zhivkov banking reform began hesitantly but grew more 
comprehensive in 1991. In a controversial policy decision, the 
government first increased interest rates from 4.5 to 8 percent in 
1990, then let them float freely beginning in 1991. Although the 
first private commercial bank was established in May 1990, a new 
National Bank Bill was not passed until June 1991. That law pro- 
vided for a two-tier bank system independent of direct government 
control but accountable to the National Assembly. The first tier 



156 



Overpass loop in Tsarigradsko Highway, Sofia 
Courtesy Sofia Press Agency 

of the new system was to be the Central Bank, the second a separate 
system of commercial banks and lending institutions serving pri- 
vate citizens and enterprises. Three-month bank credits would be 
available to cabinet ministries. The BNB was to issue monthly 
balance statements and report semiannually to the National As- 
sembly. 

Investment Policy 

In choosing among alternative investment projects, Bulgarian 
planners in the Zhivkov era faced greater difficulties than invest- 
ment decision makers in Western economies. True relative costs 
of labor and materials were masked by state assignment of prices, 
meaning that funding allocations among projects often were ar- 
bitrary. In most cases, investments were not based on efficiency 
criteria, but rather on plan goals. Artificially low interest rates also 
discouraged enterprises from efficient investment fund allocation. 

The state budget also guided party economic policy under the 
old regime. Until the reforms of the 1970s, the budget was the 
primary source of funds for enterprise investment. Budget reve- 
nues were originally derived mainly from the turnover tax, a re- 
tail sales tax that was also used to regulate demand for various 
products. Beginning in the mid-1960s, budget revenues were 



157 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

derived progressively less from the turnover tax and more from 
taxes on net enterprise income. 

Prices 

Investments in inefficient operations and subsidies on consumer 
items often led to budget deficits. Often the state simply printed 
more money to cover its obligations. Eventually this practice led 
to circulation of excess currency compared with consumer goods 
and services available at prevailing prices. Because prices were ad- 
ministratively set, shortages and long lines occurred more often 
than inflation under the CPE. But party-directed general price in- 
creases such as the average 15 percent rise in 1979 usually were 
quite steep. 

In the post-Zhivkov era, economic planners saw market- 
determined prices for most goods and services as their long-term 
goal. In 1990 the prices of 40 percent of goods and 60 percent of 
services were freed from administrative control. In the second half 
of 1990, price liberalization raised consumer prices an average of 
over 50 percent. In February 1991, price controls were removed 
from all goods and services except fuels, heat, and electricity. Im- 
mediately after this step, average food prices were nearly six times 
their 1989 level; housing was up 3.7 times, clothing three times 
more expensive. These levels, established by an independent trade 
union study, were above the level triggering new talks on com- 
pensation payments. (For the second consecutive year, a govern- 
ment indexation program was established to reimburse a share 
(estimated at an average 65 percent) of the higher cost of living 
caused by the new price policy in the first half of 1991 .) In a two- 
month period of early 1991 , consumption dropped by over 50 per- 
cent, but total consumer spending still increased by 11.5 percent. 

Foreign Trade 

Membership in Comecon tied Bulgarian trade policy closely to 
the Soviet economic sphere following World War II. By 1991, 
however, trade policy was on the verge of significant diversifica- 
tion. With the trade protection of Comecon no longer available, 
Bulgaria aggressively sought new markets in the West while seek- 
ing to retain the most advantageous commercial relations with its 
former Comecon partners. 

Postwar Trade Policy 

The adoption of the Soviet economic model had direct and in- 
direct impact on Bulgarian international trade after World War 
II. Among direct results was the decision to reduce dependency 



158 



Roses cultivated in Valley of Roses 
to produce attar of roses for 
perfume industry 
Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg 



Drying tobacco, one of Bulgaria's 
major export crops, Melnik 
Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

on prewar Western trade partners. This decision meant strong pro- 
motion of import substitution policies to bolster domestic produc- 
tion of goods previously imported. In 1960 Bulgaria's total foreign 
trade (exports plus imports) was 31 percent of NMP, quite low 
for a country with a small internal market and few natural resources. 
By the 1980s, however, this figure had risen to over 90 percent. 
Before World War II, Germany was well-established as Bulgaria's 
top trading partner. Postwar economic policy diverted trade from 
Central Europe to Eastern Europe, and primarily to the Soviet 
Union. The new domestic economic priorities dictated a revised 
foreign trade structure (see table 16; table 17, Appendix). The policy 
of promoting heavy industry, for example, required huge imports 
of machinery and raw materials (see table 18; table 19, Appen- 
dix). Beginning in the mid-1950s, imports of machinery accounted 
for approximately half the value of total imports, while fuels, metals, 
and minerals made up more than a quarter of this value. Lower 
postwar investment in agriculture eventually lessened the share of 
foodstuffs in total exports. 

The state monopoly of foreign trade also changed the way deci- 
sions were reached on international allocation of goods. Trade de- 
cisions were reached administratively by planning authorities or 
negotiated with other members of Comecon. Overall control of for- 
eign trade was shared among the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the 
Ministry of Finance, and the Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank. 

Import and export operations were conducted by foreign trade 
enterprises, most of which were affiliated with one or more associ- 
ations but retained a legal identity outside the associations. Although 
reform measures by the Zhivkov regime gave associations some 
profit incentives in international trade, the producing enterprises 
themselves were completely isolated from the foreign customer. This 
situation meant that world quality standards had no influence on 
Bulgarian producers. 

Bulgaria in Comecon 

The most important event in postwar Bulgarian international 
economic relations occurred in 1949 when it became a founding 
member of Comecon. Comecon was an attempt by the socialist 
economies to simplify the planning process by synchronizing the 
five-year plans of member countries and, more importantly, by 
achieving what Marxists called an international division of labor. 
Countries within Comecon would specialize in the products they 
made most efficiently and export the surplus. Products that a coun- 
try could not produce efficiently would be available from one or 
more of its Comecon partners. This design was intended to 



160 



The Economy 



eliminate some redundancies inherent in the Soviet economic model 
where each country produced goods of all categories. Although the 
concept achieved isolated successes such as Bulgarian forklift trucks, 
broad growth was blocked by the uniform socialist preoccupation 
with heavy industry and the lack of a single convertible currency. 
The currency issue in particular made intra-Comecon trade a cum- 
bersome process requiring negotiation of annual bilateral trade 
agreements for all member nations. 

In the 1980s, exports to the Soviet Union consisted primarily 
of machinery, electronic components, and agricultural goods. These 
included forklift trucks, electric engines, telephones, tobacco, fresh 
fruits and vegetables, and wine. Imports from the Soviet Union 
were mainly energy and raw materials, including oil, natural gas, 
iron ore, ferrous metals, and cotton. In 1988 Bulgaria still relied 
almost entirely on Soviet oil and natural gas. East Germany and 
Czechoslovakia were the next most important Comecon trading 
partners, accounting for 5.2 and 4.6 percent of exports, respec- 
tively, and 5.9 and 5.4 percent of imports, respectively. Exchanges 
of goods between Bulgaria and these countries emphasized both 
exports and imports of machinery and the export of agricultural 
products. 

In the initial years of Bulgaria's Comecon membership, the coun- 
try benefited from energy prices below world levels, especially for 
oil, in two ways. The cost of developing otherwise inefficient in- 
dustries was lower, and reexport of crude and refined oil for hard 
currency bought Western technology to upgrade the industrial in- 
frastructure. Comecon members paid for their imports through 
bilateral clearing agreements, with no exchange of hard currency. 
In the initial stages of Comecon, Bulgaria exported mainly food, 
the price of which was lower in Comecon than on the world mar- 
ket. Later, however, Bulgaria paid for imported Soviet raw materi- 
als largely with machinery that was priced higher than on the world 
market. 

Beginning in 1974, Soviet energy exports were based on a float- 
ing five-year average of world prices that rarely matched market 
prices at a given time. Even when Comecon prices were above the 
world level, Bulgaria benefited from the lack of currency exchange 
in the Comecon system. But dependence on Comecon trade, es- 
pecially Soviet energy exports, damaged Bulgaria tremendously 
when economic reform swept through the Soviet sphere in 1989 
and 1990. Of Bulgarian exports, 62.5 percent still went to the Soviet 
Union in 1988, and 53.5 percent of imports came from that coun- 
try. The new trade system, established after reforms, required trade 
accounts to be cleared in hard currency at current world prices as 



161 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

of January 1, 1991. (Bilateral protocols for this procedure had not 
been signed by that time, however; Bulgaria still owed Hungary 
87 million transferable rubles in 1991.) 

After the political reforms in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union 
announced cutbacks in energy exports to Eastern Europe. The cut- 
backs caused energy and raw materials shortages. In 1990 Bulgar- 
ian industry was forced to curtail production sharply; meanwhile, 
consumers endured severe shortages of gasoline as fuel prices dou- 
bled. A new set of export and import regulations adopted in 
mid- 1991 removed import taxes from 200 types of raw materials 
and consumer goods in critically short supply. The same regula- 
tions set export price minimums to eliminate pricing below world 
market levels; export of crude oil, metals, grains, and textile raw 
materials was banned. 

Trade with the West and the Third World 

After 1960 Bulgaria's trade with the West increased, partly be- 
cause Bulgaria needed Western machinery to supplement the out- 
dated, overpriced manufacturing equipment supplied by Comecon. 
Between 1960 and 1975, the Western share of Bulgarian imports 
went from 13.6 percent to 23.6 percent. In the same period, 
however, exports dropped from 12.4 to 9.3 percent, creating an 
external debt problem with the West. Increased exports to Third 
World nations did little to help Bulgaria reduce this trade deficit 
because most Third World trade was not in convertible currencies. 

Throughout the 1970s, Bulgarian trade balances alternated be- 
tween solvency and high deficits. Although the trade deficit was 
eliminated in 1975, many short-term debts to West European banks 
remained. By 1976 Bulgarian debt was 13 percent of estimated 
GNP — the highest ratio in Eastern Europe at the time. Bulgaria 
greatly diminished this debt by reexporting Soviet oil to Western 
buyers in the late 1970s. 

From that point, Bulgaria maintained trade surpluses in hard 
currency until 1985, when emergency imports of grain and coal 
created a deficit of US$200 million. A series of poor harvests, high 
machinery imports in the investment push of the Ninth Five-Year 
Plan (1986-90), and sharply dropping oil prices deprived Bulgaria 
of hard currency and created a major new trade deficit. Libya and 
Iraq, the main Third World customers with which a surplus had 
been accumulated, also reduced their purchase of Bulgarian goods 
at this time. 

The resulting trade deficits were financed by credits from Western 
banks. After the overthrow of Zhivkov, the government announced 
that the gross hard currency debt had reached US$10.6 billion by 



162 



The shipyards at Varna 
Courtesy Sofia Press Agency 



the end of 1989. Net indebtedness was somewhat lower at US$7.7 
billion, but much of the hard currency export credits that Bulgaria 
granted were to Libya and Iraq, who were likely to default on many 
of their deals. Bulgaria had arranged for Iraq to repay these loans 
with oil, but in 1991 the trade embargo and ensuing Persian Gulf 
War negated that agreement. In March 1990, the incoming Bul- 
garian government announced unilateral suspension of principal 
payments on outstanding debt, and later interest payments were 
suspended as well. Western lines of credit immediately were frozen, 
and Bulgarian hard currency holdings dropped to the minimal level 
of US$200 million in May 1990. " 

Bulgaria's main Western trading partners were the Federal 
Republic of Germany (West Germany) before German unification 
in 1990, Switzerland, and Italy. Exports to these countries were 
relatively minor, accounting for between 1 and 0.7 percent of total 
exports. Imports from West Germany were 4.9 percent of the total, 
while Switzerland accounted for 1.4 percent of imports, and Italy 
1.1 percent. Trade with the developed, Western economies re- 
sembled trade between an undeveloped country and an industri- 
alized one. Bulgaria imported mostly machinery from those 
countries and sold them raw and semifinished materials and agricul- 
tural products. 



163 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

The most important Third World trading partners, Iraq and 
Libya, purchased 2.8 and 2.3 percent of Bulgarian exports, respec- 
tively. These exports consisted mainly of major construction projects 
and agricultural goods. The overthrow of the Zhivkov regime re- 
vived talk of establishing a Black Sea Trading Zone that also would 
include Turkey and Greece and perhaps Romania. In establish- 
ing its new trade policy in 1991 , Bulgaria faced a choice of expand- 
ing its traditional commercial ties with Germany and Germany's 
partners in the EEC or cultivating new ties with closer markets 
such as Turkey. In 1991 Turkey offered to invest US$13 billion 
in Bulgaria's economy. An independent Union for Cooperation 
between Bulgaria and Turkey was founded to foster direct cooper- 
ation between enterprises of the two countries, and transportation 
links were solidified by ministerial agreements in 1991 . Talks with 
the EEC early in 1991 yielded assurance of short-term EEC finan- 
cial support through the PHARE (Polish and Hungarian Assistance 
for the Reconstruction of Europe) program and closer future ties, 
assuming that Bulgaria continued to make progress in its political 
and economic reform programs. 

New Trade Conditions, 1990 

The end of central planning opened the Bulgarian economy to 
world competition and began a wrenching transition for which it 
was ill-equipped in finance, industrial diversity, agricultural in- 
frastructure, and available natural resources. The transition was 
made doubly difficult because the long years of privileged access 
to energy had fostered inefficient energy use in the Bulgarian 
economy. 

Under the new economic conditions, imports would be purchased 
only in hard currency. Although Western firms and governments 
offered some credits and aid in 1991, Western investors preferred 
Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia to Bulgaria. Those coun- 
tries were more familiar to Westerners, and they had had relative- 
ly advanced market economies before World W r ar II. For these 
reasons, in the early 1990s they received the lion's share of a rather 
meager Western investment in Eastern Europe. 

Standard of Living 

From the end of World War II until the 1960s, the Bulgarian 
standard of living experienced no significant improvements. A net 
decline may have occurred during some of the collectivization 
drives. The first improvements came when the government insti- 
tuted a minimum agricultural wage as part of its reconciliation with 
the peasants after the Zhivkov Theses failed in 1960. Increases in 



164 



The Economy 



real incomes in agriculture rose by 6.7 percent per year during the 
1960s. During this same period, industrial wages increased by 4.9 
percent annually. Early in the 1960s, higher prices offset those wage 
increases; but by 1970, increased urban food supplies made im- 
proved urban incomes meaningful. According to official data, from 
the Fourth through the Eighth Five- Year Plans (1961-85), growth 
in real wages ranged from 5.3 percent (1966-70) to 0.5 percent 
(1976-80). The latter figure is low because a major price revision 
in 1979 raised prices of foodstuffs by 25 percent and consumer goods 
by 15 percent. Real growth in Bulgaria at that point was the lowest 
in Europe. Bulgarian statistics indicating real income growth often 
were inaccurate, however. A major distortion resulted from the 
failure of official figures to account for variations in availability 
of commodities or services or for government subsidies for food, 
housing, education, and health care — vital factors in evaluating 
standard of living and purchasing power. 

In 1990 a Bulgarian economist made an independent attempt 
to construct a consumer price index for the period 1979 through 
1989. Based on those findings, inflation during that period was 131 
percent, or 8.7 percent per year. Official data showed a 9.0 per- 
cent increase in consumer prices between 1980 through 1988, or 
1.1 percent annually. The same study compared the quantity of 
various food items that could be purchased with the average monthly 
salary in nine different countries, including four in the West (Aus- 
tria, France, West Germany, and Britain). Of ten basic food 
categories, the lowest amount that average monthly earnings could 
purchase in the Western economies was 3.3 times the amount ob- 
tainable from average monthly earnings in Bulgaria. Even in com- 
parison with the other socialist countries in the study, Bulgarian 
purchasing power was the lowest by at least 25 percent. A mitigat- 
ing factor in the latter set of comparisons is that official encourage- 
ment of private plots spurred substantially greater availability (albeit 
at greater cost) than in most other East European economies. 

Some improvement was achieved in the Bulgarian diet in the 
1970s and 1980s. Wary of popular discontent, Zhivkov made a 
major speech in December 1972 in which he promised a ten-year 
program to raise living standards in general and to raise food con- 
sumption to the "scientific norms" set by the United Nations (UN). 
Zhivkov never was entirely successful in this effort, however. Bread 
and sugar were the only foods for which Bulgarian consumption 
rates reached or exceeded UN norms in the later Zhivkov years. 

Availability of consumer durables significantly improved in the 
1970s. According to official statistics, between 1965 and 1988 the 
number of televisions per 100 households increased from 8 to 100; 



165 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

radios increased from 59 to 95; refrigerators from 5 to 96; wash- 
ing machines from 23 to 96; and automobiles from 2 to 40. Avail- 
able automobiles were primarily Soviet Fiats, some of which were 
manufactured in Bulgaria. Assembly of the Soviet Moskvich began 
at the Lovech Vehicle Assembly Plant in 1988. 

Housing was one of the most serious shortcomings in the Bul- 
garian standard of living. Residential construction targets in the 
Five- Year Plans were regularly underfulfllled. Consequently, fam- 
ilies often waited several years for apartments; in Sofia, where over- 
crowding was at its worst, the wait was as long as ten years (see 
Housing, ch. 2). 

Market Reform 

The first year of post-Zhivkov governance brought substantial 
political confusion and paralysis, despite the country's desperate 
need to concentrate on economic reform. The interim cabinet and 
parliament of 1990 provided only stopgap measures, not the long- 
term planning that all factions believed necessary. The coalition 
government of Dimitur Popov came to power at the beginning of 
1991 with broad support but under the worst economic conditions 
since World War II (see Governance after Zhivkov, ch. 4). The 
Popov program planned first to use support from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary), the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD — see Glossary), and the 
EEC to achieve financial stability. The second phase of the plan 
was privatization of the Bulgarian enterprise system. The hard 
winter of 1990-91 began to break the policy stalemate between the 
ruling BSP and its increasingly powerful opposition, the UDF (see 
Nongovernmental Political Institutions, ch. 4). 

Reform Mechanisms 

Although both the BSP and the UDF agreed on the need for 
market-oriented reforms, disagreements on methods and timing 
continued in 1991. The BSP advocated slow transformation, to 
minimize economic dislocations and hardship (and also to preserve 
privileged positions for party members whenever possible). The 
UDF believed that a market economy could not be installed 
piecemeal, but could be effective only as a form of "shock ther- 
apy." The UDF saw free market features such as market prices 
and privatization as incompatible with socialist institutions such 
as large state-owned enterprises. The huge operating losses of such 
enterprises were largely responsible for a severe 1990 decline in 
NMP. The model advocated by the UDF was the renaissance of 
the Polish economy through private enterprise. This model justi- 
fied severe, short-term social costs because only by inflicting them 



166 



Bulgarian Orthodox Church of St. George enclosed by courtyard of 

Balkan Sheraton Hotel, Sofia 
Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg 

could the economy be disentangled from the moribund apparatus 
that remained from the central planning era. 

Progress was made on some fronts even before formation of the 
first coalition government in early 1991. In September 1990, Bul- 
garia's admission to the IMF promised access to hard currency loans 
and help in restructuring the economy. New agricultural banks 
began providing credit to private farmers tilling the land provided 
in the 1991 Arable Land Law; the first private bank was opened; 
and Bulgaria applied for membership to the General Agreements 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT — see Glossary) and the World Bank 
(see Glossary) (see Agriculture, this ch.). 

The Economic Policy Commission 

By 1991 the Economic Policy Commission was the most impor- 
tant advisory body on economic reform for its parent body, the 
National Assembly. A number of economic proposals made in 1990 
by the government of Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov were found 
inadequate and redrawn in 1991. A particularly difficult obstacle 
in establishing truly private enterprises was Decree Number 56, 
the 1 989 formula that established semi-decentralized operating prin- 
ciples for firms and commercial organizations (see The Era of 



167 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



Experimentation and Reform, this ch.). In 1991 the National As- 
sembly considered new laws addressing aspects of the transition 
to a market economy: the Commercial Law was to replace Decree 
Number 56 as the basic description of commercial enterprise oper- 
ation: a complex of auditing and statistical laws were to put Bul- 
garian commerce on the same standards as potential Western 
investors. The Privatization Law was the last and most problematic 
item because, unlike the recipients of agricultural land under the 
Arable Land Law. private recipients of former state commercial 
enterprises had not been identified. The first goal of the Economic 
Policy Commission was to use tight monetary policy to eliminate 
unprofitable enterprises inherited from the CPE era: this would 
finally stabilize productivity after the precipitous fall that began 
in 1990 and accelerated in 1991 . Once stability was reached, a full- 
scale privatization process would begin: the 1991 timetable called 
for the latter process to be well under way by early 1992. 

Domestic and International Economic Policies in the 1990s 

Whatever the pace of the Bulgarian economic transition. 1991 
promised substantial dislocation before an upturn could be expected. 
In 1990 industrial production had fallen by 10.7 percent. Prime 
Minister Popov warned that as much as 25 percent of the popula- 
tion would require social assistance in 1991. an increase from the 
20 percent of 1990. Although the Popov government launched a 
consensus economic reform plan, pending national elections in 
mid- 1991 it remained only a caretaker government. Popov's com- 
mitment to tough financial measures and the political calm that 
prevailed during the crisis period encouraged foreign financial as- 
sistance. IMF loan requirements included liberalizing foreign trade 
policy, lifting price and currency controls, compensating for so- 
cial dislocation that resulted from reforms, maintaining a low na- 
tional budget deficit, eliminating centralized production and 
resource allocation, initiating privatization of small firms, and de- 
emphasizing trade with Comecon countries. 

In January 1991. the United States extended most-favored-nation 
status to Bulgaria: the United States Congress approved the move 
in April. The recently chartered EBRD committed between 100 
and 120 million European currency units (ECUs — see Glossary) 
to Bulgaria in 1991 and 1992. Most of the money was to go through 
the PHARE program. Of that amount. 40 percent was earmarked 
for restructuring the economy, 25 percent for agriculture, 20 per- 
cent for health care, and 10 percent for the environment. In March 
1991. the IMF approved USS500 million in loans, and the EEC 
added a loan of L'SS377 million. A request to reschedule part of 



168 



The Economy 



Bulgaria's international debt was denied in early 1991, however. 
Western aid was conditioned on visible evidence that the govern- 
ment remained in control of its reform program. The immediate 
goal of the reform program was to reduce inflationary pressure by 
removing the surplus money supply that had been caused by short- 
ages. Prices would remain subject to the Regulations on the Con- 
trol of Prices issued in February 1991, to limit price fluctuations 
and prevent monopolies from gaining huge profits. Meanwhile, 
privatization remained a potential political quagmire because, un- 
like many of the measures in the first phase, differences in approach 
and timing remained substantial among major political factions. 
The National Assembly still included many politicians from the 
Zhivkov years who would lose their power base if reform went too 
far. For that reason, the National Assembly delayed deliberation 
on several vital economic bills in 1991 . For the same reason, many 
remaining Zhivkovite industrial managers opposed application of 
reforms to their enterprises. Advocates of reform hoped that the 
1991 parliamentary elections would redistribute legislative power, 
enabling reform to continue and shortening the traumatic transi- 
tional period. . 

* * * 

Several English-language monographs provide useful informa- 
tion on the Bulgarian economy. Unquestionably, the most com- 
prehensive is John R. Lampe's The Bulgarian Economy in the Twentieth 
Century, which covers economic structure, development, and per- 
formance and provides abundant statistics. Although somewhat 
dated and less inclusive, Growth and Reforms in Centrally Planned Econ- 
omies by George R. Feiwel covers the same general field. Robert J. 
Mclntyre's Bulgaria: Politics, Economics, and Society devotes a chap- 
ter to postwar economic development through the 1980s, and 
John D. Bell's The Bulgarian Communist Party from Blagoev to Zhivkov 
analyzes the theory and practice of Bulgarian economic planning 
from 1947 through 1985. The Statistical Yearbook of the People's Republic 
of Bulgaria (the English-language version of which is an abridge- 
ment of the Bulgarian state publication) provides comprehensive 
economic data. Periodicals such as the Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty Report on Eastern Europe and Business Eastern Europe cover 
current economic issues. (For further information and complete 
citations, see Bibliography.) 



169 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 




Official party banner combining Soviet and Bulgarian flags, hanging above 
national party congress of Bulgarian Communist Party, Sofia, 1970 



ON NOVEMBER 10, 1989, after thirty-five years as undisputed 
leader, Todor Zhivkov resigned his positions as head of the Bul- 
garian Communist Party (BCP) and head of state of Bulgaria. This 
act, forced by political opposition and turmoil, was the symbolic 
watershed between two very different eras in Bulgarian governance. 
One year after Zhivkov 's resignation, Bulgaria had at least some 
of the primary building blocks for a democratic state: a freely elected 
parliament, a coalition cabinet, independent newspapers, and 
vigorous, independent trade unions. 

Beginning with Soviet occupation of Nazi-allied Bulgaria in Sep- 
tember 1944, the political culture of that country had been totally 
dominated by a monolithic communist party. In the following three 
years, that party took advantage of the presence of Soviet troops, 
decades-long disorder in the Bulgarian political system, and its own 
high visibility as an anti-Nazi resistance force to complete a rapid 
communization process. 

Postwar communist rule in Bulgaria can be divided into three 
periods with varying political characteristics. The first period, 1944 
through 1947, saw the consolidation of communist power. The 
Fatherland Front, which began in 1942 as a small illegal antifascist 
coalition, led a coup that coincided with the 1944 Soviet invasion 
and installed communists for the first time in crucial government 
positions. In the next three years, the BCP gradually eliminated 
disorganized blocks of political opposition, cut Bulgaria off from 
foreign influences except that of the Soviet Bloc, and confiscated 
most private economic resources. By the end of 1947, the last ef- 
fective political opposition had been eliminated and Soviet troops 
had left Bulgaria. Longtime communist leader Georgi Dimitrov 
was prime minister of a Bulgarian government that ruled accord- 
ing to a new constitution modeled after that of the Soviet Union. 
Although that constitution left the political institutions of prewar 
Bulgaria nominally intact, the consolidation period set the pattern 
for a very different set of political relationships. Actual political 
power was concentrated entirely in the national BCP. From 1947 
until 1989, nominations and elections to judicial, legislative, and 
executive posts required party approval. During that time, a nomi- 
nal second party existed, but party nominees were elected without 
opposition at all levels of government. The National Assembly 
(Narodno Subranie) met only to rubber-stamp proposals from the 
party or the executive branch. 



173 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

The second phase of the communist period, from 1948 through 
1953, strengthened Bulgaria's traditionally close ties with the Soviet 
Union and established a pattern of imitating the Soviet Union in 
all major aspects of foreign and domestic policy. The first Bulgar- 
ian Five- Year Plan began in 1949, by which time most means of 
production were in state hands. In 1949 Dimitrov was succeeded 
by Vulko Chervenkov, a protege of Soviet leader Joseph V. Stalin. 
Chervenkov imitated his patron's cult of personality by assuming 
total control of the BCP and the government and enforcing com- 
plete conformity to party policy through 1954. Chervenkov inten- 
sified the sovietization that began under Dimitrov; the only vestiges 
of political diversity at this point were a few national party leaders 
who survived Chervenkov' s purges. 

In 1953 the death of Stalin brought a strong reaction in Soviet 
politics against the cult of personality and in favor of collective leader- 
ship. Accordingly, in 1954 Todor Zhivkov replaced Chervenkov as 
first secretary of the BCP. In the next eight years, Zhivkov gradu- 
ally consolidated his position as supreme leader. In doing so, he 
maintained the totalitarian state machinery of his predecessors but 
showed flexibility and resiliency — especially in maintaining power 
at home while following the winding path of Soviet policy to which 
Bulgaria remained scrupulously loyal. In spite of dramatic inter- 
national changes and crises between 1954 and 1989, the Zhivkov 
era was the longest period of stable rule by a single administration 
in the history of the modern Bulgarian state. 

In the 1980s, however, the Zhivkov regime was overtaken by 
the wave of political liberation that swept all of Eastern Europe, 
and by the lethargy and corruption of an administration totally 
without opposition for nearly thirty years. Immediately after 
Zhivkov 's fall, Bulgaria returned to its precommunist political cul- 
ture, a shifting mosaic of major and minor parties and coalitions. 
The National Assembly was resurrected as the vehicle for demo- 
cratic representation, and the first free parliamentary election was 
held in 1990. Unlike the communist parties of other East Euro- 
pean nations, the BCP (which changed its name in 1990 to the Bul- 
garian Socialist Party, BSP) was based on a domestic political 
movement that predated the 1917 Russian Revolution. Partly for 
this reason, the BSP was able to win the first free elections that 
followed overthrow of the old regime. But internal fragmentation, 
economic crisis, and the party's connection with the wrongs of the 
Zhivkov era diminished the BSP's popular support as the 1990s 
began. 

Meanwhile, based on very brief experimentation with true 
parliamentary democracy before World War II, and imitating its 



174 



Government and Politics 



East European neighbors, Bulgaria had decisively rejected repres- 
sive one-party rule and professed allegiance to democracy. But for- 
mation of democratic institutions on the ruins of the early 1900s 
proved a formidable task in the early years of the postcommunist 
era. Coalition government, the main device of political stability 
in the precommunist era, functioned unevenly in solving the mas- 
sive problems of the early 1990s, and the remaining power centers 
of the old regime hindered reform. 

The Prewar Political Context 

From its separation from the Ottoman Empire in 1878 until 1947, 
Bulgaria was ruled as a constitutional monarchy, with a parliamen- 
tary system based on the Turnovo Constitution of 1879. Although 
that document was one of the most progressive national constitu- 
tions in the world when it was written, actual governance of Bul- 
garia under it was a constant struggle for power among the tsar, 
the unicameral parliament, and the Council of Ministers. The many 
political factions that proliferated in the twentieth century added 
another dimension to this struggle. Parliaments were elected and 
dissolved for purely political reasons; strong prime ministers such 
as Stefan Stambolov (1886-94) and Aleksandur Stamboliiski 
(1918-23) ignored parliament to advance their own programs (the 
constitution had no provision for consultation among government 
branches, although the Council of Ministers was nominally sub- 
ordinate to parliament); a succession of weak prime ministers were 
controlled by the tsar or by political factions such as the pro-fascist 
Zveno coalition of the 1930s; the need to placate the forces of 
Macedonian irredentism distorted both domestic and foreign pol- 
itics throughout the post-independence period; and no prime 
minister survived without stitching together tenuous coalitions of 
parties, many of which had only narrow political agendas. Frequent 
appeals were made to amend the Turnovo Constitution; in other 
cases, the constitution simply was ignored. 

The last arrangement of Bulgarian political forces before World 
War II was the royal dictatorship of Boris III. Boris devised a sys- 
tem of "controlled democracy" after the short totalitarian regime 
of Zveno had virtually abolished conventional political parties in 
1934 (see The Crises of the 1930s, ch. 1). Boris's system was based 
on judicious appointments and the balancing of civilian politicians 
against the army. His purpose was not authoritarian rule but to 
achieve a temporary centralization of power that would allow Bul- 
garia to return to stable constitutionality after the chaotic post- World 
War I period. Boris believed that independent parties would hinder 
this process, so such parties did not reemerge in Bulgaria under 



175 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

his rule. National elections were not held between 1931 and 1938, 
and subsequent prewar elections were held under strong govern- 
ment control. In spite of that control, an opposition bloc includ- 
ing the communists gained sixty parliament seats in the 1938 
election, compared with ninety-five for Boris's nonpartisan govern- 
ment candidates. In the late 1930s, Boris struggled in vain to form 
a lasting coalition that could provide solid middle ground between 
the communist and pro-Nazi factions, both of which rapidly gained 
support between 1935 and 1940. But when Bulgaria entered the 
war in 1940, the same "temporary" balance remained in place. 

The Early Communist Era 

During World War II, the BCP actively opposed Bulgaria's Axis 
alliance by forming partisan terrorist and sabotage groups. In 1942 
the broad Fatherland Front coalition was formed as the communists 
attempted to involve legal opposition groups in exerting antiwar 
pressure on the government. The coalition's activities brought se- 
vere government reprisals. By 1944 partisan units also were being 
formed in the Bulgarian army. 

The Red Army invasion of September 1944 found a temporary 
Bulgarian government desperately trying to avoid accommodation 
with the communist left or the pro-German right, but under in- 
tense diplomatic and military pressure from both Germany and 
the Soviet Union. Boris had died in 1943, and by 1944 severe war- 
time shortages (partly caused by peasants hoarding food supplies) 
had eroded support for the government. 

When Soviet troops entered Bulgaria, the Fatherland Front en- 
gineered a bloodless coup displacing the government of Prime 
Minister Konstantin Muraviev. In 1946 the first Fatherland Front 
government divided ministries among the BCP, Zveno, the Bul- 
garian Agrarian National Union (BANU), and the Bulgarian So- 
cial Democratic Party (BSDP). Within a year, the BCP had used 
that power base to purge the government of all key opposition 
figures and dominate the Fatherland Front. In 1946 a national 
referendum rejected the monarchy in favor of a people's republic, 
leading to the immediate exile of Simeon II, nine-year-old son of 
Boris III. The following month, the communists easily won a na- 
tional election for representatives to a subranie to write a new con- 
stitution over the objections of BANU, which sought a return to 
the Turnovo Constitution. In early 1947, the conclusion of peace 
between Bulgaria and the Allies eliminated the Allied Control Com- 
mission, through which Britain had maintained some influence on 
domestic Bulgarian politics. By that time, the only remaining ob- 
stacle to total BCP domination was Nikola Petkov's BANU, in a 



176 



Government and Politics 



coalition with other noncommunist parties. The power struggle 
ended abruptly in mid- 1947, when the Fatherland Front arrested 
and executed Petkov as a Western agent. This event paved the way 
for unanimous adoption of a new constitution in December 1947. 
The new document was closely modeled on the 1936 Soviet con- 
stitution. 

The parliamentary election of fall 1946 gave the BCP 275 of 465 
seats and made Georgi Dimitrov prime minister. The communists 
gained control of all significant ministries, beginning the last stage 
of consolidating communist dictatorship. The ensuing regimes of 
Dimitrov and Chervenkov defined Bulgaria as a highly conven- 
tional communist state and isolated it from nearly all noncommunist 
commercial and cultural influences. 

The State under Dimitrov 

In the 1946 elections, noncommunist parties in the Fatherland 
Front lost influence far out of proportion to the numerical election 
results. The most salient new feature of the Dimitrov Constitu- 
tion was that it rejected the separation of powers among govern- 
ment branches in favor of a "unity of state power," lodged in a 
presidium wielding legislative, judicial, and executive powers and 
chosen by the National Assembly with party approval. As before, 
the National Assembly was a unicameral legislature; elections were 
to be held every four years, and members could be recalled at any 
time. The assembly would meet in regular sessions twice a year, 
or by special order of the Presidium — making the full assembly little 
more than a rubber-stamp body. The Presidium met continuously 
and exercised all constitutional powers of the National Assembly 
when the assembly was not in session. The Presidium's powers 
included controlling the selection of the Council of Ministers, 
amending the constitution, approving the national economic plan, 
declaring war, and making peace. The president of the nineteen- 
member Presidium thus became one of the two most powerful men 
in Bulgaria. 

The Council of Ministers retained a nominal executive author- 
ity as a cabinet, but it was overshadowed by the designation of the 
National Assembly as "supreme organ of state power." In prac- 
tice, the council chairman, who by office was prime minister of 
the country, was always the first secretary of the BCP. This gave 
the prime minister power equal to that of the Presidium president. 
The judiciary, now also chosen by the legislative branch at all levels 
of government, lost all independence. Independent local political 
power was eliminated when province and district jurisdictions were 
restructured into people's councils. The councils elected executive 



177 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

committees analogous to the national Presidium and overseen by 
that body. As at the national level, local government bodies were 
filled primarily with party officials. Thus, the Dimitrov Constitu- 
tion achieved unprecedented centralization of political power in 
Bulgaria. 

Like its Soviet model, the 1947 constitution guaranteed broad 
freedoms to all citizens (religion, conscience, assembly, speech, the 
press, emancipation of women, and inviolability of person, domicile, 
and correspondence). The Bulgarian document differed from the 
Soviet by allowing private property, but only if the privilege were 
not used "to the detriment of the public good." All means of 
production shifted to state ownership. Universal suffrage was 
guaranteed, as were welfare and employment. Guaranteed employ- 
ment was restricted to socially useful occupations, however. 

Government practice soon eroded the constitutional guarantee 
of religious freedom. Between 1948 and 1952, several official acts 
repressed the Bulgarian religious community. In 1948 the exarch 
of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was forced into retirement for 
his refusal to defend the communist state and the Soviet Union. 
In 1 949 the Law on Religious Organizations put all churches under 
state control; over the next four years, Catholic and Protestant 
clergy were harrassed and imprisoned as part of an overall policy 
of preventing contact with the West. During this period, the 
Dimitrov government continued purging party and nonparty offi- 
cials, imitating the contemporaneous Stalinist practice of eliminating 
all possible political rivals. The most notable victim was the hard- 
line Stalinist and long-time party leader Traicho Kostov, convicted 
and executed in 1949 as a collaborator with the fascists and Josip 
Broz Tito, the heretical Yugoslav communist leader. 

The Chervenkov Era 

The Fifth Party Congress, held in December 1948, rightfully 
celebrated the complete political dominance of socialism in Bul- 
garia. When Dimitrov died in 1949, his successor, Stalin protege 
Vulko Chervenkov, began four years of intense party purges (dis- 
qualifying nearly 100,000 of 460,000 Bulgarian communists). Cher- 
venkov 's cultivation of a cult of personality earned him the 
nickname "Little Stalin." The breakaway of Tito's Yugoslavia from 
the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau — see Glossary) 
in 1948 caused Stalin and Chervenkov to put additional pressure 
on the BCP to conform with the Soviet line. Stalin's death in 1953 
introduced new Soviet leaders who disapproved of Chervenkov' s 
methodology, but the Bulgarian leader remained prime minister 
and dominated politics until 1956. Chervenkov announced a "new 



178 



Government and Politics 



course" in 1953, police terror abated, and some political prisoners 
were released. Meanwhile, the Bulgarian government under the 
communists followed a postwar East European pattern by creat- 
ing large numbers of bureaucratic posts that were filled by party- 
approved functionaries, the nomenklatura. A swollen bureaucracy 
had been traditional in Bulgaria since the modern state was founded 
in 1878; but previously appointments had depended on member- 
ship in the civil service elite, not on membership in a particular 
party. 

The Zhivkov Era 

Todor Zhivkov was the dominant figure in Bulgarian govern- 
ment for about thirty-five years, during which time the political 
scene remained remarkably stable. In the context of post-Stalinist 
communist statecraft, Zhivkov was a masterful politician. In the 
context of popular demands for meaningful reform, he was an 
anachronism whose removal symbolized the beginning of a new 
approach to governance. 

The Rise of Zhivkov 

The Chervenkov era firmly established Bulgarian reliance on 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) for policy leader- 
ship and resolution of domestic party rivalries. Just as Stalin's con- 
demnation had doomed Kostov, so condemnation of the cult of 
personality by Stalin's successors doomed Chervenkov and pre- 
pared the way for his successor, Todor Zhivkov. Zhivkov, who 
began his political career in the party youth organization and 
worked his way to the party Central Committee in 1948, became 
party chief when Chervenkov resigned that position in 1954. Both 
the Moscow authorities who ultimately chose new Bulgarian lead- 
ers and the BCP leaders in Sofia approved Zhivkov' s flexibility, 
youth (he was forty-two when selected), and lack of powerful friends 
and enemies. 

In 1956 Bulgarian politics again felt the influence of the Soviet 
Union. When Nikita S. Khrushchev became leader of the CPSU, 
he began a new phase of de-Stalinization and party reform that 
echoed strongly in Bulgaria. This action left Chervenkov without 
support outside Bulgaria. Then, in 1956 the April Plenum of the 
BCP Central Committee began a broad party liberalization pol- 
icy that caused Chervenkov to resign as prime minister. Rather 
than break completely with the past, however, the party retained 
Chervenkov as a member of a de facto ruling triumvirate that in- 
cluded Zhivkov and longtime party leader and purge partici- 
pant Anton Yugov, who became prime minister. Although party 



179 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

liberalization was stalled by 1956 uprisings in Hungary and Poland, 
the April Plenum identified Zhivkov as the leader of the Politburo. 
In doing so, it also shifted power conclusively to the "home" branch 
of the BCP, more attuned to Bulgarian issues and less to total obe- 
dience to the Soviet line. 

Zhivkov Takes Control 

By the end of 1961, a new wave of Soviet anti-Stalinism gave 
Zhivkov the support he needed to oust Chervenkov and Yugov. 
Zhivkov' s political position had deteriorated because his grandi- 
ose, failed plans for industrialization and agricultural collectiviza- 
tion had evoked strong social protests between 1959 and 1961 , but 
he succeeded Yugov as prime minister in 1962 (see The First Five- 
Year Plans, ch. 3). Khrushchev formally endorsed Zhivkov with 
a state visit to Bulgaria in 1962. Although no additional changes 
occurred in the party or the government until 1971 , Zhivkov began 
introducing a new generation of leaders in the mid-1960s, and po- 
litical repression eased noticeably. The old guard of officials re- 
maining from the 1944 revolution remained a powerful party 
element with important Soviet connections; therefore, Zhivkov 
provided that group enough Politburo positions to ensure its sup- 
port. Meanwhile, Zhivkov selectively purged officials throughout 
the early period to prevent development of alternative power centers 
in the party. In 1964 Zhivkov earned peasant support by appoint- 
ing Georgi Traikov, chief of the nominally independent BANU, 
head of state and by pardoning comrades of the executed BANU 
leader Petkov. 

In 1966 a strong resurgence of the conservative wing of the BCP 
at the Ninth Party Congress curtailed Bulgarian diplomatic and 
economic overtures to the West and to its Balkan neighbors. The 
new conservatism also tightened government control over the media 
and the arts, and the government resumed anti-Western propa- 
ganda to protect Bulgarian society from bourgeois influences. As 
was the case in the 1956 invasion of Hungary, Bulgarian support 
for the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia brought tighter party 
control of all social organizations and reaffirmation of "democratic 
centralism" within the party — all with the goal of reassuring the 
Soviet Union that Bulgaria would not follow in the heretical foot- 
steps of Czechoslovakia. 

The Constitution of 1971 

A later echo of the events of 1968 was the drafting of a new con- 
stitution at the Tenth Party Congress in 1971 . Unlike the Dimitrov 
Constitution, the new document specified the role of the BCP as 



180 



Todor Zhivkov one year after 
his ouster, in confinement 
at his villa, November 1990 
Courtesy Charles Sudetic 



"the leading force in society and the state," and the role of the 
BANU as its collaborator within the Fatherland Front. The 1971 
constitution also defined Bulgaria as a socialist state with mem- 
bership in the international socialist community. As before, broad 
citizen rights were guaranteed but limited by the requirement that 
they be exercised only in the interest of the state. Citizen obliga- 
tions included working according to one's ability to build the foun- 
dation of the socialist state and defend the state, compulsory military 
service, and paying taxes. Most of the governmental structure speci- 
fied in the Dimitrov Constitution remained, but a new body, the 
State Council, replaced the Presidium as supreme organ of state 
power. This council consisted of twenty-two members and a chair- 
man who was de facto head of state. The State Council was more 
powerful than the Presidium because it could initiate as well as ap- 
prove legislation, and because it exercised some of the non- 
governmental supervision normally delegated to ruling parties in 
East European communist states of that period. Council members, 
nominally elected by the National Assembly, were members of the 
BCP or other mass organizations (see Nongovernmental Political 
Institutions, this ch.). 

In 1971 Zhivkov resigned as prime minister to become chairman 
of the State Council. The National Assembly, traditional center of 
political power in Bulgaria until the 1947 constitution stripped it of 
power, received some new responsibilities. Permanent commissions 



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Bulgaria: A Country Study 

were to supervise the work of ministries, and legislation could now 
be submitted by labor and youth groups (all of which were party- 
controlled). In practice, however, the National Assembly still 
rubber-stamped legislation and nominations for the State Coun- 
cil, Supreme Court, and Council of Ministers. As a follow-up to 
the constitution's prescription of private property rights, the 1973 
Law on Citizens' Property virtually abolished private ownership 
of means of production, confining such ownership to "items for 
personal use." 

The Tenth Party Congress also devised a new BCP program 
to coincide with the new constitutional description of party power. 
The program specified an orthodox hierarchical party structure of 
democratic centralism, each level responsible to the level above. 
The lowest-level party organizations were to be based in workplaces; 
all other levels would be determined by territorial divisions. Loyalty 
to the CPSU was reiterated. The BCP goal was described as build- 
ing an advanced socialist society lacking differentiation by property 
and social standing — at that point, all of society was to be a single 
working class. Science and technology were to receive special at- 
tention by the party, to improve production that would make pos- 
sible the next jump from advanced socialism to the first stage of 
communism (see The Bulgarian Communist (Socialist) Party, this 
ch.). 

After a decade of political calm and only occasional purges of 
party officials by Zhivkov, social unrest stirred in the mid-1970s 
and alarmed the Zhivkov government. International events such 
as the Helsinki Accords (see Glossary) of 1975, the growth of Euro- 
communism in the 1970s, and the 1973 oil crisis stimulated hope 
for liberalization and discontent with the domestic economy. 
Zhivkov responded in 1977 by purging Politburo member Boris 
Velchev and 38,500 party members — the largest such change since 
the early 1960s. Provincial party organizations also were substan- 
tially reorganized. In May 1978, the Bulgarian government ac- 
knowledged for the first time that an antigovernment demonstration 
had occurred — indicating that the 1977 measures had not quelled 
domestic discontent. 

The Last Zhivkov Decade 

The period between 1978 and 1988 was one of political calm. 
With minor exceptions, the structure and operations of the govern- 
ment and the BCP remained unchanged. But the avoidance of 
meaningful change, despite cosmetic adjustments in the Zhivkov 
government, assumed that Bulgarian governance was the same 



182 



Government and Politics 



uncomplicated procedure it had been in the 1970s and early 
1980s — a major miscalculation. 

Celebration of the 1,300th anniversary of the Bulgarian state in 
1981 brought official liberalization and rehabilitation for some seg- 
ments of Bulgarian society. Bourgeois political factions that had 
opposed the BCP before World War II were exonerated and 
described as comrades in the fight for Bulgarian democracy. 
Zhivkov also raised the official status of the Orthodox Church to 
codefender of the Bulgarian nationality, and restrictions on reli- 
gious observances were eased. 

By the second half of the 1980s, substantial maneuvering and 
speculation centered on identifying the successor to the seventy- 
four-year-old Zhivkov, who was increasingly isolated from every- 
day governance. Four younger politicians divided most of the key 
responsibilities of government and party in 1986. Although specu- 
lation grew that Zhivkov had become a figurehead or was prepar- 
ing to resign, in the late 1980s he was still able to divide the power 
of his rivals and avoid naming a single successor. 

The BCP maintained complete control over all major programs 
and policies in the Bulgarian government, although the role of the 
party in specific instances was not clear. In 1987, facing a bud- 
ding opposition movement and pressure from the Soviet Union, 
the BCP began planning for multiple-candidate (not multiparty) 
regional elections to end citizen apathy toward both government 
and the party. Although some reforms were made in the nomina- 
tion process, local electoral commissions retained control over final 
lists of nominees. 

By February 1989, at least nine independent political groups had 
emerged. Spurred by the liberalized domestic policies of Mikhail 
S. Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, such groups demanded similar 
concessions from the Bulgarian government. Given Bulgaria's long 
record of mimicking Soviet policy changes, this was a natural ex- 
pectation. In fact, the 1987 BCP Central Committee plenum had 
officially endorsed perestroika (see Glossary) and glasnost (see Glos- 
sary), the cornerstones of the Gorbachev reform program. The ple- 
num also substantially reduced official state ceremonies, rituals, 
personal awards, and propaganda, explaining that such formali- 
ties alienated the people. 

In the three years following the 1987 plenum, however, the Bul- 
garian government and the BCP gave lip service to Soviet reforms, 
while quietly taking a more hard-line approach to many issues. 
During this period, reform in the BCP and the government ap- 
paratus was confined to reshuffling ministries, departments, and 
personnel as a gesture of solidarity With, perestroika. At the same time, 



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Bulgaria: A Country Study 

dissident groups were harrassed, put under surveillance, and ac- 
cused of unpatriotic activities. 

Issues of Dissent 

In the late 1980s, official repression of the Turkish minority was 
the most visible domestic issue in Bulgaria. By 1989 this policy had 
brought harsh international condemnation and provided a human 
rights issue for the domestic opposition. A total of 310,000 ethnic 
Turks were expelled or emigrated voluntarily in 1989, and the Bul- 
garian economy suffered greatly from this depletion of its work force 
(see Labor Force, ch. 3, and The Turkish Problem, this ch.). 

In July 1989, more than a hundred well-known Bulgarian in- 
tellectuals petitioned the National Assembly to restore rights to the 
ethnic Turks suffering forced emigration. Bulgarian Turks formed 
the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, advocating a wide range 
of government reforms besides the Turkish issue. The regime 
responded by accusing Turkish agents of fomenting ethnic strife, 
denying the existence of a Turkish minority in Bulgaria, and fan- 
ning the racial animosity of Bulgarians toward Turks. 

In addition to ethnic and political problems, in the late 1980s 
Bulgaria faced the need for strenuous economic reforms to improve 
efficiency, technology, and product quality. Between 1987 and 1989, 
the Zhivkov regime promised expansion of trade and joint ven- 
tures with the West, banking reform, currency convertability, and 
decentralized planning. In actuality, however, the thirty-five-year- 
old regime lacked the political will and energy to press drastic eco- 
nomic reform (see Era of Experimentation and Reform, ch. 3). 
The economic stagnation that began in the early 1980s, with which 
Zhivkov had become identified, continued unchallenged and be- 
came another major cause of political discontent. 

The Removal of Zhivkov 

Despite the appearance of numerous opposition groups in the 
preceding year, the Zhivkov regime was unprepared for the suc- 
cessive fall of communist regimes across Eastern Europe in late 
1989. In October an all-European environmental conference, Eco- 
forum, was held in Sofia under the auspices of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE — see Glossary). This 
event focused world attention on Bulgaria's history of repressing 
environmental activism and stimulated open demonstrations by 
human rights advocates and the Bulgarian Ekoglasnost environ- 
mental group (see Other Political Organizations, this ch.). Although 
some demonstrators were beaten and detained, direct communi- 
cation with the West inspired them to greater self-expression. This 



184 



Government and Politics 



activity culminated in a mass demonstration in Sofia on Novem- 
ber 3. Meanwhile, in a speech to a plenum of the BCP in late Oc- 
tober, Zhivkov admitted that his latest restructuring program, 
begun in 1987 to achieve "fundamental renewal" of society, poli- 
tics, and the economy, had been a failure. He unveiled a new, 
detailed program to counteract "alienation of the people from the 
government and the production process." Other party spokesmen 
increasingly noted recent drastic reforms in other socialist states 
and pointed to Bulgaria's failure to keep pace. Then, at the regu- 
lar plenary meeting of the BCP Central Committee in November, 
Prime Minister Georgi Atanasov announced Zhivkov 's resignation. 

Although the resignation appeared voluntary, Western observers 
agreed that top party figures, increasingly dissatisfied with Zhivkov' s 
refusal to recognize problems and deal with public protests, had 
exerted substantial pressure on him. The leaders of the movement 
to remove Zhivkov — Atanasov, Foreign Minister Petur Mladenov 
(who became head of state), and Defense Minister Dobri Dzhurov — 
had received the advance blessing of Moscow and the majority of 
the Bulgarian Politburo. Soviet leader Gorbachev apparently ap- 
proved the change because Zhivkov had not heeded warnings that 
cosmetic reform was insufficient given the drastic restructuring 
sought by Gorbachev. Within a month of his resignation, Zhivkov 
was expelled from the BCP, accused of abuse of power, and ar- 
rested. Mladenov became chairman of the State Council and chief 
of the BCP. 

Governance after Zhivkov 

The Zhivkov ouster brought rapid change in some political in- 
stitutions, little or no change in others. The official name of the 
country, dropping the term "People's," became simply the Repub- 
lic of Bulgaria. For two years, the BCP remained entrenched as 
the most powerful party, slowing reform and clinging tenaciously 
to economic and political positions gained under Zhivkov. But a 
new constitution was ratified in mid- 1991 , laying the basis for ac- 
celerated reform on all fronts. 

The Mladenov Government 

The first few months of the Mladenov regime brought few of the 
dramatic changes seen in Czechoslovakia or the German Democratic 
Republic (East Germany) in the same period. Mladenov, who came 
to power without a personal following, left much of the old govern- 
ment in power and failed to separate state from party functions. 
Although initial reforms came from the Politburo, Mladenov 
achieved popularity by immediately legalizing political protest, 



185 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

giving the media unprecedented freedom, abolishing privileges of 
party officials, and scheduling free elections within six months. Arti- 
cle 1 of the 1971 constitution, which established the leading role 
of the BCP in Bulgarian government and society, was abolished 
in January 1990. Public repudiation of Zhivkov allowed his sub- 
ordinates to treat him as a scapegoat, thus protecting themselves 
from blame by the proliferating opposition groups. 

The Bulgarian communists avoided the immediate political re- 
jection suffered by their East European comrades for several rea- 
sons. Because the BCP had begun as an indigenous Bulgarian 
movement in 1891, Bulgarians did not resent it as an artificially 
imposed foreign organization. In 1989 nearly one in nine Bulgari- 
ans belonged to the party, a very high ratio that included a large 
part of the intelligentsia. Early opposition groups were concentrated 
in Sofia and did not have the means to reach the more conserva- 
tive hinterlands, reflecting a political dichotomy between town and 
country that had existed since pre-Ottoman times (see Electoral 
Procedures, this ch.). Visible reorganization and reform occurred 
in the BCP shortly after Zhivkov left power; the Politburo was 
abolished and some old-guard communists were purged. The BCP 
invited opposition representation in the government and conducted 
a series of round-table discussions with opposition leaders. In Febru- 
ary 1990, Mladenov resigned as party chief, removing the stigma 
of party interference in government; in April, the State Council 
was abolished and Mladenov was named president. 

The 1990 Stalemate 

The first free election of the postwar era, the national election 
of June 1990, was anticipated as an indicator of Bulgaria's post- 
Zhivkov political mood and as an end to the extreme uncertainty 
that followed the Zhivkov era. But the election results provided 
no decisive answers or conclusions. During the political maneu- 
vering that preceded the election, the contest for control of the Na- 
tional Assembly narrowed to the BCP and the Union of Democratic 
Forces (UDF), a coalition of several major and many minor par- 
ties and groups with diverse interests (see The Union of Democratic 
Forces, this ch.). The BCP presented a reformist image, liberally 
blaming Zhivkov for national problems and changing its name to 
the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) to stress that a new era had 
begun. In March an agreement with opposition groups had made 
approval of legislative proposals by the round table necessary be- 
fore the BCP-dominated National Assembly could consider pas- 
sage (see The Role of Unofficial Organizations, this ch.). The round 
table also signed accords defining future legal changes in the political 



186 



Government and Politics 



system, including multiple parties, separation of powers, constitu- 
tional protection of media freedom, and legalization of private 
property. 

The parliamentary election was followed by three months of in- 
activity and drift in the summer of 1990. Although the Council 
of Ministers had resigned immediately after the election, a new 
government was not formed until late August. BSP party official 
Andrei Lukanov finally became prime minister in an all-socialist 
cabinet because UDF and other opposition parties refused to form 
a coalition. At the same time, the National Assembly required sev- 
eral weeks to agree on compromise candidate Zheliu Zhelev to 
replace Mladenov as president. The most significant political sit- 
uation was outside government institutions. The two major par- 
ties became deadlocked over UDF demands that the BSP 
acknowledge its responsibility for the economic ruin of Bulgaria, 
and that the government adopt the UDF plan for radical economic 
reform similar to that in Poland (see Market Reform, ch. 3). 
Although much of the Zhivkov old guard had been forced out in 
favor of middle-of-the road socialists in 1990, the UDF demands 
activated strong pockets of reaction. Zhelev, a dissident philosopher 
and UDF leader, spent the rest of 1990 seeking compromises among 
the factions. 

The Lukanov government, tied to an aging, largely conserva- 
tive constituency and full of little-known BSP figures, met few of 
the reform demands. In October Lukanov presented a 100-day eco- 
nomic reform plan to serve as a transition to longer-term planning 
in 1991 . The plan borrowed major parts of the program advocated 
by the UDF. The National Assembly remained too divided on the 
reform issue to give Lukanov the legislative support he needed. 
Meanwhile, polls showed a definite drop in popular support for 
the BSP; under these circumstances, the UDF intensified efforts 
to turn out the government by refusing to support any of Lukanov' s 
proposals. 

In November Bulgaria was paralyzed by student demonstrations 
and general strikes called to topple Lukanov (see Trade Unions, 
this ch.). Lukanov' s resignation ended the opposition's refusal to 
form a coalition government. Zhelev, who then commanded more 
political power than any other figure, proposed a compromise can- 
didate, Dimitur Popov, as prime minister. Popov, a judge with 
no party allegiance, received a mandate to form a new cabinet and 
proceed with reforms as soon as possible. After considerable deliber- 
ation, cabinet posts were distributed among major factions, and 
reform legislation began slowly moving into the National Assem- 
bly in the first half of 1991. 



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Bulgaria: A Country Study 

Government Structure 

In the years immediately following the Zhivkov regime, the nomi- 
nal structure of the Bulgarian government remained essentially un- 
changed. Actual decision making, however, moved from the elite 
level of the communist leadership to a variety of political figures 
and institutions. 

The Role of Unofficial Organizations 

An important quasigovernmental institution in the early stages 
of this process was the national round table. Conceived by opposi- 
tion groups shortly after Zhivkov' s fall, the round table format was 
accepted by the Atanasov government under threat of general 
strikes. In March 1990, a declaration on the role and status of the 
national round table, formulated by all major political groups, gave 
the round table approval rights to all major legislation proposed 
by the government, prior to formal consideration by the National 
Assembly. In 1990 round table discussions included key govern- 
ment figures and representatives of all constituent groups of the 
UDS and other opposition parties and trade unions. This forum 
was an effective bridge across the chaotic months preceding the 
first free election. It reached key compromises on election law, major 
provisions of the new constitution, and economic reforms. Com- 
promise measures were then forwarded to the parliament for ratifi- 
cation. By mid- 1990 round table proposals were dominated by the 
platform of the UDF, for which that forum had become the chief 
input to government policy. The national round table thus replaced 
the BCP as the de facto source of legislative initiatives, in the ab- 
sence of a coalition government representing the major Bulgarian 
political factions. 

In late 1990, President Zhelev convened a Political Consulta- 
tive Council that was able to unite all major factions behind for- 
mation of a coalition government in December 1990. This step 
ended the threat that chaos would follow the resignation of the 
Lukanov government (see The Council of Ministers, this ch.). In 
January 1991, the parties represented in the National Assembly 
signed a detailed agreement describing political rights, the legisla- 
tive agenda for 1991, BCP (BSP) responsibility for the mistakes 
of the Zhivkov regime, property rights, resolution of social con- 
flicts, and ethnic questions. The stated purpose of this agreement 
was to ease national tensions and provide a proper working at- 
mosphere for the immense reform program envisioned for 1991. 

The National Assembly 

In the post-Zhivkov reforms, the National Assembly returned 



188 



Government and Politics 



to its prewar status as a forum for debate of legislation among 
representatives of true political factions. This status had been lost 
completely from 1947 to 1989, when the assembly rubber-stamped 
legislation originating in the BCP hierarchy. 

The Assembly under Zhivkov 

According to the 1971 constitution, the unicameral National As- 
sembly was the supreme organ of state power, acting as the na- 
tional legislature and electing all the other bodies of the national 
government. In practice under the Zhivkov regime, the National 
Assembly met for three short sessions each year, long enough to 
approve policies and legislation formulated by the Council of 
Ministers and the State Council. The National Assembly had a 
chairman (until 1990 elected by the entire body at the recommen- 
dation of the BCP Central Committee) and four deputy chairs. 
In the intervals between sessions, the functions of the assembly were 
conducted by permanent commissions whose number and desig- 
nation varied through the years. Not designated in the 1971 con- 
stitution, the duties of the commissions often overlapped those of 
the ministerial departments. The National Assembly had the power 
to dissolve itself or extend its term in emergency session. 

During the Zhivkov years, new assemblies were elected every 
five years to coincide with party congresses; the Central Commit- 
tee of the BCP met immediately before the first session of each new 
assembly to approve candidates who were then rubber-stamped by 
the National Assembly for the leadership positions of the assem- 
bly, State Council, and Council of Ministers. The ninth National 
Assembly (1986-90) was rarely even notified of policy decisions 
of the Zhivkov-led State Council. Nevertheless, election of the Na- 
tional Assembly remained the most important political ritual in Bul- 
garia throughout the communist period, and the return to free 
assembly elections in 1990 recalled the direct popular representa- 
tion prescribed in the Turnovo Constitution of 1879, still revered 
as a model for Bulgarian governance. 

The First Freely Elected Assembly, 1990 

The first significant post-Zhivkov act of the holdover (ninth) Na- 
tional Assembly was passage of twenty-one measures of constitu- 
tional reform. These measures included abolition of the article of 
the 1971 constitution giving the BCP sole right to govern. In April 
1990, that National Assembly dissolved itself to make way for na- 
tional election of a Grand National Assembly, charged with writ- 
ing and ratifying a new constitution; this was the first voluntary 
adjournment of that body since World War II. 



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Bulgaria: A Country Study 



In accordance with the provisions under which the 1990 
parliamentary elections were held, after passing the new constitu- 
tion in July 1991 the Grand National Assembly voted to dissolve 
itself and continue working as a normal parliament until election 
of the new body. Thus, in the second half of 1991 work would con- 
tinue on critical legislation covering issues such as privatization, 
election procedures, and local government reform. 

After the 1990 national elections, the National Assembly re- 
mained a weak legislative body, but for a new reason. No longer 
required to follow party orders precisely, representatives often were 
split quite evenly on reform issues. The majority BSP included re- 
form and reactionary factions, and the 144 UDF members were 
a formidable opposition group. Unlike the brief assemblies of the 
Zhivkov era, the new body remained in session several days a week 
throughout the remainder of 1990 and through mid- 1991, strug- 
gling for compromise on reform legislation. 

The State Council and the Presidency 

The State Council, technically an executive committee within 
the National Assembly, was created by the 1971 constitution as 
the primary executive agency of the national government. Because 
of that role, the chairman of the council was automatically presi- 
dent of the country and thus one of the two most powerful figures 
in Bulgaria in the Zhivkov years. The State Council included 
representatives from trade unions, the Communist Youth League 
of Bulgaria (Komsomol), and other mass organizations. The council 
supervised the Council of Ministers and had the right to repeal 
ministry decisions — a function that clearly reduced the Council of 
Ministers to secondary executive status. In addition to its execu- 
tive functions, the State Council could issue direct decrees with 
full legal authority when the National Assembly was not in ses- 
sion, with no provision for later approval by the full legislative body. 
Under Zhivkov most members of the State Council were high offi- 
cials of the BCP. When Petur Mladenov replaced Zhivkov as chair- 
man of the State Council, he did not automatically become head 
of state. When the State Council was abolished in April 1990, the 
round table named Mladenov president of the republic, a new title 
for the Bulgarian head of state. The appointment was made with 
the understanding that the new constitution would set guidelines 
for this office. Meanwhile, Mladenov and his successor Zheliu 
Zhelev retained the power to form cabinets with the consent of the 
National Assembly, to represent the country abroad, and to act 
as commander in chief of the armed forces. 



190 



President Zheliu Zhelev meets with United States president George 

H. W. Bush, Washington, fall 1990 
Courtesy White House Photo Office 

The Council of Ministers 

The constitution of 1971 substantially diminished the power of 
the Council of Ministers, or cabinet, which had been an intermit- 
tent center of executive authority in Bulgarian governments since 
1878. In the last two decades of the Zhivkov regime, the council 
acted as an advisory board to the State Council and directed every- 
day operations of the government bureaucracies. All members of 
the Council of Ministers belonged to the BCP or the BANU, and 
many held top party posts and ministries simultaneously. Long- 
time Politburo member Stanko Todorov headed the executive com- 
mittee of the council from its creation in 1971 until 1989. Within 
their areas of responsibility, the ministries had authority to form 
administrative organs and to overturn acts by local government 
agencies. The exact makeup of the council was not prescribed in 
the constitution; the National Assembly had authority to make 
changes as necessary, and the council's shape and size changed 
often in the last Zhivkov years. 

After the elections of 1986, the Council of Ministers was reor- 
ganized and reduced in size. In the last years of the Zhivkov re- 
gime, it included eleven ministers, a chairman (the prime minister), 



191 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

a deputy prime minister, and the chairman of the Committee on 
State and People's Control (see Security and Intelligence Services, 
ch. 5). In early 1990, the new provisional council had fourteen 
ministries: agriculture and forests; construction, architecture, and 
public works; economy and planning; finance; foreign affairs; for- 
eign economic relations; industry and technology; internal affairs; 
internal trade; justice; national defense; national education; pub- 
lic health and social welfare; and transport. The ambassador to 
the Soviet Union also had full cabinet status, as did the heads of 
the committees for protection of the environment and state and 
people's control. Five deputy prime ministers also sat in that cabi- 
net, which was headed by Zhivkov-era holdover Georgi Atanasov. 
The second provisional cabinet, under Andrei Lukanov, included 
ministers of the environment, culture, and science and higher edu- 
cation in its seventeen departments. The ambassador to the Soviet 
Union was dropped, and a minister for economic reform added. 

The new status of the Council of Ministers as the power center 
of Bulgarian government was signaled by the targeting of Prime 
Minister Lukanov for opposition pressure in the fall of 1990. A 
second signal was intense bargaining between the BSP and oppo- 
sition parties for positions in the Popov cabinet. That bargaining 
produced a compromise agreement that gave the key ministries of 
foreign economic relations and finance to the BSP, with national 
defense going to the UDF. The Ministry of the Interior, very sen- 
sitive because of its role under Zhivkov as the enforcer of state secu- 
rity, was largely reorganized and headed by a nonpolitical figure 
whose two deputies represented the major parties. The splitting 
of the deputy minister positions was a key compromise to gain ap- 
proval of the Popov cabinet. In all, five of the seventeen ministers 
in the new cabinet were politically unaffiliated; seven remained from 
the last Lukanov cabinet to soften the transition; and the UDF filled 
only three posts. The multiparty conference that reached this agree- 
ment also allowed for further adjustments in the cabinet structure 
for the Popov government. As an interim head of government, 
Popov's main goal was to establish minimal political and economic 
conditions favorable to long-term reforms. 

The Judiciary 

Members of the highest national judicial body, the Supreme 
Court, were elected to five-year terms by the National Assembly. 
Until 1990, however, National Assembly approval really meant 
control by the State Council, hence by the BCP. The national court 
system was divided into criminal, civil, and military courts; the 
Supreme Court had jurisdiction in both original and appellate cases, 



192 



Government and Politics 



and it controlled the activities of all lower courts. The 1971 consti- 
tution called the court system and state prosecutor's office "weapons 
of the dictatorship of the proletariat." The chief prosecutor, chief 
legal official of Bulgaria, was responsible for compliance with the 
law by ordinary citizens, local and national political entities and 
officials, and other public organizations. The powers of this office 
were extended by law in 1980 in an effort to forestall public dis- 
satisfaction with the crime prevention system. Like the justices of 
the Supreme Court, the chief prosecutor served at the approval 
of the State Council. Together with the chief justice of the Supreme 
Court, the chief prosecutor provided absolute BCP control of the 
Bulgarian judicial system until 1990. The election of all judicial 
officials further guaranteed this control. 

Lower courts functioned at the provincial and municipal levels; 
election was by people's councils at the provincial level and directly 
by citizens at the municipal level, using party-approved lists. In 
1990 each of Bulgaria's provinces (including Sofia) had a province 
court. The 105 provincal courts tried minor offenses. Both profes- 
sional judges and lay assessors sat in the lower courts. Specialized 
disputes were heard outside the regular court system. For exam- 
ple, international trade cases went to the Foreign Trade Court of 
Arbitration of the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Indus- 
try, civil disputes among enterprises and public organizations were 
heard by the State Court of Arbitration, and labor disputes were 
settled by the conciliation committees of enterprises. 

Criticized before and after the fall of Zhivkov, the Bulgarian 
justice system changed little with the reform programs of 1990 and 
1991. The round table resolutions of early 1990 alluded only to 
separation of the judicial, legislative, and executive branches to 
avoid concentration of power in any single branch. However, es- 
tablishment of an independent, authoritative judiciary would be 
complicated by the universal view, instilled by forty-five years of 
complete control by the BCP, that the Bulgarian court system was 
only an extension of the state's executive power. In a 1991 poll, 
only 1.7 percent of Bulgarians expressed trust in the courts and 
the prosecutor's office. In 1990 the youngest judges were over forty 
years old, and the most talented had left for other careers because 
of the short term of office, poor pay, low professional status, and 
party control. In late 1990, Judge Dimitur Lozanchev became the 
first politically neutral chairman of the Supreme Court since World 
War II. 

Local Government 

In 1987 Bulgaria consolidated its local government structure by 



193 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

combining its twenty-eight districts (okruzi; sing., okrug), into nine 
provinces (oblasti; sing. , oblast), including the city of Sofia (see fig. 1). 
A tangible part of the Zhivkov regime's massive (and largely the- 
oretical) plan for economic and political restructuring, the reor- 
ganization imitated restructuring plans in the Soviet Union. Local 
government consolidation was to eliminate the complex and in- 
efficient okrug bureaucracies and improve the operation of "peo- 
ple's self-management," the system by which people's councils 
nominally managed area enterprises. The latter improvement was 
to result from narrowing the primary function of the new oblast 
government to the assistance of local workers' collectives. At the 
same time, municipalities and townships became somewhat more 
autonomous because the restructuring gave them some of the ad- 
ministrative power removed from the higher level. 

Although the number of districts had remained stable from 1959 
until the 1987 reform, the number and allocation of smaller urban 
and rural political entities changed rapidly during that period as 
the population shifted (see Population, ch. 2). In 1990 there were 
299 political divisions smaller than the oblast and twenty-nine 
separate urban areas. Both oblasti and smaller constituencies were 
ruled by people's councils, elected for thirty-month terms. The local 
multiple-candidate elections of February 1988 were another aspect 
of the restructuring program. Although local election commissions 
retained considerable influence over nominations, about 26 per- 
cent of successful candidates were nonparty in 1988. At that time, 
51,161 councillors and 3,953 mayors were elected. 

The people's councils at all levels were run by elected executive 
committees that met continuously. These committees had full ex- 
ecutive power to act between sessions of the people's councils, in 
the same way as the State Council acted for the National Assem- 
bly in the Zhivkov-era national government. Each council was 
responsible to the council at the next higher level; financial plan- 
ning was to conform to the goals of national economic programs. 
Local councils had authority over the People's Militia, or police, 
as well as over local services and administration. The Popov govern- 
ment scheduled new local elections for February 1991 , after which 
time reforms were expected in the local government system. Mean- 
while, most provincial governments remained under the control 
of Zhivkovite officials, intensifying the schism between the urban 
and provincial political climates. 

Electoral Procedures 

The round table reforms of 1 990 included a new election law rati- 
fied by the National Assembly. As in other aspects of governance, 



194 



A Bulgarian Orthodox priest 
participating in the election 
demonstrations of 1990, Sofia 
Courtesy Charles Sudetic 



prescribed election procedures did not change greatly under the 
new regime, but the intent and practice of the law did. The right 
to vote by direct secret ballot remained universal for all Bulgari- 
ans over eighteen, and the officials they elected remained theoret- 
ically responsible only to the voters. Prescriptions for eligibility for 
nomination and the nomination process changed little with the new 
law. The main difference was that in practice the BCP (BSP) no 
longer could indiscriminately remove elected representatives or 
members of people's councils, nor did it control the nomination 
function nominally given to public organizations, trade unions, 
youth groups, and cooperatives. 

Under the election law of 1953, all candidate lists were approved 
by the communist-controlled Fatherland Front. Under the 1990 
law, all parties and registered nonparty organizations could sub- 
mit candidates; individuals could be nominated for the assembly 
with 500 signatures of voters from their district, and an unlimited 
number of candidates might run from each district. The State Coun- 
cil formerly had the power to call elections; for the 1990 Grand 
National Assembly election, the date was fixed by agreement of 
the UDF and the BCP. The Central Election Commission, form- 
erly a creature of the State Council, was to supervise the equitable 
implementation of election laws, overseeing the operation of equiva- 
lent commissions at local levels. Election commissions at all levels 
included members from various parties; the Central Election 



195 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

Commission was headed by a professor of law with no political con- 
nection. 

The new law also revised the representational system of the Na- 
tional Assembly. The new assembly continued to have 400 seats, 
but it would sit for four instead of five years. A new electoral struc- 
ture also was introduced. Half the National Assembly members 
were elected in multiple-seat districts, in proportion to total votes 
cast for each party in the district. A 4 percent minimum was re- 
quired for a party to achieve representation. The law designated 
twenty-eight multiple-seat voting districts, based on the pre- 1987 
okruzi. The other 200 members were elected from 200 single-seat 
voting districts. A runoff election was held in each district where 
no candidate received 50 percent of the initial vote (this occurred 
in 81 of the 200 districts). All voters in the 1990 election had one 
vote in each type of district (see The National Assembly, this ch.). 

The election was supervised by the CSCE. According to impar- 
tial observers and the parties themselves, the election was reasonably 
free of interference and coercion, considering that most of the elec- 
torate had never faced a true political choice and the registration 
and voting systems were quite complex. Party strategies were dic- 
tated by timing and geography. The UDF, lacking time and re- 
sources to campaign in the provinces, confined its efforts to the 
more congenial constituency in Sofia and other large cities. The 
BSP campaigned as a reform party in progressive Sofia, but it took 
advantage of the substantial residue of Zhivkovite local officials in 
the provinces (many of whom were accused of exerting pressure 
on their constituents to vote BSP) to gain 211 assembly seats to 
the UDF's 144. The UDF outpolled the BSP in Sofia, Plovdiv, 
Varna, and most other Bulgarian cities. 

The timing of the next national election was the topic of heated 
debate in the first half of 1991 as political factions maneuvered for 
advantage. After the new constitution was ratified in July 1991 and 
a new election law was scheduled for August, elections were tenta- 
tively set for October 1991. The new election law was to free the 
system of the cumbersome procedure used in 1990. Controversial 
elements of the law were a BSP-backed clause disallowing absen- 
tee ballots from emigres and the restriction of all campaign activi- 
ties to the Bulgarian language. The 1991 law prescribed a Central 
Electoral Commission of twenty-five, to be appointed by the presi- 
dent in consultation with major political factions. The central com- 
mission would then appoint and oversee like commissions at lower 
jurisdictions and set policy for election administration. National 
elections were to be held by the proportional system, eliminating 
the two-part system of 1990. Recognized parties, coalitions of 



196 



Government and Politics 



parties, individual nominees, and combinations of individuals and 
parties would be eligible to run. The country was divided into thirty- 
one electoral constituencies, three of which were in Sofia. 

Nongovernmental Political Institutions 

Until 1989 the BCP exerted firm control over such nongovern- 
mental political institutions as trade unions, youth groups, wom- 
en's groups, and the nominally oppositionist BANU. The ouster 
of Zhivkov, however, brought a torrent of new and revived groups 
into the political arena. In the new open political climate, the 
groups' fragmented constituencies often spoke loudly for their own 
special interests, greatly complicating the process of coalition- 
building and compromise needed to accomplish national reform. 

The Bulgarian Communist (Socialist) Party 

The Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP), which renamed itself 
the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) several months after the fall 
of Zhivkov, boasted one of the highest membership-to-population 
ratios (one in nine Bulgarians) in any communist country in the 
late 1980s. Between 1958 and 1987, membership grew by 442,000, 
mainly by adding bureaucrats and blue-collar workers in younger 
age groups. In 1986 women made up 32.7 percent of party mem- 
bership, but few women held high positions. The proportion of 
worker members had grown to 44.4 percent by 1986, and the 
proportion of farm members had dropped to 16.3 percent, reflect- 
ing an even sharper drop in the overall farming population of Bul- 
garia (see table 20, Appendix). Party recruitment in the 1980s 
targeted individuals already successful in public or economic life, 
and the proportion of white-collar members increased in that 
decade. 

In 1987 the BCP was organized into 2,900 local units. Until 1990 
primary party organizations were based primarily in workplaces. 
The next level in the hierarchy was municipal organizations, which 
were overseen by city or province and ultimately national bodies. 
At every level, party and government personnel were closely inter- 
woven, and the principle of democratic centralism kept the lower 
levels strictly subordinate to the national party. The primary or- 
ganizations were charged with recruitment and mobilization. A 
major concession by the post-Zhivkov party was removal of party 
cells from all state offices, the judiciary, educational and health agen- 
cies, as well as all nongovernmental workplaces — a concession forced 
by the UDF's threat to boycott the round table negotiations that 
would set a national agenda for political reform early in 1 990 . That 
change significantly altered the primary level of party organization. 



197 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

Until 1990 the top level of party leadership was the Politburo, 
of which Zhivkov was general secretary. That position had been 
abolished in the 1950s in the BCP as part of de-Stalinization. It 
was restored in 1981, however, to recognize Zhivkov 's long ser- 
vice and conform to Soviet restoration under Leonid Brezhnev. 
Politburo members usually were selected from the central committee 
and nominally elected by party congresses, which normally met 
every five years. In 1986 the Thirteenth Party Congress elected 
an eleven-member Politburo dominated by party loyalists of Zhiv- 
kov 's generation but supplemented by a few younger specialists 
in politics and economics. Following tradition, the 1986 congress 
made few changes in the previous Politburo. The party congresses 
were nominally the top policy-making body of the party, but, like 
the National Assembly, they rubber-stamped decisions handed them 
by the party elite. 

The BCP hierarchy also included the Central Committee, whose 
members the congress unanimously approved from candidates sup- 
plied by the party leadership. Through a number of specialized 
departments, the Central Committee performed administrative 
party work between sessions of congress. After considerable size 
variation, the last Central Committee included 190 members and 
131 candidate members in early 1990. The third elite group was 
the BCP Secretariat, a group somewhat smaller than the Politburo 
(its number also varied during the Zhivkov years), entrusted with 
implementing party policy. 

Membership in the BCP required recommendation by three es- 
tablished members; if accepted at the primary and next-highest 
level, a candidate received full membership with no probationary 
period. Criminal or unethical behavior caused withdrawal of mem- 
bership. Without benefit of explanation, a varying number of mem- 
bers also failed to receive the new party cards issued before each 
party congress. Abrupt purging of cadre and membership elements 
deemed potentially hostile to current programs was a procedure 
that Zhivkov used with great skill to balance and weaken opposi- 
tion forces throughout his tenure in office. 

The fall of Zhivkov brought immediate and dramatic changes 
in the BCP, including removal of the word "communist" from 
its name. The Extraordinary Fourteenth Party Congress of the BCP 
was held in the winter of 1990, over a year sooner than scheduled. 
That congress abolished the Central Committee and the Politburo 
in favor of a Supreme Party Council headed by a presidency. To 
streamline party activity, the new council had only 131 members, 
59 fewer than the last Central Committee. The Secretariat was 
abolished. The party emerged from the congress with significant 



198 



Government and Politics 



splits between reform and conservative factions and a new tem- 
porary program. Only about 10 percent of previous Central Com- 
mittee members became members of the new Supreme Party 
Council; several party stalwarts who had survived the Zhivkov over- 
throw, including Prime Minister Atanasov, were not elected. The 
BCP's constitutional guarantee of the leading role in Bulgarian so- 
ciety already had been abolished. In a compromise with the UDF 
shortly after the congress, party organizations were banned from 
workplaces and the armed forces. The BSP had full control of the 
government (the UDF refused to form a coalition both before and 
after the 1990 elections), but BSP popularity and power ebbed 
rapidly during 1990 and 1991 . By the first anniversary of Zhivkov' s 
resignation, party membership had decreased to an estimated 
250,000. (Membership had been reported as 984,000 at the time 
of the Fourteenth Party Congress.) 

The Union of Democratic Forces 

The Union of Democratic Forces (UDF; Bulgarian Sayuz na 
Demokratichnite Sili — SDS), which emerged as the chief opposi- 
tion faction to the BCP after 1989, was a motley coalition of sev- 
eral major and many minor parties and groups. Some of the parties, 
such as the BANU, predated the communist era by several decades. 
Others, such as the Green Party, were organized after the over- 
throw of Zhivkov. When the UDF was founded in December 1989, 
it included ten organizations; by the following spring, six more par- 
ties and movements had joined. 

The basis of the UDF was the dissident groups that formed under 
the faltering Zhivkov regime in the late 1980s. The all-European 
Ecoforum of October 1989 allowed many such groups to meet and 
exchange ideas for the first time; once Zhivkov fell, the initial con- 
tacts spawned an organizational declaration that envisioned a loose 
confederation. Within the confederation, constituent groups would 
continue to work for their own specific interests. The coordinat- 
ing council was to include three members from each organization. 
Longtime dissident philosopher Zheliu Zhelev was elected chair- 
man and Petur Beron, a well-known environmental scientist, was 
chosen secretary. 

The diversity of membership required substantial compromise 
in the UDF program. At least one issue central to each member 
group was included in the program, however. The general goals 
of the program were a civil society, market economy, multiparty 
system, and constitutional government. Sixteen specific steps were 
outlined to achieve those goals. The main criterion for acceptance 



199 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

of new member organizations was compatibility of their goals with 
those in the UDF program. 

Shortly after the UDF was founded, a vital policy decision con- 
fronted its leaders: the BCP-dominated government revoked the 
Zhivkov program of Bulgarizing the names of all Turkish citizens. 
Alienating the extreme nationalist factions that opposed compromise 
with the ethnic minority, the UDF supported the government de- 
cision in its first major policy statement. 

In the first half of 1990, the stature of the UDF was enhanced 
by its participation as an equal in round table discussions with the 
BCP (BSP) on a range of policy issues that would set future eco- 
nomic and political policy. By March 1990, the coalition's main 
goal was clearly stated: to push the interim National Assembly to 
draft a democratic constitution and urgent reform legislation as 
quickly as possible, over the opposition of remaining BSP hard- 
liners and noncommunist splinter groups. All factions recognized 
that once this was completely accomplished, the coalition would 
dissolve and members would act as independent political parties 
with varying agendas. 

In the parliamentary elections of June 1990, the UDF platform 
advocated a wide range of drastic reforms in government struc- 
ture, the media, foreign policy, and the economy. Detailed proposals 
were offered for education, the environment, and a two-phase 
"shock therapy" reform leading to a free market economy. Finally, 
the UDF blamed the previous communist regime for Bulgaria's 
current crises. The UDF failed to gain a majority in the National 
Assembly because many rural areas remained in control of Zhiv- 
kovite BSP politicians. Many peasants had felt relatively secure 
under the old collective system, and the timing of the election had 
forced opposition parties to concentrate campaigns in the cities, 
their strongest regions. The BSP won 211 of the 400 seats. 

In the year following parliamentary elections, BSP obstructionism 
stymied legalization of the UDF's reform goals. On the other hand, 
the UDF's refusal to participate in the Lukanov cabinet proved 
its popular strength by stalemating Lukanov 's economic reform 
program. In the crisis-driven formation of the Popov government 
in December 1990, the UDF gained strategic cabinet posts. In Janu- 
ary 1991 , the UDF and the BSP agreed on a timetable for passage 
of the new constitution and other urgent legislation, but early in 
1991 parliamentary disagreements set back the schedule. In March 
1991, the UDF sponsored a protest rally attended by more than 
50,000 people in Sofia. In May legislators from several smaller par- 
ties walked out of the National Assembly to protest its inaction; 
the BANU contingent promised to do the same if the parliament 



200 



A group of demonstrators for the Union of Democratic Forces 
(identified by SDS on their banner) prior to the election of June 1990 

Courtesy Charles Sudetic 



201 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

had not passed a new constitution by the end of June. Meanwhile, 
however, official UDF policy continued seeking to break the long 
stalemate by convincing the socialists in the National Assembly to 
abandon their go-slow approach to reform. 

By mid- 1991 a split developed between the largest member 
groups (the reconstituted BSDP, the BANU, Ekoglasnost, and the 
Green Party) and the smaller ones over using quotas and preferen- 
tial lists in the next election — a practice that would contradict the 
UDF's role as a single national movement and give larger parties 
substantially more influence in policy making. Easily the largest 
member organizations with about 100,000 members each, the 
BANU and the BSDP would benefit most from such a shift. In 
July 1991, voting in the National Assembly on the new constitu- 
tion clarified the split between factions viewing the UDF as a sin- 
gle national movement and those seeking individual identity within 
a loose confederation. The main issue was the constitutional 
prescription for legislative representation by party. By summer 
1991, disagreements on ratification of the constitution had led 
splinter groups to form a new Political Consultative Council to rival 
the UDF's existing National Coordinating Council as a controll- 
ing agency of the UDF. This action threatened to split the UDF 
into two or three slates of candidates for the 1991 national elec- 
tions. Thus, by mid- 1991 the relative harmony of the UDF's first 
year had evolved into persistent divisiveness affecting tactics, or- 
ganizational structure, and the pace of reform. In spite of concilia- 
tory efforts by the coordinating council, the effective united front 
that had forced major concessions from the BSP in 1990 seemed 
less potent in 1991. 

Trade Unions 

The Bulgarian trade union movement was rejuvenated in the 
pluralist post-Zhivkov political atmosphere after being forced to 
adhere totally to BCP policy throughout the postwar period. By 
1990 unions were a powerful policy-making force, using well- 
organized strikes and walkouts to emphasize their positions. 

Unions under Communist Regimes 

In the decade before World War II, the benign dictatorship of 
Tsar Boris III abolished independent trade unions in favor of a 
single government-sponsored Bulgarian Workers' Union. As Bul- 
garia emerged from the war under Soviet occupation, communists 
abolished that union and replaced it with a General Workers' 
Professional Union that included both white- and blue-collar work- 
ers. Gradually, independent union organizations were forced to 



202 



Government and Politics 



disband or join the communist organization. By 1947 union lead- 
ers were an important instrument in consolidation of the party's 
power. When capitalism was declared illegal in 1948, the Dimitrov 
government united thirteen unions under the Central Council of 
Trade Unions, which endured until 1989 as the single umbrella 
organization representing Bulgarian workers. 

During that entire period, all workers' and professional organi- 
zations followed faithfully the economic policies of the BCP. The 
official goals of the Bulgarian trade unions were first to help manage- 
ment to fulfill state economic plans, then to defend workers' interests 
when they did not conflict with such fulfillment. As institutions 
the unions had no policy input. In individual enterprises, union 
leaders and managers developed informal advisory relationships. 
The only official role of the unions was as transmitters of party 
policies to the working masses. Although union and BCP mem- 
bership were theoretically separate, officials at the national and local 
levels often overlapped to give the party direct control of workers. 
For example, members of the district-level people's councils often 
were also union executives (see Local Government, this ch.). 

General congresses of trade unions were held explicitly to carry 
out BCP policy; congress delegate structure (2,997 attended the 
ninth congress in 1982) and the holding of preliminary district con- 
gresses mimicked BCP procedures. The many industrial reorgani- 
zation plans of the Zhivkov regime meant periodic restructuring, 
if not new roles, for the unions. In the early 1980s, for example, 
the decentralizing reforms of the New Economic Model (NEM) 
changed the labor union structure from one divided by region to 
one divided by brigade, collective, and enterprise, matching the 
NEM industrial structure of the time. Although this change was 
controversial, it did little to improve the influence of the Bulgar- 
ian working class on enterprise policy. 

In the 1980s, union membership approached 4 million, encom- 
passing an estimated 98 percent of Bulgarian workers. Almost a 
year before the fall of Zhivkov, the Independent Labor Federa- 
tion, Podkrepa, organized as a white-collar opposition group in- 
spired by the Polish Solidarity (see Glossary) movement. In 1989 
Podkrepa consistently was persecuted for its outspoken criticism 
of Zhivkov's policies. 

Independent Union Organizations 

When the communist regime was overthrown, the central coun- 
cil began restructuring the trade union system, declaring the or- 
ganization independent of the BCP and renaming its umbrella 



203 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

organization the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions 
(CITU). In 1990 BCP organizations were banned from work places, 
although the continuing overlap of party and union officials main- 
tained substantial communist influence in the CITU at local lev- 
els. In the early reform years, the CITU and Podkrepa were the 
two major trade union federations, although many independent 
unions also emerged in this revival period for the movement. Early 
in 1990, Podkrepa established its credibility by exacting an agree- 
ment with CITU guaranteeing its members all the rights (and the 
substantial privileges) accorded official trade unions under the pre- 
vious system. From the beginning, Podkrepa sought maximum in- 
fluence on government policy, repeatedly demanding radical 
economic reform. 

Podkrepa grew rapidly in 1990 because of its roles as a charter 
member of the UDF, as a participant in the policy round tables 
with the BCP, and as the organizer of strikes and demonstrations 
against the communist-dominated Lukanov government. In early 
1990, an estimated 300 strikes helped convince the government that 
talks with opposition groups were necessary. Although Podkrepa 
ran no candidates in the national elections of 1990, it vigorously 
supported candidates who espoused labor views. In late 1990, 
another wave of strikes pushed the Lukanov government out and 
led to the coalition Popov government. Although CITU and other 
unions participitated, Podkrepa usually was the prime organizer 
in such actions. 

CITU, whose membership of 3 million dwarfed the 400,000 of 
Podkrepa, remained politically passive in the early post-Zhivkov 
period. In mid- 1990 CITU began issuing statements critical of 
government inactivity, and it mobilized 500,000 workers to par- 
ticipate in the November 1990 strikes initiated by Podkrepa against 
the Lukanov government. 

The strikes that forced Lukanov' s resignation also raised criti- 
cism of the political role of both labor organizations late in 1990 
(see Governance after Zhivkov, this ch.). CITU received criticism 
for both its continued ties with the BSP and its aggressive refor- 
mist stance. The Supreme Party Council of the BSP declared a 
policy of noninterference in CITU affairs. Meanwhile, Podkrepa, 
led by controversial, outspokenly anticommunist Konstantin Tren- 
chev, responded to internal and external criticism by changing from 
active membership to observor status in the UDF. 

The unions continued active participation in political decision 
making in 1991, however. Because economic reforms brought sub- 
stantial unemployment and workplace disruption, representing 
worker interests was synonymous with such involvement in this 



204 



Government and Politics 



period. In January 1991, CITU and Podkrepa signed a "social peace 
agreement" with the Popov government to refrain from striking dur- 
ing the first phase of economic reform in exchange for limitations 
on work-force cutbacks (see Market Reform, ch. 3). However, juris- 
dictional and policy disputes threatened to undermine the agree- 
ment. Although both organizations continued to support the Popov 
government, in March 1991 Podkrepa proposed that UDF represen- 
tatives boycott the National Assembly because it failed to pass re- 
form measures. 

As opposition to the communists declined as a uniting factor, 
Bulgaria's trade unions maneuvered to shape new roles for them- 
selves in 1991 . Representing 40 percent of the population in a wide- 
open political culture, they exerted tremendous influence on policy 
even in the first post-Zhivkov year. The radical economic reform 
envisioned by Bulgarian leaders would include entirely new rela- 
tionships among the government, enterprise management, and 
unions. Movement to a Western- style free-market economy would 
mean conceding some worker rights taken for granted under the 
command economy, but compromise with the Podkrepa-led union 
movement promised to be a severe test for other political insti- 
tutions. 

Youth Organizations 

Following the model of the Soviet Union, the BCP put massive 
resources into its party youth organization when it came to power. 
Officially called the Communist Youth League of Bulgaria (later 
the Dimitrov Communist Youth League of Bulgaria) and abbrevi- 
ated to Komsomol, the league sought to ensure that proper socialist 
values would pass to the next generation and to supply new mem- 
bers for the party. With a peak membership of 1 .5 million in 1987, 
the Komsomol had the same organizational structure as the BCP, 
with a secretariat and executive bureau analogous to the Politburo 
at the top and a pyramid of local and regional sub-organizations. 
Besides instilling party dogma in Bulgarian youth, the organiza- 
tion was a vehicle for enforcing party directives, a source of reserve 
personnel, an organizer of social and recreational activities, and, 
in the 1980s, an instrument for encouraging computer training in 
the schools. Beginning in the mid-1970s, the Komsomol's lack of 
self-confidence was revealed in a series of party meetings, speeches, 
and programs aimed at explaining and combatting apathy and 
materialism in Bulgarian youth. By the late 1980s, the Komsomol 
was widely seen as a hollow facade; between 1987 and 1989, mem- 
bership dropped by 30 percent after compulsory registration ended 
in secondary schools. 



205 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

Immediately after the overthrow of Zhivkov, alternative youth 
groups began to form. One such group, the Federation of Indepen- 
dent Students' Unions (FISU), gained support by advocating com- 
plete separation of student groups from the BCP/BSP and its 
ideological constraints and by proclaiming itself a student voice on 
questions of national policy. FISU gained stature by being a charter 
member of the UDF. 

Meanwhile, the Komsomol acknowledged past failures, changed 
its name to the Bulgarian Democratic Youth (BDY), and began 
issuing policy statements on student rights and broader social is- 
sues. The organization was decentralized by giving local affiliates 
substantial autonomy, and democratized by limiting the terms of 
officials. Election of a political unknown, Rosen Karadimov, as 
first secretary was another signal that the youth organization had 
broken with conventional communist party practices. 

The BDY was overwhelmed by a wave of student activism in 
alternative groups. Student strikes in support of the anti-Lukanov 
labor strikes in late 1990 shut down major universities. And, like 
the BSP, the BDY faced reminders and accusations of its misdeeds 
in the pre reform era. In late 1990, the BDY returned to the state 
much of the property the Komsomol had accumulated during de- 
cades of BCP funding. It also renounced socialism and recast it- 
self as an apolitical social organization. 

The Movement for Rights and Freedoms 

With 120,000 members, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms 
(MRF) was the fourth largest political organization in Bulgaria in 
1991, but it occupied a special place in the political process. The 
leader of the movement, Ahmed Dogan, was imprisoned in 1986 
for opposition to the Zhivkov policy of assimilating ethnic Turks 
(see Bulgaria in the 1980s, ch. 1). Founded in 1990 to represent 
the interests of the Turkish ethnic minority, the MRF gained 
twenty-three seats in the first parliamentary election that year, giv- 
ing it the fourth-largest parliamentary voting bloc. Its agenda 
precluded mass media coverage or building coalitions with other 
parties, because of the strong anti-Turkish element in Bulgaria's 
political culture. By mid- 1991, the UDF had held only one joint 
demonstration with the MRF; their failure to reconcile differences 
was considered a major weakness in the opposition to the majority 
BSP. In early 1990, the MRF protested vigorously but unsuccess- 
fully its exclusion from national round table discussions among the 
major Bulgarian parties. 

In 1991 the MRF broadened its platform to embrace all issues 
of civil rights in Bulgaria, aiming "to contribute to the unity of 



206 



Government and Politics 



the Bulgarian people and to the full and unequivocal compliance 
with the rights and freedoms of mankind and of all ethnic, reli- 
gious, and cultural communities in Bulgaria." The MRF took this 
step partly to avoid the constitutional prohibition of political par- 
ties based on ethnic or religious groups. The group's specific goals 
were ensuring that the new constitution protect ethnic minorities 
adequately; introducing Turkish as an optional school subject; and 
bringing to trial the leaders of the assimilation campaign in the 
1980s. To calm Bulgarian nationalist resentment, the MRF cate- 
gorically renounced Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, and am- 
bitions for autonomy within Bulgaria. Political overtures were made 
regularly to the UDF, and some local cooperation occurred in 1991 . 
Although the MRF remained the fastest growing party in Bulgaria, 
however, the sensitivity of the Turkish issue caused official UDF 
policy to keep the MRF in isolation. 

Other Political Organizations 

Besides the BSP and the BANU, parties officially sanctioned 
under Zhivkov, an unofficial list of political organizations in early 
1990 contained fourteen political parties, seven unions and labor 
federations, and sixteen forums, clubs, movements, committees, 
and associations — diverging widely in scope, special interests, and 
size. 

Ecological Organizations 

Two ecological organizations, the Green Party in Bulgaria and 
Ekoglasnost, were founding members of the UDF. The Greens, 
which separated from Ekoglasnost shortly after Zhivkov 's fall, in- 
cluded mostly scientists and academics. Their platform stressed de- 
centralized government and a strong role for the individual in 
determining quality of life and preservation of the environment. 
The government was to play a leading role, however, in provid- 
ing social security, health care, and support for scientific reasearch. 
Ekoglasnost, which described itself as nonpolitical despite its role 
in the UDF, was founded in early 1989 as an open association of 
environmentally concerned citizens. Its purpose was to collect and 
publicize ecological information about proposed projects, and to 
assist decision makers in following environmentally sound policy. 
Ekoglasnost had a membership of 35,000 at the end of 1990. 

Revived Prewar Parties 

The Bulgarian Social Democratic Party (BSDP) was an offshoot 
of the movement that produced the BCP. The main socialist party 
in Bulgaria between the world wars, the BSDP was disbanded by 



207 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

the communists in 1948. It resurfaced in 1990, resuming its ad- 
vocacy of government reform and elimination of social privilege. 
The BSDP saw a freely elected National Assembly as the chief in- 
strument of popular democracy. The BSDP party platform also 
called for close economic ties with Europe, disarmament, and 
respect for private property. The BSDP was a founding member 
of the UDF and, under the controversial leadership of Petur 
Dertliev, one of its most active participants. 

The history of the BSDP followed closely that of the communists, 
except that the latter had a larger following. The BSDP recovered 
official status in 1990 after being disbanded in 1948. Represent- 
ing the middle class, the party stood for private property rights, 
a multiparty parliamentary system of government, radical reduc- 
tion of the military budget, and active participation in the Euro- 
pean Community. Membership in 1991 was 25,000 to 30,000. 

The Petkov branch of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union 
(BANU), the third of the prewar parties to emerge as an indepen- 
dent entity after Zhivkov, was the part of the agrarian movement 
that had actively opposed the communists between 1944 and 1947 
and thus did not survive the postwar communist consolidation. The 
"official" BANU, showpiece opposition party to the BCP from 
1947 until 1989, also was revitalized in 1990. In 1990 and 1991, 
efforts were made to reunite the two factions. (Petkov himself was 
officially rehabilitated by the National Assembly in 1990.) In its 
new incarnation, the Petkov branch advocated complete govern- 
ment decentralization, extensive support for agricultural privati- 
zation and investment, punishment of the communists and 
"official" agrarians for crimes against the Petkov branch, and a 
general return to the populist ideas of Stamboliiski (see Stamboliiski 
and Agrarian Reform, ch. 1). Together with the BSDP, the Petkov 
BANU was the largest (110,000 members in 1991) and most ac- 
tive constituent of the UDF. 

The Monarchist Movement 

Simeon II, exiled son of Tsar Boris III, was 54 years old in 1991 , 
healthy, and popular with many Bulgarians. In the difficult reform 
years, he was the center of a small but significant movement that 
saw restoration of the monarchy as a solution to the dilemmas of 
governing society. Simeon encouraged the movement by agree- 
ing to return if his people wished a restoration. Newly available 
publications on the history of the Bulgarian monarchy, especially 
Boris III, had evoked considerable public interest by 1991. A 
referendum on monarchy-versus-republic was scheduled for July 
1991, then cancelled by the National Assembly because of its 



208 



Government and Politics 



potentially divisive impact and because of strong opposition from 
the BSP and most UDF factions. The new constitution's descrip- 
tion of Bulgaria as a republic ended official consideration of resto- 
ration in 1991, but Simeon's personal popularity preserved 
monarchism as a political option for many disillusioned Bulgari- 
ans in the early 1990s. 

The Public and Political Decision Making 

In the post-Zhivkov era, extreme diversification of political or- 
ganizations and activities paralleled a similar liberation in the media 
and the arts. Under Zhivkov, Bulgaria had followed the totalitarian 
formula for media control, allowing only official radio and tele- 
vision stations and newspapers that were conduits for the official 
party line on all subjects. Limited artistic freedom came in several 
"thaw" periods (notably in the mid-1960s and the late 1970s) that 
closely followed similar relaxation in the Soviet Union. The cha- 
risma of Liudmila Zhivkova, appointed by her father to oversee 
cultural affairs in 1975, notably lightened the Bulgarian cultural 
scene from the late 1970s through 1981. The early 1980s was a 
time of unprecedented freedom for media discussion of contro- 
versial topics; the Law on Plebiscites (1983) was to have pro- 
moted discussion of preselected issues of public interest, but by 1984 
party reactionaries had reasserted control. The 1984 Bulgarian 
Writers' Conference called for more ideological content in litera- 
ture, signaling a change that lasted through the end of the Zhiv- 
kov regime. 

The Intelligentsia 

Intellectual groups developed no formal organizations comparable 
to groups in other East European countries because the small in- 
tellectual community centered in one city (Sofia) required no such 
measures. Furthermore, the Bulgarian Writers' Union already con- 
tained a large percentage of the intelligentsia. Especially during 
the "thaw" periods, factions in the union showed substantial diver- 
sity in their approach to the role of art versus that of the state. A 
much smaller Bulgarian Artist's Union and Bulgarian Journalists' 
Union had similar status. A samizdat (underground publication) 
network did circulate dissident writings from the Soviet Union and 
elsewhere. Among official publications, Narodna kultura (People's 
Culture) gained a singular reputation between 1984 and 1988 by 
publishing provocative articles on politics, economics, education, 
and the environment. In 1988 Zhivkov fired its editor Stefan Prodev 
for helping found a dissident organization. 



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Bulgaria: A Country Study 

Zhivkov and the Intelligentsia 

Until the late 1980s, Zhivkov successfully prevented unrest in 
the Bulgarian intellectual community. Membership in the writers' 
union brought enormous privilege and social stature, and that drew 
many dissident writers such as Georgi Dzhagarov and Liubomir 
Levchev into the circle of the officially approved intelligentsia. On 
the other hand, entry required intellectual compromise, and refusal 
to compromise led to dismissal from the union and loss of all 
privileges. The punishment of dissident writers sometimes went 
far beyond loss of privileges. In 1978 emigre writer Georgi Markov 
was murdered in London for his anticommunist broadcasts for the 
British Broadcasting Corporation, and Blaga Dimitrova was harshly 
denounced for her critical portrayal of party officials in her 1982 
novel Litse. 

Zhivkov also softened organized opposition by restoring sym- 
bols of the Bulgarian cultural past that had been cast aside in the 
postwar campaign to consolidate Soviet- style party control. Begin- 
ning in 1967, he appealed loudly to the people to remember "our 
motherland Bulgaria." In the late 1970s, Zhivkov mended rela- 
tions with the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, and in 1981 Liudmila 
Zhivkova's national celebration of Bulgaria's 1,300th anniversary 
raised patriotic feeling. Zhivkov' s extensive campaign of cultural 
restoration provided at least some common ground between him 
and the Bulgarian intelligentsia. 

The Ferment of 1988-90 

In late 1987, dissatisfaction with government corruption, pollu- 
tion, the Turkish issue, and repeated failure of economic reform 
programs began to stimulate open political dissent. By that time, 
a younger generation had matured, unimpressed by communist 
doctrine and disinclined to blind obedience. In November 1987, 
the Federation of Clubs for Glasnost and Democracy (originally 
the Discussion Club for Support of Glasnost and Perestroika) was 
founded by communist intellectuals to promote openness in Bul- 
garian society. In early 1988, the appearance of the Independent 
Association for Defense of Human Rights in Bulgaria publicized 
the repression of the regime. Meanwhile, the fragmented intellec- 
tual community had been galvanized by a single issue: environ- 
mental degradation. In the winter of 1987-88, an ecological 
exhibition in Ruse, one of the most seriously polluted industrial 
centers in Bulgaria, received national media attention. The com- 
munist regime's failure to protect its people from such dangers 
became a symbol for the general aura of incompetence that 
surrounded Zhivkov in the late 1980s. 



210 



Government and Politics 



In mid- 1988 Zhivkov responded to the new opposition by purg- 
ing two high pro-glasnost party officials, signaling that the party 
would permit glasnost only on its own terms. The BCP also tried 
to preempt environmental opposition by forming the Movement 
for Environmental Protection and Restoration amid promises for 
stiffer environmental regulation. 

In late 1988 and early 1989, many leaders of independent Bul- 
garian groups were deported or harrassed. Nevertheless, by 
mid- 1989 at least thirteen independent associations and commit- 
tees had been founded for the defense of human rights and the en- 
vironment. Then in 1989, communism was discredited by successful 
freedom movements in Hungary, Poland, East Germany, and 
Czechoslovakia. By that time, glasnost had stimulated political di- 
alog in the Soviet Union, which was still the model for Bulgarian 
political behavior. Under these new conditions, government in- 
timidation failed. Although Zhivkov sought reconciliation with the 
intelligentsia by proclaiming a "new cultural revolution" in early 
1989, the unions of writers, journalists, and artists leveled strong 
criticism on the environment and other issues. When Ekoglasnost 
was formed that year, it made a formidable public appeal for an 
accounting of economic policies that harmed the environment (see 
Other Political Organizations, this ch.). 

In 1989 the Federation of Clubs backed the National Assembly 
petition against Turkish assimilation by characterizing the policy 
as against the best traditions of the Bulgarian nation. According 
to one theory, the Zhivkov policy toward the Turks was calculated 
to alienate the intelligentsia from the ethnocentric Bulgarian major- 
ity by forcing the former to take sides with the Turks; whatever 
its purpose, the policy failed amid the massive Turkish exodus of 
1989. Leaders of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, deported 
for defending the Turks, were welcomed at a session of the CSCE, 
severely damaging Zhivkov' s image in Europe. In the fall of 1989, 
dissident groups received further validation at the CSCE Conference 
on the Environment in Sofia, where they held public meetings and 
were received by Western delegates. The mass demonstrations that 
followed convinced the BCP that the Zhivkov regime could not 
survive . 

Dramatic expression of public discontent continued after the 
Zhivkov ouster. In mid- 1990 tent-city demonstrations in Sofia con- 
tinued for several weeks, encountering no effective official resistance. 
Patterned after peaceful antigovernment protests of the 1960s in 
the West, the Sofia campsite of over 100 tents near the BSP head- 
quarters building began as a protest against communist reten- 
tion of power in the national elections of June 1990. The protest 



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Bulgaria: A Country Study 

eventually included demonstrators of many political viewpoints. 
Besides election fraud by the BSP, issues targeted were the Cher- 
nobyl' coverup, corruption among former and present BCP/BSP 
officials, Bulgaria's role in the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and past 
actions of present government officials such as Lukanov and In- 
terior Minister Atanas Semerdzhiev. The tent city played an impor- 
tant role in publicizing reform issues as a new national government 
was being formed. 

The Media and Public Issues 

In the wake of Zhivkov's overthrow, fast-spreading pluralism 
in the media and intellectual circles brought a din of conflicting 
opinion to the public. In 1987 Bulgaria had seventeen daily 
newspapers, most of which were local. By 1991 eight national 
newspapers were publishing, and an expanding variety of local and 
weekly papers was available. Until 1990 the chief daily newspaper 
was Rabotnichesko delo, the official organ of the BCP. After the fall 
of Zhivkov, the daily was renamed Duma; in its new format, it began 
to feature more balanced accounts of national problems, reflect- 
ing the moderate image now cultivated by its sponsoring organi- 
zation. The fragmentation of politics in 1990 brought a newspaper 
boom that included a full spectrum of political views. In 1991 the 
leading papers by circulation were Duma, Demokratsiya (an indepen- 
dent), the trade union daily Trud, and Zemia, aimed primarily at 
rural readers. The most popular weeklies were Sturshel, featuring 
folk humor, and the long- running Pogled. The weekly 168 Chasa 
went furthest in rejecting traditional Bulgarian journalism in favor 
of sophisticated parody and Western-style in-depth features. 

Universities dropped their required study of Marxist-Leninist 
ideology, and student organizations emerged immediately to as- 
sert positions on a wide variety of issues (see Youth Organizations, 
this ch.). In numerous national polls, the public expressed dissatis- 
faction with government leaders, economic policies (as both too 
radical and too conservative), and the BSP. Vestiges of the tradi- 
tional gap between city and village remained, however: on the aver- 
age, rural Bulgarians expressed less support for market reform and 
noncommunist leaders, placed less blame on the communists for 
current problems, and opposed complete rights for the Turkish 
minority more strongly. 

In 1990-91 the media featured major exposes on malfeasance 
by the Zhivkov regime (acknowledged by the present BSP under 
public pressure), coverups of radiation exposure from the Kozloduy 
Nuclear Power Plant and the Chernobyl' disaster in the Soviet 



212 



Demonstrators outside parliament building in Sofia demand 
resignation of the Bulgarian Socialist Party government, November 1990. 

Courtesy Charles Sudetic 

Union, and the murder of Georgi Markov (a full-scale investiga- 
tion of which opened in 1990). In mid- 1991 Bulgaria opened its 
archives to an international commission investigating the 1981 as- 
sassination attempt on Pope John Paul II. In spite of those develop- 
ments, in 1991 government agencies and individuals still threatened 
independent publications with court action for "treasonous" state- 
ments. In a 1991 poll by the independent 168 Chasa, 46 percent 
of respondents expressed the belief that a campaign had been or- 
ganized to control the Bulgarian media (the BSP and party offi- 
cials were most often named responsible), and 37 percent said that 
freedom of the press was not in danger in Bulgaria. 

The Permanent Commission for Human Rights and the National 
Problem was created in 1990 as an advisory and investigatory 
agency of the National Assembly. Composed of thirty-nine mem- 
bers of parliament, the commission received the nominal assign- 
ment of investigating past and present human rights violations in 
Bulgaria, recommending appropriate compensation, and drafting 
new human rights legislation. Among the issues addressed in the 
commission's first year were restoration of government-confiscated 
property to churches and Turkish citizens; verifying complaints 
of unfair sentencing and inhumane prison conditions; proposing 



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Bulgaria: A Country Study 

laws to replace restrictive legislation such as the Law on Religious 
Beliefs and the Law on Passports; and erecting legal barriers against 
state persecution for political reasons (see Religion, ch. 2). In Janu- 
ary 1991, commission chairman Svetoslav Shivarov reported that 
all political prisoners in Bulgaria had been freed. 

The Turkish Problem 

As in other parts of Eastern Europe, the repeal of single-party 
rule in Bulgaria exposed the long-standing grievances of an ethnic 
minority. Especially in the 1980s, the Zhivkov regime had syste- 
matically persecuted the Turkish population, which at one time 
numbered 1.5 million and was estimated at 1.25 million in 1991. 
Mosques were closed, Turks were forced to Slavicize their names, 
education in the native language was denied, and police brutality 
was used to discourage resistance (see Turks, ch. 2). The urban 
intelligentsia that partcipated in the 1990 reform movement pushed 
the post-Zhivkov governments toward restoring constitutionally 
guaranteed human rights to the Turks. But abrogation of Zhiv- 
kov 's assimilation program soon after his fall brought massive pro- 
tests by ethnic Bulgarians, even in Sofia. 

In January 1990, the Social Council of Citizens, a national body 
representing all political and ethnic groups, reached a compromise 
that guaranteed the Turks freedom of religion, choice of names, 
and unimpeded practice of cultural traditions and use of Turkish 
within the community. In turn, the Bulgarian nationalists were 
promised that Bulgarian would remain the official language and 
that no movement for autonomy or separatism would be tolerated. 
Especially in areas where Turks outnumbered Bulgarians, the lat- 
ter feared progressive "Islamification" or even invasion and an- 
nexation by Turkey — a fear that had been fed consciously by the 
Zhivkov assimilation campaign and was revived by the BSP in 1991 . 
Because radical elements of the Turkish population did advocate 
separatism, however, the nonannexation provision of the com- 
promise was vital. 

The Bulgarian governments that followed Zhivkov tried to realize 
the conditions of the compromise as quickly as possible. In the multi- 
party election of 1990, the Turks won representation in the Na- 
tional Assembly by twenty-three candidates of the predominantly 
Turkish MRF (see The Movement for Rights and Freedoms, this 
ch.). At that point, ethnic Bulgarians, many remaining from the 
Zhivkov regime, still held nearly all top jobs in government and 
industry, even in predominantly Turkish Kurdzhali Province. 
Nevertheless, parts of Bulgarian society felt threatened by the rise 
of the MRF. In 1990 that faction collided with a hard-line Bulgarian 



214 



Government and Politics 



group, the National Committee for Defense of National Interests — 
an organization containing many former communists instrumen- 
tal in the Zhivkov assimilation program. In November 1990, Bul- 
garian nationalists established the Razgrad Bulgarian Republic in 
a heavily Turkish region to protest the government's program of 
restoring rights to the Turks. In the first half of 1991, intermittent 
violence and demonstrations were directed at both Turks and Bul- 
garians in Razgrad. 

These conditions forced the government to find a balance be- 
tween Turkish demands and demonstrations for full recognition 
of their culture and language, and Bulgarian nationalist complaints 
against preferential treatment for the ethnic minority. In 1991 the 
most important issue of the controversy was restoring Turkish- 
language teaching in the schools of Turkish ethnic districts (see Edu- 
cation, ch. 2). In 1991 the Popov government took initial steps in 
this direction, but long delays brought massive Turkish protests, 
especially in Kurdzhali. In mid- 1991 continuing strikes and pro- 
tests on both sides of the issue had brought no new discussions of 
compromise. Frustration with unmet promises encouraged Tur- 
kish separatists in both Bulgaria and Turkey, which in turn fueled 
the ethnocentric fears of the Bulgarian majority — and the entire 
issue diverted valuable energy from the national reform effort. 
Although most political parties supported full minority rights, in 
1991 the strength of Bulgarian nationalist sentiment, deeply rooted 
in centuries of conflict with the Ottoman Empire and not inclined 
to compromise, promised to make the Turkish question the most 
pressing human rights issue in Bulgaria for the foreseeable future. 

Foreign Policy 

From World War II until 1989, Bulgarian foreign policy revolved 
around the Soviet Union. Without exception Sofia imitated or sup- 
ported Soviet twists and turns such as Khrushchev's denunciation 
of Stalin in 1956 and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Sub- 
stantial historical and economic ties supplemented the ideological 
foundation of the relationship. In the 1970s and 1980s, Bulgaria 
improved its diplomatic relations with nations outside the Soviet 
sphere. But in 1989, domestic and international events jolted Bul- 
garia from forty years of uniformity and forced it to consider for 
the first time major diversification of its foreign policy, abandon- 
ing its paramount reliance on the Soviet Union. This meant a 
lengthy period of reevaluation, during which general goals were 
agreed upon but specific policy was hotly debated. 

In 1991 Foreign Affairs Minister Viktor Vulkov listed several 
general goals of his ministry: the integration of Bulgaria as fully 



215 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

as possible into the unified European Community to facilitate de- 
velopment of a market economy and Western political institutions; 
improving relations with all Bulgaria's Balkan neighbors and the 
countries of the Black Sea region, with emphasis on mutual ter- 
ritorial integrity and sovereignty; active participation in the United 
Nations and other international organizations able to guarantee 
the security of small states; and maintaining as much as possible 
of Bulgaria's unique relationship with the Soviet Union while draw- 
ing much closer to the United States. Once the economic advan- 
tages of membership in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(Comecon — see Glossary) disappeared in 1990 and instability be- 
came chronic in the Soviet Union, other sources of economic and 
geopolitical security became the primary quest in Bulgaria's prag- 
matic search for foreign partners (see Bulgaria in Comecon, ch. 3). 
In 1990 indications of the new pragmatism were recognition of the 
Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Israel and an official invita- 
tion for the pope to visit Bulgaria. 

The Foreign Policy Establishment 

Major changes were made in the organizations conducting Bul- 
garian foreign affairs after the ouster of Zhivkov. Post-Zhivkov 
governments ended the practice of selecting members of the Minis- 
try of Internal Affairs for diplomatic positions in which they gathered 
intelligence and carried out subversive activities abroad (see Security 
and Intelligence Services, ch. 5). Admitting that the Bulgarian in- 
telligence presence abroad had been extensive under Zhivkov, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared in mid- 1991 that henceforth 
only a single, identified intelligence officer would remain in each 
Western embassy. In a sharp streamlining of the diplomatic corps, 
200 of Bulgaria's 544 foreign diplomats were called home in 1990 
and 1991, and 20 of its 79 foreign missions were closed, mostly 
in Third World countries (relations with those countries continued, 
however). 

Under the communist Lukanov government of 1990, President 
Zheliu Zhelev assumed major responsibilities as head of state in 
talks with foreign leaders; his nonpartisan political position at home 
and his direct approach to foreign and economic issues gained 
Zhelev respect as a spokesman in Bulgaria and abroad, as well as 
large-scale commitments of aid from several Western sources (see 
Domestic and International Economic Policies in the 1990s, ch. 3). 
When Popov formed his government in 1991 , Vulkov (leader of the 
BANU) replaced a former Zhivkovite intelligence official as minister 
of foreign affairs, supplementing Zhelev' s efforts and improving 
the world image of Bulgaria's official foreign policy agency. 



216 



Government and Politics 



Relations with Balkan Neighbors 

Although the Zhivkov regime often advocated closer relations 
and multilateral cooperation with Yugoslavia, Turkey, Greece, 
Albania, and Romania, a number of traditional issues barred sig- 
nificant improvement until the late 1980s. Bulgarian proposals to 
make the Balkans a zone free of chemical and nuclear weapons, 
or a "zone of peace and understanding" (advanced by Zhivkov 
at the behest of the Soviet Union, to eliminate weapons of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO — see Glossary) from the 
region) was vetoed on several occasions. But in 1990, Zhelev was 
able to remove some of the suspicion that had barred rapproche- 
ment by the Zhivkov regime. Post-Zhivkov regimes sought closer 
relations with both Greece and Turkey, partly in the hope that 
NATO would grant Bulgaria membership to form a bridge between 
its two mutually hostile members. 

Yugoslavia 

Bulgarian relations with Yugoslavia were conditioned by old 
issues of Balkan politics and by strong domestic political forces at 
work in both countries. Throughout the 1980s, the Yugoslav media 
complained loudly that Bulgaria mistreated its Macedonian citizens 
by insisting that Macedonians were ethnically Bulgarians, mak- 
ing separate ethnic recognition inappropriate. The Zhivkov regime 
(and its successors), fearing that inflamed nationalism in Yugo- 
slavia would intensify demands for Macedonian autonomy across 
the border in Bulgaria, largely ignored the Yugoslav propaganda 
campaign on the Macedonian issue. The dispute over Macedonia 
survived and prospered after communism lost its grip on both coun- 
tries. Bulgarian nationalists, stronger after Zhivkov, held that the 
Slavic population of the Republic of Macedonia was ethnically 
Bulgarian, a claim leading naturally to assertion of a Greater Bul- 
garia. To defuse nationalist fervor on both sides, and in keeping 
with the policy of improved relations with all neighbors, Zhelev 
officially advocated nonintervention in the ethnic affairs of other 
nations. 

The nonintervention strategy assumed greater importance when 
the Republic of Macedonia sought independence from the Yugo- 
slav federation in 1991 in an effort to escape the increasing domi- 
nance of the Republic of Serbia in the federation. That effort 
reinforced the protective attitude of Macedonian nationalists in Bul- 
garia toward Yugoslav Macedonia, which had been part of Serbia 
in the interwar period. Serbia's use of force to prevent the breakup 



217 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

of the Yugoslav federation in 1991 triggered Bulgarian fears of wider 
destabilization in the Balkans if Serbian expansionism were fully 
revived. 

In 1991 Bulgarian policy toward Yugoslavia was complicated 
by the rejuvenation of Macedonian national groups in Bulgaria. 
The largest of these was the Union of Macedonian Societies, a long- 
standing cultural and educational society that in 1990 took the prefix 
IMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization), which 
was the name of the terrorist organization active in Bulgaria, 
Greece, and Serbia between 1893 and 1935 (see The Macedonian 
Issue, ch. 1). But the threat posed by such groups remained small 
because the focus of Bulgarian nationalism was the Turkish issue 
in 1991, and because economic reform was the major concern of 
all factions. In spite of claims by the Serbian press that Bulgaria 
was aiding Croatia in the civil war of 1991 and that Bulgaria owed 
Serbia reparations from World War II, Bulgaria followed Zhelev's 
policy of nonintervention as the Yugoslav civil war continued. 

Romania 

In the early 1980s, Bulgarian relations with Romania featured 
regular official visits by Zhivkov and Romanian President Nico- 
lae Ceau§escu and diplomatic avoidance of differing approaches 
to internal control (Romania being the more totalitarian) and the 
Warsaw Pact (see Glossary) (Bulgaria being the more loyal mem- 
ber). At that point, both countries concentrated on more pressing 
foreign issues, and both advocated creating a Balkan nuclear-free 
zone. But during the 1980s, relations were strained by the indepen- 
dent foreign policy of Romania, its opposition to perestroika in the 
late 1980s, and mutual accusations of environmental pollution af- 
fecting the other country. Deteriorating personal relations between 
Zhivkov and the maverick Ceau§escu also may have contributed 
to the decline. But, in the name of Warsaw Pact solidarity, the 
Zhivkov regime subdued criticism of chemical pollution from 
Romanian plants across the Danube, and it remained neutral in 
the Hungarian-Romanian dispute over Romanian treatment of eth- 
nic Hungarians in that country in the late 1980s. After the emer- 
gence of the environment as a political issue in 1989, however, 
accusations became more harsh on both sides. In 1991 joint com- 
missions attempted to reach a compromise on the environmental 
issue and restore the pragmatic, relatively amicable relationship 
of the postwar years. 

Greece 

Bulgarian relations with Greece, a traditional enemy, were sta- 
ble throughout the 1970s and 1980s, in spite of major government 



218 



Government and Politics 



changes in both countries. Zhivkov made this stability a model for 
the overall Balkan cooperation that was a centerpiece of his for- 
eign policy in the 1980s. In 1986 the two countries signed a decla- 
ration of good-neighborliness, friendship, and cooperation that was 
based on mutual enmity toward Turkey and toward Yugoslav de- 
mands for recognition of Macedonian minorities in Bulgaria and 
Greece. An important motivation for friendship with Greece was 
to exploit NATO's Greek-Turkish split, which was based on the 
claims of the two countries in Cyprus. In early 1989, Bulgaria signed 
a ten-year bilateral economic agreement with Greece. 

The main historical issue between Bulgaria and Greece, dispo- 
sition of their Macedonian minorities, was settled during the 1970s; 
after that time, the parties adopted mutual policies of strict non- 
interference in internal affairs. In mid- 1991 the possibility of in- 
dependence for Yugoslav Macedonia threatened to renew tension 
in that area. Post-Zhivkov Bulgarian policy toward Greece remained 
very conciliatory, however; in 1991 Zhelev stressed cooperation 
with Greece as a foundation for Balkan stability and reassured the 
Greeks that Bulgarian rapprochement with Turkey did not threaten 
this relationship. 

Turkey 

In spite of intermittent rapprochement, Turkey was hostile to 
Bulgaria through most of the 1980s because of Zhivkov' s mistreat- 
ment of Bulgarian Turks and the economic hardship caused in Tur- 
key by mass immigration of Turks from Bulgaria in 1989. The last 
rapprochement, a protocol of friendship in early 1988, was signed 
by Bulgaria to defuse international criticism of its ethnic policy. 
That agreement dissolved rapidly in 1988, when Turkey saw no 
change in Bulgarian ethnic assimilation; by 1989 Turkey was vow- 
ing to defend the Turkish minority, while Bulgaria claimed that 
its "Turks" were all Bulgarians converted to Islam under the 
Ottoman Empire (see The Turkish Problem, this ch.). 

The ouster of Zhivkov and subsequent Bulgarian commitment 
to repatriate deported Turks and grant them full human rights 
brought a marked change in Turkish policy. Despite delays and 
complaints from the Bulgarian Turks, Turkey remained patient 
and positive toward all signs of progress. The former dissident 
Zhelev, long a vocal critic of assimilation, became president and 
met with Turkish President Turgut Ozal in September 1990. That 
meeting began a series of high-level economic talks in 1990-91 that 
yielded Turkish loans and technical assistance to Bulgaria and 
promised to bolster bilateral trade, which had shrunk by 80 to 90 



219 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

percent in the mid-1980s. A new treaty of friendship and coopera- 
tion was prepared in the summer of 1991. 

Despite the thaw, obstacles remained in Bulgarian-Turkish rap- 
prochement. The ill will caused by Zhivkov's shrill anti-Turkish 
propaganda remained fresh in the early 1990s. Strident anti-Muslim 
and anti-Turkish statements in the media by Bulgarian nationalist 
factions kept tension high, and minor border incidents continued 
in 1991. And Bulgarian friendship with Greece created a precari- 
ous balancing act that required caution toward such moves as the 
Bulgarian-Turkish nonagression pact proposed by Turkey in late 
1990. 

The Soviet Union 

In the post-Zhivkov era, the most controversial foreign policy 
problem was defining Bulgaria's new relationship with its traditional 
protector and best trading partner, the Soviet Union. Although 
Zhivkov's relations with Gorbachev had not been as warm as those 
with earlier Soviet leaders, Bulgaria remained strongly dependent 
on the Soviet Union economically even in the years immediately 
following Zhivkov's ouster (permission for which Bulgarian Polit- 
buro members duly sought and received from Moscow). In mid- 
1992 the 1967 Treaty for Cooperation, Security, and Friendship 
with the Soviet Union was to expire. 

Because the treaty called for notice of abrogation to be given 
a year in advance, by mid- 1991 Bulgarian national opinion was 
divided over what terms should be included in the National As- 
sembly's draft of a new treaty. Led by the BSP, one body of Bul- 
garian opinion advocated essentially renewing the existing treaty, 
giving the Soviet Union top priority in the new foreign policy to 
ensure continued supply of fuels and other vital materials. A sec- 
ond body of opinion, led by the UDF and Podkrepa, conceded the 
pragmatic necessity of continued economic relations but urged that 
a new treaty eliminate all subordination of Bulgarian to Soviet in- 
terests and provide complete flexibility for Bulgaria to establish com- 
mercial and diplomatic ties with the West. Amid heated public 
debate, the Popov government reached agreement with the Soviet 
Union on a short-term abrogation followed by accelerated joint de- 
velopment of a new treaty reflecting the changed positions of both 
sides. The Bulgarian National Assembly was expected to pass a 
bill to that effect in August 1991 (see Foreign Trade, ch. 3; see 
Foreign Military Relations, ch. 5). 

Because the two countries had no disputed territory and were 
on roughly parallel paths of political reform in 1991, major issues 
between them were mostly economic. The primary Bulgarian 



220 



Government and Politics 



concern was to protect its newborn geopolitical independence from 
any recurrence of the Warsaw Pact mentality in Moscow. Other 
critical goals in 1991 were stabilizing the unpredictable supply of 
Soviet oil, protecting large numbers of Bulgarian guest workers 
threatened with layoff in the Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic (Komi ASSR), and reestablishing Soviet markets for Bul- 
garian goods that had shrunk drastically in 1990. A new bilateral 
defense agreement also was a priority in the wake of Warsaw Pact 
disestablishment. In July 1991, Bulgaria set a precedent by sign- 
ing a trade agreement with the Byelorussian Republic, the first inter- 
governmental pact made directly with one of the Soviet republics. 

Western Europe and the United States 

Under Zhivkov, Bulgaria's policy toward Western Europe and 
the United States was determined largely by the position of the 
Soviet Union. Events such as the invasions of Czechoslovakia and 
Afghanistan automatically distanced Bulgaria from the West; then, 
in the early 1980s Soviet efforts to split NATO by cultivating 
Western Europe brought Bulgaria closer to France and the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany (West Germany) — a position that con- 
tinued through the 1980s. A 1988 application for membership in 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT — see Glos- 
sary) was refused because of the Turkish assimilation program, after 
widespread expectations of success. 

Decades of complete isolation from the West left traces on Bul- 
garian policy even in the 1980s. In early 1989, President Francois 
Mitterrand of France was the first Western head of state to visit 
Bulgaria since before World War II. Between 1945 and 1989, the 
highest visiting United States official was an assistant secretary of 
state. And in 1985 Sir Jeffrey Howe became the first British for- 
eign secretary to visit Bulgaria since the nineteenth century — an 
indication that isolation began before the onset of communism. 

The first post-Zhivkov regime recognized quite early, however, 
that Cold War politics no longer could limit Bulgaria's choice of 
economic or diplomatic partners. Within a few months of the Zhiv- 
kov ouster, the National Assembly Committee on Foreign Policy 
had received the head of the Council of Europe and received a 
pledge of closer ties, and Bulgarian diplomats and businessmen 
had described reform goals, priorities, and investment opportuni- 
ties to a CSCE Conference on Economic Cooperation. Shortly 
thereafter Prime Minister Lukanov visited the headquarters of the 
European Economic Community (EEC — see Glossary) in Brus- 
sels. Lukanov signed a treaty on trade and economic cooperation 
to remove all trade barriers by 1 995 and guarantee Bulgarian access 



221 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

to EEC markets. Lukanov also gained substantial support for Bul- 
garian membership in the International Monetary Fund (IMF — 
see Glossary), the International Bank for Reconstruction and De- 
velopment, and GATT. 

A critical stage in the new policy was Zhelev's meeting with 
Western leaders in Europe and the United States in the fall of 1 990 . 
Zhelev explained Bulgaria's nonaligned position and its needs to 
United States President George H.W. Bush and to Mitterrand, 
receiving substantial pledges of aid from both leaders. Traditional 
trading partner Austria also pledged substantial new investment 
in the Bulgarian economy during Zhelev's tour of the West. 

Bulgaria's new policy toward the West was reflected in a series 
of decisions taken in 1990. Diplomatic relations were restored with 
South Korea and Israel, Western allies in sensitive areas of Cold 
War confrontation. An official invitation for Pope John Paul II 
to visit Bulgaria constituted a new level of recognition of that reli- 
gious leader's authority. And in early 1991, Bulgaria sent token 
noncombat forces in support of the United States-led Persian Gulf 
War effort. In 1991 Zhelev's cooperation with an international in- 
vestigation of the Markov murder was another significant gesture 
to the Western world. 

From the beginning, the success of Bulgaria's intense campaign 
for closer relations with the West depended on continued progress 
in economic and human rights reform and was measured in eco- 
nomic terms. As the stature of the Soviet Union dwindled steadily 
in 1991, the hope of gaining full status in the European commu- 
nity was a powerful weapon for reformers within Bulgaria. Given 
Bulgaria's strategic position and chronic instability elsewhere in 
the Balkans, Western nations monitored Bulgaria carefully and re- 
warded its progressive steps. Nonetheless, in 1991 Bulgaria re- 
mained far behind Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland in 
receiving Western aid. 

* * * 

Few monographs have been written on the Bulgarian govern- 
ment and politics of the late 1980s. Background to that period is 
provided by the politics sections of Robert J. Mclntyre's Bulgaria: 
Politics, Economics and Society and John D. Bell's The Bulgarian Com- 
munist Party from Blagoev to Zhivkov. More recent political events are 
reported authoritatively in numerous journal articles, including 
"Long Memories and Short Fuses," by F. Stephen Larrabee; "Bul- 
garia: An Eastern European Revolution in Suspension," by Steven 
Chiodini; "Bulgaria's Time Bind: The Search for Democracy and 



222 



Government and Politics 

a Viable Heritage" by Joel Martin Halpern and Barbara Kerewsky- 
Halpern; and "'Post-Communist' Bulgaria," by John D. Bell. Also 
extremely valuable are the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Report 
on Eastern Europe, each covering a particular aspect of the current 
political situation. (For further information and complete citations, 
see Bibliography.) 



223 



Chapter 5. National Security 



Thracian warrior in Roman mural, Serditsa 



IN 1991 BULGARIA GRAPPLED with political changes and eco- 
nomic difficulties that threatened its national security. The coun- 
try's most intractable problems were internal crises rather than 
external threats. The Warsaw Pact (see Glossary), which had guided 
national security policy since 1955, became defunct as a military 
organization on April 1, 1991. A concurrent shift from one-party 
communist rule to multiparty politics made the future political 
character and role of the Bulgarian People's Army (BPA) uncer- 
tain. Grave economic problems also portended that a smaller 
proportion of national resources would be devoted to defense in 
the future. The European strategic environment seemed less tense 
and threatening than at any time in the recent past, largely be- 
cause of the waning of the Cold War; however, the more imme- 
diate situation in the Balkans appeared less secure in 1991. 
Neighboring countries Yugoslavia and Greece were apprehensive 
that Bulgarians might renew their interest in the Greater Bulgaria 
established briefly under the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878. 

The Bulgarian military establishment was substantial and well 
equipped considering the small size and population of the coun- 
try. One expert observer described it aptly as a regional force of 
significance. The data exchanged at the signing of the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE — see Glossary) on 
November 19, 1990, revealed previously unknown details on the 
command organization, structure, strength, and disposition of Bul- 
garia's ground and air forces. The BPA appeared to be a relatively 
cohesive force without serious ethnic or other internal fragmenta- 
tion. Despite the end of the Warsaw Pact, a continued military 
relationship with the Soviet Union was expected, based on genuine 
affinity and mutual interest between the two countries. In the late 
1980s, Bulgaria imitated several major military reforms then being 
introduced in the Soviet Armed Forces, which long had served as 
the model for developing Bulgaria's armed forces. The BPA in- 
stituted unilateral force reductions, restructuring, defense indus- 
try conversion, and a new openness in military affairs that imitated 
Soviet glasnost (see Glossary). 

In 1991 Bulgaria's uncertain internal security situation reflected 
the unsettled state of politics and the economy. Increased political 
freedom, economic hardship, and the inability or reluctance of the 
governments that followed the regime of Todor Zhivkov (1962-89) 
to use force or coercion against the population created the potential 



227 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

for domestic unrest. These factors made possible increased reli- 
ance on the internal security apparatus, and ultimately the BP A, 
to maintain order and even to carry out basic government func- 
tions. In the immediate post-Zhivkov years, the army was the pivo- 
tal institution protecting legitimate national security interests and 
territorial integrity during the transition to democracy and the rule 
of law. 

Development of the Armed Forces 

The ancestors of the modern Bulgarians established a respecta- 
ble martial tradition during centuries of combat with the Byzan- 
tine and Ottoman empires. After Russian armies freed it from 
Ottoman control in the late nineteenth century, Bulgaria became 
an independent military force in the Balkans. Bulgaria's neighbors 
viewed it as the major regional power with outstanding territorial 
ambitions; for that reason, they joined forces to offset Bulgarian 
military power before 1914. Bulgaria participated actively in combat 
operations as a German ally in World War I. Although again al- 
lied with Germany in World War II, Bulgaria did not join in Ger- 
man offensive operations. After World War II, Bulgaria came under 
Soviet military influence and in 1955 joined the Soviet-led War- 
saw Pact (see World War II, ch. 1). In that capacity, Bulgaria be- 
came an integral part of Soviet military and political policy toward 
the southern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO — see Glossary). Although the end of superpower confron- 
tation in Europe had loosened the bilateral military connection to 
the Soviet Union by 1991, extensive military ties remained. 

Early Development 

For several centuries after they migrated to the Balkans in the 
middle of the seventh century A.D. , the Bulgars were the primary 
rivals of the Byzantine Empire for control of the eastern Balkans. 
In the seventh and eighth centuries, Bulgar kings established an 
independent empire that inflicted several defeats on the Byzantines 
in Macedonia and Thrace. King Terbelis defeated the Byzantine 
army at the Battle of Anchialus in 708, drove through Thrace to 
the walls of Constantinople, and besieged the Byzantine capital in 
712. In 717, however, Terbelis allied with the Byzantine Emperor 
Leo III against the Arabs. Terbelis led the Bulgar army into Thrace, 
won the Battle of Adrianople in 718, and defended Constanti- 
nople against a Muslim siege from across the Bosporus. Emperor 
Constantine V reasserted Byzantine control over the Bulgars in the 
mid- to late eighth century. King Kardan regained the initiative 



228 



National Security 



by the end of the century and forced Byzantium to pay tribute to 
the Bulgars. 

The power of the First Bulgarian Empire waxed during the ninth 
and early tenth centuries. The Bulgars continued their struggle with 
Byzantium and encountered new foes as well. They fought the 
Magyars and Pechenegs, who raided them from north of the 
Danube River (see fig. 2). Beginning in 808, Tsar Krum fought 
a successful war against the Byzantines, winning the Battle of 
Versinikia in 813, capturing Adrianople, and advancing to the walls 
of Constantinople. However, Krum's son was defeated at the Battle 
of Mesembria in 817. Tsar Simeon fought successful wars against 
the Byzantines in the late ninth and early tenth centuries, captur- 
ing Thessaly, Macedonia, and Albania from the Byzantines, con- 
quering Serbia, and threatening Constantinople itself. 

Between 967 and 969, the Byzantines and Russians invaded and 
annexed Bulgaria. Samuil, an expatriate noble, then regained con- 
trol of eastern Bulgaria and Serbia by defeating the Byzantines near 
Sofia in 981. Throughout the late tenth and early eleventh centu- 
ries, he fought the Byzantines in Macedonia and Thrace. In 1014, 
however, the Byzantines crushed the Bulgarian army and re- 
occupied Bulgaria. 

Bulgaria became a vassal state of the Byzantine Empire as well 
as a march route and battleground for advancing Mongols, Turks, 
Serbs, Magyars, and European crusaders beginning in the twelfth 
century. The Bulgarians fought alongside the Serbs in the unsuc- 
cessful Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389 — a defeat that began nearly 
five centuries of Ottoman domination during which tsarist Russia 
represented the only hope for liberation. 

From the Struggle for National Independence to World War I 

Uprisings against Ottoman control in 1875 and 1876 began mili- 
tary action that finally brought Bulgaria conditional independence 
in 1878. Bulgaria was a major battleground in the Russo-Turkish 
War of 1877-78. Russia fought the war as the champion of Slavs 
living under the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. Under the Treaty 
of San Stefano, signed March 3, 1878, Bulgaria became an au- 
tonomous state under Russian protection. The same year, the Eu- 
ropean powers forced Bulgaria to sign the Treaty of Berlin, 
returning substantial territory to the Ottoman Empire in the name 
of regional balance. Bulgaria retained its autonomy, however. 

Conflict with Balkan neighbors began when the new nation 
sparked a brief war with Serbia in 1885 over control of the province 
of Eastern Rumelia. Seeking compensation for Bulgaria's annexa- 
tion, Serbia invaded the province and was defeated by Prince 



229 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



Alexander, modern Bulgaria's first ruler. After inconclusive fight- 
ing, Bulgaria and Serbia agreed to the Treaty of Bucharest, which 
restored prewar borders in 1886. 

During the twentieth century, persistent territorial disputes and 
dissatisfaction with borders determined Bulgaria's position in four 
wars. In 1912 Bulgaria entered the Balkan League, a military 
alliance with Serbia and Greece, to eliminate the last vestiges of 
Turkish rule in the Balkans and to expand its own territory in the 
process. Fielding approximately 180,000 troops, Bulgaria provided 
the bulk of the military personnel for operations against Turkish 
forces in the First Balkan War. Bulgarian armies besieged Con- 
stantinople in November 1912, but they were driven back tem- 
porarily by the Turks. When the key city of Adrianople fell to 
Bulgarian and Serbian forces in March 1913, Turkey capitulated. 
It surrendered its European possessions under the Treaty of Lon- 
don in May 1913. 

A dispute over the spoils of the First Balkan War led directly 
to the Second Balkan War. Bulgaria asserted that Serbia occupied 
more of Macedonia and Thessaloniki than it was allowed by the 
prewar agreement. In June 1913, Bulgarian armies attacked Ser- 
bian forces in Macedonia and another army advanced into Thes- 
saloniki. After checking this offensive, Serbian and Greek forces 
pushed the Bulgarians back into Bulgaria in July. Romania then 
declared war on Bulgaria and advanced unopposed toward Sofia, 
while Turkey capitalized on the situation to retake Andrianople. 
Bulgaria sued for peace and lost territory in Macedonia, Thrace, 
and Southern Dobruja to Greece, Serbia, and Romania, respec- 
tively, in the Treaty of Bucharest (August 1913). 

Bulgaria's rivalry with Serbia and Greece defined its participa- 
tion in World War I . Bulgaria avoided involvement in the war until 
1915 when it mobilized 1.2 million soldiers and joined the Central 
Powers in attacking Serbia. Bulgaria took this action in the expec- 
tation that a victory by the Central Powers would restore Greater 
Bulgaria. In October 1915, two of Bulgaria's armies drove west 
into Serbia while allied Austro-Hungarian and German armies 
drove south. Bulgarian forces blocked British and French troops 
in Thessaloniki from linking with Serbian forces. 

In mid-1916 over 250,000 British, French, and Serbian troops 
prepared for an offensive from Thessaloniki northwest along the 
Vardar River. Although the Germans and Bulgarians preempted 
the offensive and drove this force beyond the Struma River by late 
August, the war then settled into a long, costly stalemate along 
the Vardar. Seriously weakened by a poor military supply system 
and widespread unrest among the soldiers, Bulgaria collapsed and 



230 



National Security 



surrendered in 1918. The country suffered greatly during the war. 
Mobilization disrupted food production, and German requisitioning 
of grain and other foodstuffs taxed stored food supplies. About 
100,000 Bulgarian soldiers were killed in combat, and 275,000 non- 
combatants died as a direct result of the war (see World War I, 
ch. 1). 

The Interwar Years and World War II 

The harsh terms of the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine (November 
1919) limited the postwar Bulgarian army to 20,000, and con- 
scription was forbidden. Many embittered former officers became 
politically active in the Military League, a formidable and well- 
organized opposition faction in the 1920s and 1930s. Irredentism 
made Bulgaria a natural ally of Germany during the interwar years. 
After border skirmishes with Bulgaria in 1925 and 1931, Greece 
joined Romania, Yugoslavia, and Turkey in forming the Balkan 
Entente in 1934 to contain perceived Bulgarian expansionism. Bul- 
garia began to rearm in 1936 with German, British, and French 
assistance. Meanwhile, the Military League had been influential 
in staging coups in the early 1930s. In 1936, however, Tsar Boris 
III (1918-43) dismantled the organization, stripping the military 
of the political influence it had accumulated after World War I. 

After several years of hesitating between alignment with Ger- 
many or the Soviet Union, Bulgaria finally sought to satisfy ter- 
ritorial claims to the south and west by signing the Tripartite Pact 
with the Axis powers in March 1941. But Bulgaria minimized its 
involvement in the war, managing to satisfy the terms of alliance 
with Germany without a declaration of war on the Soviet Union. 

In spite of its passive policy, Bulgaria was a vital pivot for Ger- 
man operations in the Balkans, North Africa, and on the eastern 
front against the Soviet Union. Germany launched invasions of 
Greece and Yugoslavia from Bulgaria in April 1941 , and Bulgaria 
occupied parts of the territory it expected to retain after the war. 
German forces used the country as a rear area for transporting 
troops and supplies and providing training, and as a rest and recre- 
ation point. Its railroads and ports were critical to the German war 
effort. More than fifty German ships and submarines were berthed 
in the harbor at Varna as late as the summer of 1944. 

The Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) dominated the anti- 
German partisan movement that arose in 1941 . Although the move- 
ment had a central military commission to direct armed activities, 
the partisans generally were poorly organized and armed. Their 
total number never exceeded 18,000 and, unlike partisans else- 
where, they were more active in the cities than in the countryside. 



231 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

The partisans received arms and supplies from the Soviet Union 
and Britain. The most successful aspect of partisan activity was 
pro-Soviet propaganda, demonstrations, terrorism, and sabotage 
against installations in Bulgaria critical to the German war effort. 
Among assassination attempts against German officials and Bul- 
garian fascists, the assassination of Minister of War Khristo Lukov 
in 1943 had the greatest impact. Harsh recriminations discouraged 
such activities, however. In 1943 the partisans formed the first fight- 
ing units of the People's Revolutionary Army of Liberation 
(PRAL), which eventually included brigade-sized units. Still, their 
armed attacks on German forces generally ended in failure. As late 
as 1944, entire units were captured or killed in action. 

The Soviet Union declared war on Bulgaria on September 5, 
1944, as the Red Army forces of the Third Ukrainian Front under 
General Fedor Tolbukhin crossed its northern border from Roma- 
nia. Bulgaria changed sides on September 8 and declared war on 
Germany. Tolbukhin took command of the Bulgarian forces and 
reorganized them. By September 17, a Bulgarian army of 200,000 
troops was mobilized and attached to the Third Ukrainian Front 
fighting German forces in Macedonia and Serbia. At the end of 
World War II, Bulgaria again returned the Greek and Yugoslav 
territory that it had occupied in 1941. 

Postwar Development 

The Red Army met little hostility during its occupation of Bul- 
garia from 1944 to 1947. At the time of invasion, the Soviet Union 
did not regard Bulgaria as an enemy state, because Bulgaria had 
not declared war or participated actively in the German eastern 
front. According to the Yalta agreements of 1945, the Allied Con- 
trol Commission for Bulgaria, assigned to administer the country 
until a peace treaty was signed, was essentially an extension of the 
Red Army military administration. Under pressure from Britain, 
the preponderant interest of the Soviet Union in Bulgaria was recog- 
nized by giving it 75 percent control of the commission. 

The Soviet Union immediately reorganized the Bulgarian Army 
to ensure that the BCP would have a leading role. More than 40 
generals and 800 officers discredited by their association with the 
German Army were purged or resigned when Bulgaria switched 
sides in the war. Although former Minister of War Damian Vel- 
chev returned to his post in the Fatherland Front coalition govern- 
ment, the BCP used the presence of Soviet occupation forces to 
push the old officer corps out of domestic politics. In July 1946, 
control of the army shifted from the Ministry of War to the full 
cabinet, 2,000 allegedly reactionary officers were purged, and 



232 



National Security 



Velchev resigned in protest. The combination of events provided 
an opening for the BCP to establish full control over the military. 
It conducted a decisive purge in October 1947. Accusing the re- 
maining noncommunist senior officers of plotting to overthrow the 
Fatherland Front, the BCP dismissed one-third of the officer corps. 
After 1949 the BCP dominated the army, and party membership 
was obligatory for officers on active duty. 

In the first postwar years, Bulgaria closely followed the exam- 
ple of Soviet military development and served Soviet interests in 
the Balkans. BCP leader Georgi Dimitrov exhorted Bulgarian 
officers to learn from the experience, strategy, and military art of 
the Soviet Union. He wanted the BP A to be exactly like the Soviet 
armed forces, with common missions, organization, weapons and 
equipment, and military science. 

In 1946 Bulgaria participated in the initial conflict of the Cold 
War by aiding communist forces in the Greek civil war. Bulgar- 
ian support, including operating bases on Bulgarian territory, made 
possible communist victories near the border. As a result, Greece 
charged Bulgaria with numerous violations of its northern border. 
In 1947 the United Nations (UN) confirmed the Greek charges 
and later officially condemned Bulgaria for aiding communist guer- 
rilla forces. 

In the late 1940s, the Bulgarian armed forces were composed 
almost entirely of former partisans, peasants, and workers. Ap- 
proximately 75 percent were members of the BCP or the Com- 
munist Youth League of Bulgaria (Komsomol). Many peasants and 
workers were attracted to the military by upward mobility and pay 
that was higher than in factories or farms. The armed forces were 
officially named the Bulgarian People's Army (BP A) in 1952. Bul- 
garia joined the Warsaw Pact on May 14, 1955, and contributed 
a token battalion to the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia on 
August 20, 1968. Bulgaria initiated a major military moderniza- 
tion program in the 1980s, adding its first T-72 tanks, MiG-23 
fighters, Su-25 fighter-bombers, Mi-24 attack helicopters, and 130 
surface-to-surface missiles to its inventory. During that period, the 
education level and technical competence of the officer corps rose; 
by 1985 nearly 85 percent had received at least a secondary edu- 
cation (see Education, ch. 2). 

National Defense Posture 

In 1991 the Warsaw Pact disbanded as a military alliance. Bul- 
garian commitment to the Soviet-led alliance accordingly ceased 
to be the main direction of its national defense. The disintegration 
of the Warsaw Pact presaged a major shift in threat perception, 



233 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

military doctrine, and strategy. Historical, geographic, and eco- 
nomic factors promised to assume greater importance in shaping 
Bulgaria's approach to national defense. Traditional allies and ad- 
versaries such as Germany and Turkey now exerted critical in- 
fluence on decisions about military requirements, doctrine, and 
strategy. The country's geopolitical position in the volatile Balkans 
at the crossroads of Europe and Asia was another important de- 
terminant. Economic considerations limited the development and 
retention of military capabilities. In the early 1990s, Bulgarian offi- 
cials began to stress guaranteeing national security through politi- 
cal agreements with neighboring countries rather than military 
force. 

Threat Perception 

Bulgaria was the only Warsaw Pact country without a frontier 
with the Soviet Union. Of the nearly 1 ,900 kilometers of land bor- 
ders, 520 were with Romania, 500 with Yugoslavia, 480 with 
Greece, and 380 with Turkey. With the general exception of Roma- 
nia, Bulgaria had had serious past conflicts with each of these coun- 
tries. Bulgaria and neighboring NATO members Greece and 
Turkey had historical disputes that long predated the establishment 
of their respective rival alliances after World War II. However, 
unlike its former Warsaw Pact allies in Europe, Bulgaria's tradi- 
tional enemies were NATO members or nonaligned nations. Re- 
lations with Greece had been friendly since 1980, based primarily 
on a shared antipathy toward Turkey. In 1986 Bulgaria and Greece 
signed a joint declaration of friendship and cooperation. 

The issue of Macedonia was a source of potential conflict be- 
tween Bulgaria and its neighbors. In 1991 the prospect of civil war 
in Yugoslavia raised concern that Bulgaria could reclaim Macedonia 
as a step toward reestablishing the Greater Bulgaria prescribed in 
the Treaty of San Stefano (see San Stefano, Berlin, and Indepen- 
dence, ch. 1). Bulgaria's Macedonian border had been tense since 
the Second Balkan War; in 1989 the ouster of Zhivkov escalated 
the risk that Macedonia would set off political or military conflict 
with all of Yugoslavia or with its neighboring Republic of Serbia. 
Bulgarian spokesmen denied having territorial ambitions against 
Yugoslav Macedonia, but they added ambiguity by referring to 
it as an open issue. Unlike the Yugoslavs, the Bulgarians did not 
recognize Macedonians as an ethnic group distinct from Bulgarians. 

Proximity to NATO members Greece and Turkey, both with 
strong armed forces and significant military potential, was Bulgar- 
ia's primary strategic concern in the post-Warsaw Pact era. The 
plan for the development of the BPA was measured against the 



234 



National Security 



military programs of those two neighbors. The BP A leadership 
openly rated both their armies as superior to its own forces, stress- 
ing that Turkey boasted military manpower second only to the 
United States among NATO countries and a population of over 
100 million. In the view of the Bulgarian military establishment, 
the size of the Turkish armed forces was the primary standard for 
determining appropriate reductions in BPA forces, as well as in 
strategic defense planning. Despite the relative lack of tension in 
bilateral relations with Turkey and an apparent absence of hostile 
intentions on its part in 1990, the treatment of ethnic Turks in Bul- 
garia remained an irritating and potentially explosive issue in 
bilateral relations. In 1987 veiled threats by Turkey to resolve the 
issue by force had caused alarm in Bulgaria. The outburst of pro- 
Turkish and Bulgarian nationalist rhetoric that followed the fall 
of the BCP regime, which had been willing to suppress ethnic un- 
rest by force, raised ethnic tensions in a period when central govern- 
ment control over society had substantially decreased (see The 
Turkish Problem, ch. 4). 

Even in decline, the Warsaw Pact alliance remained a major fac- 
tor in Bulgarian threat perception and military planning. Bulgaria 
continued to count on an ongoing close military relationship and 
practical cooperation with the Soviet Union to balance perceived 
security threats. In 1991 the Bulgarian government conducted 
negotiations for a new bilateral treaty with the Soviet Union to 
guarantee it against external aggression. In return Bulgaria would 
pledge not to join any organization, such as NATO, perceived 
hostile to the Soviet Union. Whatever its relation to the Soviet 
Union, by 1991 Bulgaria was entering a new, shifting local balance 
of power similar to the balance that existed in the Balkans before 
World War II. 

Doctrine and Strategy 

The assigned mission of the BPA under the Warsaw Pact was 
to defend the southwestern border of the alliance. In practice, this 
mission was considerably more oriented to offensive operations than 
official pronouncements implied. Located within what the Soviet 
General Staff called the Southwest Theater of Military Operations, 
Bulgaria would have confronted Turkey in case of a Warsaw Pact 
conflict with NATO. As indicated by several joint amphibious land- 
ing exercises undertaken with the Soviet Union, Bulgaria's prin- 
cipal objectives would have been to control Thrace and to help 
Soviet forces seize and hold the critical straits at the Bosporus and 
the Dardanelles. 



235 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

In the new geopolitical climate of 1991, military spokespersons 
emphasized different sources of military doctrine, including the con- 
stitution, resolutions passed by the National Assembly (Subranie), 
the United Nations Charter, international law, and declarations 
of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE — 
see Glossary). Military spokespersons cited active efforts to pur- 
sue mutual security and trust with Turkey and Greece as well as 
good relations with Yugoslavia, Romania, and other European na- 
tions. The military denied all territorial claims against neighbor- 
ing countries and stressed that participation in the CSCE process 
indicated its respect for the inviolability of European borders. It 
publicly rejected the threat or use of force against any country ex- 
cept in legitimate self-defense of territorial integrity, national in- 
dependence, and sovereignty. Arms control was an important 
element of military doctrine before and after the overthrow of Zhiv- 
kov. Bulgaria had long advocated, without success, the establish- 
ment of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans. In the mid-1980s, the 
Zhivkov government arranged several unproductive meetings of 
the Balkan countries on nuclear disarmament. The primary aim 
of this effort was elimination of NATO nuclear weapons in Tur- 
key. A signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968, 
Bulgaria regularly pledged not to possess or produce nuclear 
weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. In 1990 the coun- 
try was embarrassed, however, by the revelation that it possessed 
eight Soviet-made SS-23 missile launchers eliminated from the 
Soviet inventory under the terms of the Treaty on the Elimination 
of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Nuclear Missiles in 1987. 
Although acknowledging receipt of SS-23 missiles and launchers 
in 1986, Bulgaria categorically denied having any nuclear capa- 
bility associated with them. It offered to dismantle the systems in 
accordance with the treaty. Similar allegations about the presence 
of intermediate-range Soviet SS-20 missile launchers in Bulgaria 
had appeared in the foreign press in 1984 but were never substan- 
tiated. Zhivkov called for a ban on chemical weapons in the Balkans 
in 1985 at the same time as the United States accused Bulgaria 
of storing chemical weapons on its territory. 

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) 
was a contentious issue within the Warsaw Pact in 1990. The treaty 
committed Bulgaria to limiting its ground and air forces to a per- 
centage of the Warsaw Pact's combined ceiling of 20,000 tanks, 
30,000 armored combat vehicles, 20,000 artillery pieces, 6,800 com- 
bat aircraft, and 4,000 attack helicopters. However, the Warsaw 
Pact divided its overall ceilings so that the Soviet Union received 
most of the apportionment and the other former Warsaw Pact 



236 



National Security 



countries were limited to smaller quotas. Bulgaria's quotas were 
1,475 tanks, 2,000 armored combat vehicles, 1,750 artillery pieces, 
235 combat aircraft, and 67 attack helicopters. In 1990 the minister 
of national defense disclosed that the Warsaw Pact debate over 
weapons allocation had been acrimonious because each member 
had tried to maximize its quota, hence its security, before the alli- 
ance's military organization dissolved. 

In 1991 Bulgaria did not have a formal law on national defense, 
and its military doctrine was still largely defined by Warsaw Pact 
declarations and documents. The Warsaw Pact's Political Consul- 
tative Committee had formally adopted a defense doctrine and the 
principle of reasonable sufficiency during its May 1987 meeting 
in Berlin. Closely following this doctrine and the Soviet example, 
Bulgaria then implemented a new national defensive doctrine calling 
for reasonable sufficiency. In the inexact and halting process of 
quantifying this term, military leaders basically agreed on the need 
to ensure national security at the lowest possible level of armaments. 
But the levels required to deter potential enemies or defend the 
country against them proved to be more debatable. By 1990 some 
clear steps had been taken toward reducing offensive weapons 
systems in favor of defensive ones (see Armed Services, this ch.). 

Like professional military officers in other countries, the Bul- 
garian general staff viewed doctrine less from its political and dip- 
lomatic aspect than from its strictly technical military aspect. The 
technical side of doctrine focused on planning for a number of likely 
military contingencies and scenarios threatening national se- 
curity. Although Bulgaria's political stance was based on a lack of 
enemies, the technical or worst-case military planning aspect of 
doctrine was dictated by the country's geopolitical position, the 
decline of the Warsaw Pact, and the possibility of instability in the 
Balkans. 

Defense Organization 

Like most other national institutions, the defense establishment 
was in the midst of a major transition in 1991. The new political 
course brought changes to a military system long based on the Soviet 
model. Democratic, multiparty politics brought the issue of depo- 
liticization in the armed forces to the forefront. The state organi- 
zation for national security and defense decision making, including 
the high command, retained its former structure. Major changes, 
including unilateral reductions and restructuring in accordance with 
defensive doctrine, were carried out in the ground, air and air 
defense, and naval forces. 



237 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

The Military in the Political System 

In 1991 Bulgaria was in the midst of shifting from a highly politi- 
cized army to a depoliticized one. The military had always been 
involved in domestic political struggles. The Military League ex- 
erted strong political influence through its support for the Zveno 
coalition after World War I (see The Crises of the 1930s, ch. 1). 
In 1934 the Military League took a leading role in overthrowing 
the government, and as recently as 1965 military officers were in- 
volved in political intrigue. The reported 1965 coup attempt led 
by General Ivan Todorov-Gorunia was allegedly aimed at replac- 
ing Zhivkov and establishing a more nationalist, less pro-Soviet 
leadership in the country. By 1990 communist Bulgaria had ap- 
parently made more progress in separating the military from poli- 
tics than the Soviet Union, but perhaps less than other communist 
countries of Eastern Europe. 

After World War II, the BCP quickly established control over 
the army. It purged old officers and made political loyalty to the 
new regime a more important criterion than professional compe- 
tence for the selection of new officers (see Postwar Development, 
this ch.). Political officers in the ranks of the BPA ensured loyalty 
by extending the party apparatus throughout the military estab- 
lishment. As in the Soviet Union and other Soviet-allied countries, 
party membership in the officer corps exceeded 80 percent. 

Despite more than forty years of efforts to ensure communist 
control of the armed forces, the BPA took no action when BCP 
General Secretary Todor Zhivkov was ousted by party officials in 
November 1989. According to many reports, the conspicuous lack 
of military support for Zhivkov dissuaded his security forces from 
intervening to prevent the overthrow. In the immediate post- 
Zhivkov era, the BPA and its leadership declared an intention to 
be an apolitical, stabilizing factor in the peaceful transition to 
democracy. 

The shift to multiparty politics brought opposition pressure to 
depoliticize the armed forces, in part because all parties feared the 
BPA could split into partisan armed factions or become the instru- 
ment of one party as it had been for the BCP. In the new climate 
of open political discourse, national security and defense became 
frequent topics of debate among political parties. The military 
leadership, however, complained that some parties failed to show 
a sufficiently responsible attitude toward these issues. 

In January 1990, at the direction of the reform wing of the BCP, 
the State Council repealed the section of Article 1 of the constitu- 
tion that had institutionalized the exclusive political role of the party 



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National Security 



in the armed forces. The decree replaced BCP political organs in 
the army with educational work organs. The State Council followed 
that action with a more specific decree ordering complete depoliti- 
cization of the armed forces. The Military Administration Depart- 
ment of the BCP Central Committee and the Main Political 
Administration of the BPA were removed from the Ministry of Na- 
tional Defense and their functions curtailed. The decree effectively 
eliminated control by the BCP (which in early 1990 renamed itself 
the Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP) over the army by removing 
cells of the party and the Komsomol from the army. In September 
1990, the National Assembly approved a new law on political par- 
ties. The law depoliticized several government institutions, includ- 
ing the army, and required them to respond to the state rather than 
the ruling party. By the end of the year, 98 percent of all soldiers 
reportedly had relinquished their membership in political parties 
in accordance with the law. If they refused to do so, they were dis- 
charged from the service. In 1991 the Ministry of National Defense 
campaigned for exclusion of active-duty military personnel from 
voting in elections. 

Besides changing the legal framework for the relationship be- 
tween the military and the political system, the new political course 
in Bulgaria brought practical changes in everyday army life. The 
content of military education shifted dramatically from emphasiz- 
ing the defense of the communist system to the defense of the 
homeland without regard to political considerations. Bulgarian 
sources indicated that the adjective People's in Bulgarian People's 
Army now was interpreted to mean "national' ' and not ' 'proletar- 
ian." Defense of national independence, sovereignty, and territorial 
integrity replaced the defense of socialism as the primary mission 
of the military. Professional competence replaced political alle- 
giance and reliability as the most important measure of officer 
qualifications. The military post of political officer was eliminated 
officially, although plans called for retraining some political officers 
for new educational duties within the armed forces. The remainder 
would have to qualify as regular line officers or leave the service. 
Nevertheless, the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) opposition 
coalition accused the BSP of continued party recruitment among 
cadets and newly enlisted personnel after the State Council decree 
on depoliticization. 

Government Organization for Defense 

Prior to November 1989, the chairman of the State Defense Com- 
mittee was the commander in chief of the BPA, and as such made 
every important decision about internal and external security. The 



239 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

secretary general of the BCP and president of the State Council 
automatically held the position of chairman of the State Defense 
Committee as well. The consolidation of these three positions had 
enabled a single person, Todor Zhivkov, to make political deci- 
sions on security issues and supervise their implementation within 
the government apparatus, especially as they concerned the econ- 
omy and defense industries. 

In the post-Zhivkov order, the commander in chief of the armed 
forces was the president of the republic, a position independent 
of party affiliation. In 1990 the National Security Council was 
formed as a consultative organ under the president after the State 
Defense Committee was abolished. The National Security Coun- 
cil advised the president in making decisions on a range of domes- 
tic and foreign policy issues related to national security, including 
defense preparedness, organization, training, and deployment of 
the armed forces, public order, and use of the internal security 
forces. The National Security Council included the vice president; 
the chairman of the Council of Ministers; the ministers of foreign 
affairs, national defense, internal affairs, and economy and plan- 
ning; and the chief of the General Staff. Decisions were imple- 
mented through the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of National 
Defense, and the General Staff. 

The democratization of 1990 allowed the National Assembly to 
participate in making decisions on security issues rather than merely 
rubber-stamping decisions made elsewhere. In 1990 the National 
Assembly established a new legislative body, the Commission on 
National Security, to provide oversight for government activities 
in internal and external security. The commission's role remained 
largely undefined in 1991 , but its nominal function was to enforce 
government compliance with the rule of law in security matters 
and to protect the rights of citizens. 

Despite these organizational changes, the constitutional provi- 
sions, most laws and statutes, and instructions and regulations per- 
taining to national security and defense adopted by the government 
under the former BCP remained in effect. A complex of laws, 
drafted for inclusion in the new constitution ratified by the Na- 
tional Assembly in 1991 , were designed to codify the many individ- 
ual changes made in military practice and institutions after 1989. 

During and after the ouster of Zhivkov, the prestige of the mili- 
tary among the people appeared to remain quite high. Despite its 
association with the former BCP regime, the military was cred- 
ited for remaining in the barracks during the political transition. 
Although some long-serving, high-ranking officers were removed 
later, others remained and even advanced as a result of the ouster. 



240 



National Security 



Longtime Minister of National Defense and BCP Politburo mem- 
ber Army General Dobri Dzhurov was dismissed in 1990 in the 
aftermath of the democratic opening. However, Colonel General 
Atanas Semerdzhiev, first deputy minister of defense and chief of 
the General Staff under Zhivkov, rose to the post of minister of 
the interior in 1990. The retention and promotion of an officer like 
Semerdzhiev, formerly decorated and favored by Zhivkov himself, 
indicated the value placed on the stabilizing role of the military 
during this turbulent period. 

High Command 

The high command consisted of the Ministry of National Defense 
and the General Staff. The minister of national defense was always 
a professional officer bearing the rank of army general or colonel 
general. In 1990, however, reformers called for a civilian defense 
minister to ensure civilian control over the armed forces. The mili- 
tary flatly rejected such demands, insisting that the minister of na- 
tional defense must be a professional officer because civilians lacked 
the required expertise — despite evidence of able civilian adminis- 
tration of defense ministries in other countries. 

The Ministry of National Defense was responsible for implement- 
ing the decisions of the National Security Council and the National 
Assembly within the armed forces. The ministry recruited, equipped, 
and administered the armed forces according to directives of the 
executive and legislative branches of government. The ministry 
linked the armed forces to the national economy for the purpose 
of procuring weapons and military equipment. The Ministry of 
National Defense was organized according to a Soviet model. The 
first deputy minister of national defense was also the chief of the 
General Staff, responsible for planning and directing the opera- 
tional deployment of the armed forces and coordinating the actions 
of the three armed services in peacetime and wartime. The deputy 
minister's staff included a first deputy, several deputy chiefs, and 
a disarmament inspectorate. All military commands reported to 
the General Staff. The country was divided into three military dis- 
tricts. Daily military administration, however, was performed at 
the level of military regions corresponding to the eight provinces 
and the city of Sofia (see Local Government, ch. 4). Besides two 
communications brigades and the usual service and support bat- 
talions, the General Staff controlled several other organizations, 
including a military scientific research institute, military history 
institute, military mapping and topography institutes, the Georgi 
Rakovski Military Academy, the Military Medical Academy, and 
the military medical infrastructure throughout the country. 



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Bulgaria: A Country Study 

The commanders of the ground, air, and naval forces were 
deputy ministers of national defense controlling separate service 
commands within the Ministry of National Defense. The service 
commands were concerned primarily with training and maintain- 
ing combat readiness in their units. Other deputy ministers of na- 
tional defense included the chief of weapons and military equipment, 
the chief of the Material-Technical and Rear Support Command, 
and the chief of civil defense. Other elements reporting to the 
minister of national defense included the office of the inspector 
general; the departments of personnel, military education, medi- 
cal services, international relations, military counterintelligence, 
military justice and procuracy, cultural institutions, and public in- 
formation; and the radiation and chemical detection command post. 
The International Relations Department maintained contacts with 
foreign military establishments and their attaches in Bulgaria. The 
Cultural Institutions Department was responsible for several mili- 
tary museums, officers' clubs, theaters, cinema and art studios, 
and the BPA performing ensemble. The Public Information Depart- 
ment managed the press center, military publishing house, nine 
military newspapers and journals, and television and radio pro- 
grams for the Ministry of National Defense. 

In late 1990, the minister of national defense announced that 
reductions in the armed services would affect the command ele- 
ments and administrative organizations within the Ministry of Na- 
tional Defense in proportion to reductions in operational forces. 
Some directorates with related functions reportedly were merged, 
but the full extent of reductions in the Ministry of National Defense 
was not yet evident in 1991. 

Armed Services 

In 1991 the three armed services of the BPA were the ground, 
air and air defense, and naval forces. The ground forces, or army, 
clearly was the most important service. In addition, each service 
had several combat arms and support branches. Some support ser- 
vices, such as the construction or civil defense troops, were not 
subordinate to a particular armed service. In 1991 the BPA was 
reducing, restructuring, and modernizing its forces. The Minis- 
try of National Defense announced that, while the air and air 
defense and naval forces would retain their basic structure, sub- 
stantial changes in the ground forces were expected. 

In 1991 the military had 107,000 personnel, a reduction of more 
than 45,000 since 1988 (see Military Personnel, this ch.). More 
than 80 percent were conscripts. In late 1990, the minister of na- 
tional defense had announced plans for further reductions in 1991 , 



242 



Observation post in military exercises in Khaskovo District, 1985 

Courtesy Sofia Press Agency 

including elimination of one motorized rifle division, one tank 
brigade, and one air force regiment — a total of 10,000 personnel, 
200 T-62 tanks, 200 artillery pieces, and 20 MiG-21 aircraft. The 
minister also announced that over 500 T-34 tanks held in storage 
were to be destroyed. The navy planned to decommission five older 
combat ships in 1991. 

At the same time, the minister of national defense stressed a need 
to restructure the BP A into a more modern, professional, and bet- 
ter trained force. Such a force could be smaller because the new 
defensive doctrine required fewer forces. Tank and mechanized in- 
fantry units were reduced in favor of more antitank, air defense, 
and other defensive systems. The major problem for the BPA's fu- 
ture development was improving the quality of armaments while 
reducing their quantity. However, the minister of national defense 
publicly expressed concern that domestic industries could not produce 
many types of modern weapons that used new technologies. In the 
area of personnel, the minister announced plans to modernize mili- 
tary training programs by updating curricula at military educational 
establishments and making field training and exercises more realistic. 

Ground Forces 

Ground forces combat units included motorized rifle, tank, 



243 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



artillery and missile, and antiaircraft troops, as well as several com- 
bat support branches. The ground forces numbered over 70,000 
soldiers, the majority of whom were conscripts. As recently as 1990, 
they had consisted mainly of eight motorized rifle divisions and 
five tank brigades. In 1991 the active ground forces deployed four 
motorized rifle divisions and two tank brigades, with four divisions 
and one brigade in reserve status. In implementing the new defen- 
sive doctrine, the ground forces further reduced tanks in the re- 
maining motorized rifle divisions by 30 percent, converting their 
tank regiments into motorized rifle regiments. Defensive weapons 
in divisions were increased by adding more antitank, combat en- 
gineering, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare units. The at- 
tachment of several antiaircraft elements to the ground forces 
command indicated that the command operated its own air defense 
network to protect deployed ground units. The antiaircraft attach- 
ments included one air defense command post, one air defense 
brigade, several antiaircraft maintenance brigades, one radio- 
technical or radar battalion, and one antiaircraft artillery test range. 

In all, the ground forces had over 2,400 tanks, including more 
than 300 T-72, 1 ,300 T-55, and 600 older T-34 vehicles. The more 
than 2,000 armored combat vehicles included nearly 150 modern 
BMP armored fighting vehicles and over 600 BTR-60 and 1,100 
MT-LB armored personnel carriers. The ground forces operated 
2,500 large-caliber artillery systems. These included 450 85mm 
D-44 and 100mm SU-100 and T-12 antitank guns; 200 122mm 
BM-21 multiple rocket launchers; over 1,600 122mm and 152mm 
howitzers and guns, including nearly 700 self-propelled 2S1, 500 
M-30, and smaller numbers of D-20, M-1937, and M-46 towed 
guns; and 350 mortars, including the self-propelled 120mm Tun- 
dzha produced in Bulgaria. The ground forces had 64 launchers 
for surface-to-surface missiles. That number included modern SS-1 
missiles and older, less accurate FROG- 7 missiles with respective 
ranges of 300 and 75 kilometers. Besides these battlefield missiles, 
eight longer-range SS-23 launchers were available (see Doctrine and 
Strategy, this ch.). The Soviet-made AT- 3 was the main antitank 
guided missile in the inventory. Air defense for the ground forces 
consisted of 50 mobile SA-4, SA-6, and man-portable SA-13 tac- 
tical surface-to-air missiles and nearly 400 self-propelled and towed 
100mm, 85mm, 57mm, and 23mm air defense guns. 

The bulk of the ground forces were deployed along two primary 
operational directions: the west-southwest, opposite Yugoslavia and 
Greece, and the southeast, opposite Turkey. Stationed in Sofia, 
Plovdiv, and southern Khaskovo provinces, the First Army faced 
Yugoslavia and Greece with more than 600 tanks, 700 armored 



244 



National Security 



combat vehicles, and 800 large-caliber artillery weapons. The Third 
Army was located primarily in Burgas and northern Khaskovo 
provinces facing Turkey and had over 800 tanks, 900 armored com- 
bat vehicles, and 700 heavy artillery pieces. The active units of 
the Second Army, a low-strength formation to be staffed by reserves 
in wartime, were based in central Bulgaria, in Plovdiv, and northern 
Khaskovo provinces. The Second Army was positioned to support 
either the First Army in the west or the Third Army in the east 
when fully mobilized during wartime. Relatively few ground forces 
were deployed in the north opposite Romania or in the east along 
the Black Sea coast. 

At nearly full strength, the First and Third Armies had two motor- 
ized rifle divisions each. Strategic reserves consisted of one indepen- 
dent tank brigade and one artillery, antitank, and antiaircraft 
regiment each. In 1991 the Third Army opposite Turkey had a 
second independent tank brigade reinforced with two artillery bat- 
talions. The tank brigades each had four to six battalions and as 
many as 200 tanks. Support units included supply, maintenance, 
and artillery-technical brigades; communications and combat en- 
gineering regiments; and radio relay cable, electronic warfare, 
reconnaissance, artillery-reconnaissance, parachute-reconnaissance, 
radio-technical, bridging, and chemical defense battalions. The ar- 
mies also controlled their own artillery, chemical, communications, 
vehicle and armor, combat engineering, medical- sanitary, fuel, and 
food depots, military hospitals, and maintenance and mobilization 
bases to support their maneuver units. They had one or two ter- 
ritorial training centers that functioned as reserve divisions for their 
respective armies. The centers were organized into reserve detach- 
ments for motorized rifle, tank, artillery, and antiaircraft troops, 
and specialist training groups for artillery-technical, antitank, recon- 
naissance, communications, combat engineering, maintenance, and 
rear support troops. Many reserve detachments were significant 
forces in themselves, often as large as motorized rifle regiments 
but lacking a full contingent of personnel. The low-strength Sec- 
ond Army itself was similar in organization and purpose to a ter- 
ritorial training center. It had one full-strength tank brigade, one 
artillery regiment, several combat support regiments and battal- 
ions, several reserve detachments and groups, depots, one mili- 
tary hospital, and one maintenance base. 

The typical motorized rifle division had four motorized rifle regi- 
ments, one artillery regiment, one antiaircraft artillery regiment, 
one independent tank battalion, one independent artillery battal- 
ion, one antitank battalion, and several machine gun-artillery bat- 
talions. Reconnaissance, communications, combat engineering, 



245 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

maintenance, and supply battalions provided necessary combat sup- 
port to the division. 

A typical motorized rifle regiment had three motorized rifle bat- 
talions with ninety armored combat vehicles and one tank battal- 
ion with thirty tanks. Its artillery battalion had two to four batteries 
of nine artillery pieces. It had one antiaircraft artillery battalion, 
one antitank battery, and one or two machine gun- artillery batteries. 

Air and Air Defense Forces 

Air and air defense force units were rather evenly dispersed 
throughout the country. They operated approximately 300 com- 
bat aircraft, including over 160 MiG-21, 70 MiG-23, 40 Su-25, 
and 20 MiG-29 fighters and more than 100 L-29 and L-39 com- 
bat trainers. Two MiG fighter and three MiG interceptor regiments 
were operational. The air forces had two regiments of Mi-24 attack 
helicopters, two regiments of Mi-17, Mi-8, and Mi-2 multipurpose 
combat support helicopters, and one squadron of Mi-2 and Mi-8 
transport helicopters. The air and air defense forces had over 22,000 
personnel, about 75 percent of whom were conscripts. 

The First Air Defense Division and Second Air Defense Divi- 
sion, deployed in Sofia and Burgas provinces, respectively, were 
composed of two interceptor regiments with eighteen aircraft each. 
They operated Soviet-made MiG-21, MiG-23, and MiG-29 fight- 
ers. A third air defense division controlled the strategic air defense 
network of approximately 280 Soviet-made SA-2, SA-3, SA-5, 
and more modern SA-10 surface-to-air missile launchers dispersed 
at about thirty sites throughout the country. In 1991 the division 
probably had four regiments, each composed of several battalions. 
Battalions provided central command and control for as many as 
ten launchers, with each launcher corresponding to a battery. 

The Tenth Composite Air Corps in central Bulgaria was the larg- 
est air formation. It had more than 225 aircraft. Its principal mis- 
sion was to provide air support, tactical reconnaissance, and mobility 
for the ground forces. It had two fighter-bomber regiments, one 
fighter regiment, one reconnaissance aircraft regiment, and four 
helicopter regiments, as well as large numbers of radar, mainte- 
nance, and communications support units under its command. Its 
aircraft included MiG-21 and MiG- 17 fighters and MiG-23 and 
Su-25 fighter-bombers, Su-22, MiG-21, and MiG-25 reconnais- 
sance variants, and over forty specialized Mi-24 attack helicopters 
and forty Mi-2, Mi-8, and Mi-17 combat and transport helicopters. 

The Higher Aviation School of the air and air defense forces com- 
mand also controlled two aviation training regiments and one avi- 
ation training squadron with over eighty L-29 and L-39 primary 



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National Security 



trainers and over eighty MiG-15, MiG-17, and MiG-21 armed 
combat trainers in northern Bulgaria (see Officer Education, this 
ch.). The Higher Aviation School also had a large number of logis- 
tics and other support units to train specialists for the service. 

Naval Forces 

The navy defended approximately 350 kilometers of coastline 
along the Black Sea. Its major bases were located at Varna (the 
headquarters), Atiya, Sozopol, Balchik, and Burgas. Naval forces 
included over twenty submarines and minor surface combatants 
that could be deployed in coastal defense operations. As recently 
as 1989, Bulgarian naval forces defended claims to their territorial 
waters in incidents with Turkish forces at sea. As in the case of 
the ground forces, the Ministry of National Defense announced 
some unilateral naval reductions in 1990. In all, five vessels were 
to be retired or sold abroad: two submarine chasers, two coastal 
patrol boats, and one submarine. They were basically obsolete and 
had little residual military value. This deletion was more than 
balanced by the addition of three Soviet Poti-class corvettes to the 
operational inventory. In 1990 the navy had about 10,000 person- 
nel, half of them conscripts. 

The navy had four components: the Black Sea Fleet, Danube 
Flotilla, Coastal Defense, and a shore establishment. The Black 
Sea Fleet was organized into submarine, escort ship, missile and 
torpedo boat, amphibious craft, and minesweeping squadrons and 
brigades. The Danube Flotilla operated patrol craft along the river- 
ine border with Romania. Coastal Defense included amphibious 
landing and mine countermeasures forces. The shore establishment 
controlled naval bases, training facilities, and naval aviation, coastal 
artillery, and naval infantry units. 

Bulgaria obtained its minor surface combatant crafts from the 
Soviet Union. Its main forces consisted of four Pobeda-class sub- 
marines, two Druzki-class frigates, five Poti-class corvettes, six Osa- 
class missile patrol boats, six Shershen-class torpedo boats, and three 
SO- 1 -class and seven Zhuk-class patrol craft. The navy received 
its Pobeda- (formerly Romeo-) class submarines from the Soviet 
Union beginning in 1972. Originally built in the 1950s, they were 
armed with eight 533mm torpedo tubes. The Druzki- (formerly 
Riga-) class frigates were built in 1957 and 1958. They were modern- 
ized extensively during the early 1980s. They had three 100mm 
guns, three 533mm torpedo tubes, and four five-tube antisubmarine 
rocket launchers. The navy acquired its first three Poti-class cor- 
vettes from the Soviet Union in 1975 and another three in 1990. 
These were lightly armed antisubmarine warfare platforms carrying 



247 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

four 406mm torpedo tubes and two antisubmarine rocket launch- 
ers. The Osa-class missile patrol boats carried four SS-N-2 surface- 
to-surface missile launchers. The Soviet Union built them in the 
1960s and first transferred them to Bulgaria in the early 1970s. 
The Shershen-class torpedo boats had four 533mm torpedo tubes 
and were built and acquired at approximately the same time as 
the Osa-class boats. 

The navy operated more than thirty mine-warfare counter- 
measures ships, including four modern Soviet-built Sonya-class 
oceangoing minesweepers acquired in the early 1980s. The other 
minesweepers, including the Vanya-class, Yevgenya-class, and 
several miscellaneous ships, were restricted to coastal or inshore 
operations. The inventory also included two Polish-built Polnocny- 
class medium landing ships. These amphibious ships each could 
transport and land six tanks and 150 troops. The navy had nineteen 
additional Vydra-class medium landing craft, each of which could 
carry 100 troops and 250 tons of equipment on their open tank 
decks. 

Naval aviation, coastal artillery, and naval infantry were small 
support arms of the navy. Naval aviation consisted of one squa- 
dron of three armed and nine unarmed search-and-rescue and anti- 
submarine warfare helicopters. These Mi- 14, Mi-8, Mi-4, and Mi- 2 
naval helicopters were obtained from the Soviet Union. Coastal 
artillery had two regiments with about 150 guns of 100mm or 
130mm caliber. They were organized into several battalions with 
five batteries each. Coastal artillery units also operated an unknown 
number of Soviet SS-C-1 and more modern SSC-3 antiship mis- 
sile launchers. Their mission was to direct fire against combatants 
offshore, supporting amphibious assaults on the Bulgarian coast- 
line. The naval infantry force consisted of three companies of 100 
troops each. Their small size limited them to guard duty and ground 
defense of important coastal installations against commando raids 
and other assault forces. 

Border Troops 

The Border Troops were part of the BPA. Composed of 13,000 
troops in sixteen light infantry regiments, they resembled military 
units more than a police force. The mission was to defend the coun- 
try's frontiers against illegal crossings. The Border Troops regu- 
lated the movement of people within a strip twelve kilometers wide 
along the border. They cooperated with other authorities to pre- 
vent smuggling, although contraband control was not primarily 
their responsibility (see Crime, this ch.). During wartime the Border 
Troops were to coordinate their actions with the ground forces as 



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National Security 



a first line of national defense. The majority of the Border Troops 
were deployed to guard frontiers with Greece, Turkey, and Yugo- 
slavia, but they also defended the Romanian border. Several light 
patrol boats operated along the Danube River where it separated 
Bulgaria from Romania and along the Black Sea coast. 

Construction Troops 

Between 12,000 and 15,000 conscripts traditionally served as con- 
struction troops. They had their origin in the compulsory labor 
service established by the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union 
(BANU) government in 1920 (see Stamboliiski and Agrarian Re- 
form, ch. 1). Commanded by a general and organized into mili- 
tary units, this labor service built roads, railroads, and entire 
industrial enterprises. Although service in the Construction Troops 
satisfied military service requirements, these units were controlled 
by the Ministry of Construction, Architecture, and Public Services, 
and they received little or no military training. According to the 
chairman of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, these units 
typically drafted Turks and other ethnic minorities considered un- 
suitable for service in combat units because of linguistic barriers 
or perceived political unreliability (see Turks, ch. 2; The Move- 
ment for Rights and Freedoms, ch. 4). 

After the fall of Zhivkov, the Construction Troops received con- 
siderable attention. It was alleged that the Construction Troops 
had built over 20,000 apartments and houses for members of the 
BCP elite during the last ten years of the Zhivkov regime. High- 
ranking officers reportedly could requisition labor crews from the 
Construction Troops to work on their apartments or country homes. 
The Construction Troops often were reported as working in uran- 
ium mines, metallurgical industries, and other unsafe environments 
that did not attract enough civilian workers. 

In 1991 the future of the Construction Troops depended on the 
status of professionalization in the armed forces. Opponents ar- 
gued that these units were not a necessary component of profes- 
sional armed forces, and that their functions should devolve to the 
civilian economy. Proponents insisted that the Construction Troops 
provided a low-cost labor force for important national projects, in- 
cluding factories, power plants, and other capital investment 
projects, as well as useful occupational training in the building trades 
for a large number of conscripts. In the first half of the 1980s, a 
reported 1.2 billion leva (for value of the lev, see Glossary) worth 
of labor came from this source for more than 700 projects. Similar 
debates surrounded specially designated railroad troops and trans- 
portation troops. 



249 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

Civil Defense Troops 

A strong emphasis on civil defense resulted from Bulgaria's par- 
ticipation in the Warsaw Pact and the BCP's efforts to mobilize 
the population. The civil defense program developed in the 1960s 
from the recognition that nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons 
delivered by long-range missiles and artillery ended the clear dis- 
tinction between the front lines and civilian areas. Planning for 
civil defense was intended to meliorate the worst effects of weapons 
of mass destruction and to ensure continuity in communications, 
transportation, supply, and power generation during wartime. 

The Ministry of National Defense operated the National Radi- 
ation and Chemical Defense Warning System and planned the over- 
all direction and financing of civil defense activities. Civil defense 
committees attached to people's councils at the province or munici- 
pality level implemented civil defense plans for those jurisdictions. 
Civil defense organizations in manufacturing plants, enterprises, 
schools, and other collectives had similar responsibilities. Staffed 
with conscripts and organized into battalions, the civil defense troops 
trained the civilian population in individual and collective defen- 
sive measures, including dispersal and evacuation. They maintained 
firefighting, decontamination, civil engineering, salvage, rescue, 
and medical assistance programs and skills needed for the civil 
defense program. Despite these preparations for civil defense, con- 
struction of protective shelters for the population was a relatively 
low priority, primarily because of economic constraints. A network 
of hardened command posts for the military and civilian leader- 
ship was believed to exist. 

Logistics and Arms Procurement 

The Material-Technical and Rear Support Command had wide 
responsibility for logistical support to the BPA, ranging from rou- 
tine supply operations to maintenance and arms procurement. Its 
base and depot network included petroleum-oil-lubricant (POL) 
depots, special fuel bases, POL and special fuel equipment main- 
tenance battalions, central supply bases, food and general supply 
depots, central maintenance bases, central vehicle and armor-tank 
depots, vehicle and armor-tank maintenance bases, artillery depots, 
central artillery ammunition bases, and central missile maintenance 
bases. 

One major directorate of the Material-Technical and Rear Sup- 
port Command was responsible for military repair bases and 
factories. This directorate controlled general equipment repair 
factories, electro-mechanical factories, vehicle repair factories, and 



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National Security 



an institute for research and development in maintenance of 
weapons and equipment. In addition to this directorate, the com- 
mand ran a military technology research institute, a laser technol- 
ogy laboratory, an electro-mechanical training equipment factory, 
a central artillery-technical test range, and a billeting service. It 
also operated several schools for maintenance specialist training 
(see Military Training, this ch.). 

Despite the range of these activities, Bulgaria produced relatively 
few of its own armaments and other combat equipment. Defense 
production plants were located in Gabrovo, Karlovo, Kazanluk, 
Plovdiv, Sofia, and Varna, but the vast majority of arms and equip- 
ment came from the Soviet Union, with smaller amounts from 
Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Zhivkov regime also occasionally 
purchased military equipment from at least three NATO mem- 
bers, including the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). 
The exact nature and amount of weapons systems produced for 
domestic use remained largely unknown during that period, 
however. The Tundzha mortar and a few types of armored com- 
bat vehicles were produced domestically. Bulgarian shipyards did 
not produce surface combat ships or submarines. 

Following the lead of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria announced a 
major program of defense industry conversion in 1990. The sec- 
tion of the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Services responsible 
for arms production was renamed the Special Production and Con- 
version Department to reflect conversion to civilian manufacture. 
Bulgaria planned to convert an unspecified number of military 
plants and to require firms producing both military and civilian 
goods to double their output of the latter. By the end of 1990, 
defense plants were required to produce a total of 246 million leva 
worth of nonmilitary goods, increasing to 394 million leva in 19,91 , 
and to 1,130 million leva by 1995. In this period, their production 
mix was to change to 60 percent civilian and 40 percent military 
goods. Fully and partially converted military enterprises would 
manufacture textiles, capital equipment and machine tools, trac- 
tors and cultivators, durable consumer appliances, industrial and 
medical lasers, and canned food. The encouragement of joint ven- 
tures between Bulgarian and foreign firms was another element 
of the conversion program. Despite these changes in the defense 
industries, the government planned to retain complete authority 
over military production. 

Military Budget 

Bulgaria traditionally spent less on defense than other Warsaw 
Pact countries, but military spending was a greater burden on its 



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Bulgaria: A Country Study 

economy than on those of its allies. During the late 1980s, the mili- 
tary budget amounted to more than 10 percent of the gross na- 
tional product (GNP — see Glossary) because Bulgaria had the 
lowest GNP in the Warsaw Pact. Measured in terms of total govern- 
ment spending, the military budget typically accounted for more 
than 20 percent of the national budget. In contrast, BPA leaders 
complained that by 1990 defense spending had dropped to about 
6 percent of state expenditures, a smaller proportion than that spent 
by the governments of Greece or Turkey. 

Between 1986 and 1989, the military budget increased gradually 
from 1.67 to 1.8 billion leva. In January 1989, however, the State 
Council and the Council of Ministers reduced the appropriated 
defense budget for 1989 by 12 percent to 1.6 billion leva. The an- 
nouncement cited restructuring in the armed forces and economic 
considerations as reasons for the reduction. The Ministry of Na- 
tional Defense stated its intention to absorb the cut by reducing 
expenditures on operations, maintenance, and procurement, which 
were the largest components of the military budget. 

Military Personnel 

Bulgaria traditionally had more troops in uniform per capita than 
the other Warsaw Pact countries. At one time, it had almost as 
many soldiers as Romania, a country with a population three times 
larger than Bulgaria's. Total personnel in the BPA were drastically 
reduced from 152,000 to 107,000 between 1988 and 1991, however. 
The Ministry of National Defense cut the officer corps by over 1 , 700 
and general officers by 78. The military strongly opposed addi- 
tional reductions on the grounds that they would seriously jeopardize 
national security. Military spokesmen pointed to the 300,000- to 
350,000-soldier Turkish force in eastern Thrace and western Anato- 
lia as the key factor in determining the appropriate personnel level 
for the BPA. The unilateral reduction between 1988 and 1991 oc- 
curred against a backdrop of sharp domestic political debate over 
reducing the basic two-year military conscription term to eighteen 
months. 

Recruitment and Service Obligations 

The standard two-year term of military service for most con- 
scripts was reduced to eighteen months by the National Assembly 
in 1990. At the same time, the three-year term for sailors and other 
specialists was changed to two years. Bulgarian males entered the 
armed forces at the age of nineteen. Although the BPA was smaller 
than before, the new eighteen-month service term caused a turn- 
over of one- third of all conscripts every six months, making universal 



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conscription of nineteen-year-old males a necessity to maintain force 
levels. A population growth rate barely above zero exacerbated the 
manpower problem. In 1991 the minister of national defense noted 
an increased incidence of potential conscripts avoiding military ser- 
vice. He stated that 6,000 young men over seventeen years of age 
were known to have departed the country illegally for this reason, 
and another 3,500 failed to appear before the conscription com- 
mission and were presumed to be living abroad. The existing law 
on the armed forces prohibited men in this age category from leaving 
Bulgaria before performing their compulsory service. Although 
young men enrolled in a higher school or university could defer 
fulfillment of their military obligation until they had completed their 
education, draft deferments for other reasons were granted infre- 
quently and reluctantly. 

In 1991 political parties debated additional adjustments in the 
conscription system. The UDF and the BANU argued for a fur- 
ther reduction to a one-year term for most conscripts and six months 
for university graduates. They also called for extending contracts 
to some soldiers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to shift the 
BP A to a more professional force. Other aspects of military ser- 
vice discussed by the Commission on National Security of the Na- 
tional Assembly in 1990 were possible voluntary service by women 
and service in the national police force as an alternative to mili- 
tary conscription. 

Supported by the BSP, the military argued that one year of mili- 
tary service was insufficient to provide required training for con- 
scripts. It maintained that at any given time only 50 percent of 
the army would have completed basic training and be in a state 
of minimum combat readiness. Furthermore, shorter service would 
make the training of Bulgarian troops inferior to that of other armies 
in the region. Military spokesmen argued that the country could 
not afford the wages or the benefits required in a professional army, 
nor could it attract enough volunteers under the austere conditions 
of military service throughout the country. The army viewed the 
draft and mobilization as essential to ensure an adequate force in 
wartime. Some military leaders charged that the UDF and the 
BANU sought to reduce service terms in order to gain votes from 
servicemen who would gain early release. The military opposed 
alternative service on the grounds that the Construction Troops 
were the existing alternative to combat service. 

Military Training 

Military training began with mandatory premilitary training 
through the Organization for Cooperation in Defense, a mass 



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Bulgaria: A Country Study 

organization with more than 10,000 affiliates in schools, coopera- 
tive farms, and enterprises throughout the country. Under its 
auspices, reserve officers and active-duty junior officers trained 
thousands of young men and women between the ages of sixteen 
and eighteen in a year-round program. In classroom and field ex- 
ercises, trainees learned marksmanship, radio communications, 
scuba diving, and technical military specialties such as aircraft and 
vehicle operations and maintenance. For the last, the Organiza- 
tion for Cooperation in Defense had an inventory of more than 
seventy BTR-60 and MT-LB armored personnel carriers. Al- 
though the organization also sponsored sports competitions and 
summer camps less directly related to military service, the main 
goal of premilitary training was to reduce the time required to adapt 
young inductees to military life. 

Military training followed the Soviet model because the Soviet- 
made weapons and equipment in the inventory required special- 
ized training in operation and maintenance. Training, which also 
followed Soviet tactical concepts, moved in an annual cycle under 
the two-year service term. Adjustments in the training cycle were 
expected to compensate for the shorter eighteen-month service term. 
On the other hand, in 1990 elimination of political indoctrination 
requirements freed as much as 25 percent of conscript training time 
for military and physical training. Immediately after induction, 
conscripts began basic physical conditioning, training in handling 
and maintenance of small arms, drill, and general military indoc- 
trination. They learned a range of individual skills required in small 
unit combat situations, including first aid, radiation and chemical 
decontamination, and camouflage techniques. After basic train- 
ing, soldiers formed crews for training on larger weapons and equip- 
ment. They participated in exercises of increasing scale until the 
training cycle culminated in a large-scale combined arms maneu- 
ver held each year. In 1990 the minister of national defense called 
for more realistic training, especially for combat at night and in 
poor visibility conditions. Conscripts received specialist training 
in a variety of fields. Separate schools trained junior specialists in 
transport and rear services, tank and vehicle maintenance, POL 
handling, and military music. 

The majority of NCOs were new inductees selected at induc- 
tion for special training at service schools. NCOs served longer than 
the usual conscription period. In the early 1970s, special second- 
ary schools were also established for NCO training. These schools 
were available to acceptable applicants who had completed the 
eighth grade. The course of study lasted three years and gradu- 
ates were obligated to serve in the armed forces for ten years. 



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Military life was generally austere but not significantly differ- 
ent from conditions throughout the country. The greatest hard- 
ship was the requirement that conscripts serve outside their home 
provinces. In 1991 increasing criticism was leveled at the negative 
aspects of military service, especially the hazing of new conscripts. 
The press widely reported complaints from conscripts and parents 
that hazing often included intimidation and violence against young 
recruits by senior soldiers. In response, junior officers were assigned 
barracks duty to prevent such excesses. A general decline in mili- 
tary discipline also had become a problem in 1991. The press re- 
ported widespread cases of soldiers failing to wear proper uniforms 
or to carry proper identity papers, increased rates of absence without 
leave, and black market activities by soldiers. Misappropriation 
of money and property, theft of weapons and ammunition, and 
violent assault and murder were cited as increasingly common oc- 
currences. The Plovdiv garrison alone reported 600 violations of 
military conduct rules during the last six months of 1990. Burgas, 
Stara Zagora, and other garrisons in southeastern Bulgaria were 
cited as particular problem areas. A spokesperson for the Minis- 
try of National Defense voiced concern that the process of demo- 
cratization had the unintended side effect of undermining order 
in the ranks of the BPA. The spokesperson accused the media and 
political parties of encouraging disciplinary violations and disobe- 
dience among conscripts without regard to the need to maintain 
the integrity and capabilities of the BPA. On the other hand, the 
military leadership tended to label all agitation for better living con- 
ditions as simply a failure of discipline. 

Officer Education 

The level of education of Bulgarian officers rose in the 1970s 
and 1980s. In the early 1970s, only 40 percent had degrees from 
higher military or civilian schools, but this figure rose to nearly 
two-thirds of the entire officer corps by 1980. Cadet programs in 
several higher military schools provided officers for the armed forces. 
These programs were equivalent to a civilian university curricu- 
lum. Applicants were required to have a secondary school educa- 
tion and to be single, in excellent physical condition, and under 
twenty-four years of age. Many applicants had completed their com- 
pulsory military service as conscripts and had decided to pursue 
a professional military career. The ground forces had three higher 
military schools for training combined arms officers, artillery 
officers, and reserve officers. The air and air defense forces had 
one Higher Aviation School that provided firsthand experience with 
aircraft besides its classroom training. The Higher Aviation School 



255 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

had three flight training regiments with supporting aviation engineer- 
ing, communications, and radio-technical (radar) support battalions 
(see Armed Services, this ch.). The naval forces had a Higher Naval 
School to train officers for the service. Cadets in training to be line 
officers had four-year courses of study; those preparing for techni- 
cal specialties such as artillery, aviation, and communications had 
five-year courses of study. Cadets received their commissions im- 
mediately after they graduated. 

Selected officers could obtain advanced academic training. Mid- 
grade officers could apply for acceptance in the Georgi Rakovski 
Military Academy in Sofia. Graduation from the academy, which 
was similar to a Western war college or command and staff course, 
was a prerequisite for advancement into the senior officer ranks. 
Approximately one-third of all career officers completed that course. 
Most active-duty officers studied in one of several Soviet military 
academies. Completion of a two-year program in the Soviet Union 
and fluency in Russian were requirements for field-grade officers. 
In 1991 the minister of national defense raised the possibility of 
sending officers to study in Western military academies, but he 
cited the language barrier and the country's financial difficulties 
as obstacles. The General Staff had several other specialized aca- 
demic institutes for the study of military science and history (see 
High Command, this ch.). It also operated the Military Medical 
Academy, which was established as a training and research center 
in the military aspects of the medical sciences, to upgrade training 
of military physicians and to provide medical services for the armed 
forces. 

A professional military career was considered relatively presti- 
gious in Bulgaria, although prestige began to wane in the post- 
Zhivkov era. Depending on whether nonmonetary benefits like 
housing and food were considered, an officer's pay was generally 
25 to 50 percent higher than that offered in civilian positions with 
comparable responsibilities. Only in 1990 did the defense estab- 
lishment begin to address problems familiar to military officers in 
all countries, however. For example, spouses frequently were un- 
able to find work in the vicinity of military posts. In 1991 a special 
cash allowance to military families was being considered to cover 
these instances. Day-care and school accommodations often were 
scarce, and adequate housing unavailable. The quasi-official Georgi 
Rakovski Officer Legion was established in 1990 to promote a broad 
range of professional interests and address issues such as living stan- 
dards within the Ministry of National Defense. 

In the early 1990s, tenure became a vital concern to officers. 
In 1991 the minister of national defense announced that reductions 



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in the armed forces would reduce the officer corps by nearly 15 
percent. A military affiliate of the Podkrepa labor federation was 
founded in 1991 by a group of junior officers and NCOs (see Trade 
Unions, ch. 4). As an independent organization, it was seen as 
a more formidable adversary to the Ministry of National Defense 
than the Georgi Rakovski Officer Legion. Some of the Podkrepa 
affiliate's founders were dismissed from the service, apparently in 
retaliation for their activities. 

Reserves and Mobilization 

In 1991 Bulgaria had a force of approximately 500,000 in reserve 
for service in the event of mobilization. This figure included over 
400,000 in the ground forces, nearly 50,000 in the air and air 
defense forces, and smaller numbers in the naval forces. Individu- 
als were counted in the active reserves for the first five years after 
their release from military service. Their reserve obligation con- 
tinued until age fifty for former conscripts and until age sixty for 
officers. The demand for labor in the civilian economy and a lack 
of training put a practical limit on the effectiveness of the reserves. 
Soldiers discharged in the latest five-year period represented the 
largest contingent in the reserves, and they could be mobilized after 
a short period of refresher training and physical conditioning. The 
deactivation of four motorized rifle divisions and increased emphasis 
on territorial training centers indicated that reserves could become 
a more important part of the force structure. 

Ranks, Uniforms, and Insignia 

The ground forces and air and air defense forces used the same 
system of ranks. The air and air defense forces and naval forces 
lacked an equivalent to the four-star army general rank in the 
ground forces. Below army general, there were three general- grade, 
three field- grade, and four company- grade officer ranks. In descend- 
ing order, the ranks were colonel general, lieutenant general, major 
general, colonel, lieutenant colonel, major, captain, senior lieu- 
tenant, lieutenant, and junior lieutenant. Naval officer ranks in- 
cluded three admiral, four captain, and three lieutenant ranks. The 
ground forces and air and air defense forces had six enlisted grades, 
four sergeant and two private. The naval forces had equivalent petty 
officer and seaman grades. 

Officers wore a service uniform consisting of a tailored blouse 
with patch pockets and trousers that tucked into high boots. A Sam 
Browne belt and sidearms were optional. The ground forces wore 
stripes and piping on caps and rank insignia that varied in color 
according to the branch of service (motorized rifle, tank, artillery, 



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Bulgaria: A Country Study 



and others). Enlisted uniforms were similar in design but had less 
ornate trim. The air and air defense forces and naval forces had 
the same uniforms but could be distinguished by blue stripes and 
piping for the former and traditional naval blues and whites for 
the latter. 

Rank insignia on uniforms consisted of stars or stripes on shoulder 
boards. Officer ranks were identified by varying numbers of stars 
and increasingly ornate shoulder boards with higher ranks. Those 
of company-grade officers were relatively plain: those of general 
officers were very ornate. Enlisted grades were denoted by increas- 
ing numbers of stripes. Privates and seamen wore no stripes and 
plain shoulder boards. The number and width of stripes increased 
with promotion to higher grades (see fig. 13: fig. 14: fig. 15). 

Foreign Military Relations 

For most of the postwar era. Bulgaria's strictly defined relations 
with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact limited its relations 
with the military establishments of other countries. In the 1970s 
and 1980s. Bulgaria established military contacts with a few de- 
veloping countries in the Middle East and Africa because of their 
relations with the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact 
raised a question about Bulgaria's future external military ties. Op- 
tions included continuing a bilateral relationship with the Soviet 
Union, establishing a multilateral security arrangement with neigh- 
boring Balkan countries or former Warsaw Pact allies in Eastern 
Europe, mounting an effort to join NATO, or withholding mili- 
tary commitments to other countries. 

The Warsaw Pact 

Geographically isolated from the strategically more important 
northern-tier countries of the alliance. Bulgaria participated in a 
few joint exercises of the Warsaw Pact along the central front op- 
posite NATO in the German Democratic Republic (East Germa- 
nv) and Czechoslovakia. Participation in that front usually was 
limited to small contingents. Small-scale maneuvers or command 
and staff exercises were held in Bulgaria in 1964 and 1972. Shield-82 
was the first major Warsaw Pact exercise m Bulgaria. That exer- 
cise involved 60.000 allied troops and included units from the 
northern-tier Warsaw Pact countries for the first time. The major- 
ity of participants were Soviet soldiers, however. The use of air or 
sea transportation instead of ground transportation across Roma- 
ma. which allowed no foreign troops on its territory, restricted par- 
ticipation by the northern-tier Warsaw Pact countries. Part of the 
rationale for the Yarna-Odessa ferry completed in the late 1970s 



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National Security 



was to bypass this obstacle and provide direct Soviet-Bulgarian 
transport of equipment and troops. The Warsaw Pact conducted 
a major command and staff exercise for its Southwestern Theater 
of Military Operations in Bulgaria in March 1984. Union-84 in- 
cluded general staff elements from the Soviet Union, Hungary, 
Romania, and Bulgaria in simulated coordination of their respec- 
tive ground and naval forces. 

Military Cooperation and Exchanges 

Bulgaria had fewer military contacts with developing countries 
than did its Warsaw Pact allies, instead stressing economic, agricul- 
tural, and technological exchanges. Military cooperation with de- 
veloping countries occurred primarily as part of assistance programs 
to Soviet allies rather than as an independent policy. 

Beginning in the late 1970s, Bulgaria developed military rela- 
tions with several key countries in the Middle East and Africa. By 
the mid-1980s, friendship treaties were in effect with Angola, Ethio- 
pia, Libya, Mozambique, and Syria — all of which were receiving 
substantial military aid from the Soviet Union. These treaties men- 
tioned unspecified military cooperation between the two signato- 
ries. In the 1980s, the Bulgarian minister of national defense paid 
official visits and received military delegations of developing coun- 
tries without further elaboration of those terms. During this pe- 
riod, Bulgaria also had limited military relations with several 
developing countries that were not Soviet client states, including 
India, Nigeria, and Zambia. 

More recently, Bulgaria extended its policy of military cooper- 
ation to immediate neighbors. In 1987 and 1988, Bulgaria and 
Greece exchanged visits by the chiefs of their respective general 
staffs. In 1990 the National Assembly ordered several units of special 
troops deployed to the Persian Gulf. Over 270 troops, consisting 
of a medical team, chemical defense company, and rear services 
unit, supported the United States-led coalition that forced the Iraqi 
army to withdraw from Kuwait in February 1991. In November 
1990, the Bulgarian General Staff sent a delegation to Turkey, sig- 
naling a decisive warming of relations with that traditional enemy. 
In 1991 a Bulgarian-Turkish nonaggression pact was discussed, 
but Bulgaria feared that a bilateral treaty would damage its close 
relations with Greece. 

Arms Sales 

During the 1980s, Bulgaria annually exported an estimated 
US$250 to US$500 million worth of arms and military equipment. 
On one occasion, Zhivkov personally boasted of having arms supply 



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Bulgaria: A Country Study 




National Security 




Bulgaria: A Country Study 



relationships with thirty-six different countries. The Kintex for- 
eign trade organization had responsibility for managing arms sales 
abroad. Beginning in the early 1960s, Bulgaria reportedly used its 
merchant ship fleet to deliver arms to socialist-oriented forces fight- 
ing civil wars in Algeria, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique 
and to leftist terrorist groups in Italy, Turkey, and the Middle East. 
Kintex allegedly was willing to accept narcotics from Turkish ter- 
rorists and other insurgent groups as payment for arms, a charge 
Bulgarian officials denied. A captured leader of the Italian Red 
Brigades asserted that Bulgaria was willing to provide weapons to 
his group during the early 1980s. One of Bulgaria's more infamous 
sales transferred sixty Soviet tanks to Nicaragua and trained seventy 
Nicaraguan pilots in 1983 and 1984, at the height of the Sandinista 
government's war against anticommunist rebels in that country. 

Political change removed Kintex and its activities from the 
category of state secrets. In 1990 the trade organization revealed 
that it maintained contacts in fifty countries and sold them mainly 
small arms, ammunition, and tanks and combat aircraft retired 
from service with the BP A. The democratization of post-Zhivkov 
Bulgaria reportedly had the same downsizing effect on Kintex as 
it had on other defense-related enterprises (see Logistics and Arms 
Procurement, this ch.). According to one source, arms exports to 
the Soviet Union declined from billions to several hundred mil- 
lion leva between the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Plans were 
announced to continue Bulgaria's arms sales under stricter legis- 
lative scrutiny and government control in the 1990s. 

Law and Order 

The BCP gained control of the Ministry of Justice and Minis- 
try of Internal Affairs in the Fatherland Front coalition after the 
overthrow of the wartime government on September 9, 1944. The 
party used these posts to increase its political power and ultimately 
to push all noncommunists out of the cabinet. In the subsequent 
reorganization of the national police force, party loyalists replaced 
officers suspected of having cooperated with the Gestapo. BCP 
cadres held every important national, regional, and municipal po- 
sition in the new People's Militia that replaced the prewar local 
police force. The BCP also replaced the prewar court system with 
People's Courts, in which party members served as judges and 
jurors. With some modifications, the internal security and justice 
systems established in the mid- 1940s remained in place for the next 
forty years, bolstering one-party rule. 

The fall of Zhivkov in November 1989 and the end of the com- 
munist monopoly on political power brought overt pressure for 



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democratic reform of the justice system. In 1991 some improve- 
ments were evident, but other problems persisted. The Ministry 
of Internal Affairs retained its broad responsibility for maintain- 
ing law and order, law enforcement, internal security, and foreign 
intelligence activities. Before 1989 it had been more powerful and 
important than the judicial system it was supposed to serve; in 1991 
many still considered the ministry a reactionary and sinister force 
because of past involvement in repressive activities and indications 
of continued party influence within its ranks. However, a new union 
of its employees called for significant reforms, including the 
depoliticization and professionalization of its work force. Immedi- 
ately after the Zhivkov ouster, substantial public pressure called 
for depoliticizing the ministry, which one high official described 
as the "armed detachment of the party." Early in 1990, a reor- 
ganization plan proposed drastic cuts in budgeting and personnel 
and a complete revision of the ministry's functions. 

Bulgaria lost social stability between 1989 and 1991. Increased 
social tension, crime, violence, and civil disorder were the unintended 
consequences of greater freedom. A crisis of law enforcement fol- 
lowed in the wake of political relaxation and democratization. The 
police seemed unsure whether to enforce the laws of the legal sys- 
tem of the discredited Zhivkov regime. This uncertainty was reflected 
when the People's Militia, formerly an efficient and feared instru- 
ment of the communist regime, took no action to stop vandals and 
arsonists who attacked and burned the BSP headquarters in Au- 
gust 1990. 

Crime 

More than 700,000 crimes were reported in Bulgaria between 1970 
and 1990. The People's Militia reported an annual rate of 570 crimes 
per 100,000 people in 1989. By 1989, homicides had increased by 
30 percent, burglaries by nearly 40 percent, and rapes by 45 per- 
cent over the rates in the mid-1980s. In 1990, the incidence of crime 
again increased sharply. Compared with the 15,000 crimes com- 
mitted during 1989, the People's Militia received reports of more 
than 4,600 crimes in Sofia alone during the first six months of 1990. 
Approximately 70 percent of these crimes were committed by repeat 
offenders, and a very high percentage were petty crimes against 
property. Organized crime was increasingly evident; more than ten 
criminal organizations reportedly operated in Sofia. They were in- 
volved in black-market activities and were reputed to have connec- 
tions to organized crime in other countries. 

In an effort to curb another aspect of the crime problem, the Na- 
tional Assembly appealed in 1990 for citizens to surrender their 



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Bulgaria: A Country Study 




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National Security 



unregistered firearms and ammunition. The People's Militia re- 
ported that 145 crimes were committed with firearms between 1985 
and 1989 and that in that period 60 people were killed and more 
than 120 people were wounded by illegal firearms. In 1989 authori- 
ties seized nearly 800 illegal firearms, and 2,500 firearms were sur- 
rendered voluntarily. That year approximately 85,000 firearms had 
been registered in the country. In 1990 the government revoked 
a law allowing party members and government officials to carry 
weapons. 

Smuggling of drugs, arms, and other contraband was a persis- 
tent problem during and after the Zhivkov regime. Allegations of 
official involvement in smuggling appeared frequently in the for- 
eign press (see Arms Sales, this ch.). Government spokespersons 
denied these charges and routinely asserted that the geographical 
situation of Bulgaria at the crossroads of Europe and Asia made 
it a natural route for illegal trade. They pointed out instances in 
which customs officials arrested foreigners, particularly Turks and 
Yugoslavs, passing through Bulgaria with illegal narcotics bound 
for Europe. The press noted cooperation between customs authori- 
ties and the UN Commission for Narcotics Control in efforts to 
curtail international drug trafficking. The UN supported these ef- 
forts by funding construction of modern border checkpoints in Bul- 
garia. The International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) 
also certified that Bulgaria had a good record in international law 
enforcement. In Bulgaria the Directorate of Customs and Customs 
Control of the Ministry of Finance was responsible for preventing 
drug trafficking; however, the People's Militia and Border Troops 
also were active in the counternarcotics effort. 

The Judicial System 

In 1991 the court system operated basically as it had before 1989. 
The administration of justice was based on the penal code of 1968 
and several subsequent amendments to it, and on the constitution 
of 1971. In general, the courts had little independence and the 
Ministry of Justice had few powers under the former regime. In 
1991 , however, the National Assembly was considering draft laws 
on penal procedure, punishment, courts, amnesty, state secrets, 
and travel abroad. It sought to guarantee accused persons access 
to defense counsel during each phase of the legal process, to elimi- 
nate detention on suspicion, and to ensure that three judges and 
four lay jurors, called assessors, would preside over trials involv- 
ing particularly grievous crimes in which the death penalty would 
be a possible sentence. 



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Bulgaria: A Country Study 

The court system consisted of municipal, provincial, and mili- 
tary courts; the Supreme Court; and public prosecutors at cor- 
responding levels. The National Assembly elected the judges of the 
Supreme Court, its president, and the chief prosecutor to five-year 
terms. The chief prosecutor selected and supervised prosecutors 
to serve at the municipal and province levels and enforced compli- 
ance with legal standards by the government, its officials, and all 
citizens, prosecuting cases involving major crimes detrimental to 
the national interests or economy of Bulgaria. Judges at lower lev- 
els were elected to five-year terms by their respective constituen- 
cies. Conciliation committees in enterprises or municipal courts 
ruled on labor disputes. The arbitration court adjudicated civil cases 
and disputes between enterprises. 

Under the penal code inherited from the Zhivkov era, crimes 
against the socialist economy or socialist property generally were 
punished more severely than crimes against persons. Major economic 
crimes, misappropriation, and serious malfeasance were punished 
rigorously. Directors and managers could be held criminally liable 
for the shortcomings of their enterprises. Six-year prison terms were 
levied for crimes such as conducting private economic activity while 
representing a state enterprise and receiving economic benefits for 
work or services not rendered. Illegally crossing national borders 
was punishable by a fine of 3,000 leva and a five-year prison term, 
with heavier penalties for recidivists. In the reform period, an in- 
creasing number of minor offenses were changed to receive adminis- 
trative punishments such as fines up to 300 leva. These administrative 
proceedings represented rather arbitrary justice because the accused 
did not have the right to trial or legal counsel. The administrative 
proceedings were an expedient designed to alleviate a tremendous 
backlog of minor cases. Beginning in 1990, the dismantling of the 
state enterprise system called for shifting the emphasis of the crimi- 
nal code from protection of state property to protection of the in- 
dividual. This shift was attempted in the new constitution ratified 
by the National Assembly in July 1991. Independence of the judi- 
cial system, needed to standardize and clarify the administration 
of justice, received little attention in initial rounds of reform, however 
(see The Judiciary, ch. 4). 

The Ministry of Internal Affairs 

Under Zhivkov the Ministry of Internal Affairs had been charged 
with all aspects of internal and external security in peacetime. Given 
this assignment, the forces under the ministry had vast jurisdic- 
tion over society and were a feared and hated part of the communist 
government. For that reason, reorganization of internal security and 
intelligence operations was one of the first goals of the post-Zhivkov 



266 




Troops disembarking from armored personnel carrier during military 

exercises in Khaskovo District, 1985 
Courtesy Sofia Press Agency 

regimes. The overthrow of Zhivkov revealed the activities of Depart- 
ment Six, the "thought police" division of State Security that had 
been in charge of monitoring the activity of dissidents. Liquida- 
tion of that department was announced within a month of Zhiv- 
kov' s ouster; it also was blamed for the assaults on demonstrators 
that had received world publicity at the time of the 1989 ecological 
conference in Sofia (see The Ferment of 1988-90, ch. 4). The UDF 
and other political organizations called for a complete review of 
past investigations to identify violations of civil rights by the minis- 
try, review accusations of physical abuse during detention, improve 
prison conditions, and overturn sentences applied after improper 
investigation. The remaining prestige of the ministry was demon- 
strated in December 1990, however, when it and the defense minis- 
try were the posts most hotly contested between the BSP and the 
UDF in formation of the first multiparty cabinet. At that time, 
a civilian became head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the 
first time since 1944. 

The Ministry of Internal Affairs controlled the People's Militia 
(police) and the special militarized Internal Security Troops known 
as the Red Berets. In response to public demands for reform, a 
new Independent Trade Union Organization of Militia Employees 



267 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

set forth reforms to improve the organization's public relations, 
which remained very poor in 1990. Declaring that membership in 
a party was incompatible with nonpartisan law enforcement, the 
union called for the depoliticization and professionalization of the 
militia through training programs, legal definition of its author- 
ity, and visible separation from influence by the BSP, with which 
the public still linked the militia. The force also sought to change 
its name from "militia" to "police." The Commission on National 
Security of the National Assembly supported this proposal, and 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs itself drafted a new law on the Peo- 
ple's Militia for consideration by the National Assembly. 

The People's Militia controlled several subordinate organizations, 
including the Territorial Militia, Road Militia, Commercial Militia, 
Central Investigations Department, Training Department, and Ad- 
ministration Department. The Territorial Militia provided law en- 
forcement at the local level. Directorates for the Territorial Militia 
in each province of the country reported to the People's Militia 
at the national level. The Road Militia acted as a traffic enforce- 
ment authority similar to a highway patrol or state police force. 
The Commercial Militia investigated economic crimes, fraud, and 
thefts. The Training Department supervised the training of per- 
sonnel for the People's Militia. It operated a special secondary school 
to train sergeants and a national academy to train officers. Candi- 
dates studied law codes, criminology, criminal procedure, and for- 
eign languages. 

The Red Berets were also part of the Ministry for Internal Secu- 
rity. They were a militarized, light infantry force responsible for 
preventing riots and other civil disturbances. Their 15,000 per- 
sonnel were organized into fifteen regiments; they operated over 
100 BTR-60 armored personnel carriers equipped for riot control. 
Together with the People's Militia and the secret police, the Red 
Berets were involved in the infamous Bulgarization campaign dur- 
ing 1984 and 1985 (see Bulgaria in the 1980s, ch. 1; The Turkish 
Problem, ch. 4). They were deployed in November 1990 to main- 
tain order in Sofia during the general strike that toppled the BSP 
government. 

The Penal System 

Until 1990 the Ministry of Internal Affairs operated the penal 
system through its Central Prison Institutions Department and its 
Prison Service. The latter organization trained and administered 
prison guards. In 1990 the system included thirteen prisons and 
twenty-six minimum-security facilities housing 6,600 prisoners. 



268 




Military personnel used in crowd control during Union of 
Democratic Forces rally, Sofia 1990 
Courtesy Charles Sudetic 

Major prisons were located in Bobov Dol, Pazardzhik, Plovdiv, 
Sofia, Stara Zagora, Varna, and Vratsa. In 1990 authorities re- 
ported that the total prison population had declined by 10,000 as 
a result of amnesties granted to political prisoners during the previ- 
ous three years. The remaining prison population included a high 
percentage of repeat offenders and prisoners convicted of serious 
crimes. The institution at Pazardzhik reported more than 560 in- 
mates, including more than 50 imprisoned for murder, 60 for rape, 
140 for other crimes against persons, and the balance for crimes 
against property. Offenders guilty of less serious crimes served time 
in minimum-security facilities, including open and semi-open labor 
camps. Prison strikes and demonstrations began with the Zhivkov 
ouster, continuing and escalating through the first half of 1990. 
Sparked by the release of large numbers of political prisoners, mas- 
sive strikes elsewhere, and the suddenly volatile sociopolitical cli- 
mate, the strikes became violent, and several inmates reportedly 
immolated themselves to protest prison conditions. Red Berets were 
called upon to reinforce Prison Service guards. By 1991 Bulgaria 
had already implemented one stage of prison reform to improve 
its international human rights image: prisons were put under the 
Ministry of Justice instead of the Ministry of Internal Security. 



269 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



Security and Intelligence Services 

In 1990 the Bulgarian state security system was substantially 
revamped in response to opposition pressure to improve the sinister, 
oppressive reputation gained by agencies of the Ministry of Inter- 
nal Affairs during the Zhivkov era. After encountering strong 
resistance from party functionaries accustomed to using their po- 
sitions for personal gain, the realignment used the American security 
system as a model to create three services under a streamlined 
Ministry of Internal Affairs. The National Security Service (be- 
fore mid- 1991 called the National Service for Defense of the Con- 
stitution) was given responsibility for identifying and countering 
foreign intelligence, subversive, or terrorist activities affecting the 
security, territorial integrity, or sovereignty of the country. It had 
authority for domestic law enforcement in cases involving inter- 
national criminal activity, organized crime, smuggling, political 
corruption, and illegal fascist or nationalist organizations. The new 
philosophy announced for conduct of these activities included inde- 
pendence from all political parties, oversight by the Commission 
on National Security of the National Assembly, and recruitment 
according to professional rather than political qualification. In 1990 
the service was given the important new role of preventing vio- 
lence during elections. 

Unlike the catchall National Security Service, the other two in- 
telligence agencies had very specific roles. The National Protec- 
tion Service was formed from the Department of Security and 
Protection, which Zhivkov had turned into a massive organization 
with unspecified functions ranging from personal protection to sup- 
plying imported cars to high party officials. The new protection 
service was much smaller and was confined to physical protection 
of government officials and foreign dignitaries. 

The third security agency, the National Intelligence Service, was 
responsible for counterespionage and monitoring activities in neigh- 
boring countries, roles filled by the State Security (Durzhavna 
sigurnost, DS) prior to 1990. The National Intelligence Service 
announced a personnel cut of 20 percent in 1991, but even in the 
new atmosphere of disclosure little else was reported about its ac- 
tivity or staffing. After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the Bul- 
garian counterintelligence effort continued to be directed against 
the NATO countries adjacent to Bulgaria; counterintelligence 
against former Warsaw Pact allies remained forbidden under a mu- 
tual cooperation agreement. The work of the National Intelligence 
Service was supplemented by the Military Counterintelligence 
Service, which was moved from DS jurisdiction to the Ministry 



270 



National Security 



of National Defense in 1990. The military service reported to the 
General Staff. According to its chief, military intelligence was 
responsible for identifying and countering subversive actions, in- 
cluding terrorism, sabotage, and espionage. Besides foreign intel- 
ligence services, the activities of military intelligence were directed 
against domestic political extremism and crime. 

After reorganization of the DS agencies, substantial public skep- 
ticism remained about the role of the secret services in monitoring 
Bulgarian society. Some Department Six agents remained active, 
and in 1991 the existence of still undisclosed Department Six files 
fueled much media speculation. Revelations that the KGB had over- 
seen DS activity under Zhivkov brought speculation that KGB 
agents might still be active in Bulgaria after the Warsaw Pact ended. 
The Ministry of Internal Affairs claimed that only two agents re- 
mained in 1991, attached to the Soviet Embassy. 

Terrorist and Espionage Activities 

Bulgaria's involvement in international terrorism began in the 
early twentieth century when it provided sanctuary and a base of 
operations to the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organiza- 
tion (IMRO) for terrorist activities against Yugoslavia and Greece. 
In the 1920s and 1930s, IMRO became a virtual state within a 
state in southwestern Bulgaria, also known as Pirin Macedonia. 

From the beginning of the first communist regime, the State Secu- 
rity service was involved in conventional intelligence collection, ille- 
gal technology transfer, and covert actions abroad. The more recent 
notoriety of the State Security began in 1978 when it was accused 
of murdering prominent emigre Georgi Markov in London. Once 
a protege of Zhivkov, Markov had fled Bulgaria in 1969 and was 
frequently critical of his former mentor in Bulgarian language 
broadcasts for the British Broadcasting Corporation. He was 
stabbed with a poison-tipped umbrella in London, assumedly by 
a Bulgarian agent. During the same period, at least two similar 
assassination attempts were made on emigres, and a number of 
Bulgarian dissidents received threatening letters. In 1991 President 
Zheliu Zhelev agreed to open a full investigation of the Markov 
murder, using State Security files. 

Other incidents of State Security activity abroad received inter- 
national attention. The Bulgarian Embassy in Egypt was closed 
in 1978 after authorities found evidence of a plot to incite the Egyp- 
tian population to overthrow President Anwar al Sadat. In the 
1980s, Bulgaria engaged in retaliatory expulsions of Italian and 
Turkish diplomats on charges of espionage at a time when rela- 
tions with both countries were strained. The most infamous incident 



271 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

was the State Security's alleged involvement in the attempted as- 
sassination of Pope John Paul II in 1981 . In that case, the attacker, 
a Turkish radical, claimed that the Bulgarian and Soviet intelligence 
agencies had masterminded his plan in order to eliminate the Pol- 
ish pope's political influence in Eastern Europe. Three Bulgarians 
identified as coconspirators were acquitted in 1986, but the inci- 
dent caused the United States Department of State to place Bul- 
garia on its list of countries sponsoring terrorism. 

A leader of the Red Brigades, an Italian terrorist group that kid- 
napped a U.S. Army general in 1981, later implicated Bulgaria in 
the kidnap plot. The terrorist asserted that the aim of Bulgarian in- 
telligence was to destabilize Italy and gain information about NATO. 
The terrorists were ostensibly offered training, arms, and logistical 
assistance in this operation. A Bulgarian diplomat was expelled from 
Japan for spying on the Japanese biotechnology and genetic engineer- 
ing industry in 1983. In 1990 the UDF asserted that it possessed 
documents detailing the connections between the ousted Zhivkov 
regime and international terrorists as well as the operation of ter- 
rorist training centers in Bulgaria. In 1991 the government of Prime 
Minister Dimitur Popov pledged to disclose additional information 
on intelligence activities under Zhivkov. 

During the Turkish assimilation campaign of 1984-85, the DS, 
People's Militia, Red Berets, and the army were reported as using 
violence against ethnic Turks who resisted adopting Bulgarian names 
in place of their Turkish ones. As many as several hundred ethnic 
Turks may have been killed by secret police during this campaign. 
Additional hundreds of Turks were forcibly resettled, arrested, or 
imprisoned for refusing to cooperate with the assimilation measures. 
Bulgarian authorities blamed ethnic Turks for a bombing campaign 
in which thirty Bulgarians were killed in public places in 1984 and 
1985. Although guilt was never established, the terrorist acts aroused 
ethnic feeling that supported the Bulgarization campaign. As the 
1990s began, the Bulgarian civilian government had asserted con- 
trol over all internal security agencies, inspiring the hope that a more 
open society would result. 

* * * 

English-language sources on Bulgarian national security, the 
armed forces, and law and order are relatively few. Stephen Ashley's 
1 989 article in The Warsaw Pact and the Balkans, edited by Jonathan 
Eyal, is the best treatment of the BP A and Bulgarian security. F. 
Stephen Larrabee's article "Long Memories and Short Fuses" sets 
a context for understanding the security environment in which the 



272 



National Security 



country found itself as the Warsaw Pact disbanded and traditional 
conflicts reemerged in the Balkans. A 1982 book by Ivan Volgyes, 
The Political Reliability of the Warsaw Pact Armies, remains a good over- 
view of BPA force structure and personnel. Michael M. Boll's The 
Soviet- Bulgarian Alliance on Bulgarian security policies is useful but 
dated. Official Bulgarian data supplied for the Treaty on Conven- 
tional Armed Forces in Europe and The Military Balance provide 
detail on the organization, structure, strength, and disposition of 
ground forces and air and air defense forces. Milan Vego covers 
the naval forces in "Special Focus: The Bulgarian Navy" in the 
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Given increasingly open coverage 
of national security issues in primary sources, translations of the 
Bulgarian press by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and 
Joint Publications Research Service provide information on cur- 
rent developments. (For further information and complete citations, 
see Bibliography.) 



273 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Area and Estimated Population of Provinces, 1987 

3 Population of the Largest Cities, 1987 

4 Urban Growth, Selected Years, 1946-87 

5 Birth Rates and Death Rates, Selected Years, 1946-87 

6 Major Ethnic Groups, 1956 and 1965 

7 Protestant Denominations, 1975 

8 Employees in the State Economy by Sector, 1985, 1986, and 

1987 

9 Population Distribution as Related to Working Age, Selected 

Years, 1956-87 

10 Number of Schools, Teachers, and Students by Kind of School, 

Selected Years, 1951-88 

1 1 Investment Apportionment in the State Economy, Selected 

Years, 1949-88 

12 Average Annual Growth Rate of Net Material Product by 

Five-Year Plan, 1949-88 

13 Government Budget, Selected Years, 1980-90 

14 Ownership of Selected Consumer Products, 1980, 1983, and 

1987 

15 Conversion Values of the Lev to Major World Currencies, 

1991 

16 Distribution of Imports by Country, Selected Years, 1950-88 

17 Distribution of Exports by Country, Selected Years, 1950-88 

18 Distribution of Major Imports by Commodity, Selected Years, 

1980-88 

19 Distribution of Major Exports by Commodity, Selected Years, 

1980-88 

20 Social Categories in Bulgarian Communist Party Member- 

ship, Selected Years, 1944-86 



275 



Appendix 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know Multiply by To find 



Millimeters 0.04 inches 

Centimeters 0.39 inches 

Meters 3.3 feet 

Kilometers 0.62 miles 

Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 2.47 acres 

Square kilometers 0.39 square miles 

Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet 

Liters 0.26 gallons 

Kilograms 2.2 pounds 

Metric tons 0.98 long tons 

1.1 short tons 

2,204 pounds 

Degrees Celsius 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit 

(Centigrade) and add 32 



Table 2. Area and Estimated Population of Provinces, 1987 



Province Area * Population 



Burgas 14,657 872,700 

Khaskovo 13,892 1,044,400 

Lovech 15,150 1,072,100 

Mikhaylovgrad 10,607 668,200 

Plovdiv 13,628 1,258,000 

Razgrad 10,842 850,000 

Sofia (city) 1,331 1,208,200 

Sofiya 18,979 1,017,000 

Varna 11,929 980,100 



TOTAL 111,015 8,970,700 



* In square kilometers. 

Source: Based on information from The Statesman's Year-Book, 1990-1 991, Ed., John Paxton, 
New York, 1990, 243. 



277 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



Table 3. Population of the Largest Cities, 1987 



City 



Population 



City 



Population 



Sofia 1,128,859 Sliven 

Plovdiv 356,596 Shumen 

Varna 305,891 Pernik 

Burgas 197,555 Yambol 

Ruse 190,450 Khaskovo 

Stara Zagora 156,441 Gabrovo 

Pleven 133,747 Pazardzhik 

Dobrich (Tolbukhin) 111,037 

Source: Based on information from The Stateman's Year-Book, 1990-1991 , Ed., John Pax- 
ton, New York, 1990, 243. 



106,610 
106,496 
97,225 
94,951 
91,409 
81,554 
81,513 



Table 4. Urban Growth, Selected Years, 1946-87 



Natural Urban 
Urban Percentage of Population 

Year Population Total Population Increase 



1946 1,735,200 24.7 19,800 

1956 2,556,100 33.6 25,500 

1965 3,828,400 46.5 31,800 

1975 5,067,000 58.0 58,100 

1985 5,807,500 64.9 30,200 

1987 5,959,400 66.4 29,000 



Source: Based on information from Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.), Bulgarien, Gottingen, 
Germany, 1990, 445, 447. 



Table 5. Birth Rates and Death Rates, Selected Years, 1946-87 

Births Deaths 



Year Number Birth Rate * Number Death Rate 



1946 179,200 26.5 95,800 13.7 

1956 147,900 19.5 71,200 9.4 

1965 125,800 15.3 67,000 8.1 

1975 144,700 16.6 90,000 10.3 

1985 119,000 13.3 107,500 12.0 

1987 116,700 13.0 107,200 12.09 



* Per 1,000 population. 

Source: Based on information from Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.), Bulgarien, Gottingen, 
Germany, 1990, 437, 440. 



278 



Appendix 



Table 6. Major Ethnic Groups, 1956 and 1965 



1956 1_965 

Ethnic Group Population Percentage Population Percentage 



Bulgarian 6,506,541 85.5 7,231,243 87.9 

Turkish 656,025 8.6 780,928 9.5 

Gypsy 197,865 2.6 148,874 1.8 

Macedonian * 187,789 2.5 9,632 0.1 

Armenian 21,954 0.3 20,282 0.3 

Greek 7,437 0.1 8,241 0.1 

Tatar 5,993 0.1 6,430 0.1 



* Official census category. Figures do not represent actual size of this group. 

Source: Based on information from Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.), Bulgarien, Gottingen, 
Germany, 1990, 475. 



Table 7. Protestant Denominations, 1975 



Denominations Membership Clergy Parishes 



Pentecostal 5,000-6,000 36 43 

Adventist 3,500 40 20 

Congregationalist 2,600 24 26 

Methodist 1,000 15 13 

Baptist 700 7 10 



Source: Based on information from Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.), Bulgarien, Gottingen, 
Germany, 1990, 564. 



Table 8. Employees in the State Economy by Sector, 
1985, 1986, and 1987 
(in thousands) 



Sector 


1985 


1986 


1987 


Agriculture 


878.8 


848.1 


821.5 




1,411.1 


1,403.0 


1,422.3 


Construction 


360.6 


359.2 


359.1 


Commerce 


355.2 


360.7 


361.4 




299.5 


306.3 


303.3 


Education and culture 


311.7 


317.2 


317.6 




201.1 


201.8 


207.7 


Administration 


54.1 


54.3 


57.2 


Science and research 


82.1 


83.0 


85.8 


Housing and community services 


54.4 


56.7 


58.7 


Other 


86.2 


86.2 


89.0 


TOTAL 


4,094.8 


4,076.5 


4,083.6 



Source: Based on information from The Europa World Year Book, 1989, 1, London, 1989, 567. 



279 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



Table 9. Population Distribution as Related to Working Age, 
Selected Years, 1956-87 



Year 


Under Working Age 


Working At 


re * 


Over Work 


ing Age 


Number 


Percentage 


Number Percentage 


Number 


Percentage 


1956 . 


. . 2,136,700 


28.1 


4,486,800 


58.9 


980,200 


13.0 


1965 . 


.. 2,112,400 


25.7 


4,789,000 


58.2 


1,326,500 


16.1 


1975 . 


.. 2,061,400 


23.6 


5,058,100 


58.0 


1,608,100 


18.4 


1985 . 


. . 2,046,700 


22.9 


5,013,200 


56.0 


1,888,800 


21.1 


1987 . 


. . 2,029,300 


22.6 


5,004,500 


55.8 


1,942,400 


21.6 



* 16 to 54 for women; 16 to 59 for men. 

Source: Based on information from Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.), Bulgarien, Gottingen, 
Germany, 1990, 456. 



Table 10. Number of Schools, Teachers, and Students by Kind of School, 
Selected Years, 1951-88 



School 


1951 


1961 


1971 


1981 


1988 


Trade schools 












Number 


187 


236 


328 


300 


264 




1,564 


2,835 


8,454 


9,435 


7,457 




35,724 


42,123 


130,292 


151,200 


107,967 


Schools for the handicapped * 












Number 


11 


20 


116 


129 


128 


Teachers 


115 


987 


2,155 


2,373 


2,364 


Students 


976 


8,090 


16,870 


17,420 


16,764 


Professional schools 












Number 


175 


231 


246 


234 


248 




2,690 


5,307 


9,045 


9,415 


10,619 


Students 


61,591 


93,944 


152,919 


97,575 


115,036 


General middle schools 












Number 


129 


144 


134 


112 


74 


Teachers 


4,627 


8,021 


6,270 


7,419 


9,637 




113,259 


158,004 


100,949 


97,089 


167,845 



* Includes schools for mentally handicapped, maladjusted, deaf-mute, blind, and speech-impaired 
individuals. 



Source: Based on information from Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.), Bulgarien, Gottingen, 
Germany, 1990, 502, 506, 508, 510. 



280 



Appendix 



Table 11. Investment Apportionment in the State Economy, 
Selected Years, 1949-88 
(in percentages) 



Category 1949 1960 1965 1970 1980 1985 1988 



Industry 31.4 34.2 44.8 45.2 41.9 46.8 51.0 

Agriculture 12.4 29.7 19.7 15.8 12.4 8.2 7.0 

Construction 2.2 1.6 2.7 2.9 2.5 3.8 3.4 

Transportation 16.5 5.4 6.1 7.8 9.7 8.5 9.7 

Housing 22.9 19.2 16.9 15.8 20.2 19.5 17.3 

Other 14.6 9.9 9.8 12.5 13.3 13.2 11.6 



Source: Based on information from Bulgaria, Tsentralno statistichesko upravlenie. Statisticheski 
godishnik na Narodna Republika Bulgaria, 1989, Sofia, 1989, 38; and John R. Lampe, 
The Bulgarian Economy in the Twentieth Century, New York, 1986, 165. 



Table 12. Average Annual Growth Rate of Net Material Product 
by Five- Year Plan, 1949-88 * 



Five-Year Plan Total Economy Industry Agriculture 



First (1949-52) 8.4 20.7 -0.9 

Second (1953-57) 7.8 12.7 4.9 

Third (1958-60) 11.6 16.2 6.6 

Fourth (1961-65) 6.7 11.7 3.2 

Fifth (1966-70) 8.7 10.9 3.5 

Sixth (1971-75) 7.8 9.1 2.9 

Seventh (1976-80) 6.1 6.0 0.9 

Eighth (1981-85) 3.7 7.0 -3.9 

Ninth (1986-88) 5.5 5.6 1.2 



* Official government figures. First, third, and ninth plans were abandoned or declared fulfilled before 
the full five years had elapsed. For definition of net material product — see Glossary. 

Source: Based on information from Bulgaria, Tsentralno statistichesko upravlenie. Statisticheski 
godishnik na Narodna Republika Bulgariia, 1989, Sofia, 1989, 42, 43, 46; and John R. 
Lampe, The Bulgarian Economy in the Twentieth Century, New York, 1986, 144, 162. 



281 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



Table 13. Government Budget, Selected Years, 1980-90 1 
(in millions of leva) 2 

1980 1986 1988 1990 



Expenditures 

Current expenditures 



Wages and salaries 


1,162 


1,729 


1,778 


2,316 




. . . . 3,403 


4,756 


5,167 


5,904 


Defense and security 


1,139 


1,914 


1,929 


2,114 


State subsidies 


3,128 


5,301 


6,767 


6,050 




422 


369 


795 


2,125 


Social security 


2,392 


3,627 


3,895 


4,446 


Total current expenditures 


11,646 


17,696 


20,331 


22,955 


Capital investments 


1,237 


3,447 


2,062 


1,488 


Total expenditures 


12,883 


21,143 


22,393 


24,443 


.evenues 










Tax revenues 










Taxes on profits 


2,302 


6,440 


8,110 


9,734 


Income taxes 


945 


1,372 


1,538 


1,721 




3,431 


5,672 


4,442 


4,565 


Customs duties 





159 


310 


355 


Social security contributions 


2,753 


3,325 


3,628 


4,027 


Other 


36 


56 


133 


126 


Total tax revenues 


9,467 


17,024 


18,161 


20,528 


Nontax revenues 










Trade-related revenues 


1,975 


920 


1,551 


1,510 


Other 


1,574 


2,197 


2,092 


2,010 


Total nontax revenues 


3,549 


3,117 


3,643 


3,520 


Total revenues 


13,016 


20,141 


21,804 


24,048 



1 Figures may not add to total because of rounding. 

2 For value of the lev — see Glossary. 



Source: Based on information from World Bank, Bulgaria: Crisis and Transition to a Market 
Economy, 1, Washington: 1991, 28. 



Table 14. Ownership of Selected Consumer Products, 
1980, 1983, and 1987 
(in percentages of households) 



Item 1980 1983 1987 





88 


92 


94 


Refrigerator 


76 


88 


94 




75 


87 


97 


Washing machine 


71 


81 


91 


Automobile 


29 


34 


39 


Telephone 


24 


34 


47 



Source: Based on information from Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.), Bulgarien, Gottingen, 
Germany, 1990, 470. 



282 



Appendix 



Table 15. Conversion Values of the Lev to Major World 
Currencies, 1991 



C^. 1 1 r r <=» n r v 


Symbol 


Per 


Lev \^3.1ue 




ATS 


1 


1.5146 




BEF 


100 


51.719 




GBP 


1 


31.417 




NLG 


1 


9.4505 




FRF 


100 


313.86 




DEM 


1 


10.642 




GRD 


100 


9.718 


Japanese yen 


JPY 


100 


13.307 


Swiss franc 


CHF 


1 


12.489 




USD 


1 


18.367 



Source: Based on information from Bulgarian National Bank notification to domestic foreign- 
exchange bankers, June 3, 1991. 



Table 16. Distribution of Imports by Country, Selected Years, 1950-88 

(in percentages) 



Country 


1950 


1960 


1970 


1980 


1988 


Comecon countries * 












Soviet Union 


50.2 


52.6 


52.2 


57.3 


53.5 




3.8 


11.1 


8.6 


6.6 


5.9 


Other 


31.6 


20.3 


15.3 


18.8 


17.3 


Western countries 














3.4 


5.9 


2.7 


4.8 


4.9 


Other 


1.3 


7.7 


16.5 


8.6 


10.6 


Third World countries 


n.a. 


2.4 


4.7 


3.9 


7.8 



n.a. — not available. 

* Comecon — Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (see Glossary). 



Source: Based on information from Bulgaria, Tsentralno statistichesko upravlenie. Statisticheski 
godishnik na Narodna Republika Bulgariia, 1989, Sofia, 1989, 84-85; and John R. 
Lampe, The Bulgarian Economy in the Twentieth Century, New York, 1986, 152, 188. 



283 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



Table 17. Distribution of Exports by Country, Selected Years, 1950-88 

(in percentages) 



Country 


1950 


1960 


1970 


1980 


1988 


Comecon countries * 












Soviet Union 


54.4 


53.8 


53.8 


49.9 


62.5 




5.5 


10.2 


8.7 


5.5 


5.2 


Other 


32.0 


20.2 


17.2 


15.4 


16.9 


Western countries 














0.7 


3.3 


2.6 


2.5 


1.0 


Other 


7.2 


9.1 


11.6 


13.3 


5.3 




0.2 


3.4 


6.1 


13.4 


9.1 



* Comecon — Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (see Glossary). 



Source: Based on information from Bulgaria, Tsentralno statistichesko upravlenie. Statisticheski 
godishnik na Narodna Republika Bulgaria, 1989, Sofia, 1989, 84-85; and John R. 
Lampe, The Bulgarian Economy in the Twentieth Century, New York, 1986, 152, 188. 



Table 18. Distribution of Major Imports by Commodity, 
Selected Years, 1980-88 
(in percentages at constant prices) 



Commodity 


1980 


1985 


1987 


1988 


Machinery and equipment 


45.4 


47.2 


43.5 


43.5 


Fuels, metals, and minerals 


28.3 


24.0 


32.4 


32.2 




7.2 


6.8 


5.4 


5.7 


Chemicals 


6.7 


6.6 


6.4 


5.6 


Raw materials 


5.9 


6.2 


5.4 


5.6 


Foodstuffs 


2.9 


5.0 


4.1 


4.3 


Other 


3.6 


4.2 


2.8 


3.1 



Source: Based on information from Bulgaria, Tsentralno statistichesko upravlenie. Statisticheski 
godishnik na Narodna Republika Bulgania, 1989, Sofia, 1989, 83. 



Table 19. Distribution of Major Exports by Commodity, 
Selected Years, 1980-88 
(in percentages at constant prices) 



Commodity 


1980 


1985 


1987 


1988 


Machinery and equipment 


50.7 


54.1 


58.8 


58.7 


Processed foods 


15.6 


12.7 


11.4 


11.2 


Fuels, metals, and minerals 


12.7 


10.4 


8.8 


8.2 


Consumer goods 


9.4 


9.4 


10.2 


11.0 


Foodstuffs 


3.6 


3.2 


2.8 


2.8 




.... 2.8 


3.9 


3.7 


4.0 


Construction materials 


2.2 


1.9 


1.9 


1.7 


Other 


3.0 


4.4 


2.4 


2.4 



Source: Based on information from Bulgaria, Tsentralno statistichesko upravlenie. Statisticheski 
godishnik na Narodna Republika Bulgania, 1989, Sofia, 1989, 83. 



284 



Appendix 



Table 20. Social Categories in Bulgarian Communist Party 
Membership, Selected Years, 1944-86 
(in percentages) 



Professionals 
and 

Year Workers Farmers Intelligentsia Women Under 30 



1944 26.5 51.9 8.0 n.a. n.a. 

1948 26.5 44.7 16.3 13.0 26.0 

1954 34.1 39.8 17.9 1.3 n.a. 

1962 37.2 32.1 23.6 21.3 15.6 

1971 40.1 26.1 28.2 25.2 16.1 

1976 41.4 23.0 30.2 27.5 15.0 

1986 44.4 16.3 n.a. 32.7 11.9 



n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.), Bulgarien, Gottingen, 
Germany, 1990, 183, 185. 



285 



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295 



Glossary 



Asia Minor — The Asian portion of what is now Turkey. 

Bogomilism — A religious sect founded in Bulgaria and flourish- 
ing in the Balkans between the tenth and fifteenth centuries. 
It combined beliefs from several contemporaneous religions, 
most notably the Paulicians from Asia Minor (q.v.). The cen- 
tral belief was that the material world was created by the devil. 

Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) — An international 
communist organization (1947-56) including communist 
parties of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, 
Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia (expelled 
in 1948). Formed as a tool of Soviet foreign policy, it issued 
propaganda advocating international communist solidarity. 

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) — 
Originating at the Helsinki meeting that produced the Helsinki 
Accords (q.v.) in 1975, a grouping of all European nations (the 
lone exception, Albania, joined in 1991) that subsequently spon- 
sored joint sessions and consultations on political issues vital 
to European security. 

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) — An agree- 
ment signed in 1990 by the members of the Warsaw Pact (q. v. ) 
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (q. v.) to establish 
parity in conventional weapons between the two organizations 
from the Atlantic to the Urals. Included a strict system of in- 
spections and information exchange. 

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) — A multi- 
lateral economic alliance headquartered in Moscow until it 
disbanded in 1991. Members in 1991: Bulgaria, Cuba, Czecho- 
slovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Soviet 
Union, and Vietnam. Also known as CMEA and CEMA. 

Cyrillic — Alphabet ascribed to the missionary Cyril (ninth cen- 
tury), developed from Greek for recording church literature 
in Old Church Slavonic. Now the alphabet of Belarus, Bul- 
garia, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine, and several 
former Soviet republics in Central Asia, it is considered one 
of the three principal alphabets of the world. 

Enlightenment — Intellectual and spiritual movement in Europe in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, concerned with the 
relationship of God, nature, reason, and man, often challeng- 
ing the tenets of Christianity. 



297 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) — 
A bank founded under sponsorship of the European Commu- 
nity (EC) in 1990, to provide loans to East European coun- 
tries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia) to establish independent, 
market- type economies and democratic political institutions. 
Some forty-one countries were shareholders in 1991. 

European currency unit (ECU) — The unit of account of the Euro- 
pean Economic Community (q.v.), value of which is determined 
by the value of the currencies of the member states, apportioned 
by relative strength and importance of the member's economy. 
In 1988 one ECU equalled about one United States dollar. 

European Economic Community (EEC) — The "Common Mar- 
ket" of primarily West European countries, organized to 
promote coordinated development of economic activities, ex- 
pansion, stability, and closer relations among member states. 
Methods included elimination of customs duties and import 
regulations among member states, a common tariff and com- 
mercial policy toward outside countries, and a common agricul- 
tural and transport policy. A significant further reduction of 
intraorganizational barriers was planned in 1992. 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) — An integrated 
set of bilateral trade agreements among nations, formed in 1947 
to abolish quotas and reduce tariffs. Bulgaria applied for mem- 
bership in 1991. 

glasnost — Russian term, literally meaning "openness," applied be- 
ginning in the mid-1980s in the Soviet Union to official per- 
mission for public discussion of issues and access to information. 
Identified with the tenure of Mikhail S. Gorbachev as leader 
of the Soviet Union (1985-91). 

gross national product (GNP) — The sum of the value of goods and 
services produced within a country's borders and the income 
received from abroad by residents, minus payments remitted 
abroad by nonresidents. Normally computed over one year. 

Helskinki Accords — Signed in 1975 by all countries of Europe ex- 
cept Albania (which signed in 1991) plus Canada and the 
United States at the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (q.v.), a pact outlining general principles of inter- 
national behavior and security and addressing some economic, 
environmental, and humanitarian issues. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established with the World 
Bank (q.v.) in 1945, a specialized agency affiliated with the 
United Nations and responsible for stabilizing international ex- 
change rates and payments. Its main business was providing 



298 



Glossary 



loans to its members when they experienced balance of pay- 
ments difficulties. Bulgaria became a member in 1991. 

League of Nations — An organization for international cooperation 
established by the Allied powers after World War I . Discredited 
by failure to oppose aggression in the 1930s, it became inac- 
tive at the beginning of World War II and was replaced in 1946 
by the United Nations. 

lev (pi., leva) — The national currency unit of Bulgaria, consisting 
of 100 stotinki. Exchange rate to the U.S. dollar in 1991 was 
18 leva. 

Marshall Plan — In full, the European Recovery Program, a United 
States-sponsored program to rehabilitate European nations after 
World War II and prevent communist subversion of countries 
weakened by war. 

net material product (NMP) — The total economic value of produc- 
tion in the productive sectors of a national economy (not count- 
ing administration, defense, finance, education, health, and 
housing) after depreciation has been deducted. 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) — An organization 
founded in 1949 by the United States, Canada, and their post- 
war European allies to oppose the Soviet military presence in 
Europe. Until the dissolution of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact 
(q.v.) in 1991, it was the primary collective defense agreement 
of the Western powers. Its military and administrative struc- 
ture remained intact after the threat of Soviet expansionism 
had subsided. 

passenger kilometers — The total number of kilometers traveled by 
passengers by a given mode of transportation in a specified pe- 
riod of time. 

perestroika — Russian word meaning "restructuring," applied in the 
late 1980s to official Soviet program of revitalization of the com- 
munist party, economy, and society by adjusting economic, 
social, and political mechanisms. Identified with the tenure of 
Mikhail S. Gorbachev as leader of the Soviet Union (1985-91). 

Shia — A member of the smaller of the two divisions of Islam, sup- 
porting the claims of Ali to leadership of the Muslim commu- 
nity, in opposition to the Sunni (q.v.) view of succession to 
Muslim leadership — the issue causing the central schism within 
Islam. 

Solidarity — An independent trade union founded in 1980 in com- 
munist Poland. For its defiance of the communist system, the 
union attained great political power through the loyalty of a 
large part of the Polish population. Under the leadership of 
Lech Walesa, it eventually formed the basis of the first post- 
war noncommunist Polish government. 



299 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 

Sunni — A member of the larger of the two fundamental divisions 
of Islam, opposed to the Shia (q. v.) on the issue of succession 
to Muslim leadership. 

ton kilometers — The total number of tons of cargo conveyed via 
a given mode of transportation in a specified period of time. 

Warsaw Pact — In full, Warsaw Treaty Organization, a mutual 
defense organization including the Soviet Union, Albania 
(which withdrew in 1961), Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the Ger- 
man Democratic Republic (East Germany), Hungary, Poland, 
and Romania. Founded in 1955, it enabled the Soviet Union 
to station troops in most of the other countries to oppose the 
forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, q. v. ) 
and was the basis of invasions of Hungary (1956) and Czecho- 
slovakia (1968). Disbanded in 1991. 

World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of four 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International 
Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Cor- 
poration (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA). The IBRD, established in 1945, has as its 
primary purpose the provision of loans to developing countries 
for productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund 
but administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 
to furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much 
easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, 
founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD 
through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage 
the growth of productive private enterprises in the less- 
developed countries. The MIGA, founded in 1988, insures pri- 
vate foreign investment in developing countries against vari- 
ous non-commercial risks. The president and certain senior 
officers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The 
four institutions are owned by the governments of the coun- 
tries that subscribe their capital. To participate in the World 
Bank group, member states must first belong to the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund (IMF — q.v.). 



300 



Index 



abortion: restrictions on, 78 
Academic Freedom, Law on (1990), 
112-13 

acquired immune deficiency syndrome 

(AIDS), 107-8 
Administration Department, 268 
administrative subdivisions, 71, 194, 197 
Adrianople, Battle of (718), 228 
Adventist Church, 93 
Afghanistan: military support to, 53; 

Soviet invasion of, xxxiii, 52, 55, 221 
agrarians. See Bulgarian Agrarian Na- 
tional Union (BANU) 
Agricultural and Cooperative Bank, 156 
agricultural collectivization, xxxi, 46, 53, 
53-54, 127, 129, 144-47; benefits of, 
49; campaigns, 144-47; compensation 
for, 150-51; opposition to, 44; pace of, 
47, 127, 129; peasant resistance to, 46, 
147, 180; problems with, 180; reforms 
in, 132 

agricultural cooperatives: increase in 
membership of, 39; voluntary forma- 
tion of, 150 

agricultural-industrial complex (agroprom- 
ishlen kompleks—XPK), 53-54, 132, 134, 

147, 148 

agricultural labor: percentage of, in labor 
force, 122; shortages of, xxxiv, 72, 82, 
121, 147, 184 

agricultural land: chemical damage to, 69, 
70; as percent of total, 121 

agricultural plots: private, 150; consoli- 
dation of, 147-48; size of, 40, 129-30 

agricultural production, 150; attempts to 
increase, 128; attempts to industrialize, 
132; decline in, 147; diversification of, 
39; under five-year plans, 129; govern- 
ment control of, 39; growth of, 25, 27, 
39, 129, 136, 147, 148; under Liapchev, 
37; quotas in, 147, 148; under Stam- 
bolov, 25; target negotiation, 132; 
under Third Five- Year Plan, 49 

agricultural products (see also under in- 
dividual crops), 148-51; export of, 40, 

148, 164; food, 150; grain, 121; indus- 
trial crops, 40; tobacco, 121, 148; 
vegetables, 121 



agricultural reform, 33-35, 148; resis- 
tance to, 151; retreat from, 132; under 
Zhivkov, 55, 125 

agricultural workers, 100; income of, 150; 
minimum wage for, 164; number of, 
102; as party members, 197; as percent- 
age of population, 101; shortage of, 
xxxiv, 102, 148 

agriculture, xxx, 144-48; aid for restruc- 
turing, 168; under democratization, 
118; under five-year plans, 128, 129; 
government intervention in, 27; income 
in, 123, 165; investment in, 47, 160; 
modernization of, 129; net material 
product growth of, 141; as percentage 
of net material product, 130, 144; pol- 
icy, experiments with, 53; privatization 
in, 76, 129, 150; resources, 121 

agropromishlen kompleks. See agricultural- 
industrial complex 

AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome 

air and air defense forces, 242, 246-47; air- 
craft of, 246; combat units of, 246; com- 
manders of, 242; conscripts in, 246; 
deployment of, 246; number of personnel, 
246; uniforms, ranks, and insignia, 257-58 

air pollution, 70 

Albania: Bulgarian occupation of, 229; in 

World War I, 31 
Albanians: revolt against Ottoman Turks, 

29 

alcohol consumption, 107 

Algeria: arms sales to, 262 

Aleksandur, Ivan, 7 

Alexander II: assassinated, 23 

Alexander III: death of, 26; relations of, 
with Alexander of Battenburg, 23 

Alexander of Battenburg, 230; deposed, 
24; elected prince, 22-23; opposition of, 
to liberal faction, 23; opposition of, to 
Turnovo constitution, 23; relations of, 
with Alexander III, 23 

Alexander the Great, 4 

Allied Control Commission, 43, 232; dis- 
mantled, 44, 176 

Allied powers, xxx; attempts to achieve 
peace with, 42 



301 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



Amnesty International, 82 
Anchialus, Battle of (708), 228 
Andropov, Iurii V.: relations of, with 

Zhivkov, 56 
Angola: arms sales to, 262; military sup- 
port to, 53, 259 
antiwar campaigns, 31-32, 41, 42, 176, 
231-32 

APK. See agricultural-industrial complex 

April Plenum of 1956, 48 

April Uprising of 1876, 20 

Arable Land Law (1991), 150, 167 

Argentina: emigre population in, 78 

armed forces, 227-33, 237-39, 242-50, 
252-57; allowances, 256; benefits in, 
256; budget, 251-52; depoliticized, 
xxxv, xli, 199, 237, 238, 239; dis- 
cipline, 255; high command, 241-42; 
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization, drive against, 38; living 
standards in, 256; modernization of, 
233, 242, 243; party membership in, 
233; political role of, 238-39; prestige 
of, 240, 256; professionalization of, 
249; post-World War II, 232-33; purge 
of, 233; quotas of, in Warsaw Pact, 
237; reduced, 237, 242; reserves, 245, 
257; resignations, xli; restructuring of, 
237, 242, 243; uniforms, ranks, and in- 
signia, 257-58; in World War I, 
230-31; in World War II, 231 

Armenians: in Ottoman Empire, 10; in 
population, 79, 87 

armistice of 1944, 43 

arms: control, 236; private, surrendered, 
265; trafficking, 56 

army, 242, 243-46; combat units of, 
243-44, 245-46; commanders of, 242; 
conscripts in, 244; control of, 26, 232, 
238; coup by, 26; deployment of, 244; 
internal security by, 34; materiel of, 
244; number of troops in, 244; plot 
against Zhivkov, 50; purged, 232, 238; 
reorganized by Soviets, 232; reserves, 
245, 257; support units of, 245; train- 
ing, 245, 255; uniforms, ranks, and in- 
signia, 257-58; vehicles of, 244 

art: repression of, 46 

Asen, 7 

Asenovgrad: declared ecologically endan- 
gered, 121 
Asparukh (khan), 6 
assimilation program, revoked, 200 



associations, 126; responsibilities of, 132, 
134; target negotiation by, 132 

Atanasov, Georgi: as prime minister, 185, 
192, 199 

Atanasov government, 188 

Atatiirk, Kemal: support for, 35 

Atiya: armed forces stationed at, 247 

attar of roses, 63, 150 

auctions, 137 

Australia: emigre population in, 78 

Austria: aid from, 222 

Austria-Hungary: Bosnia and Hercego- 
vina annexed by, 28; conflict of, with 
Serbia, 30; intervention of, in Balkan 
uprisings, 29; reaction of, to Internal 
Macedonian Revolutionary Organiza- 
tion, 27; ties with, 26 

automobiles, 166; manufacture of, 142, 
143 

Axis powers, xxx; passive alliance with, 
41-42, 85, 231 



Balchik: armed forces stationed at, 247 

Balkan Airlines, 152 

Balkancar enterprise, 142, 143 

Balkan Entente (1934), 38, 41, 231 

Balkan League, 29, 30, 230 

Balkan Mountains, 63, 68 

Balkan nations: conferences on Macedo- 
nia issue, 38; emigre population in, 78; 
mini- Helsinki conference of, xl; politics 
of, 18; relations with, 51, 52, 216, 217- 
20, 258 

Balkan nuclear-free zone, 52, 217, 218, 
236 

Balkan Pact (1953), 47 
Balkan War, First, 29-30, 230; beginning 
of, 29 

Balkan War, Second, 30, 230 
Baltic states: relations with, xxxix 
banking system, 155-58; credits in, 156; 

experimented with decentralization, 

156; reform of, 156-57 
bankruptcy: in Great Depression, 37 
banks: accounts in, 128; agricultural, 167; 

commercial, 136; private, 128 
BANU. See Bulgarian Agrarian National 

Union 
Basil II, 67 

Batak: massacre at, 20 

BCP. See Bulgarian Communist Party 

BDY. See Bulgarian Democratic Youth 



302 



Index 



Belarus: relations with, xxxviii 

Belene Nuclear Power Plant, 139, 140; 
public opposition to, 140 

Belgrade Declaration (1955), 48 

Benkovski, Georgi, 19, 20 

Berlin, Treaty of (1878), 3, 20, 229; ef- 
fect on commerce, 25; opposition to, 
23; provisions of, 20, 23 

Beron, Petur, 15, 199 

Berov, Liuben, xliii, xlv 

Berov government, xliii, xlvi; budget of, 
xliv 

birth rate, 56, 82 

Black Sea, 63, 68; oil drilling in, 121; pol- 
lution in, 70 

Black Sea Fleet, 247 

Black Sea Trading Zone, 164 

Blagoev, Dimitur, 31 

Blagoevgrad: American college in, 113; 
centenarians in, 105 

Biochemical Bank, 156 

birth control: availability of, 77-78 

BNB. See Bulgarian National Bank 

Bobov Dol, 118; prison in, 269 

Bogomil heresy, 6 

Bolsheviks: antiwar campaigns of, 31-32 
Bolshevik Tool Plant, 142 
book printing, 165 

Border Troops, 248-49; deployment of, 
249; mission of, 248-49, 265; number 
of, 248 

Boris I, 80, 90 

Boris III, 35, 36, 37; birth of, 26; death 
of, 42, 176; relations with Germany 
under, 41; royal dictatorship of, 39, 
175-76, 202, 231; named tsar, 33 

Bosnia and Hercegovina: annexed by 
Austria-Hungary, 28; nationalist move- 
ment in, 30; recognition of, xl, xlv; 
revolt of, against Ottoman Turks, 19 

Botev Peak, 63 

BRCC. See Bulgarian Revolutionary Cen- 
tral Committee 

Brezhnev, Leonid: relationship of, with 
Zhivkov, 56 

Britain: attempts to limit Russian in- 
fluence, 3, 14; attempts at trade with, 
40; intervention of, in peasant upris- 
ings, 18; materiel from, 231; purchase 
of Ruse-Varna Railway from, 23 

relations with, 38; war declared on, 41 

British Broadcasting Corporation, 210, 
271 



BSDP. See Bulgarian Social Democratic 
Party 

BSP. See Bulgarian Socialist Party 

Bucharest, Treaty of (1913), 30, 32, 230 

budget deficit, 158 

budget revenue: sources of, 157-58 

budget, military, 251-52 

Bukhovo uranium mine, 70 

Bulgar: etymology of word, 6 

Bulgarian Agrarian National Union 
(BANU), 27, 29, 33-34, 202, 216, 253; 
amnesties for, 50; under communism, 
44, 176; corruption in, 36; in Council 
of Ministers, 44; under democratiza- 
tion, 200-202; in elections of 1919, 34; 
in elections of 1920, 35; factions in, 38; 
in Fatherland Front, 181; government 
relations with, 50; as obstacle to com- 
munist rule, 176; Petkov branch of, 
208; purges of, 36; rehabilitated, 38, 
208; reign of terror against, 36; under 
royal dictatorship, 39; in Union of 
Democratic Forces, 199; under Zhiv- 
kov, 51, 180 

Bulgarian Agrarian Union, 27 

Bulgarian Artists' Union, 209, 211 

Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and In- 
dustry, 193 

Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) {see 
also Bulgarian Socialist Party; com- 
munists), xxxiv, 197-99; acceptance of, 
186; antiwar protests by, 41, 176, 231- 
32; conservative resurgence in, 180; 
consolidation of power by, 173; under 
constitution of 1971, 180-81, 189; con- 
trol of army by, 233, 238; control of 
ministries by, 262; corruption in, 56, 
186, 212; cult of personality denounced 
by, 48; cultural foundation for, 174; 
under democratization, 117; economic 
control by, 117, 125, 127; in elections 
of 1990, 186; factions in, 199; farm 
members, 197; goals of, 182; liberali- 
zation under, 179-80; membership in, 
197, 198, 233; Mladenov as head of, 
185; and multiparty elections, 183; op- 
position to, 183; origins of, 25, 34; out- 
lawed, 36; purges of, 46, 182, 186, 198; 
recruitment, 197; reform in, 186; 
replaced by national round table, 188; 
reprieve of purged leaders, 47; restruc- 
tured, 50-51, 183; role of: defined in 
1971 constitution, 51, 183; secretary 



303 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



general of, 240; Supreme Party Coun- 
cil, 198, 199, 204; teachers in, 112; 
women in, 197; workers in, 35, 197; 
Zhivkov as head of, 173; Zhivkov ex- 
pelled from, 185 

Bulgarian Communist Party Central Com- 
mittee, 143; abolished, 198; members 
of, 198; 1987 plenum, 183; size of, 198 

Bulgarian Communist Party Secretariat, 
198 

Bulgarian Democratic Center, xliii 
Bulgarian Democratic Youth (BDY), 206 
Bulgarian Empire, First, 6-7, 229; litera- 
ture under, 80; religion in, 80; territory 

of, 6 

Bulgarian Empire, Second, 7-8 
Bulgarian Evangelical Philanthropic So- 
ciety, 92 

Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank, 156 
Bulgarian Journalists' Union, 209, 211 
Bulgarian language, 86; influences, 81; 

origins of, 80; primer for, 15 
Bulgarian National Bank (BNB), 126, 

135, 136, 156; government borrowing 

from, xliv; private banks merged with, 

128 

Bulgarian Orthodox Church, xliii, 6, 87, 
92; administrative system of, 17; de- 
clared independent, 17; education by, 
89; established, 6; excommunicated, 
17; holidays of, 89; independence, 46, 
178; Macedonian dioceses ceded to, 25- 
26; members of, in population, 79, 86; 
monks in, 88; number of churches in, 
88; number of monasteries in, 88; nuns 
in, 88; oppression of, 55, 178, 210; Otto- 
man recognition of, 19; priests in, 88; 
property restored to, 213; reorganized, 
9; revival of, 89, 183; rituals of, 89; 
union of, with Roman Catholic Church, 
90 

Bulgarian People's Army (BPA) (see also 
under individual branches; see also armed 
forces): commander in chief of, 239, 
240; force reductions, 227; future of, 
227; mission of, 235; named, 233; po- 
litical activities of, 227; political officers 
in, 238; restructuring, 227; role of, 227; 
Soviet army imitated by, 233 

Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Com- 
mittee (BRCC), 19; reorganized, 20 

Bulgarian Secret Central Committee, 19 



Bulgarian Social Democratic Party 
(BSDP), 27, 176, 202; disbanded, 207; 
history of, 208; membership of, 208; 
platform of, 208; reformed, 208; in the 
Union of Democratic Forces, 208 
Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) (see also 
Bulgarian Communist Party), xxxi, xliii, 
151, 174, 186; in elections, xxxvi, 200; 
foreign relations under, 220; head- 
quarters burned, 263; membership in, 
199; stalemate of, with Union of Demo- 
cratic Forces, xxxiv, 166, 186, 187, 
200; support for, 187, 199 
Bulgarian State Railroad, 152 
Bulgarian Workers' Party, 36 
Bulgarian Workers' Socialist-Democratic 
Party (BWSDP), 33; origins of, 34; 
workers in, 35 
Bulgarian Workers' Union, 202 
Bulgarian Writers' Conference, 55, 209 
Bulgarian Writers' Union, 209, 211; 

purged, 48 
Bulgarians as ethnic group, 78, 79 
Bulgars, 3, 228; converted to Christian- 
ity, 3, 80; immigration of, to the Bal- 
kans, 5-6 

bureaucracy: as percentage of work force, 
56; size of, 56, 179 

Burgas (city): percentage of population in, 
71; population in, 72; as port, 75 

Burgas (province): armed forces stationed 
in, 245, 246, 247 

Burgas Petrochemical Combine, 143 

Burgas-Yambol Railway, 26 

Bush, George H.W., 222 

BWSDP. See Bulgarian Workers' So- 
cialist-Democratic Party 

Byelorussian Republic: trade agreement 
with, 221 

Byzantine Empire, 118; allied with Kievan 
Rus', 6; fall of, 3; incorporation of 
Thrace into, 5; invasion of Bulgaria by, 
6, 7, 229; legacy of, 3; rule of Bulgaria 
by, xxix, 6-7, 80, 229 

Byzantine Patriarchate: control of Bulgar- 
ian church by, 9 

cabinet, xxxvi-xxxvii, 232 
Canada: emigre population in, 78 
capital: accumulation, 131; investment, 

131, 136 
capitalism: declared illegal, 203 



304 



Index 



Carpathian Mountains, 63 
Ceau§escu, Nicolae, 218 
censorship: liberalized, 50 
Central Bank, 157 

Central Committee. See Bulgarian Com- 
munist Party Central Committee 
Central Council of Trade Unions, 203 
Central Election Commission, 195-96 
Central Investigations Department, 268 
Central Powers: members of, 31, 230; ter- 
ritorial offers by, to Bulgaria, 31 
Central Prison Institutions Department, 
268 

CFE. See Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe, Treaty on 

Chaira station, 139 

Chankov, Georgi, 48 

Chelopets: mining in, 118 

Chernenko, Konstantin: relations of, with 
Zhivkov, 56 

Chernobyl' disaster: coverup of, 212; en- 
vironmental effects of, 69; political im- 
plications of, 140; radiation from, 121 

Chervenkov, Vulko, xxxii, 46, 179; cult 
of personality of, 46, 174, 178; disap- 
proval of, 178, 179; economic policy of, 
47; fall of, 48; foreign policy of, 47; as 
minister of education and culture, 48; 
ousted from Politburo, 50; purged, 50, 
180; purges by, 48, 178 

Chervenkov government (1949-56), 46, 
174, 178-79; collectivization under, 
147; repression under, 46, 147 

chief prosecutor, 193 

children: compensation for, 104; as de- 
terminer of status, 77; health problems 
of, from environmental pollution, 107; 
ideal number of, 77, 94; work by, 98 

Chintulov, Dobri, 16 

Chiprovets uprising (1688), 11 

chitalishte (reading room), 16, 110 

chorbadzhi, 9, 94 

Christianity (see also under individual denomi- 
nations): conversion of Bulgar tribes to, 
3, 80; introduction of, 5 

cities {see also urban areas): growth of, 72; 
historical development of, 71, 72 

Citizens' Property, Law on (1973), 182 

CITU. See Confederation of Independent 
Trade Unions 

civil baptism, 88 

Civil Defense Troops, 250; organization 
of, 250; training of, 250 



class (see also social groups): government 
representation by, 29, 38-39 

class conflict: origins of, 4 

clergy: accused of spying, 91, 92; num- 
ber of, in Orthodox church, 88; repres- 
sion of, 46, 178 

climate, 67-68; continental zone, 67, 68; 
Mediterranean zone, 67-68; rainfall, 
68; seasons, 68; temperature, 68 

coal, xxxvi, 118-21; imported, 142; min- 
ing of, 118, 138 

Coastal Defense, 247 

Cold War: initial conflict of, 233 

collective farms, 127, 129-30, 132, 144- 
48 

Comecon. See Council for Mutual Eco- 
nomic Assistance 

Comecon countries: economic synchroni- 
zation with, 160-61; exports to, 143; 
use of ruble in, 155; trade with, 158 

Cominform. See Communist Information 
Bureau 

commerce: with Europe, xlv, 25; in na- 
tional revival, 13-14; state control of, 
40 

Commercial Law (1991), 168 

Commercial Militia, 268 

communications, 152-55; foreign lan- 
guage programming in, 152; percent- 
age of labor force in, 122; privatization 
in, 155 

Communications and Informaton Sci- 
ence, Commission on, 155 

Communist Information Bureau (Comin- 
form), 127; joined, 44-45; Yugoslavia 
expelled from, 46, 178 

Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU), 179; loyalty to, 182 

communist rule, 4; consolidation period, 
44-49, 173, 176-79; declaration of, 44; 
democratic period, 174-75; education 
under, 110; employment under, 123; 
opposition to, 44; religion under, 88, 
91, 92, 93; Soviet period, 174 

communists (see also Bulgarian Com- 
munist Party): under democratization, 
186; reign of terror against, 36; under 
royal dictatorship, 39; uprisings by, 36; 
workers as, 35 

Communist Youth League of Bulgaria 
(Komsomol), 190, 205-6, 239; func- 
tions of, 205; membership of, 205, 233; 
structure of, 205 



305 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



communities (obshtini), 71 

concentration camps, 42 

Confederation of Independent Trade Un- 
ions (CITU), 204 

Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (CSCE), 184, 196, 236; Con- 
ference on Economic Cooperation, 221 

Conference on the Environment, 211 

Congregationalists, 92 

conscription: adjustments in, 253; avoid- 
ance of, 253; deferments from, 253; 
term of, 252 

conscripts, 253; in air and air defense 
forces, 246; in army, 244; hazing of, 
255 

Constantine (Roman emperor), 72 
Constantine V (Byzantine emperor), 6, 
228 

Constantinople: cultural importance of, 
16; Ottoman capture of, 9 

constituent assembly (1879), 22 

constitution of 1879 (Turnovo Constitu- 
tion), 22, 176; Alexander's opposition 
to, 23; amendments to, 23, 175; bal- 
ance of power under, 175; desire to re- 
turn to, 189; framework for, 22; subranie 
under, 22, 189; suffrage under, 22 

constitution of 1947, 45-46; adopted, 177; 
citizens rights under, 45, 178; drafted, 
44, 176; economy under, 45-46; model 
for, xxxiii, 45, 173; nationalization 
under, 45-46; press under, 178; private 
property under, 45, 178; ratified, 44; 
religion under, 178; state power under, 
177, 178; women under, 178 

constitution of 1971, xxxiii, 51, 180-82; 
Article I of, abolished, 180-81, 186, 
189, 238-39; Bulgarian Communist 
Party under, 186, 189; Council of Min- 
isters under, 191; government structure 
under, 181 ; judiciary under, 193, 265; 
obligations under, 181; private prop- 
erty under, 51; reform of, 189, 190; 
rights under, 181; women under, 99 

constitution of 1991, xxxvi; military doc- 
trine under, 236; ratified, 196 

construction: employment in, 101; ex- 
ports by, 164; growth rate, 136; guest- 
workers in, 76; income in, 123; under 
net material product, 136; percentage 
of labor force in, 122 

Construction, Architecture, and Public 
Services, Ministry of, 279 



Construction Bank, 156 

Construction Troops, 249; conscripts in, 
249, 253; future of, 249; number of, 
249; organization of, 249; origins of, 
249 

consumer control, 125; credits, 156 

consumer goods, 251; availability of, 
165-66; emphasis on production of, 47; 
shortages of, 126, 158; state monopo- 
lies of, 128 

consumer price index, 165 

consumption, 158 

Control mechanisms, economic, 123-27 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 

(CFE), Treaty on (1990), xli, 227, 236 
conversion to Christianity, 80 
Cooperation, Security, and Friendship, 

Treaty of (with Soviet Union, 1967), 

220 
copper, 118 

corruption: in Bulgarian Agrarian Na- 
tional Union, 36; in Bulgarian Com- 
munist Party, 56; demonstrations 
against, 28; in government, 28 

cotton: imports of, 161 

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(Comecon), xxxi, xxxii, xxxiii, 54, 68; 
benefits of, 161, 216; relationship with, 
130, 160-62 

Council of Europe, 221 

Council of Ministers, 104, 182, 191-92, 
240; armed forces under, 252; econom- 
ic planning by, 125; members of, 191- 
92; ministries under, 192; powers of, 
177, 189, 191, 192; provisional, 192; 
reorganized, 191; selection of, 177; 
struggle for power by, 175 

coups d'etat: of 1885, 23; of 1934, 38, 
231, 238; of 1944, 43, 173, 176 

coups d'etat, attempted: 233; in Egypt, 
53; of 1965, 50, 238; in Sudan, 53 

courts, 265-66; backlog in, 266; lower, 
193, 266; military, 266; municipal, 
266; provincial, 266; public distrust of, 
193 

CPSU. See Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union 

Craiova, Treaty of (1940), 41 
Crete, 14 

crime, 263-65, 266; annual rate of, 263; 

organized, 263; punishment for, 266 
Croatia, 218; recognition of, xl, xlv 
Crusades, 7, 75 



306 



Index 



CSCE. See Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe 

cult of personality: of Chervenkov, 46, 
178; officially denounced, 48, 174, 179; 
of Stalin 174 

cultural exchange programs, 53 

cultural revival {see also National Revival), 
13; under Zhivkova, 55 

culture: influences on, 15; liberalized con- 
straints on, 47, 50; under Ottoman 
rule, 9; preservation of, 80, 81; repres- 
sion of, 46; Western influence on, 52 

currency, 155-56; in Comecon trade, 
161; devaluations of, 155; exchange 
rate, 155-56 

currency, hard: debt in, 55, 162-63; from 
exports, 148; need for, 118; reserves of, 
118, 162; trade conducted in, 144, 155, 
161, 164 

Cyril, 6 

Czechoslovakia, xxxii, xl, 164; exports to, 
130; industrial arrangements with, 143; 
joint military exercises with, 258; in 
Little Entente, 40; materiel from, 251; 
membership in European Community, 
xxxix; revolution in, 211; Soviet inva- 
sion of, xxxiii, 132, 180, 212, 215, 221, 
233; technical assistance from, 139, 140 



Dalmatians: in Ottoman Empire, 10 

Danube Flotilla, 247 

Danube River, 63, 67; as border, 62, 63; 
Border Troops patrol of, 249 

Danubian Plateau, 63, 67, 68; early set- 
tlements on, 71 

death: causes of, 106; rate, 61 

debt: under Ferdinand, 27; internal, xliii- 
xliv, 118; rescheduling, 169 

debt, external, 118; of hard currency, 55, 
162-63; payments suspended, xxxv, 
163; as percentage of GNP, 162; to 
West, 162 

decentralization, industrial, 131 

Decree Number 56: 137, 167-68 

defendants: rights of, 265 

defense industry, domestic, xli, 243; con- 
version of, 227, 251; plants, 251 

defense organization, 237-51; govern- 
ment, 239-41; Soviet model for, 237; 
transition in, 237 

defense posture, 233-37 

deGaulle, Charles: Zhivkov's visit to, 52 



Delchev, Gotse, 28, 85 
democratic centralism, 182, 197 
democratization, xlii, 61, 262; Bulgarian 
Communist Party in, 117; effect of, on 
armed forces, 255; justice system 
under, 263; transition agreement in, 
188; unemployment under, 102 
Demokratsiya, 212 

demonstrations. See political protest 
dentists, 105 

Department of Security and Protection, 
270 

depoliticization, xxxv, 111, 197, 263 

de-Stalinization, 179 

diet, 106-7; improvements in, 49, 165; 

in 1950s, 49; traditional, 107 
Dimitrov, Filip, xxxv, xxxvi-xxxvii, xl 
Dimitrov, Georgi, xxxii, 36, 233; death 

of, 46, 178 
Dimitrova, Blaga, 210 
Dimitrov Communist Youth League 

of Bulgaria. See Communist Youth 

League of Bulgaria 
Dimitrov Constitution. See constitution of 

1947 

Dimitrov government (1947-49), 44, 86, 

173, 177-78; unions under, 203 
Dimitrov government (1992): problems 

in, xlii; vote of no confidence in, xliii 
Dimitrovgrad: chemical plants at, 143; 

declared ecologically endangered, xxxii, 

121 

Dimo Dichev Thermoelectric Plant, 139 
Dimov, Dimitur, 47 
Directorate for Civilian Mobilization, 128 
Directorate of Customs and Customs 

Control, 265 
Discussion Club for Support of Glasnost 

and Perestroika, 210 
dissident groups, 186; formed, 183; 

harassed, 184 
divorce: rate, 99; restrictions on, 99; 

stigma of, 99 
Dobrich: population in, 72 
Dobro Pole: retreat from, 32-33 
Dobruja, 62, 68; Adventists in, 93; ceded 

to Bulgaria, 41 ; early settlements in, 71 ; 

given to Romania, 230 
Dogan, Ahmed, 206 
Dolno Ezerovo, 107 
domestic policy, 49, 53-54 
drainage, 67 
drought, 55, 68 
drug trafficking, 56, 265 



307 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



DS. See State Security 
Dubrovnik, 91 
Duma, 212 

Durzhavna sigurnost (DS). See State Se- 
curity 

Dzhagarov, Georgi, 210 
Dzhurov, Dobri, 185, 241 

earthquakes, 64-67 

Eastern Europe: trade with, 117, 160 

Eastern Orthodox Church (see also Bulgar- 
ian Orthodox Church), 88-89; in First 
Bulgarian Empire, 80, 90 

Eastern Rite Church. See Eastern Ortho- 
dox Church 

Eastern Rumelia: union with, 23; war 
over, 229 

EBRD. See European Bank for Recon- 
struction and Development 

Ecoforum conference, xxxiv, 121, 184, 
199, 267 

economic association, xxxix 

economic growth: under communist rule, 
136; decline of, 135-36; under Ferdi- 
nand, 27; under New Economic Model, 
136; under Stambolov, 26 

economic planning (see also five-year 
plans), xxxi, xxxiii, 128; failures of, 
xxxiv-xxxv; hierarchy, 125; ineffici- 
ency under, 125; innovation dis- 
couraged under, 125; material balances 
in, 126; process, 126-27; Soviet model 
for, 47, 49, 125, 126; system, 125-27 

economic policy, 127-38; assessment of, 
118; of Chervenkov, 47; under com- 
munist rule, 118, 127-28 

Economic Policy Commission, 167-68 

economic reform, xxxi, 47, 123, 130-38, 
166-69; under democratization, xxxv, 
xliv, 121, 187; goals of, 169; incentive 
for, 131, 184; mechanisms, 166-67; 
methods, 166; of 1965, 53; Poland as 
model for, 166-67; timing, 166; trade 
unions under, 204-5 

economy: aid for restructuring, 168; cri- 
sis in, 54; effect of reparations payments 
on, 37; experimentation in, xxxiii, 117, 
125, 130-38; indicators, 49; interwar, 
39-40; market, 117; performance, 
127-38; rehabilitation, postwar, 46; 
restructuring of, 127; role of Bulgarian 
Communist Party in, 117; Soviet inter- 



vention in, 47; statistics, 118; structure, 
123-27; units, larger, 132-34 

economy, centrally planned, 124-25; ad- 
vantages of, 124; criticisms of, 124-25; 
distribution problems under, 135; tran- 
sition from, 164; under constitution of 
1947, 45-46 

Edinna sredna politekhnicheska uchilishta. 
See Unified Secondary Polytechnical 
Schools 

education (see also schools), xxxiii, 109-13; 
communist indoctrination in, 110, 112; 
compulsory, 35, 110; curriculum, 110; 
employment in, 101; foreign aid for 
reforming, 113; for girls, 15; of Gyp- 
sies, 86; independence of, 37; level of, 
61; under Liapchev, 37; and marriage, 
98-99; political activity in, 112; post- 
secondary, 112; problems in, 111; re- 
form of, 110, 112; religious, 89; 
restructuring of, 111; secular, 15; so- 
cialist, 111; Soviet model for, 47, 49; 
subsidies for, 165; of workers, 101 

educational councils, 111 

EEC. See European Economic Com- 
munity 

EFTA. See European Free Trade Asso- 
ciation 

Egypt: attempted coup in, 53, 271 
Ekoglasnost, xxxii, 184-85, 202, 207, 
211; demonstrations by, 184; founded, 
207; membership of, 207; platform of, 
207 

election commissions, 195 

election laws, 194, 195, 196 

elections: campaigns for, 196; candidates 
for, 195; under communist rule, 177; com- 
munists in, 174; constituencies of, 197; 
eligibility for, 195; free, 186, 196; intimi- 
dations in, 35; multicandidate, 183; of 
1919, 34; of 1931, 37; of 1938, 39; of 
1944, 44; of 1946, 44; of 1990, 174, 186, 
196, 100; of- 1991, xxxvi, xxxviii, 194; 
nomination process for, 195; rigged, 44; 
Russian intervention in, 23 

electoral procedures, 194-97 

electric power: brownout schedule for, 
140; generation of, 55-56, 121; short- 
ages of, 55, 140; state ownership of, 40 

electrification, 128 

Electronic Materials Processing and 
Equipment Scientific-Production Com- 
bine, 142 



308 



Index 



Electronics Bank, 156 

Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter- 
Range Nuclear Missiles, Treaty on 
(1987), 236 

embassies: intelligence officers in, 216 

emigration, 61 ; brain drain, 102, 122; of 
Bulgarians, 77, 78; of Jews, 87; of 
Turks, 56, 77, 78, 81, 82 

employees, 100; as percentage of popu- 
lation, 101 

employment: in administration, 102; in 
construction, 101; in education, 102; 
guaranteed, 178; in housing, 102; in 
research, 101-2; in trade, 101; in trans- 
portation, 101 

energy (see also fuels): imports of, 161, 
162; industry goals, 138; inefficient use 
of, 138; shortages, 131 

energy generation, xxxvi, 138-41; con- 
ventional, 139; development of, 139; 
hydroelectric, 138-39; nuclear, xxxii, 
138, 139-41; thermoelectric, 138, 139 

English language, 110 

Enlightenment: influence of, 13 

Entente: members of, 31; territorial offers 
by, to Bulgaria, 31 

enterprises, private. See private enterprises 

enterprises, state. See state-owned enter- 
prises 

environment, 68-70; aid for restoring, 
168 

Environment, Ministry of, xxxiii 
environmental movement, xxxiv, xxxvii, 
69, 121, 144, 207; environmental prob- 
lems, xxxi-xxxii, 118, 121, 210, 218; 
attempts to get international aid for, 70; 
caused by burning coal, 139; caused by 
industrial growth, 69, 141; caused by 
strip mining, 139; health problems 
caused by, 107; protests against, xxxii, 
69, 121, 210; taboo on discussion of, 69 
esnafi, 94 

espionage, 271-72 

ESPU. See Unified Secondary Polytech- 

nical Schools 
Ethiopia: military support to, 53, 259 
ethnographic characteristics, 78-87 
Europe: commerce with, xlv, 25; eco- 
nomic cooperation agreements with, 
54; influences of, in national revival, 
13-14; license agreements with, 54; re- 
lations with, 52, 55, 221-22; trade 
agreements with, 54 



Europe, Central: trade with, 117, 160 
Europe, Eastern: relations with, xxxii, 
130 

European Bank for Reconstruction and 

Development (EBRD), 166 
European Community (EC), xxxix, xlv, 

216; membership in, xxxix 
European Economic Community (EEC), 

221; assistance from, 141, 168; trade 

with, 164, 221-22 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 

xlv 

European Parliament, xlv 
Evren, Kenan, 56 

exercises, military, 235; with Hungary, 
259 

exports (see also under individual products): 
to Comecon countries, 143; of crops, 
148; to Czechoslovakia, 130; to East 
Germany, 130; of food, 132, 148, 161; 
hard currency from, 148; to Italy, 163; 
of Soviet oil, 162; to Soviet Union, 47, 
130, 143, 161; to Switzerland, 163; to 
West Germany, 163 

families: allowances to, for children, 78; 
average size of, 99; duties in, 100; in 
modern society, 98-100; status in, 95; 
of students, 112; value of, 98 

family, extended (zadruga): decline of, 61, 
94; fragmentation of, 95; inheritance 
in, 95; members of, 94; "old man" in, 
94-95; as origins of villages, 95; as per- 
centage of all households, 99; senior 
woman, 94-95 

Family Code (1985), 99; emancipation of 
women in, 99 

Fatherland Front coalition, 232, 262; Bul- 
garian Agrarian National Union in, 
181; communists in, 44; coup by, 43, 
173; elections under, 195; origins of, 
173, 176; Petkov executed by, 44, 177; 
purges by, 44; reorganized, 45 

Federation of Clubs for Glasnost and 
Democracy, 210, 211 

Federation of Independent Students' 
Unions (FISU), 206 

Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha: de- 
clares himself tsar, 28-29; elected 
prince, 25; European refusal to recog- 
nize, 25; intervention in agriculture, 



309 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



27; intervention in industry, 27; power 
accumulated by, 26; rail lines nation- 
alized by, 28; recognition of, 25, 26; 
religion under, 91; rule by, 26-29; 
Stambolov dismissed by, 26; wife for, 
26 

Filov, Bogdan, 41, 42 
Finance, Ministry of, 125, 126, 192, 265 
financial enterprises: income in, 123; na- 
tionalization of, 46 
financial system, national, 155-58 
First Air Defense Division, 246 
First Army, 244-45 

FISU. See Federation of Independent Stu- 
dents' Unions 

five-year plans, xxxi, 126, 128-30; basis 
forjudging fulfillment of, 136; goals for, 
157; Eighth (1981-85), 136, 148; First 
(1949-53), 128-29, 174; Fourth (1963- 
67), 131; Second (1953-57), 129 

Five-Year Plan, Third (1958-62): agricul- 
tural collectivization in, 147; agricul- 
tural production in, 49; Great Leap 
Forward in, 49, 129; industrial produc- 
tion in, 49; targets for, 129 

floods, 67 

food: export of, 148-50, 161; prices, 165; 

production, 251; subsidies for, 165; 

supply, 151, 176; supply to cities, 132 
foreign affairs: in 1960s, 51-52, 53; in 

1970s, 52-53 
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of, xxxix, 215- 

16 

foreign assistance, xliv, 166-69, 216; from 
European Economic Community, 141; 
refusal of, xliv-xlv, 44 

Foreign Economic Relations, Ministry of, 
192; abolished, xxxvii 

foreign influences, xxix 

foreign investment: encouraged, xxxv, 
137; under Liapchev, 37; Western, 52 

foreign policy, xxx, xlv, 215-22; under 
Chervenkov, 47; imitation of Soviet 
Union in, xxxviii, 215; in late 1930s, 
40-41; under Liapchev, 37 

Foreign Trade, Ministry of, 125 

Foreign Trade Court of Arbitration, 193 

forests: environmental damage to, 69 

forestry: earnings from, 123; guest- 
workers in, 76; settlements for, 71 

France: aid from, 113, 222; attempts to 
trade with, 40; attempts to limit Rus- 
sian influence, 3,14; cultural ties with, 



15-16; educational ties with, 15-16; in- 
tervention of, in peasant uprisings, 18; 
materiel from, 231; relations with, 
xxxix, 38, 221 

French Revolution: influence of, on na- 
tional revival, 13 

fuels {see also energy), 138; imports of, 138 

Gabrovo, 142; defense production plant 

in, 251 
Gagauz: in population, 79 
Ganev, Stoyan, xxxvii, xxxix, xl 
Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 14 
gasoline: shortages of, 162 
GATT. General Agreement on Tariffs 

and Trade 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 

(GATT): application for membership 

in, 167, 221, 222 
General Staff, 240, 241, 256, 271; duties 

of, 241 

General Workers' Professional Union, 
202 

Georgiev, Kimon, 43; as prime minister, 
38 

Georgi Rakovski Military Academy, 241, 
256 

Georgi Rakovski Officer Legion, 256, 257 
German Democratic Republic (East Ger- 
many), xxxii; exports to, 130; joint 
military exercises with, 258; revolution 
in, 211 

Germans: in population, 79 

Germany: aid from, for reforming edu- 
cation, 113; agricultural exports to, 40; 
invasion of Poland by, 40; materiel 
from, 231; relations with, xxxix, 221; 
takeover of Sudetenland by, 40; ties 
with, 26, 33, 40; trade with, 160, 164; 
in World War I, 3 1 ; in World War II, 
85, 231, 232 

Germany, Federal Republic of (West 
Germany): diplomatic relations with, 
52; economic cooperation agreements 
with, 54; license agreements with, 54; 
materiel from, 251; trade with, 163 

Giurgiu plant: health problems attributed 
to, 107 

glasnost, 183, 211 

GNP. See gross national product 

godparents, 95 

golden ages, xxix; first, 6-7; second, 7-8 



310 



Index 



Gorbachev, Mikhail S., 183, 185; rela- 
tions of, with Zhivkov, 56, 220; visit by, 
136 

Gorna Oryakhovitsa, 64 

government (see also government, local): 
budget, 252; intervention of, in agricul- 
ture, 27, 39; intervention of, in industry, 
27; job creation by, 102; representation 
by class in, 29; spending on environ- 
mental protection, 69 

government, local, 177-79, 193-94; con- 
solidation of, 193-94 

grand national assembly: of 191 1 , 28-29; 
of 1990, xxxvi, 189, 195 

Great Depression, xxix, 37 

Greater Bulgaria, 227, 230, 234 

Greater Macedonia, xl 

Great Leap Forward, 49 

Greece, 24; agreement on disposition of 
Macedonia, 29; attempts to achieve 
peace with, 42; in Balkan Entente, 38, 
231; in Balkan Pact, 47; in Balkan 
Wars, 29-30, 230; in Black Sea Trad- 
ing Zone, 164; border with, 234, 249; 
claims to Macedonia, 27, 29, 30; eco- 
nomic agreement with, 219; forced to 
leave southern Bulgaria, 37; Macedo- 
nians in, xxxix, 85; military programs 
of, 235; in proposed nuclear-free zone, 
52; relations with, xxxix, xl, 47, 51, 
217, 218-19, 234, 236; riots against 
(1906), 28; strategic considerations of, 
234; territory returned to, 232; Thrace 
awarded to, 33, 43; uprisings in, 14; 
in World War I, 31 

Greek civil war, 233 

Greek language: in First Bulgarian Em- 
pire, 80 

Greek Orthodox Church, 80 

Greeks: in Ottoman Empire, 10; popu- 
lation in Bulgaria, 79, 87 

Green Party, 199, 207; platform of, 207 

gross national product (GNP): compared 
to net material product, 136; debt as 
percentage of, 162; industry as percent- 
age of, 40; military budget as percent- 
age of, xliv, 252 

groundwater: pollution of, 70 

guestworkers: Bulgarians as, 76, 221; in 
Bulgaria, 76 

Guinea-Bissau: arms sales to, 262 

Gypsies, 86-87; education of, 86-87; 
forced settlement of, 86; illiteracy 



among, 86-87; in intelligentsia, 87; lan- 
guages of, 86; and name-change pol- 
icy, 83-84, 86; neighborhoods of, 86; 
occupations of, 87; political participa- 
tion of, xlvi; in population, 79, 86; 
religion of, 89 



hajdutin exploits, 11, 17 

Health, Ministry of, 106 

health (see also medicine), 104 

health care, xxxiii-xxxiv; aid for restruc- 
turing, 168; foreign aid for, 105; im- 
provements in, xxxiii, 49; nationalized, 
61; in 1950s, 49; personnel, 105; ser- 
vices, reform of, 105; subsidies for, 165; 
traditional, 104 

health facilities, 49, 105, 106; church-run, 
91, 92, 106; maternity, 105; military, 
241; private, 106; in villages, 76 

health problems, 104-8; caused by en- 
vironmental pollution, 107 

Helsinki Accords (1975), 54, 182 

Higher Aviation School, 246-47, 255 

Higher Naval School, 356 

history, recorded, 11, 12 

Hitler, Adolf, 38, 41 

HIV. See human immunodeficiency virus 

Holy Synod, 88; publishing by, 88, 89 

homelessness, 109 

housing, 108-9; availability of, 108, 166; 
communal, 108; under democratiza- 
tion, 109; employment in, 102; family, 
108; of Gypsies, 86; indoor plumbing, 
109; for newly weds, 99, 108; in rural 
areas, 109; size of, 108; in Sofia, 109; 
subsidies for, 165 

Howe, Jeffrey, 221 

human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), 

107-8 
human rights, 269 
Hungarian revolution (1956), 48 
Hungary, xl, 164; freedom movement of 

1989 in, 211; joint military exercises 

with, 259; membership in European 

Community, xxxix 
hydroelectric power plants: potential for 

production, 67; problems with, 55 



IAEA. See International Atomic Energy 
Agency 



311 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



Ilinden independence group, 85 
Ilinden-Preobrazhensko Uprising (1903), 
28, 85 

IMRO. See Internal Macedonian Revolu- 
tionary Organization 

IMF. See International Monetary Fund 

imports: of fuel, 138; hard currency for, 
164; from Italy, 163; of manufacturing 
inputs, 160; from Soviet Union, 47, 
138, 161; from Switzerland, 163; from 
West Germany, 163 

import substitution, 160 

income: of agricultural workers, 150, 165; 
average, 123; under communist rule, 
123; in Great Depression, 37; in indus- 
try, 165; of peasants, 37; per capita, 37; 
taxes, 128 

independence, xxix-xxx, 20-22, 28-29, 
229 

independence movement, 14-22; compli- 
cations of, 3; organizations for, 18-19; 
for religion, 16-17 

Independent Association for Defense of 
Human Rights in Bulgaria, 210 

Independent Labor Federation. See 
Podkrepa 

Independent Trade Union Organization 

of Militia Employees, 268 
Independent Workers' Trade Union, 36 
India: military relations with, 259 
Indonesia: military support to, 53 
industrial growth: under communist rule, 

141; environmental problems caused 

by, 69, 141; obstacles to, 143-44; rates, 

141; under Second Five-Year Plan, 129 
industrialization, xxxi, 4, 128; growth of, 

25; problems with, 180 
industrial laborers: conditions for, 25; as 

percentage of labor force, 122; sources 

of, 25 

Industrial Petrochemical Plant, 143 

industrial policy, 53, 141-42 

industrial production, 141; attempts to in- 
crease, 128; under communist rule, 
141; under Ferdinand, 27; under five- 
year plans, 129; growth in, 27; under 
Liapchev, 37; rates of, 141; target 
negotiation, 132; under Third Five- 
Year Plan, 49 

industrial reform: outcomes of, 132; 
retreat from, 132; under Zhivkov, 55, 
125 



industry, 141-44; civil defense organiza- 
tions in, 250; electronics, 142; employ- 
ment in, 101, 130; under five-year 
plans, 128-29; government interven- 
tion in, 27; growth of, 40, 136; invest- 
ment in, 49; labor discipline in, 127; 
lack of competition in, 143; light, 141 , 
142; machine-building, 143; metallur- 
gical, 143; nationalization of, 45-46, 
127-28; under net material product, 
136; as percentage of gross national 
product, 40; as percentage of net 
material product, 130; surplus workers 
in, 123; under Third Five-Year Plan, 
49 

industry, heavy: centers of, 142; demands 
of, 138; emphasis on, 47, 138, 160; ex- 
ports by, 142; inefficiency in, 138; in- 
vestment in, xxxi 

inflation, 118, 158 

Industry, Trade, and Services, Ministry 
of, 251; under democratization, 165; 
under economic planning, 158; after 
World War I, 33, 35 

intellectual life, 48-49; thaw in, 48 

intelligence: gathering of, xxxix, 216; 
military, 271; services, 270-71 

intelligentsia, 100, 209-10, 211; demon- 
strations by, 28; government relations 
with, 50; Gypsies in, 87; party mem- 
bership of, 186; as percentage of popu- 
lation, 100, 101; under Zhivkov, 210 

Intelsat. See International Telecommuni- 
cations Satellite Corporation 

interest rates, 156, 157 

Interior, Ministry of, 50, 192 

Internal Affairs, Ministry of, 216, 262, 
263, 266-69 

Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Or- 
ganization (IMRO), 22, 218; crack- 
down on, 35, 38; decrease in influence 
of, 28; Stamboliiski's handling of, 35, 
36; terrorism by, 27, 37, 271; under 
Liapchev, 36-37 

Internal Security Troops, 267, 268, 269, 
272; number of personnel in, 268 

International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA): Kozloduy evaluation by, 140 

International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development: application for member- 
ship in, 222 

International Criminal Police Organiza- 
tion (Interpol), 265 



312 



Index 



International Monetary Fund (IMF): ap- 
plication for membership in, 222; loans 
from, 167, 168; support from, 166 

International Telecommunications Satel- 
lite Corporation (Intelsat), 152 

Interpol. See International Criminal Police 
Organization 

Intervision East European television net- 
work, 152 

investment: in agriculture, 47; from Aus- 
tria, 222; by enterprises, 135; net cap- 
ital, 131, 136; policy, 157-58; Western, 
52 

Iraq: trade with, 162, 163, 164 

iron, 118, 121, 141; imported, 142, 161 

Iron Gate, 63 

irrigation: sources of water for, 67 
Iskur River, 67 

Islam, 89-90; followers of, 89; forced con- 
version to, 9, 80, 84; Orthodox customs 
in, 90; Shia, 90; Sunni, 89-90; syn- 
cretism in, 90; tolerance of, 87-88 

isolation: under Chervenko, 47 

Israel: emigration of Jews to, 87; recog- 
nition of, 216, 222 

Italy: arms sales to, 262; diplomats of, ex- 
pelled, 271; intervention of, in Balkan 
uprisings, 29; ties to, 40; trade with, 
163 

Ivailo, 7 

Ivan Asen II, 7 

Jews: assimilation of, 93; under com- 
munist rule, 93; emigration of, 87; in 
Ottoman Empire, 9; in population, 79; 
protection of, in World War II, 42, 93 

jobs: government creation of, 102; of 
Gypsies, 87; in villages, 76 

John XXIII (pope), 91 

John Paul II (pope): attempted assassina- 
tion of, 52, 56, 213, 272; invitation to 
visit, 216, 222 

journalists: purged, 48 

Judaism, 93 

judges: election of, 193, 266; terms of, 
192-93 

judiciary, 192-93; independence of, 37, 
177, 266; under Liapchev, 37; public 
distrust of, 193; reform of, 266 

Justice, Ministry of, 262, 265 

Kaloian, 7 



Karadimov, Rosen, 206 

Karavelov, Liuben, 19, 23 

Karavelov, Petko: as prime minister, 23; 

as revolutionary, 23 
Kardan (king), 228-29 
Karlovo: defense production plant in, 251 
Kazakhstan, xxxix 

Kazanluk: defense production plant in, 
251 

KGB. See State Security, Committee for 

Khaskovo Province: armed forces sta- 
tioned in, 244-45; percentage of popu- 
lation in, 71 

Khrushchev, Nikita S.: emulation of, 
xxxiii, 53, 179; relations of, with Zhiv- 
kov, 49; Stalin denounced by, 48, 50, 
215; visit to Bulgaria by, 50; Zhivkov 
endorsed by, 50, 180 

Kievan Rus', 6 

Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slo- 
venes: formed, 33; Macedonia in, 85; 
relations with, 35 

Kingdom of Yugoslavia: Macedonia in, 
85 

Kintex arms-export enterprise, 53, 262; 

effect of democratization on, 262 
Kioseivanov, Georgi, 41 
Kiustendil, 36 

Kolarov, Vasil, 36; executed, 46 
Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist 

Republic: guestworkers in, 76, 221 
Komsomol. See Communist Youth 

League of Bulgaria 
Konstantin Preslavski Higher Pedagogi- 
cal Institute, 89 
Korea, Republic of, 216, 222 
Kosovo Polje, Battle of, 9, 229 
Kostinbrod: radio broadcasts in, 152 
Kostov, TraTcho, 179; executed, 46, 178 
Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant, xxxvi, 
140; accidents at, 140; declared unsafe, 
140; problems with, 55, 140; radiation 
from, 121, 212 
Kremikovtsi: mineral resources at, 
118-21 

Kremikovtsi Metallurgical Complex, 141; 

problems with, 142; production at, 142 
Kremikovtsi Metallurgy Works: pollution 

by, 70 
Krum (tsar), 229 

Kurdzhali: centenarians in, 105; declared 
ecologically endangered, 121; pollution 



313 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



in, 70, 107, 121; Turkish population 
in, 84 

kurdzhaliistvo (anarchy), 14, 15 
laboratories, 106 

labor: brigades, 135; laws, 35; reform, 
123; shortages, xxxiv, 72, 118, 122 

Labor Code (1951), 103 

labor-cooperative farm (trudovo-kooperativno 
zemedelsko stopanstvo — TKZS), 144 

labor force, 121-23; availability factors, 
122; benefits of, 122; categories of, 122; 
discipline of, under nationalization, 
127; distribution of, 122; peasants in, 
122; shortages in, xxxiv, 121, 131, 147, 
184; size of, 122; skilled, 118, 122; 
turnover, 129; urbanization of, 117; 
women in, 123 

land: area, 62; redistribution, xxxv, xliv; 
reform, 18 

landholding: by peasants, 25, 54, 61, 95, 
144; redistribution of, 35 

law and order, 262-72 

lead, 118 

League of Nations: membership in, 35, 37 
Leo III (emperor), 228 
Levchev, Liubomir, 210 
Levski, Vasil, 19 
Liapchev, Andrei, 36 
Liapchev government, 36-37 
LIAZ-Madera trucks, 143 
Liberac Auto Plant, 143 
liberals, 22, 23; Alexander's opposition 
to, 23 

Libya: military support to, 53, 259; trade 
with, 162, 163, 164 

Life and Tribulations of the Sinner Sofronii 
(Vrachanski), 13 

life expectancy, 61, 104 

Lilov, Aleksandur, xliii, 50 

literacy, 81; of Bulgarians, 87; under 
communist rule, xxxiii, 110; of Gyp- 
sies, 86-87 

literature, 11-13; historical, 11; national, 
80; translation of western, 16 

Litse (Dimitrova), 210 

Little Entente, 40 

livestock, 148 

living conditions, 78 

living standards, xxxv, 40, 164-66; 
decline in, 61; under First Five-Year 
Plan, 128; improvements in, 164; in 



military, 256; in villages, 76; under 

Zhivkov, 49 
loans, foreign, 166-69 
logistics, 250-51 

London, Treaty of (1913), 30, 230 
Lovech: percentage of population in, 71 
Lovech Vehicle Assembly Plant, 166 
Lozanchev, Dimitur, 193 
Ludzhev, Dimitur, xxxvii 
Lukanov, Andrei; as prime minister, 187, 
192, 221 

Lukanov government, xxxiv, 167, 187, 
212 

Lukov, Khristo: assassination of, 232 



Macedonia: attempts to administer, 28; 
Bulgarian occupation of, 41, 228, 229; 
Bulgarian population in, 3; conferences 
to address problems of, 38; desire to 
annex, 23, 62, 84, 85, 234; dioceses of, 
ceded to Bulgarian church, 25-26; dis- 
putes over, 52, 84; foreign claims to, 
27, 29, 30; given to Greece, 230; inva- 
sion of, 31; recognition of, xl, xlv; refu- 
gees from, 28; as target for conquest, 
3; in World War I, 31; in World War 
II, 41 ; under Yugoslav rule, xxxix, 43, 
85 

Macedonian Empire, 4 

Macedonian independence movement (see 
also International Macedonian Revolu- 
tionary Organization), 25, 27-28, 36, 
85, 217; Bulgarian sympathy for, 28, 
219; demonstrations against handling of, 
28; factions in, 37; under Liapchev, 37; 
StamboliTski's handling of, 35, 36; 
Stambolov's handling of, 25, 26; 
Stoilov's handling of, 27; terrorism by, 
38 

Macedonian language: dialects of, 84-85 

Macedonians, 84-86, 234; dispositions of, 
84, 85; in Greece, 85; population of, 
85-86; in Yugoslavia, 85-86, 217 

Magyars, 7, 229 

Mahmud II (sultan), 18 

Main Directorate for Statistics, 128 

Main Political Administration, 239 

Makariopolski, Ilarion, 17 

Malinov, Aleksandur, 32 

manufacturing: under democratization, 
118 

Mao Zedong, 129 
Maritsa Basin, 118, 138 



314 



Index 



Maritsa-iztok (East Maritsa): coal min- 
ing at, 118, 138, 139; environmental 
problems caused by, 139 

Maritsa-iztok Industrial-Power Complex, 
139; reliability of, 139 

Maritsa-iztok- 1 Thermoelectric Plant, 
139 

Maritsa-iztok-2 Thermoelectric Plant, 
139 

Maritsa River, 67; pollution in, 121 
Maritsa River valley, 64; early settle- 
ments in, 71 
Maritsa-zapad (West Maritsa), 118 
Markov, Georgi: murder of, 54, 210, 213, 
271; state investigation of murder of, 
222, 271 

marriage: age for, 98; arranged, 98; and 
extended family, 94; qualities of spouse, 
99; rate, 98; women in, 95 

Marshall Plan: refusal of aid from, 44 

Marx, Karl, 124 

Marxism: indoctrination in, xxxiii, 110, 
112, 212 

Material-Technical and Rear Support 

Command, 250; responsibility of, 250 
media, xliii, 212-14; censorship of, eased, 

55; control of, 209, 213; freedom for, 

186; under Zhivkov, 209 
medicine: availability of, 106; prices of, 

105; shortages of, 105-6 
merchants, 13 

Mesembria, Battle of (817), 229 
Mesta River, 67 
Methodists, 92 
Methodius, 6 

Middle East: arms sales to, 262; military 

support to, 53 
migration (see also emigration): internal, 

61, 72, 75-76; urban, 117, 122, 130 
Mikhaylovgrad: percentage of population 

in, 71 

Miladinov brothers, 85 
Military Administration Department, 239 
Military Counterintelligence Service, 270- 
71 

military doctrine, 235-37 

Military League, 231; coups d'etat by, 
231, 238; political influence of, 238 

Military Medical Academy, 241, 256 

military officers, 231 ; criteria for selection 
of, 238, 239; cuts in, 252; doctrine of, 
237; education of, 233, 255-57; party 
membership of, 233, 238; political, 238, 



239; technical competence of, 233; ten- 
ure of, 256-57; training for, 268 
military officers, noncommissioned, 254; 
service obligation of, 254; training of, 
254 

military personnel, 252-58; cuts in, 252; 

number of, 252; recruitment of, 252- 

53; service obligations of, 252-53 
military relations, 258-62; with Greece, 

259; with India, 259; with Nigeria, 259; 

with the Soviet Union, 227, 228, 235, 

258 

military sales: from Czechoslovakia, 251; 
as exports, 259-62; from Germany, 
251; from Poland, 248, 251; procure- 
ment, xli, xlv, 241, 250-51; from Rus- 
sia, xlv; from the Soviet Union, 247, 
248, 251; from Ukraine, xlv 

military schools: applicants for, 255; cadet 
programs in, 255 

military service, and marriage, 98 

military tradition, 3 

military training, 243, 251, 253-55, 268; 
level of, 255; based on Soviet model, 
254; basic, 254; centers, 245; cycle of, 
254; specialist, 254 

minerals, 118-21 

mines: state-owned, 40 

mining, 118-21; settlements, 71 

ministries: authority of, 191 

minority policy, xlvi, 78-80 

Mitterrand, Francois, 221, 222 

Miusiulmani, 90 

Mladenov, Petur, 185; government of, 
123, 185-86; as head of Bulgarian 
Communist Party, 185; as head of State 
Council, 185; as president, 186, 190 

modernization, 4; of agriculture, 129; 
under Zveno coalition, 39 

monarchy: abolished, 4, 44; legitimacy of, 
26; movement to restore, 208-9; refer- 
endum on, 208-9; struggle for power 
by, 175 

monasteries: number of, 88; role of, in 
preserving culture, 80 

money supply: frozen, 128; reduced, 128 

Montenegro: agreement on disposition of 
Macedonia, 29; revolt of, against Otto- 
man Turks, 19 

mosques: built, 90; closed, 82; number 
of, 90 

Mt. Athos, monastery on, 12-13 
Mount Musala, 64 



315 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



Mount Vikhren, 64 

Movement for Environmental Protection 
and Restoration, 211 

Movement for Rights and Freedoms 
(MRF), xxxviii, 184, 206-7, 249; co- 
operation of, with Union of Democratic 
Forces, 207; excluded from national 
round table, 206; founded, 206; in- 
dependence of, xliii; leaders of, de- 
ported, 211; platform of, 206-7; 
political participation by, xxxvi, 
xxxviii, 214 

Mozambique: arms sales to, 262; military 
support to, 259 

MRF. See Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms 

Muraviev, Konstantin, 176 

Muslims (see also Islam): ethnic distribu- 
tion of, 89; in population, 79, 86; pub- 
lishing by, 90; repression of, 46, 90 

Narodna kultura (People's Culture), 209 
National Alliance, 36 
national anniversary, 1,300th, xxx, 55, 
183, 210 

National Assembly, 188-91, 194-96; 
under communist rule, 173, 177; under 
democratization, 174, 186; economic 
reform under, 169; elections for, 189, 
196; factions in, 190; functions of, 189, 
241; military doctrine under, 236; in 
1947 constitution, 181; in 1971 consti- 
tution, 181-82; organization of, 189; 
powers of, 177, 181, 192; representa- 
tion in, 196; security issues under, 240; 
size of, xxxvi; struggle for power by, 
175; Turks in, 214; under Zhivkov, 189 
National Assembly Committee on For- 
eign Policy, 221 
National Bank Bill (1991), 156 
National Committee for Defense of Na- 
tional Interests, 215 
National Council of Teachers, 111 
National Defense, Ministry of, 239, 240, 
250, 256, 270-71; calls for civilian head 
of, 241; commands within, 242; Cul- 
tural Institutions Department, 242; In- 
ternational Relations Department, 242; 
military budget under, xliv, 252; organi- 
zation of, 241; Podkrepa as adversary 
of, 257; Public Information Department, 
242; responsibilities of, 241 



National Health Council, 106 

National Intelligence Service, 270 

national labor exchange, 123 

National Security, Commission on, 240, 
253, 268, 270 

nationalism, xxix, 8; after Balkan Wars, 
30; cultural expressions of, 15-16; sup- 
pression of, 26 

nationalist movement: branches of, 18; 
precursors of, 11 

nationalization, 127; of industry, 127-28; 
of rail line by Ferdinand, 28 

National Land Council, 151 

national police, 253; purged, 262; reor- 
ganization of, 262 

National Protection Service, 270 

National Radiation and Chemical De- 
fense Warning System, 250 

National Revival (see also cultural revival), 
109-10; commerce and, 13; early 
stages, 11-14; literature in, 11-13, 81; 
missionaries in, 92; role of religion in, 
88; schools in, 81; Western influence 
on, 13 

national round table, 186-87, 188; elec- 
tion laws under, 194; influence of, 186; 
Mladenov named president by, 190; 
Movement for Rights and Freedoms 
excluded from, 206; Podkrepa in, 204; 
reduces role of Bulgarian Communist 
Party, 188; role of, 188; threats to boy- 
cott, 197; Union of Democratic Forces 
in, 200 

National Security Council, 240, 241; 
members of, 240 

National Security Service, 270 

National Service for Defense of the Con- 
stitution, 270 

National Socialist Movement: founded, 
38; under royal dictatorship, 39 

National Socialist Party (Nazi Party), 38 

NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Or- 
ganization 

natural gas: hard currency for, 144; im- 
ports of, 138, 144, 161 

naval forces, 242, 247-48; aviation, 248; 
bases, 247; coastal artillery, 248; com- 
manders of, 242; fleet, 247; infantry, 
248; mission of, 248; modernization of, 
247; reductions in, 247; reserves, 257; 
ships, 243, 247; uniforms, ranks, and 
insignia, 257-58 



316 



Index 



Nazi Party. See National Socialist Party 
Nazi-Soviet alliance, 40 
NEM. See New Economic Model 
net material product (NMP), 118; agri- 
culture as percentage of, 130, 144; com- 
pared with GNP, 136; growth rate, 
xxxv, 136, 141; industry as percentage 
of, 130, 141; under Second Five- Year 
Plan, 129; second round of, 136; trade 
as percentage of, 160 
New Economic Model (NEM), 55, 
134-35; accounting under, 135; eco- 
nomic growth under, 136; failure of, 
57; financial incentives under, 135; 
goals of, 134 
Neuilly-sur-Seine, Treaty of (1919), 33, 
231 

New Regulations on Economic Activity 

(1987), 136 
New System of Management (1964-68), 

131 

newspapers (see also journalists; media), 
212 

New Union for Democracy, xliii 
Nicaragua: arms sales to, 262 
Nigeria: military relations with, 259 
Nikola Vaptsarov Combine, 142 
Nis Convention, 35 
NMP. See net material product 
nomenklatura, 179 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), xxx, xxxiii, 51, 217, 234; 
counterintelligence against, 270; policy 
toward, 228; relations with, xl, 258 

North Bulgarian Swell, 64 

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (1968), 
236 

Nuclear Power Supply, Commission on, 
140 

nuclear waste disposal, 140 
nurses, 105 

oil: crisis, 182; extraction, 121; hard cur- 
rency for, 144; imports of, 138, 144, 
161; shortages, 54 

Old Church Slavonic, 11-12 

Old Slavonic, 81 

Orange Guard, 35, 36 

Organization for Cooperation in Defense, 
253-54 

Orthodox seminary in Sofia, 89 



Osman I, 7-8 

Ottoman Empire, xxx, xxxii, 7; decline 
of, 8, 10-11, 14, 26, 28; expansion of, 
8; fall of, 31; forced relocation in, 71; 
founded, 7; Macedonian dioceses ceded 
to Bulgarian church, 25-26; reform in, 
18, 28; uprisings against, 10-11, 19-20, 
29, 229 

Ottoman rule, xxix, 3, 7-11, 80; Bulgar- 
ian culture under, 9-11; Christian 
resistance to, 13; forced conversion 
under, 9, 80; peasants under, 9 

Ottoman system: assimilation policy of, 
9, 80; goal of, 9; introduction of, 9 

Ozal, Turgut, 219 



Paisi of Hilendar, 12 

Palestine: emigration to, 93 

Panagyurishte: declared ecologically en- 
dangered, 121 

parliament. See subranie 

Party Congresses: Extraordinary Four- 
teenth, 198; Second, 129; Sixth, 47; 
Ninth, 180; Tenth, 51, 180-82, 182 

Passports, Law on, 214 

paternalism in society: decline of, 94 

patriarchy, 94-98; in extended family, 94 

Paul VI (pope): Zhivkov's visit to, 52 

Paulicians, 91 

Pazardzhik: prison in, 269 

peasant revolts: intervention in, 18; of 
1277, 7; of 1835, 17; of 1841, 17; of 
1850-51, 17, 18; of 1960s, 49; against 
taxes, 27 

peasants, 47; antiwar campaigns of, 
31-32; attitudes toward postcommunist 
reform, 200; education of, 110; forced 
into urban work force, 25, 61, 122, 130; 
in Great Depression, 37; impoverish- 
ment of, 95; income of, 37; landhold- 
ingsof, 25, 54, 61, 95, 144; opposition 
of, to collectivization, 44, 46, 147; 
under Ottoman rule, 9; political organi- 
zation of, 29; taxes on, 9, 25, 27, 29; 
in traditional society, 94; voting by, 35; 
under Zhivkov, 180 

Pechenegs, 229 

penal code of 1968, 265 

penal system, 268-69; under democrati- 
zation, 263 



317 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



pensioners: as percentage of population, 
103 

Pensions, Law on (1957), 103 
Pentecostals, 92-93 

People's Bloc coalition, 38; fragmentation 
of, 38; overthrown, 38 

People's Constitutional bloc, 39 

people's councils, 177-78; organization 
of, 194 

People's Courts, 262 

People's Liberal Party, 26 

People's Militia, 194, 262, 265, 267, 272; 
subordinate organizations of, 268 

People's Revolutionary Army of Libera- 
tion (PRAL), 232 

perestroika: pressure to implement, 136, 
183; Romanian opposition to, 218 

periodicals, 16, 212 

Permanent Commission for Human 
Rights and the National Problem, 213 
Pernik, 142 

Persian Gulf War, 163, 222, 259 
Peter, 7 

Petkov, Nikola, 44, 176; executed, 28, 44, 

177; pardoned, 180 
Petkov Instrument Plant, 143 
PHARE program (Polish and Hungarian 

Assistance for the Reconstruction of 

Europe), 164, 168 
Pharmaceuticals Council, 106 
pharmacies, 106 

Philip of Macedonia: Plovdiv founded by, 
72 

physicians, 105; military, 256; in 1950s, 
49; per capita, xxxiii; in private prac- 
tice, 106 

Pirin Macedonia, 271 

Pirin Mountains, 64, 67 

Pirin region: Macedonians in, 85-86 

planning, military, 235 

Plebiscites, Law on (1983), 109 

Pleven, 142; oil drilling in, 121; Pen- 
tecostals in, 92; population of, 72 

Pliska, 6 

Plovdiv, xxxi; Adventists in, 93; armed 
forces stationed in, 244, 245; Armeni- 
ans in, 87; Catholics in, 91; declared 
ecologically endangered, 121; defense 
production plant in, 251; founded, 72; 
history of, 75; 1990 elections in, 196; 
percentage of population in, 71; 
Pomaks in, 84; population of, 72; pris- 



on in, 269; radio broadcasts in, 152; rail 
lines in, 75; unemployment in, 102 
Plovdiv-Pazardzhik Plain: pollution in, 70 
Plovdiv Power Electronics Plant, 143 
Podkrepa (Independent Labor Federa- 
tion), xxxvii, 203; foreign relations 
under, 220; membership of, 204; mili- 
tary affiliate of, 257; participation of, 
in national round table, 304; perse- 
cuted, 203; political protest by, 204; 
rights sought by, 204; in Union of 
Democratic Forces, 204 
poetry, 16 
Pogled, 212 

Poland, xxxii, xl, 164; German invasion 
of, 40; military purchases from, 248, 
251; membership in European Com- 
munity, xxxix; as model for economic 
reform, 166; revolution in, 211 

police organizations, 267-68 

Polish and Hungarian Assistance for the 
Reconstruction of Europe. See PHARE 
program 

Politburo: abolished, 198; Chervenkov 
ousted from, 50; members of, 198; 
purges, 49; reform under, 185; Zhiv- 
kov as head of, 180, 198 

political activity: of armed forces, 238-39; 
in education system, 112 

political apathy, 57 

political atmosphere, 54-55 

Political Consultative Council, 188, 202 

political prisoners, xxxv, 47, 214, 269 

political parties (see also under individual par- 
ties), 4; abolished, 38; concern of, with 
defense, 238; law on, 239 

political protest, 182; against collectiviza- 
tion, 180; for democratization, 211; by 
environmentalists, xxxii, xxxvii, 69, 
121, 184-85, 211; factors provoking, 
227-28; legalized, 185; against Lu- 
kanov, 187; of 1905, 28; of 1941, 42; 
of 1970s, 54; of 1980, 28; by peasants, 
xliv; by Podkrepa, 204; against repres- 
sion, 28; by Turks, 215; by Union of 
Democratic Forces, 200 

Pomaks, 9, 80, 84; features of, 84; forced 
assimilation of, 84; and name-change 
policy, 83-84; religion of, 89; uprising 
by, 84 

Popov, Dimitur, 150; as prime minister, 
xxxv, 187, 192 



318 



Index 



Popov government, xxxv, 166, 216; elec- 
tions under, 194; formation of, 200; 
openness under, 272; Turks under, 215 

population, xxx, 70-78; age distribution 
in, 76, 105, 122; aging of, 105, 122; in 
cities, 72; density, 77; distribution of, 
72; government attempts to increase, 
77; of Gypsies, 86; increase in, 77; of 
Macedonians, 85-86; in 1985, 77; in 
1990, 77; percentage suffering from 
pollution, 70; percentage of pensioners 
in, 103; of Plovdiv, 72; trends, 77-78; 
rural, 76; settlement patterns of, 71; of 
Sofia, 72; of Turks, 82; urban, 75; of 
working age, 122 

population statistics: birth rate, 56, 72, 
82, 99, 100, 121, 122; fertility rate, 78; 
growth rate, 77, 78, 253; infant mor- 
tality rate, xxxiii, 104, 105; life expec- 
tancy, xxxiii, 104, 105; mortality rate, 
78, 105; natural growth, 76; prenatal 
mortality rate, 105 

ports, 75, 152 

postal service, 155 

Prague Spring (1968), 51; reaction to, 51 
PRAL. See People's Revolutionary Army 

of Liberation 
Pravda, 110 

Pravets Instrument Plant, 143 
precipitation, 68 
Presidency, 190, 240 
Presidium, 177 

press {see also media; newspapers): censor- 
ship of, 38; freedom of, 37, 178; under 
Liapchev, 37 

prices, 158; under communist rule, 118; 
decline of, 37; under democratization, 
168; of food, 165; in Great Depression, 
37; increases, 158, 165; liberalized, 158 

prime minister, 191-92; Atanasov as, 
185, 192, 199; Georgiev as, 38; Kara- 
velov as, 23; Lukanov as, 187, 192, 
221; Popov as, 187, 192; powers of, 
177; Yugov as, 179; Zhivkov as, 179, 
180 

Prison Service, 268 

prisons, 269; conditions in, 213; inmates 
in, 269; reform of, 269; violence in, 269 

private enterprises, 167-68 

private sector, xxxv; nationalized, 127; in 
1930s, 40 

privatization: of agriculture, 76, 129, 150; 
of communications, 155; under demo- 



cratization, xxxv, xliv, 166 

Prodev, Stefan, 209 

productivity: under central planning, 124; 
decline in, 143 

Program for Energy Development through 
1995 and in Perspective until 2005 
(1988), 138 

property, private: under constitution of 
1947, 45, 178; under constitution of 
1971, 51, 182; in extended family, 94; 
restoration of, xxxv 

Protection of the Environment, Law on 
(1991), xxxii 

Protestant Churches: dissolved, 46; health 
services of, 92; members of, in popu- 
lation, 79; persecution of, 92, 178; 
schools of, 92; youth clubs of, 92 

Protestantism {see also under individual de- 
nominations), 92-93; missionaries, 92 

provinces (oblasti), 71, 194; percentage of 
population in, 71 

Public Education, Law on (1991), 112 

Public Health, Ministry of, 121 

purges: of army, 232; by Chervenkov, 48, 
174; under democratization, xxxix, 
186; by Dimitrov, 178; by Fatherland 
Front, 44; by Stamboliiski, 36; by Zhiv- 
kov, 49, 54, 182, 211 



Rabotnichesko delo, 212 

radio, 152, 155, 165 

Radomir Heavy Equipment Plant, 142 

Radoslavov, Vasil, 30; resignation of, 32 

rail lines: in Plovdiv, 75 

railroads, 151; nationalized by Ferdinand, 

28; state ownership of, 40 
Rakovski, Georgi, 18-19 
raw materials: imports of, 160; inefficient 

use of, 138 
Razgrad: Muslims in, 90; percentage of 

population in, 71; Turkish population 

in, 84 

Razgrad Bulgarian Republic, 215 
recentralization, industrial, 132 
Red Berets. See Internal Security Troops 
Red Brigades, 272; arms sales to, 262 
reform, military, xl-xli, 227 
refugees: from Macedonia, 28 
religion {see also under individual religions), 

80, 87-93; under communism, 88, 178; 

tolerance of, 87-88, 90 
religious freedom, 46, 178; persecution, 82 



319 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



Regulations on the Control of Prices 

(1991), 169 
Religious Beliefs, Law on, 214 
Religious Organizations, Law on (1949), 

88, 178 

reparations, World War I, 33; canceled, 
39; effect of, on economy, 37 

research: employment in, 101; income in, 
123 

research and development, 143 
reserves, armed forces, 257; number of, 
257 

resource base, 118-21 

retirement: age, 100; eligibility for, 100 

revolution of 1989, 117, 138 

Rhodope Mountains, 63, 64, 67, 68; early 

settlements in, 71; Muslim settlements 

in, 89 
Rhodopes Vault, 64 
Rila Monastery, 88, 89 
Rila Mountains, 64, 67; mining in, 118 
Rilski, Neofit, 15 
riots: anti-Greek (1905-8), 28 
rivers, 67; pollution of, 69 
Road Militia, 268 
roads, 151 

Robert College, 16, 92 
Roma. See Gypsies 

Roman Catholic Church, 90-92; hospi- 
tals of, 91; membership in, 91; mission- 
aries, 11, 90, 91; oppression of, 91, 
178; oppression of, eased, 55; schools 
of, 91; union of, with Bulgarian Ortho- 
dox Church, 90 

Roman Empire, 4, 5 

Romania: in Balkan Entente, 38, 231; in 
Black Sea Trading Zone, 164; border 
with, 62, 234, 249; chemical pollution 
from, 69; claims to Macedonia, 30; en- 
vironmentalists' protests against, 69; 
German army in, 41 ; joint military ex- 
ercises with, 259; in Little Entente, 40; 
in proposed nuclear-free zone, 52; re- 
lations with, 218, 236; in Second 
Balkan War, 30, 230; in World War I, 
31 

Romanian language, 86 

Romanians: in Bulgarian population, 79 

Romany language, 86 

Roncalli, Angelo, 91 

rural areas: infant mortality in, 105; labor 

shift to cities, 117, 122, 130; migration 

to, 72; politics in, 186 



rural-urban dichotomy, xxxi, 54, 212; in- 
crease in, 40; in politics, 186 

Ruse: Adventists in, 93; Catholics in, 91; 
chemical pollution in, 69; declared eco- 
logically endangered, xxxii, 121; eco- 
logical exhibition in, 210; population 
of, 72; port of, 75, 152; shipyard, 143 

Ruse- Varna Railway: purchase of, 23 

Russia {see also Soviet Union): borders 
with, xxix; cultural ties with, xxxix, 
15-16; educational ties with, 15-16; 
grants for study in, 16; intervention of, 
in Bulgarian elections, 23; invasion by, 
229; as protector of Bulgaria, xxxii, 3, 
14, 229; Ottoman Turks driven out by, 
3; reaction of, to Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organization, 27; rela- 
tions with, xxxviii, xlv, 25 

Russian army: hostility toward, 23 

Russian language, 110, 256 

Russians: in Bulgarian population, 79; 
religion of, 92 

Russo-Turkish wars (1877-78), 229; Bul- 
garian aid to, 17 



Sadat, Anwar al, 271 
samizdat, 209 

Samokov: synagogues in, 93 

Samuil, 6, 229 

Sandanski, lane, 85 

Sayuz na Demokratichnite Sili (SDS). See 
Union of Democratic Forces 

schools, 111; church-run, 91, 92; depoli- 
ticization of, 111; dropouts from, 111; 
failures in, 111; fines in, 111; general, 
111; girls', 15; municipal, 111; primary, 
110; private, 111; professional, 111; 
secondary, 111; secular, 15; specialized, 
111; state, 111; technical, 111; Turkish 
language in, 82; in villages, 76 

science, culture, and art, commission on 
(Zhivkova), 54-55, 209, 210 

SDS. See Union of Democratic Forces 

Second Air Defense Division, 246 

Second Army, 245 

security services, 270-71 

Semerdzhiev, Atanas, 212, 241 

September Uprising of 1875, 19 

Serbia, 7, 24, 234; agreement on disposi- 
tion of Macedonia, 29; in Balkan Wars, 
29-30, 230; Bulgarian occupation of, 



320 



Index 



229; claims to Macedonia, 27, 29, 30; 
conflict of, with Austria-Hungary, 30; 
connections to Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organization, 27; inva- 
sion of, 31; Ottoman defeat of, 9; revolt 
of, against Ottoman Turks, 19; upris- 
ings in, 14; wars with Bulgaria, 24, 30, 
229; in World War I, 230; in Yugo- 
slavia, 217-18 
Serditsa, 5 

settlements: early, 71; at high altitudes, 

71; patterns of, 71 
Shabla Electromechanical Plant, 143 
Shield-82 exercises, 258 
shipbuilding, 143, 251 
shipping, 152 
Shishman, Mikhail, 7 
Shivarov, Svetoslav, 214 
Shumen: population of, 72; Tumbul 

Mosque in, 90 
Shumen Vehicle Plant, 143 
Silistra, 62 

Simeon (tsar), 6, 229 

Simeon II, 42; exiled, 44, 176; movement 

to restore, 208 
Skopje- Razgrad fault line, 67 
Slavic language, 3 

Slavs: converted to Christianity, 80; en- 
slavement of, by Ottomans, 9; forced 
resettlement of, 9, 10; settlement in 
Balkans, 5 

Sliven: Muslims in, 90; Pentecostals in, 
92; population of, 72 

Slivnitsa, Battle of, 24 

Slovenia, xl, xlv 

Smolyan: centenarians in, 105 

smuggling: allegations of official involve- 
ment in, 265; of arms, 53 

Social Council of Citizens, 214 

Social Democratic Party, 31; formed, 25, 
34; as original communist party, 25 

social groups (see also class), 100-102 

socialism: inspiration for, 25 

socialists: antiwar campaigns of, 31-32; 
workers as, 35 

social reforms: of 1856, 18; of 1876, 18 

social services, 102-13; Soviet model for, 
47, 49; in villages, 76 

social system, 94-102; classes in, 94; 
traditional, xxxi, 94-98 

social welfare law (1949), 103 

social welfare system, 103; child-care al- 
lowance in, 103; guarantees in, 178; 



pensions, 103 

Sofia (city), xxxi; administrative sub- 
divisions in, 71; Adventists in, 93; air 
pollution in, 70; air raids on, 42; armed 
forces stationed in, 244, 246; Armeni- 
ans in, 87; Catholics in, 91; climatic 
conditions, 68, 70; defense production 
plant in, 251; Ecoforum conference in, 
xxxiv, 121, 184, 267; election cam- 
paigns in, 196; founded, 72; housing 
in, 109; industry in, 142; Jews in, 93; 
1990 elections in, 196; opposition 
groups in, 186; Pentecostals in, 92; 
prison in, 269; unemployment in, 102 

Sofia Basin, 63, 64 

Sofia University, 112 

Sofiya Province: percentage of population 
in, 71 

SofroniT Vrachanski, 13, 14 
Sokolov, Iordan, xxxvii 
Solidarity, 203; influence of, 54 
Somalia: military support to, 53 
South Ukraine Nuclear Power Station, 
141 

South- Western Theater of Military Oper- 
ations, 259 

Soviet Union (see also Russia): advisers 
from, 47, 129; agreements signed by, 
138; aid from, 129; armistice with, 43; 
arms exports to, 262; borders with, 
xxix; Bulgarian army reorganized by, 
232; commercial treaty with (1940), 40; 
defense agreement with, 221; economic 
ties with, 215, 220-21; embassy of, 271; 
emigre population in, 78; energy trans- 
missions from, xxxvi, 141, 161, 162; 
exports to, 47, 130, 143, 161, 162; glas- 
nost in, 211; imitation of, xxx, xxxii- 
xxxiii, xxxviii, 53, 179, 215, 233, 251; 
imports from, 161; industrial arrange- 
ments with, 143; invasion of Af- 
ghanistan by, xxxiii, 52, 221; invasion 
of Czechoslovakia by, xxxiii, 132, 180, 
212, 215, 221, 233; military purchases 
from, 247, 251; military advisers, 47; 
military exercises with, 258-59; mili- 
tary relations with, xli, 227, 228, 235, 
258; military training in, 256; occupa- 
tion by, xxix, xxxii, 4, 43, 173, 176, 
232; propaganda for, 232; as protector, 
xxxviii, 235; reexport of oil from, 162; 
relations with, xxxii, 38, 40, 41, 51, 
216, 220-21; relations with Yugoslavia, 



321 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



47, 48; technical assistance from, 139, 
140; trade relations with, 130; trade 
with, 47, 129, 144, 160; war declared 
by, 42-43 

Sozopol: armed forces stationed at, 247 
SPC. See State Planning Committee 
SPC. See State Production Committee 
Special Production and Conversion 

Department, 251 
spending, consumer, 158 
Sredna Gora, 63, 67; mining in, 118 
Srednogorie: pollution in, xxxii, 70, 107, 

121 

Stalin, Joseph V., 174; death of, 47, 178; 
demands of, on Eastern Bloc, 46; 
denounced by Khrushchev, 48, 50, 
215; split, with Tito, 46 

Stamboliiski, Aleksandur, 4, 208; assas- 
sinated, 36, 175; fall of, 35-36; as head 
of Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, 
29; in Malinov government, 32 

Stamboliiski government, 33-35; coali- 
tion in, 34; economy under, 35-36; for- 
eign policy under, 35; Macedonian 
independence movement under, 35, 36; 
purges under, 36 

Stambolov, Stefan, 4, 24, 175; assassi- 
nated, 26; dismissed by Ferdinand, 26; 
involvement of, with monarchy, 26; 
People's Liberal Party founded by, 26 

Stambolov government, 24-26; handling 
of Macedonian issue, 25, 26; oppres- 
sion under, 25, 26 

Stara Planina, 63 

Stara Zagora: population of, 72; prison 
in, 269 

Stara Zagora Industrial Robot Plant, 143 
state administration, 101, 113 
State and People's Control, Committee 
on, 192 

State Council, 51, 190; abolished, 186; 
armed forces under, 239, 252; created, 
51, 181; functions of, 190; judiciary 
under, 193; Mladenov as head of, 185, 
190; powers of, 181, 182, 189; presi- 
dent of, 240; Zhivkov as chairman of, 
51, 181 

State Court of Arbitration, 193 
State Defense Committee: chairman of, 
239, 240 

state-owned enterprises: abuses of, 134; 
under central planning, 124, 126; civil 
defense organization in, 250; corrup- 



tion in, 132, 266; industrial, 134; in- 
efficiency in, 124; investment under, 
135; labor problems in, 127; monopo- 
lies of, 128, 134; operating losses of, 
166; poor quality of output from, 124, 
134; privatized, xxxv; role of, 40; self- 
financing by, 135, 156; types of, 40 

State Planning, Ministry of, 132 

State Planning Committee (SPC): eco- 
nomic planning by, 125, 126 

State Production Committee (SPC), 128 

State Savings Bank, 156 

State Security (Durzhavna sigurnost), 
270-71, 272; control of, 50; curbed, 50; 
Department Six, 267, 271; intelligence 
in, 271; model for, 270; reorganized, 
270, 271 

State Security, Committee for (KGB), 
271 

Stematografia (Zhefarovich), 12 

168 Chasa, 212, 213 

Stoilov,Konstantin, 27 

Stoilov government: handling of Macedo- 
nian issue, 27 

Stolnik: radio broadcasts in, 152 

strategic location, 3, 64, 234, 237 

strategy, military, 235-37 

strikes, xxxvii; general, 187; in Great De- 
pression, 37; by railway workers 
(1906), 28'; student support for, 206; 
suppression of, 35; by transportation 
workers, 34-35 

strokes, mortality from, 106 

Struma River, 67 

student demonstrations: against Lukanov, 
187, 206; against political indoctrina- 
tion courses, 112, 212 

student exchanges, 53 

students: allowance for, 104; availability 
of, 113; married, 112 

Sturshel, 212 

subranie, 22-23, 38-39; conservatives in, 
37; constitution of 1947 drafted by, 44; 
in 1879 constitution, 22; elections for, 
23, 34; factions in, 25-27; Russian inter- 
vention in elections for, 23; Zveno in, 76 
subsidies, xxxi, 131, 143, 165 
Sudan: attempted coup in, 53 
Sudetenland: German takeover of, 40 
suffrage: under 1879 constitution, 22; 

under 1947 constitution, 178 
Supreme Court, 182, 193, 266; jurisdic- 
tion of, 192-93; members of, 192 



322 



Index 



Supreme Economic Council, 128 
Supreme Medical Council, 106 
Sveta Nedelia Cathedral: bombing of, 36 
Swineherd tsar. See Ivailo 
Switzerland: trade with, 163 
synagogues, 93 

Syria: military support to, 259 
Taskov, Boris, 49 

Tatars, 7; distribution of, 87; in popula- 
tion, 79, 87; religion of, 89 

taxes, 27, 136; on bachelors, 78; income, 
128; on peasants, 9, 25, 27; progres- 
sive income, 35; turnover, 157; after 
World War I, 33 

teachers, 110; in Bulgarian Communist 
Party, 112 

technology, Western, 52 

telegraph, 155 

telephones, 152, 155 

television, 152, 155, 165 

temperature, 68; inversion, 68 

Temporary Law on National Schools 
(1878), 110 

tent city, in Sofia, 109, 211-12 

Tenth Composite Air Corps, 246 

Terbelis (king), 228 

Territorial Militia, 268 

terrorism, 36-37, 271, 272; by Internal 
Macedonian Revolutionary Organiza- 
tion, 27, 271; by Macedonians, 38 

Thessaly: Bulgarian occupation of, 229 

Third Army, 245 

Third World countries: arms smuggling 
to, 53; military assistance to, 53; mis- 
sions to, closed, 216; relations with, 
xxxiii, 52-53; trade with, 162-64 

Thrace: Bulgarian occupation of, 41, 228; 
Bulgarian population in, 3; desire to 
annex, 23; in First Balkan War, 29; 
given to Serbia, 33, 43, 230; occupa- 
tion of, 4-5; as target for occupation, 
3; uprisings in, 41 

Thracian Plain, 63, 64, 67, 68 

Thracians, 4; Sofia founded by, 72 

threat perception, 234-35 

Timok Valley, 63 

Tito, Josip Broz, 178; friendship with 
Khrushchev, 48; split of, with Stalin, 46 
Tiutiun (Dimov), 47 
TKZS. See labor-cooperative farm 
tobacco: consumption, 107; cultivation, 



121; export of, 148, 161 

Todorov, Stanko, 191 

Todorov-Gorunia, Ivan, 238 

Tolbukhin. See Dobrich 

Tolbukhin, Fedor, 232 

topography, 62-67; altitude, 63-64; 
mountains, 63-64; plains, 63-64; 
plateaus, 63; valleys, 63-64 

trade {see also exports; imports), 158-64; 
agreement with Byelorussian Republic, 
221; under central planning, 156; with 
Comecon countries, 158; deficit, 162; 
employment in, 101; guilds, 13; hard 
currency for, 155, 164; importance of, 
131; nationalized, 127; in 1990, 164; 
as percentage of net material product, 
160; policy, 158-60; shift to Eastern 
Europe, 117; under Third Five-Year 
Plan, 49; with Third World, 162-64; 
with West, 160, 162-64 

trade unions, xliii, 202; abolished, 202; 
under communist rule, 202-3; criti- 
cisms of, 204; under economic reform, 
205; general congresses of, 203; goals 
of, 203; membership in, 203, 205; re- 
structured, 203-4 

Traikov, Georgi, 45, 180 

Training Department, 268 

Transport, Agricultural, and Building 
Equipment Bank, 156 

transportation, 151-52; employment in, 
101; income in, 123; neglect of, 152; 
percentage of workers in labor force, 
122; ports, 152; railroads, 151; roads, 
151; shipping, 152; strike, 1919-20, 
34-35 

Transportation Bank, 156 
Transylvanian Alps, 63 
Trenchev, Konstantin, 204 
Tripartite Pact, 41, 231 
Trud, 212 

trudovo-kooperativno zemedelsko stopanstvo. See 
labor-cooperative farm 

trusts. See associations 

Tsankov, Aleksandur, 36; National So- 
cialist Movement founded by, 38 

Tsankov government, 36; reign of terror 
by, 36 

Tsankov, Dragan, 23 

Tumbul Mosque, 90 

Tundzha River valley, 71; early settle- 
ments in, 71 

Turgovishte, 143 



323 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



Turkey: aid from, 219; arms sales to, 262; 
arms smuggling to, 53; in Balkan En- 
tente, 231; in Balkan Pact, 47; in Black 
Sea Trading Zone, 164; border with, 
xxix, 62, 122, 234, 249; diplomats of, 
expelled, 271; in First Balkan War, 
230; investment by, 164; military pro- 
grams of, 235; population of, 235; in 
proposed nuclear-free zone, 52; rela- 
tions with, xl, 51, 56, 217, 219-20, 234, 
236, 259; in Second Balkan War, 30; 
strategic considerations of, 234; trade 
with, 219-20 

Turkish language, 86; restrictions on use 
of, 80, 82; in schools, xxxviii, 80, 82, 
84, 207, 215 

Turkish minority, xxx, 81-84, 214-15; 
birth rates of, 56, 82; cultural rights re- 
stored to, 82-83; emigration of, xlvi, 
56, 77, 78, 81, 82, 121, 122, 148, 184, 
211, 219; homelessness among, 109; 
persecution of, xxxviii, 214, 219, 235, 
249; political protest by, 215; popular 
prejudice against, xxxvii, 215; in popu- 
lation, xxxvii, 79, 82, 214; property re- 
stored to, 213; religion of, 89; 
Zhivkov's policy on, 51-52 

Turkish Republic, 35 

Turks, forced assimilation of, xxxiv, 
xxxvii, xlvi, 56, 79-80, 81, 184, 206, 
214, 221, 268, 272; international reac- 
tion to, 56; opposition to, 211; reasons 
for, 82; revoked, 200; techniques, xlvi, 
79-80, 81, 82, 83 

Turnovo, 7; grand national assembly at, 
28-29 

Turnovo constitution, ^constitution of 
1879 

Tutrakan region: Adventists in, 93; Mus- 
lims in, 90 
Two-Year Plan (1947-48), 128 



UDF. See Union of Democratic Forces 

UDF-MRF coalition, xl, xlii-xliii 

underemployment, 123 

unemployment: under communist rule, 
xxxv, 123; compensation, 104, 123; 
under democratization, 102, 121, 123; 
in Great Depression, 37; of minorities, 
xlvi; in Plovdiv, 102; rate, 123; in So- 
fia, 102; urban, 130 

Ukraine, xxxix; relations with, xxxviii, xlv 



Uniate Catholic Church, 91-92 
Unified Secondary Polytechnical Schools 
(Edinna sredna politekhnicheska uchilishta — 
ESPU), 110 
Union-84 exercises, 259 
Union for Cooperation, 164 
Union of Bulgarian Priests, 46 
Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), 
xxxvii, xliii, 151, 199-202, 239, 253, 
272; basis for, 199; Bulgarian Social 
Democratic Party in, 208; compromise 
in, 199; constitutional reform under, 
190; cooperation with Movement for 
Rights and Freedoms, 207; economic 
reform under, 166; in elections, xxxvi, 
186, 196, 200; factions in, xliii, 202; 
foreign relations under, 220; founded, 
199; membership, 199; organization of, 
199; Podkrepa in, 204; program of, 
199-200; protest rally by, 200; stale- 
mate with Bulgarian Socialist Party, 
xxxiv, 166, 186, 187, 200; support of 
Bulgarian Communist Party, 200; 
threat to boycott national round table, 
197 

Union of Democratic Forces National 
Coordinating Council, 202 

Union of Evangelical Churches in Bul- 
garia, 92 

Union of Macedonian Societies, 218 
United Nations, 233, 236; participation 
in, 216 

United Nations Commission for Narcotics 

Control, 265 
United States: aid from, xl, 113, 168, 222; 

emigre population in, 78; missionaries 

from, 92; relations with, xxxix, 216; 

war declared on, 41 
United States Department of Agriculture, 

148, 272 

universities: political indoctrination in, 
112, 212; weaknesses in, 113 

University of Maine, 113 

uprisings: April, 20; by the army in 1887, 
25; by communists, 36; in Hungary, 
180; in Macedonia, 22, 28; in Nis, 17; 
against Ottoman Empire, 229; in 
Poland, 180; by Pomaks, 84; Septem- 
ber, 19; in Thrace, 41; in Turnovo, 17; 
in Vidin, 17, 18 

urban areas {see also cities): birth rate in, 
72; food supply to, 132; infant mortal- 
ity in, 105; percentage of population in, 



324 



Index 



75; politics in, 186; rural labor shifted 
to, 117, 122, 130; unemployment in, 
130 

urbanization, 71, 75 

urban migration, xxxi, 13, 72; during na- 
tional revival, 13; reasons for, 75; by 
women, 75 

urban work force: characteristics of, 75; 
peasants forced into, 25,61, 117, 122, 
130; political orientation of, 35 

Valley of the Roses, 63 

Varna (city), 62; defense production plant 
in, 251; 1990 elections in, 196; Pente- 
costals in, 92; population of, 72; port 
of, 75, 231; prison in, 269; shipyard, 
143 

Varna-Odessa ferry, 258-59 
Varna Province: percentage of population 
in, 71 

Vatican: diplomatic relations with, 91 
vehicles, pollution by, 70 
Velchev, Boris: purged, 54, 182 
Velchev, Damian, 38, 232, 233 
Velchev-Georgiev government, 38 
Versinikia, Battle of (813), 229 
veterans, 104 
Victor Emmanuel III, 40 
Vidin: Jews in, 93; radio broadcasts from 
152 

Vienna-to-Constantinople Railway, 26 

Vietnam, Democratic Republic of (North 
Vietnam): assistance to, 53; guestwork- 
ers from, 76 

V.I. Lenin Ferrous Metals Combine, 142 

villages: aging of population in, 76; 
decline of population in, 76; formed 
from extended families, 95; housing in, 
109; natural growth in, 76; as reposi- 
tories of folk culture, 10, 81 

Vitosha Mountains, 72 

Vratsa: declared ecologically endangered, 
121; prison in, 269 

Vratsa Industrial Chemical Combine, 143 

Vulkov, Viktor, 215, 216 

wages, 125, 135; agricultural, 165; 
guarantees of, removed, 136; indus- 
trial, 165; minimum, 104, 136, 164; in 
1950s, 49 

war crimes trials, 43 



Warsaw Pact, xxx, 218, 258-59; attrac- 
tion of, to Solidarity movement, 54; 
demise of, xl, 227, 233, 237, 258; duties 
under, 235; forces, 236-37; member- 
ship in, 228, 233; military exercises in, 
258-59; and threat perception, 235 

Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Com- 
mittee, 237 

water pollution, 69, 70 

West: debt to, 162; trade with, 162-64 

West Germany. See Germany, Federal 
Republic of 

women: in armed forces, 253; attitudes 
of, toward childbearing, 77; child-care 
compensation for, 104; emancipation 
of, 99, 178; employment of, 123; in- 
heritance rights of, 95; marriage of, 98; 
as party members, 197; roles of, 94, 95, 
98, 100; status of, 95; urban, 75; in 
work force, 99-100 

women's revolt (1918), 32 

work force: bureaucracy as percentage of, 
56; peasants forced into urban, 25; 
women in, 99-100 

workers, 100; antiwar campaigns of, 
31-32; demonstrations by, 28; depoliti- 
cized, xxxv, 199; education of, 101; 
jobs of, 101; as party members, 197; 
political orientation of, 35; service, 122; 
surplus, 123; wages of, 125 

World Bank: loans from, xxxv; member- 
ship in, 167 

World War I, xxix, 4, 30-33, 228, 230; 
antiwar campaigns, 31-32; capitula- 
tion, 33, 231; combatants in, 31; divi- 
sion of territory after, 85; early action 
in, 31; number of soldiers in, 230; repa- 
rations following, 33; settlement of, 33 

World War II, xxix, 4, 41-43, 228; divi- 
sion of territory after, 85; fate of Jews 
in, 42, 93 

Yalta agreements (1945), 232 
Yantra River: pollution of, 69 
Yaroslav, 6 

Young Newlywed Families Fund (1979), 
108 

Young Turks, 28, 29 

youth: apathy of, 57; clubs, 92, 205-6 

Yugoslavia: attempts to achieve peace 

with, 42; in Balkan Entente, 38, 231; 

in Balkan Pact, 47; border with, 62, 



325 



Bulgaria: A Country Study 



234, 249; border with, sealed, 47; dis- 
integration of, xxxix-xl, xlv; emigre 
population in, 78; expelled from 
Cominform, 46; imitation of, 53; In- 
ternal Macedonian Revolutionary Or- 
ganization raids into, 37; in Little 
Entente, 40; Macedonia given to, 32; 
Macedonians in, xxxix, 85, 217; in pro- 
posed nuclear-free zone, 52; relations 
with, 35, 38, 40, 47, 52, 217-18, 236; 
relations with Soviet Union, 47, 48, 
178; territory returned to, 232 
Yugov, Anton: as prime minister, 179; 
purged, 49, 50, 180 

zadruga. See family, extended 
Zambia: military relations with, 259 
Zemia, 212 

Zhefarovich, Hristofor, 12 

Zhelev, Zheliu, 219; as chairman of 
Union of Democratic Forces, 199; as 
president, xxxv, xxxix, xl, xliv, 187, 
190, 216, 222, 271; and Turkish 
minority, 219 

Zhivkov, Todor, xxxii; assumption of 
power by, 47, 48-49; career of, 179; as 
chairman of State Council, 51, 240; 
consolidation of power by, 174, 180; 
demonstrations against, 121; egalitar- 
ian persona of, 51; endorsed by 
Khrushchev, 50, 180; expelled from 
Bulgarian Communist Party, 185; as 
head of Bulgarian Communist Party, 
174, 240; as head of Committee of State 
Security, 50; as head of Politburo, 180, 



198; intelligentsia under, 210; over- 
thrown, xxxii, xxxiv, 117, 138, 173, 
174, 185, 198, 238; as prime minister, 
179, 180; purges by, 49, 180, 182, 211; 
relations with Andropov, 56; relations 
with Brezhnev, 56; relations with 
Ceau§escu, 218; relations with Cher- 
nenko, 56; relations with Gorbachev, 
56, 220; relations with Khrushchev, 49; 
as scapegoat, 186; successor for, 183 

Zhivkova, Liudmila, 50; anniversary 
celebration under, 183, 210; as chair of 
commission on science, culture, and 
art, 54-55, 209, 210; death of, 55 

Zhivkov government (1956-89), 50-57, 
179-85; Balkan detente policy, 52; cor- 
ruption in, 212; diet under, 165; 
domestic policy of, 53; economic ex- 
perimentation under, 117; education 
under, 110; environmental problems 
under, 69; foreign policy of, 51-53; in- 
dustrial growth under, 69, 143; Na- 
tional Assembly under (1971), 189; 
political methodology, 50-51 ; policy ex- 
periments of, 53; relations with agrar- 
ians, 50; relations with intelligentsia, 
50; religion under, 93; thaw under, 55, 
209 

Zhivkov Theses, 129-30; agriculture 

under, 17; failure of, 49 
zinc, 118 

Zveno coalition, 37, 175; censorship un- 
der, 38; class representation under, 38; 
coups by, 38, 43; goals of, 37-38; mili- 
tary influence on, 238; political parties 
abolished by, 38; in subranie, 176 



326 



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x miiMd. 






JJu 




i ui Key 




x iiiiippiiica 




-74 


T T era n n q 


550-162 


Poland 


550- 


-97 


Uruguay 


^0-1 81 


x Kjx lutdi 


550- 


-71 


V C11CZ.UC1CI 


550-160 

\J \J X \J\J 


XX.WJ.1XCLX.L1CI 


550- 


-32 


V lPtn & m 

V lV.lllcLlJ.1 


550-37 


Rwanda and Burundi 


550- 


-183 


Yemens The 


550-51 


OaUUl i\x aula 


550- 


-99 


Yi i (To q1 avia 

X LI fci WolCt V Id 


550-70 


Senegal 


550- 


-67 


Zaire 


550-180 


Sierra Leone 


550- 


-75 


Zambia 


^0-1 84 


kJlllcicllJvJl C 


550- 


-171 


/lmnanwp 


550-86 


Snm ?» 1 1 c\ 
O iJ 1 1 1 dl 1 cL 








550-93 


South Africa 








j ju zj -J 


OUV1CL I11U11 








550-179 


Spain 








550-96 


Sri Lanka 








550-27 


Sudan 








550-47 


Syria 








550-62 


Tanzania 









328 




if 



PIN: 006980-000 



